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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation explores the motivation of Romanian soldiers in combat and committing 
atrocities against Romanian Jews and Soviet civilians.  While there has been some investigation 
into the Romanian Army’s operations and its participation in the Holocaust the topic remains 
largely unexamined, despite Romania being the most important Nazi-allied army on the Eastern 
Front and the greatest independent perpetrator in the Holocaust after Nazi Germany.  This 
dissertation argues that Romanian officers and soldiers were highly motivated in combat on the 
Eastern Front by nationalism, religion, anti-Semitism, and anti-communism.  These things united 
Romanians of all classes to support a “holy war” to defend Romania from the alleged threat of 
“Judeo-Bolshevism.”  The Romanian Army reinforced soldiers’ motivation through propaganda, 
coercion, and remuneration.  Romanian soldiers were primarily motivated by intrinsic factors to 
fight, although extrinsic factors became more important to persuading soldiers to keep fighting as 
the war on the Eastern Front dragged on.  The same factors motivated officers and soldiers to 
carry out atrocities, primarily against Jews, but also partisans, prisoners of war, and civilians in 
the Soviet Union.  The Romanian Army was deeply complicit in Hitler’s war of annihilation.  
This dissertation fills an important gap because the current consensus, based primarily on 
German impressions and a highly sanitized nationalist narrative, claims that Romanian officers 
were Francophile, thus only reluctant allies of the Germans, and Romanian soldiers were simple 
peasants, therefore allegedly quickly demoralized due to insufficient motivation.  Both assertions 
are propped up by a narrow approach focusing on the Romanian Army’s combat operations on 
the front line.  In contrast, this dissertation examines Romanian interwar society that shaped the 
motivation of soldiers, while at the same time expanding the scope to include soldiers’ role in the 
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Holocuast, to argue that the Romanian Army had much greater motivation to fight the Soviets 
and participate in Nazi anti-Semitic policies than previously believed.  This dissertation does not 
forget to address the motivation of women providing military service as well as ethnic, religious, 
and racial minorities who fought in the Romanian Army during the Second World War. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2009, during an interview in Bucharest, Mr. Halic and Mr. Dobrin, two veterans of the 
Eastern Front, became animated as they discussed the war.  In response to an inquiry on rations 
Mr. Halic said Romanian soldiers never starved because they “laid their hands on” whatever they 
needed from Soviet civilians.  Mr. Dobrin softened the comment by claiming that they paid for 
goods they requisitioned.  Mr. Halic agreed, but then, laughing, remarked that “most often” they 
just took it by force.  When asked about the murder of Jews, Mr. Halic drowned out Mr. Dobrin, 
who had been disputing the number of Jews killed by Romanian soldiers, and civilians, saying 
that the Germans could not be blamed for the atrocities in eastern Romania because Romanian 
soldiers had a “grudge” against Jews after 1940 when the Red Army occupied eastern Romania.  
He argued that Jews had abused the Romanian Army as it retreated before the Red Army as the 
Soviets occupied eastern Romania.  Mr. Halic continued and stated that the alleged betrayal by 
Jews in northern Bukovina and Bessarabia had to be “reckoned.”  Mr. Dobrin chimed in to add 
that Jews “paid” in 1940 when the Romanian Army returned in 1941.1 
Romania’s “holy war” between 22 June 1941 and 23 August 1944 was fought by soldiers 
motivated to fight against the threat of “Judeo-Bolshevism.”  The wartime regime under General, 
promoted to Marshal, Ion Antonescu declared war on the first day of Operation Barbarossa, the 
invasion of the USSR.  Romania did not wait for a pretext, such as Hungary or Finland who only 
declared war days later after Soviet air attacks, because the Red Army occupied eastern Romania 
                                                 
1 Halic and Dobrin, Bucharest, 2009. 
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in 1940.  The Romanian Army provided 325,000 soldiers for the invasion.  The Romanian Army 
made an invaluable contribution to the German Army’s campaigns in 1941: assaulting the Stalin 
Line, besieging Odessa, fighting north of the Azov Sea, and occupying Crimea.  During 1942, 
the Romanian soldiers helped finish conquering Crimea, win a great victory in the second battle 
of Kharkov, almost reach the Caucuses oil fields, and hold the exposed flanks at Stalingrad.  At 
its peak in late 1942, the Romanian Army fielded an estimated 464,000 men fighting on various 
fronts in the USSR.  After Stalingrad, approximately 110,000 Romanian soldiers helped hold the 
Kuban bridgehead until late 1943 and 75,000 survivors defended Crimea until spring 1944.  The 
Romanian Army mobilized 432,000 soldiers to defend Romania during summer 1944.2  The size, 
close cooperation with the German Army, and long alliance with Nazi Germany all demonstrate 
the extent of Romanian support for the “holy war” against “Judeo-Bolshevism.” 
Romania’s military contribution is only one part of the story.  The Romanian Army also 
implemented harsh occupation policies in the Soviet Union and, more than any other Axis ally, 
participated extensively in the Holocaust on the Eastern Front.3  The massacres of Jews carried 
out by ordinary Romanian soldiers were as terrible as any by Einsatzgruppen, paramilitary “task 
forces” formed from specially selected members of the Nazi SS, on the Eastern Front.  The Iaşi 
pogrom killed 8,000-15,000 Jews.  Romanian soldiers shot or otherwise murdered, with the help 
of civilians and the SS, 43,500 Jews in eastern Romania.  Romanian soldiers killed 25,000 Jews 
in Odessa after it fell.  Romanian and SS forces shot another 100,000 Jews during the winter of 
                                                 
2 Alesandru Duţu, Armata română în război (1941-1945) (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 2016), 9.   
3 Richard DiNardo, Germany and the Axis Powers: Front Coalition to Collapse (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2005), 130-132.  
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1941-1942 in Romanian-occupied western Ukraine, dubbed Transnistria.4  Romanian soldiers 
tasked with security between the Bug and Dnieper rivers in German-occupied Ukraine assisted 
the SS in rounding up or murdering Jews in cities such as Dubossary, Nikolaev, Kirovograd.  In 
Crimea the Romanian Army implemented a harsh anti-partisan campaign and murdered or turned 
Jews over to the SS.  During the fall of 1941, following massacres initiated by soldiers in eastern 
Romania, the Antonescu regime ordered 125,000-145,000 Jews deported from eastern Romania 
to Transnistria, joining Soviet Jews in ghettos and camps, and died in the tens of thousands from 
starvation, disease, and exposure.  During 1941-1944 an estimated 300,000 Romanian and Soviet 
Jews were murdered under Romanian administration.5  The motivation of Romanian soldiers in 
committing these atrocities was linked to their motivation in combat against the Red Army.     
This dissertation argues that Romanian soldiers were highly motivated by intrinsic factors 
on the Eastern Front between 22 June 1941 and 23 August 1944.  The primary motivating factors 
were nationalism, religion, anti-Semitism, and anti-communism.  These things united Romanians 
of all classes to support what they saw as a “holy war” to redeem Romania and destroy the threat 
of “Judeo-Bolshevism.”  This common motivation aided in the creation of strong primary groups 
on the front, giving soldiers another reason to fight, to protect their comrades in the foxhole next 
                                                 
4 For the Iaşi pogrom, see, Vladimir Solonari, Purifying the Nation: Population Exchange and Ethnic Cleansing in 
Nazi-Allied Romania (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Willson Press; Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2010), 166; for northern Bukovina and Bessarabia the number is derived from a recent averaging of high and low 
claims of all known massacres in the region, see, Simon Geissbühler, Iulie însângerat: România şi holocaustul din 
vara lui 1941. Trad. Ioana Rostoş (Bucharest: Curtea Veche, 2015), 156-160; for an estimate of the massacres in 
collaboration with the SS in eastern Romania, see Dennis Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally: Ion Antonescu and His 
Regime, Romania 1940-1944 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 145; for an estimate of the Odessa massacre, 
see, DiDardo, Germany and the Axis Powers, 133; for massacres in Transnistria, see, Eric C. Steinhart, The 
Holocaust and the Germanization of the Ukraine (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 131-132.   
5 In 2004, an official commission estimated 280,000 to 380,000 Jews were murdered west of the Bug in territories 
under Romanian administration during the war, see, International Comission on the Holocaust in Romania, “Final 
Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania,” 306, Minority Rights Information System, 
accessed 9 April 2016, http://miris.eurac.edu/mugs2/do/blob.pdf?type=pdf&serial=1117716572750. 
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to them.  Intrinsic motivation not only explains why officers and soldiers of the Romanian Army 
fought against the Red Army, but why they initiated the mass murder of Jews in eastern Romania 
and collaborated with the SS in German-occupied territory in the Soviet Union to implement the 
“Final Solution,” the Nazi plan to exterminate all Jews.  Officers and soldiers perceived Jews as 
a threat to them and their comrades who had to be dealt with radically.  The crimes committed by 
the Romanian Army during 1941-1942 in the Soviet Union go a long way in understanding why 
soldiers kept fighting after Stalingrad.  Fear of Soviet retribution for heinous acted committed in 
the initial advance motivated soldiers to fight in a lost cause as the German Army retreated and 
the advancing Red Army threatened their homes with spoliation.     
Soldiers were part of an institution that trained them to fight, drilled them to obey without 
question, and required them to think of the group ahead of the individual.  The Romanian Army 
exerted various means to motivate them in combat, nevertheless, such extrinsic motivation had a 
secondary role in motivating soldiers who believed in the war, especially in 1941-1942.  Officers 
kept a close watch on their soldiers’ motivation and morale after crossing the Dniester River into 
the USSR.  They used propaganda, coercion, and remuneration to reinforce soldiers’ motivation 
in combat and expanded the scale of atrocities, particularly against Jews in eastern Romania, but 
also Jews, communists, partisans, and Soviet POWs in the USSR.  Officers were the backbone of 
the Romanian Army who cajoled, threatened, and rewarded their soldiers to keep them fighting.  
An officer’s decoration as a hero or punishment as a coward or an incompetent depended on the 
performance of his troops in combat, so they reinforced soldier’s intrinsic motivation whenever it 
faltered, and increasingly leaned on propaganda, coercion, and remuneration during 1943-1944.  
Officers clamped down their own and soldiers’ impulses to commit atrocities as it became clear 
the German Army would lose the war and the Red Army was likely to occupy Romania.   
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 The traditional consensus, however, argues that Romanian soldiers were reluctant allies 
of the German Army.  This was due, in large part, to the lack of access to archival materials in 
Romania after the Second World War, but just as importantly military and Holocaust historians 
developed two very different narratives of the Romanian Army in the Second World War that 
did not interact in its historiography.  In fact, despite the fall of communism in Eastern Europe 
having opened archives, Romanian military and Holocaust historians continue to talk past each 
other, exacerbated by the fact they are divided by language – history of the Romanian Army is 
written almost entirely in Romanian and history of the Holocaust in Romania is mostly written in 
English.  This work combines the two historiographies to properly understand the motivation of 
Romanian soldiers who fought alongside the German Army during the Second World War.   
Missing Historical Debate 
There is remarkably little debate about the motivation of Romanian officers and soldiers 
during the Second World War.  In addition to two separate historiographies – Romanian military 
history that focuses on combat on the front versus history of the Holocaust in Romania that deals 
with crimes in Romanian-occupied territory – within each of the two camps there is a consensus.  
Romanian military historians argue that soldiers were brave but outmatched, were motivated to 
fight only to the Dniester, and were tragic victims of Nazism and Communism.  Historians of the 
Holocaust in Romania argue anti-Semitic atrocities were planned from the top-down and soldiers 
followed orders.  Both need to be challenged through a bottom-up approach.  Furthermore, the 
motivation of soldiers in combat and committing atrocities are inviably linked.   
Romanian military historiography of the Second World War is dominated by nationalist 
historians, many of whom are retired officers, who focus on the bravery of soldiers and defend 
the honor of the Romanian Army.  The origin of the narrative of brave, but doomed Romanian 
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soldiers caught between “totalitarian” giants on the Eastern Front began in 1943 when diplomats 
of the Antonescu regime spread this apologist narrative in neutral capitals across Europe.  After 
the initial communist seizure of power in 1947, the new regime created a narrative of liberation 
by the Red Army and talking about the role of the Romanian Army on the Eastern Front became 
taboo.  Several diplomats who had served in the Antonescu regime and went into exile after the 
war wrote apologist memoirs in English that depicted Romanian soldiers as reluctant allies of the 
German Army.  One of the few generals to escape into exile published an account in 1965 meant 
as an official history of the war against the USSR for the Romanian exile community because the 
General Staff had not written one – it is anti-communist and pro-Legionary.6  The Legion of the 
Archangel Michael was the Romanian fascist movement.  After the end of the Soviet occupation 
of Romania in 1958 and under the new regime of Nicolae Ceauşescu, the leader of the Romanian 
Communist Party from 1965 to 1989, the period between 23 August 1944 and 9 May 1945 when 
the Romanian Army was required to fight alongside the Red Army was celebrated by nationalist 
historians.  Romanian communist historians named it the “Anti-Hitlerite War,” but were critical 
of how the Soviets treated the Romanian Army.  In the 1980s, however, they began to partially 
rehabilitate the Antonescu regime and depicted the dictator as a tragic figure caught between the 
Nazis and the Soviets who defended Romanian sovereignty the best he could.  The alliance with 
Nazi Germany could be referenced, but only indirectly and as a terrible mistake.7  The Holocaust 
                                                 
6 Most of his audience were former Legionaries, he himself was part of a Legionary puppet government, so his book 
criticizes Antonescu and praises the Legionaries, see, Platon Chirnoagă, Istoria politica şi militara a rasboiului 
româniei conra rusiei sovietice, 22 iunie 1941-23 august 1944 (Editia II.  Madrid: Editura Carpatii, 1986).   
7 For a concise overview of the development of the memory of the Second World War in Romania, see, Gavin 
Bowd, Memoria Războiului, 1941-1945 (Bucharest: Editura Pro Historia, 2006).  
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in Romania was blamed on German “occupiers” and a few fascist Legionaries.  This set the tone 
for Romanian military histories written after the fall of communism in 1989.   
After 1989, nationalist military historians dusted off the old narrative of the Romania as a 
reluctant ally of the Axis and mated it with the communist narrative of the “Anti-Hitlerite War” 
to depict Romanian soldiers as heroes and victims in the Second World War.  The rehabilitation 
of Antonescu, his regime, and the Romanian Army was remarkably quick.8  Mark Axworthy, a 
British historian, used his contacts with the British Military Attaché in Bucharest to be the first 
Western military historian to peruse newly available documents to published Third Axis, Fourth 
Ally in 1995 – with substantial assistance from Romanian military historians, two of whom are 
cited as co-authors.  His book examines the Romanian Army, Air Force, and Navy between 1941 
and 1945.  It quickly became the standard work on the subject and greatly influenced histories of 
the Eastern Front written since.  While a competent account of combat operations, which heavily 
emphasizes weapons and technology, Axworthy – following the lead of the Romanian nationalist 
historians he befriended – glosses over the Soviet occupation of 1940, claims Romanian soldiers 
lacked motivation after crossing the Dniester, misrepresents the politics of the officer corps, and 
overemphasizes the last months of the war fighting against Nazi Germany.  The book also lacks 
footnotes and relies on materials at the National Military Museum and Ministry of Defense, both 
in Bucharest as he did not research at the Romanian Military Archives in Piteşti.  To his credit 
Axworthy does briefly acknowledge the Romanian Army’s participation in the Holocaust.9   
                                                 
8 For a detailed analysis of commemoration of the memory of the war in a wider context, see, Maria Bucur, Heroes 
and Victims: Remembering War in Twentieth-Century Romania (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).   
9 Mark Axworthy, Cornel Scafes, and Christian Craciunoiu, Third Axis, Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the 
European War, 1941-1945 (St. Petersburg, Florida: Hailer Publishing, 1995); the next year his co-author helped put 
out an illustrated history, see, Cornel I. Scafeş et al., Armata română, 1941-1945 (Bucharest: Editura R.A.I., 1996).   
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In Romania, nationalist military historians downplayed the Romanian Army’s role in the 
Holocaust as it did not fit with their narrative of bravery and victimhood.  An awkward example 
is the inclusion of Colonel Gheorghe Carp, commander of the 7th Roşiori Regiment in 1941, in a 
book entitled Romanian Heroes on the Eastern Front in 1995.  It includes a short biography and 
account of the death of 30 officers killed in combat, all lieutenant-colonels or colonels except for 
one general.  Colonel Carp and several of his staff officers were killed “heroically” in an ambush 
during an attack in the Caucasus on 2 September 1942.  The account does not mention that 15-20 
Soviet POWs were shot in reprisal soon after.  Even more problematically, in June 1941, Colonel 
Carp had ordered officers in his regiment to form “execution squads” and to murder all Jews and 
communists in its path that he and soldiers blamed for attacking or abusing the Romanian Army 
during its withdrawal from eastern Romania in 1940 as they advanced through eastern Romania.  
This case was thoroughly investigated during 1950-1951 by the Securitate, the communist secret 
police, and brought to light soon after 1989.10  Nevertheless, nationalists continue to depict army 
officers, and even member of the fascist Legionary movement, as anti-communists martyrs.11  
While dozens of books about the Romanian Army on the Eastern Front have been published in 
Romania during the last three decades, they do not add much other than more operational details.  
They continue to assert that Romanian soldiers were reluctant allies of the Wehrmacht, although 
                                                 
10 Alexsandru Duţu şi Florica Dobre, Eroi români pe frontul de răsărit (1941-1944), volumul I. (Bucharest: Editura 
Eminescu, 1995), 25-30; for all the witness testimonies, see, ACNSAS, Fond Documentar, dosar 8178.   
11 When an anti-Legionary law was passed in 2015, criminalizing the use of fascist symbols, nationalists published a 
widely available book that argued “anti-communist heroes” were being attacked, see, Cezarina Condurache (coord.), 
Eroii anticomunişti şi sfinţii închisorilor reincriminaţi prin legea 217/2015 (Bucharest: Editura Evdokimos, 2015).   
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they stress their bravery and importance to the German war effort at the same time, and if they 
address the Holocaust they minimize or justify the actions of the Romanian Army.12   
Holocaust historians are largely unconcerned about the motivation of Romanian soldiers, 
especially because Romanian Holocaust historiography is dominated by intentionalist historians.  
Inspired by the work of Allied prosecutors at the Nuremburg Trials and Raul Hilberg, whose The 
Destruction of the European Jews in 1961 was the first comprehensive history of the Holocaust, 
a growing number of German historians began arguing that each step of the “Final Solution” was 
initiated from the top-down by Hitler and the events of the Holocuast unfolded according to the 
Führer’s master plan.13  In 1970, Karl Schleunes A Twisted Road to Auschwitz signaled the start 
of a challenge to the growing consensus.14  Another group of historians argued that Hitler did not 
have a master plan and it was German bureaucrats from the bottom-up initiated the steps towards 
genocide.  The two sides came to be identified in the 1980s as intentionalists, the most extreme 
claiming Hitler decide to murder all European Jews as early as 1919, and functionalists, the most 
extreme claiming that Hitler had little part in initiating the Holocaust.  During the 1990s, the two 
camps moved closer to the middle and today moderate intentionalists and moderate functionalists 
have come to a consensus that the Holocaust resulted from a mixture of top-down and bottom-up 
factors, only disagreeing about which factors predominated. 
                                                 
12 The most recent account of the war by one of the most prolific Romanian military historian, and retired colonel, is 
almost totally about combat operations.  It only briefly mentions atrocities against Jews.  For example, the massacre 
of Jews at Odessa is reduced to a single paragraph and blames “communists and Jews” for triggering it.  The harsh 
anti-partisan policies and reprisals are justified as military necessity, Duţu, Armata română în război, 110, 131. 
13 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985).   
14 Karl Schleunes, A Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi Policy Toward German Jews, 1933-1939 (Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1990).   
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A functionalist counterpoint has not yet developed in the historiography of the Holocaust 
in Romania.  Matatias Carp, General Secretary of the Association of Romanian Jews, wrote the 
first history of the Holocaust in Romania when his “Black Book” was published in 1946-1948.15  
It was based mostly on oral testimony and a few documents unearthed by post-war investigators 
for war crimes trials.  A few German historians, especially Raul Hilberg, used German records in 
following decades to shed some light on the Holocaust in Romania, but in Romania the subject – 
other than Hungarian crimes in northern Transylvania – became taboo.  In the 1980s, Jean Ancel, 
born in Iaşi in 1940 and died in Israel in 2008, took advantage of good relations existing between 
Romania and Israel to gather materials on the Holocaust when he visited Bucharest.16  He edited 
or wrote a half dozen influential works over the next two decades that culminated in The History 
of the Holocaust in Romania published posthumously in 2011.  Ancel’s intentionalist approach 
rather simplistically applied German arguments to a Romanian context: Antonescu replaced 
Hitler, Legionaries stood in for Nazis, Serviciul Secret de Informații (the Romanian secret police 
known by its acronym SSI) became the Gestapo, Romanianization was Aryanization, an SSI unit 
on the front was an Einsatzgruppe, the Bucharest pogrom in 1941 imitated Kristalnacht, a Reich-
wide pogrom orchestrated by Hitler in 1938, and Antonescu supposedly had a “master plan” to 
exterminate all Romanian Jews mirroring Hitler’s “Final Solution.”17  Ancel also favored higher 
estimates for the number of Jews killed by the Antonescu regime.  Radu Ioanid’s The Holocaust 
                                                 
15 Originally four volumes, see, Matatias Carp, Holocaust in Rumania: Facts and documents on the annihilation of 
Rumania’s Jews – 1940-1944, trans. Seán Murphy (Budapest: Primor Publishing Co, 1994).   
16 The 12-volume work was the first major contribution since the “Black Book,” see, Jean Ancel, ed., Documents 
concerning the fate of Romanian Jewry during the Holocaust (New York: Beate Klarsfeld Foundation, 1986). 
17 He also argues that diplomats, politicians, and journalists were all in the pocket of the SS, implying that greedy 
Romanians had little ideological loyalty, see, Jean Ancel, The History of the Holocaust in Romania, trans. Yaffah 
Murciano, ed. Leon Volovici (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011), 62-63, 152-153, 179-183, 217, 229. 
 11 
 
in Romania, published in 2000, is probably more influential.  His book is based mostly on Carp’s 
“Black Book,” Ancel’s collection of documents from 1986, and some new material collected by 
the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum from Romanian archives after 1989.  Ioanid does 
not challenge previous intentionalist arguments in his primarily descriptive account.18  The more 
recent work by Holocaust historians continues to build on this intentionalist foundation. 
The intentionalists generally depict Romanian soldiers as simple executioners of policies 
emanating from Bucharest.  The motivation of the officer corps or enlisted soldiers to kill has not 
attracted attention by historians of the Holocaust in Romania, and none have explicitly connected 
atrocity motivation in the rear to combat motivation on the front.  In his 2010 book Purifying the 
Nation, Vladimir Solonari criticizes some of Ancel’s obviously flawed arguments, but he focuses 
on elites who made policy and ordered the mass deportation of Jews from eastern Romania after 
the Romanian Army had liberated it in 1941.  He excludes atrocities in Transnistria or east of the 
Bug.  Solonari acknowledges that “genocidal initiatives” from the bottom-up “were an important 
part” of the Holocaust in eastern Romania, but only briefly addresses the actions of mid-ranking 
officers.19  Diana Dumitru’s The State, Antisemitism, and Collaboration in The Holocaust from 
2016 examines the initiative of Romanian and Soviet civilians in her comparative history of the 
Holocaust in eastern Romania and Transnistria.  Ironically, despite her subject matter, she takes a 
top-down approach.  Dumitru’s arguments center on the role of the state in shaping society and 
claims Soviet anti-anti-Semitism propaganda during the interwar period successfully reshaped 
                                                 
18 Radu Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies Under the Antonescu Regime, 
1940-1944 (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000).   
19 He ignores rank and file soldiers who he sees as directed by mid-ranking officers.  “Although the initiative and 
order were coming from above, without the enthusiastic support of mid-level military and gendarme officers, mass 
killings would never have taken place,” see, Solonari, Purifying the Nation, 171-172, 177.   
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popular Soviet attitudes towards Jews in less than 20 years.  She also explicitly excludes soldiers 
or gendarmes.  Dumitru assumes that soldiers had less free will, would always kill if asked, and 
only civilians murdered Jews “on their own initiative and without orders from above.”20  
This work takes a moderate functionalist approach to the Holocaust and contextualizes it 
in Romanian society, army politics, and soldiers’ intrinsic motivation.  While policy-makers in 
Bucharest played a very important role, especially in the decision to deport Jews from Bukovina 
and Bessarabia, popular anti-Semitic violence initiated by soldiers – or civilians – was at least as 
important.  Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, Mihai Antonescu, began talking privately 
about “a historic moment” to “effect purification of the population” in eastern Romania five days 
before the invasion, but already on 2-3 July – after Army Group Antonescu began an offensive to 
liberate eastern Romania – he began speaking publicly on the “[r]adical purification” and “very 
severe” policies to be implemented in eastern Romania.21  He felt comfortable saying so because 
of popular anti-Semitic violence committed by soldiers.  In 1940, soldiers had killed Jews during 
their retreat through Bukovina, Bessarabia, and Moldavia before the Antonescu regime had even 
taken power.  By early July 1941, soldiers and civilians had already begun to murder Jews west 
of the Prut, including the notorious Iaşi pogrom.  In subsequent weeks, east of the Prut, soldiers 
and junior officers usually initiated atrocities, mid-ranking officers chose to expand them, and 
senior officers legitimized them by issuing orders that justified what was already occurring.  The 
crimes perpetrated by Romanian soldiers during the advance into eastern Romania in 1941 bear a 
remarkable similarity to crimes carried out by German soldiers against civilians in Belgium and 
                                                 
20 Diana Dumitru, The State, Antisemitism, and Collaboration in the Holocaust: The Borderlands of Romania and 
the Soviet Union (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 4, 6-7.   
21 Quotes translated and found in, Solonari, Purifying the Nation, 149-157.   
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France in 1914.22  However, atrocities did not end at the Dniester, but continued as the Romanian 
Army advanced into the USSR, as the massacre in Odessa shows, and farther east in Ukraine the 
SS directed Romanian soldiers who remained deeply complicit in the “Final Solution.” 
The motivation of Romanian soldiers in combat cannot be divorced from their motivation 
in committing atrocities.  A narrow focus on operations by nationalist military historians allows 
them to preserve the honor of the Romanian Army and maintain the fiction that its soldiers were 
only reluctant allies of the Wehrmacht.  Historians of the Holocaust in Romania have focused on 
a top-down approach that largely ignores the officer corps and especially the rank and file of the 
Romanian Army because they assume Antonescu initiated everything and the army just followed 
orders.  Romanian military history and history of the Holocaust in Romania need to be integrated 
because it shows that Romanian soldiers had strong intrinsic motivation on the Eastern Front. 
Sources 
 This dissertation is the first academically rigorous account of the Romanian Army during 
the Second World War in English that is based on extensive original research.  This work brings 
together archival materials, Romanian Army periodicals and newspapers, and soldier journals, all 
of which were created during the war.  Furthermore, it integrates memoir literature, records from 
war crimes trials, and secret police files, which were written after the war.  Finally, recent oral 
interviews with surviving veterans by the author inform the dissertation’s arguments.  Of course, 
it also stands on the shoulders of historians who produced invaluable secondary literature.   
 The author not only researched in many archives that are less frequently used, especially 
by non-Romanian researchers, but examined their contents in a different way then most of those 
                                                 
22 John Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities: A History of Denial (New Haven: Yale, 2001), 113-118. 
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who do carry out research in them.  The most important was Arhivele Militare Române (AMR), 
or the Romanian Military Archives, located in the provincial city of Piteşti, 119 km away from 
Bucharest.  The AMR is the central repository of all official Romanian military documents from 
its inception in the mid-nineteenth century through to today.  A portion of these materials copied 
onto microfilm are held at the Serviciul Istoric al Armatei (SIA), or the Historical Service of the 
Army, in Bucharest.  The microfilmed material, as the author discovered, is not comprehensive 
and was selected according to unclear criteria set by communist military historians in the 1960s 
and 1970s, so one does not know what is missing from SIA microfilm.  Therefore, it is necessary 
to research at the AMR in Piteşti to discover all the documents in the original file.  The author is 
one of the few foreign, and probably the first American, researcher to visit the AMR. 
 The AMR is a treasure trove.  The author had already examined documents from the files 
of the Ministry of Defense held in Arhivele Naţionale Istorice Centrale, or the Central Historical 
National Archives, across the street from the famous Cişmigiu Park in Bucharest, so at the AMR 
he examined the collections of the most important field units, including Third and Fourth armies, 
Mountain and Cavalry corps, and others.  Many files had never been looked at before and those 
that were had had been examined by Romanian military historians.  Things like army discipline, 
poor performance in combat, rivalries between officers, atrocities against Jews or civilians, and 
other unflattering subjects are generally avoided by them.  AMR files include combat reports, 
orders, campaign studies, intelligence reports, complaints, requests, interviews, letters, and much 
more.  They were invaluable in understanding the motivation of soldiers, attitudes in the officer 
corps, and details on Romanian participation in the Holocaust.  The Romanian Army did not 
extensively document its crimes on the Eastern Front, but there is much to be gleaned from these 
records, especially on almost unknown acts perpetrated east of the Bug. 
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 Official army publications of the interwar and war years are another source underutilized 
by historians.  Biblioteca Acadamiei Române or the Romanian Academy Library, houses copies 
of military journals like România militară, or Military Romania, and military periodicals, such as 
Sentinela, or The Sentry, Soldatul, or The Soldier, Ecoul Crimeei, or The Echo of Crimea, and 
many others published during 1941-1944.  Propaganda reflected common beliefs in Romanian 
society and these official army publications provide key insights into military thought, common 
beliefs, and themes in wartime propaganda.  No historian has ever incorporated these materials 
into a history of the Romanian Army during the Second World War.   
 In addition to official army records and publications, this work uses unofficial materials, 
such as wartime letters and diaries written by soldiers.  The library at Muzeul Militar Naţional, or 
the National Military Museum, in Bucharest includes a Manuscript Collection with unpublished 
letters and diaries.  In addition to such unpublished materials, Editura militară, or the Military 
Publishing House, has published many diaries written by officers and NCOs during 1941-1945.  
Three of them will feature prominently in this work.  Major, later Lt.-Colonel, Vasile Scârneci’s 
diaries from the First World War and the Second World War were published in a single volume 
with the title Life and Death on the Front Line.  The decorated commander of the 3rd Mountain 
Battalion kept an almost daily record between 22 June 1941 and 1 January 1944 with extensive 
commentary on combat, life on the front, morale of his men, progress of the war, and even some 
atrocities.  He provides the perspective of a mid-ranking officer on the front.  Like many in the 
Mountain Corps he was from Transylvania.  Scâneci was born in 1896 in the town of Rupea then 
in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  During 1914-1916 he spied for the SSI until Romania invaded. 
He volunteered as private, quickly was promoted a sergeant, and in 1917 received a battlefield 
commission as a lieutenant.  Scârneci went to officer training schools during the interwar period 
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and rose in the ranks.  After 1941, he fought from the Prut through Ukraine to Crimea and then 
in the Caucasus.  His hatred of communism is palpable, as is his contempt for ethnic Germans in 
Transylvania and his suspicion of Jews.23  Diaries written by NCOs provide perspectives from 
the rank and file.  Sergeant Evsevie M. Ionescu served in the 53rd Artillery Regiment, supporting 
various mountain units, and kept a diary from 17 July 1941 to 3 January 1944.  He was born in a 
village in Wallachia in 1910.  He moved to Bucharest in 1926 and later Ploieşti where he worked 
as a manager of a restaurant-hotel.  He was drafted in 1933-1935, trained as an artilleryman, and 
called up when war threatened in 1939.  Ionescu’s diary is filled with immediate concerns, such 
as food and mail, but also carefully recorded passages from army newspapers and radio speeches 
on why Romanian soldiers were fighting and each time he visited a church to pray for victory.24  
Corporal Ştefan Cârlan served as a radioman in the 38th Infanterie Regiment and kept his diary 
from 31 March 1942 to 12 May 1945.  He was born in 1918 in the village of Lacu Sărat outside 
the large port city of Brăila on the Danube.  He was drafted in 1939, but not sent to the front until 
the 10th Infantry Division was remobilized to support the Axis invasion of the Caucasus in 1942.  
Cârlan’s diary mostly chronicles his diet, he edited it in the 1970s hoping to published it and may 
have cut some things, nevertheless, it shows his reactions to news on the radio, his disdain for the 
backwardness of the USSR, respect for the faith of locals, and rumors on the front.25  Obviously 
a serious work of history cannot be based solely on such anecdotal evidence, but these diaries are 
some of the few perspectives from the bottom written during the war and very important.  
                                                 
23 Vasile Scârneci, Viaţa şi moartea în linia întâi: Jurnal şi insemnări de război, 1916-1920, 1941-1943 (Bucahrest: 
Editura Militară, 2013).   
24 Evsevie M. Ionescu, Însemnări din război: Jurnalul unui sergent (1941-1944) (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 2005). 
25 Ştefan Cârlan, Păstraţi-mi amintirile!  Jurnal de război (1942-1945) (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 2007).   
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 Soldiers wrote personal memoirs of their experience after the war and a growing number 
are being published.  These memoirs vary greatly, but they can be roughly be grouped into three 
types: those written during communism, those written after 1989, and those written by veterans 
in exile.  In the first group are memoirs written by senior officers seeking to justify their actions 
during the war, such as With the Marshal until Death written by General Constantin Pantazi, the 
Minister of Defense between 1942 and 1944 and close friend of Antonescu, or Memories of an 
Intelligence Officer by Colonel Ion Grosu, head of Third Army intelligence from 1941 to 1944.  
While they clearly had an agenda and pushed blame for war crimes on the Germans, they give an 
important perspective of leaders in the Romanian Army.26  Mid-ranking officers penned memoirs 
usually less to defend the Antonescu regime than to defend their own honor, such as Major, later 
Lt.-Colonel, Gheorghe Răşcănescu, who wrote a couple short accounts at the urging of family on 
his wartime accomplishments at Odessa and Stalingrad, or Captain Dumitru Păsat, who wrote a 
memoir to celebrate his wise leadership over a rehabilitation unit at Stalingrad.27  Veterans who 
wrote memoirs in exile usually did so in English and were often minorities of some kind, such as 
ethnic Germans like Immanuel Weiss and Sigmand Landau or Baptist George Crisan, and near 
the end of their lives.  They usually contain a strong anti-communist message.28  The fall of 
communism in Romania triggered a new phase of memoir writing by veterans who could finally 
tell their stories without fear.  With titles such as Sergeant Emilian Ezechil’s To the Gates of the 
                                                 
26 Ion Grosu, Memoriile unui ofiţer de informaţii (Bucharest: Editură Militara, 2009). 
27 Gheorghe Răşcănescu, Erou la cotul Donului: Însemări din război, 1941-1944 (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 
2017); Dumitru Păsat, Memoriile Căpitanului Dumitru Păsat, 1941-1945 (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2015). 
28 Immanuel Weiss and George F. Wieland, Bessarabian Knight: A Peasant Caught between the Red Star and the 
Swastika: Immanuel Weiss’s True Story (Lincoln, NB: American Historical Society of Germans from Russia, 1991); 
Sigmund Heinz Landau, Goodbye, Transylvania: A Romanian Waffen-SS Soldier in WWII (Mechanicsburg, PA: 
Stackpole Books, 1985); George Crisan, An Amazing Life: Escape from Romania (New York: Vantage Press, 1990).  
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Inferno, 2nd Lieutenant Dumitru Teodorescu’s The Mountain Soldier’s Pride, and 2nd Lieutenant 
Gheorghe Netejoru’s I too fought in the East, all published after 2000, these memoirs further the 
comfortable narrative that Romanian soldiers were tragic victims of Nazism and Communism.29  
While all these memoirs have certain issues they are still useful sources.     
 Another important source of soldier accounts after the war are the testimonies of veterans 
during investigations into war crimes by the communist secret police, known as the Securitate.  
These records are available in Arhiva Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității 
(ACNSAS), or the National Council for the Study of the Archives of the Securitate Archive in 
Bucharest.  For obvious reasons the testimony of the officers and soldiers interrogated by agents 
of the Securitate is not entirely reliable.  These veterans were accused of war crimes and tried to 
shift the blame elsewhere, usually claiming that they had been ordered to commit the crimes they 
were accused of and were threatened with punishment if they had not followed orders, but they 
provide some of the few detailed accounts of atrocities.  The testimony in these documents from 
ACNSAS have buttressed the intentionalist arguments of historians of the Holocaust in Romania.   
Lastly, the author carried out a series of oral interviews with almost 40 veterans in over a 
dozen cities across Romania.  The National Association of Veterans of War has an office in each 
county seat that helped facilitate contacting veterans of the Eastern Front for the interviews that 
were held either in the county office or the personal home of the veteran.  These interviews were 
useful because the veterans could be directly asked about their motivation during the war.  Some 
had been interviewed a few times by local reporters or historians, who had been directed to them 
                                                 
29 Emilian Ezechil, La porţile infernului: 1941-1945 (Bucharest: Tritonic, 2008); Dumitru Teodorescu, Mândria 
vânătorului de munte (Baia Mare: Editura Marist, 2013); Gheorghe Netejoru, Şi eu am luptat în est: Spovedania 
unui fost prizonier de război (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 2010).  
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by the National Association of Veterans of War as well, so their testimony was already polished.  
Others had not been interviewed before.  By the time the interviews took place at least 20 years 
had passed since the fall of communism and most had been exposed to the new post-communist 
narrative of the Eastern Front with Romanian soldiers as heroes and victims.  They also knew of 
accusations against the Romanian Army by Holocaust historians.  All these influences must have 
colored their testimony during the interviews, but not enough to make them worthless.   
The factors that had motivated them during the Second World War still resonated.  There 
was usually little hostility towards the Germans, most veterans described the Germans as correct, 
civilized, and respectful – some did acknowledge that they did not act that way towards Jews and 
communists – and the Soviets as dirty, uncouth, and barbaric.  A few shed tears over the decision 
by King Mihai I to abandon the Germans on 23 August 1944.  All repeated nationalist arguments 
– one came with a pamphlet on Romanian claims to Bessarabia that he gave to the interviewer.  
Those who took part in the withdrawal from eastern Romania in 1940 still felt anger over the 
Soviet occupation.  They were somewhat candid when asked about the Holocaust.  While none 
admitted to personally carrying out atrocities a few did relate stories of atrocities that they had 
seen on the front.  Many contested the numbers of Jews that Holocaust historians have proved 
were killed and justified those that were as punishment for alleged acts by Jews in 1940.   
Motivation and Military Professionalism 
 The Romanian Army was a young institution in 1941, dating only to 1860, and it was not 
very professional.  The Romanian Army had become effective in mobilizing soldiers on a mass 
scale but proved less successful in training or leading to fight efficiently in battle.  The state also 
experienced increasing difficulties in raising the funds necessary to properly equip soldiers with 
modern weapons and technology, both of which were becoming more complex, expensive, and 
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difficult to obtain.  When the Romanian Army went to war in 1877-1878, 1913, 1916-1919, and 
1941-1945 it relied on soldiers’ motivation to make up for its deficiencies in training, leadership, 
and equipment.  During the Second World War, Romanian soldiers proved to have deep reserves 
of intrinsic motivation while fighting alongside the German Army and, if and when that faltered, 
Romanian officers applied extrinsic motivation to keep them fighting.   
 By the interwar period, the Romanian Army was semi-professional at best.  According to 
Roger Reese, who recently distilled the characteristics of military professionalism from previous 
scholarship on the subject, the “yardsticks to measure professionalism” are: special knowledge 
and skills, impulse to improve standards of performance, a strong corporate or group identity, 
recognition and articulation of special interests for the institution, autonomy, and volunteerism.30  
The core of the army was the officer corps and it was the most professional part of the Romanian 
Army by the Second World War, however, it was divided between regular officers, for whom the 
army was a chosen vocation, and reserve officers who served temporarily out of obligation to the 
state, who did not become very competent before leaving active duty.   When war began in 1941, 
the Romanian Army had to rely on these poorly trained reserve officers.  Regular officers looked 
down on them because of their inexperience and accused them of being unable to control their 
soldiers, but reserve officers proved highly motivated in combat despite suffering heavy losses.31  
The army lacked a professional non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps and during the war also 
                                                 
30 Roger Reese, Red Commanders: A Social History of the Soviet Army Officer Corps, 1918-1991 (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2005), 2003.   
31A report in January 1941 pointed out that “on very many occasions distinctions are made between them and active 
officers.”  Reserve officers were upset they were treated as inferiors, especially since they had answered the call to 
fulfill their patriotic duty, see, AMR, Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 410, f. 341; reserve officers only had a year’s training 
at a military school and two months service in a unit.  Nonetheless, most reserve officers fought bravely, although a 
few older ones were unfamiliar with new weapons and out of practice, see, Mark Axworthy, “Peasant Scapegoat to 
Industrial Slaughter: The Romanian Soldier at the Siege of Odessa” in Time to Kill: The Soldier’s Experience of 
War in the West, 1939-1945, ed. Paul Addison and Angus Calder (London: Pimlico, 1997), 228-229.   
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relied on reserve NCOs.  A new contingent, or class, of enlisted men was drafted each year to 
replace the outgoing contingent and despite two years of military service most left poorly trained 
soldiers because of unprofessional attitudes of officers, incompetence, and budget shortfalls.  
The only thing the Romanian Army had plenty of in 1941 was motivation. 
 The relationship between military professionalism and the Holocaust is complex.  Poorly 
trained soldiers led by inexperienced reserve officers often panicked when they came under fire 
and usually targeted Jews or others identified as communists to be shot in reprisal for casualties 
that they suffered.  At the same time, however, senior officers with years of training believed that 
Jews represented a threat to military security and so when they were presented biased reports that 
confirmed their preexisting beliefs they justified ordering reprisals and ethnic cleansing by citing 
military necessity.  It should be stressed that the Romanian Army did not train its men to commit 
atrocities against Jews before 1941.  Nonetheless, many officers and soldiers, after initial chaotic 
pogroms and massacres, became adept killers with further tutelage from the SS.   
Organization of the Romanian Army 
 Following the First World War, the state made efforts to prepare the military to defend 
Romania if a war broke out with one or a combination of its hostile revisionist neighbors.  After 
the enlarged state ratified a new constitution in 1923, it turned to reforming the Romanian Army. 
In 1924 a number of laws were passed reorganizing it.  The Romanian Army was divided into 
regular [activ], reserve, and territorial [miliţii] forces.  Romania was divided into seven zones 
assigned to seven corps, numbered I-VII, each with three infantry divisions.  Each corps also had 
a corresponding territorial corps that was responsible for recruitment, preparing for mobilization, 
and requisitioning materials for the royal maneuvers each fall; and in wartime were responsible 
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for training, mobilizing industry, and domestic security.  Lastly, the Superior Council for the 
Defense of the Country was established to set defense goals and coordinate policy.32 
 The General Staff was the most important army organization.  Originally named Statul 
Major General, or the General Staff, when it was first established in 1859 by the interwar period 
it was known as Marele Stat Major, or the Great Staff, but for convenience’s sake it will simply 
be called the General Staff.  It was patterned on the French General Staff with its four sections: 
Section I–Personnel, Section II–Intelligence, Section III–Operations, and Section IV–Logistics.  
In April 1940 another four sections were created: Section V–Training, Section VI–Transport-
Communication, Section VII–Superior Military Education, and the Adjutant Section.  It also had 
the History Service, the Administrative Service, the Secretariat for the Superior Council for the 
Defense of the Country, the General Staff Troop Detachment, and the editing office of România 
militară, the official journal of the General Staff.  The organization was headed by the Chief of 
the General Staff who in turn was aided by two, and after April 1940 three, deputy chiefs of the 
General Staff.  The first Deputy Chief of the General Staff directed sections II, III, V, VI, and 
Adjutant, plus General Staff Troop Detachment, to plan combat operations.  The second Deputy 
Chief of the General Staff was tasked with planning how to support combat operations and was 
assigned sections I, IV, VI, and România militară.33  The third Deputy Chief of the General Staff 
was added to help with the increased workload after the total mobilization in 1940.    
  The General Staff was under the civilian control of the Ministry of National Defense.  It 
had been known as the Ministry of War until the 1930s.  The Romanian Air Force became more 
                                                 
32 Eftimie Ardeleanu, Alexandru Oșca, Dumitru Preda, coord., Istoria statului major general: Documente, 1859-
1947 (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 1994), 30-31.   
33 Ibid., 56, 233-235. 
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independent during the 1930s.  First, the State Sub-Secretariat of the Air was established in 1932 
and then four years later the Ministry of the Air and Navy was created.  Both Air Force and Navy 
remained subordinate to the ultimate authority of the General Staff in case of war.  The Ministry 
of Army Endowment was created in 1938 to coordinate the procurement of equipment.  After the 
invasion of Poland, the General Staff divided Romania into three threatened “fronts” in 1939: 
East, between the Carpathians and the Dniester River; South, between the Carpathians and the 
Danube River, and West, between the Carpathians and the western frontier.  The central zone, 
the so-called “Transylvanian Plateau,” was to act as a national redoubt if all three frontiers were 
overrun by a coalition of the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Bulgaria.34 
 When Romania declared war, the General Staff became Marele Cartier General, or the 
Great General Headquarters.  In previous wars, its titular head was the monarch, however, during 
the Second World War it functioned under Antonescu.  Like the German High Command or the 
Soviet Stavka, the General Headquarters brought army, air force, and navy under centralized 
control, but unlike Hitler’s or Stalin’s high commands, it remained subordinated to the Ministry 
of Defense.  It was occupied with directing operations, not formulating strategy, that was left to 
the Council of Ministers – any strategic ideas the Antonescu regime did think up were ignored by 
German High Command.  The General Headquarters did not operate during the entire campaign 
against the Soviet Union.  It was first active from 21 June to 21 November 1941.  It was divided 
into General Headquarters–Echelon I that followed the front and General Headquarters–Echelon 
II that stayed in Bucharest, each directed by a Deputy Chief of the General Staff, and the Chief 
of the General Staff became Chief of the General Headquarters.  During the invasion, Antonescu 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 35.   
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accompanied General Headquarters–Echelon I from Odobeşti to Roman, then Iaşi, advancing to 
Chişinău, and finally halting in Tighina.  From there it directed the assault on Odessa, demanded 
harsh reprisals in the city after it fell, and coordinated the demobilization most of Fourth Army 
afterwards before it too returned to Bucharest – leaving Third Army to direct soldiers east of the 
Dniester.  Between 22 November 1941 and 7 August 1942, the General Headquarters reverted to 
the General Staff. 35  General Headquarters–Echelon I reactivated on 8 August 1942, traveled to 
Rostov to coordinate the deployment of Romanian units to the Don River and operations there.  
This time Antonescu, who was very ill, did not go with it.  General Headquarters–Echelon II was 
renamed the General Staff–the Sedentary Part [Partea Sedentară] and stayed in Bucharest.  After 
Stalingrad, General Headquarters–Echelon I returned to Romania, leaving a liaison detachment 
with Army Group Don to help coordinate the withdrawal of the surviving Romanian forces.  On 
30 January 1943, General Headquarters-Echelon I was again amalgamated with General Staff–
Sedentary Part and for the rest of the war was simply called the General Staff.36  For simplicity’s 
sake only the terms General Headquarters and General Staff will subsequently be used.   
 During each of the two six-month periods the General Headquarters operated, it proved to 
be competent, if uninspired, in its operations.  General Headquarters liberated eastern Romania 
and bottled up the Soviets at Odessa in 1941.  At Rostov, during 1942-1943, it deployed a large 
force farther than ever before, was well-aware of the looming danger at Stalingrad, did its best to 
prepare for an expected Soviet winter counteroffensive, directed survivors to support the German 
relief attempt, and shepherded remaining troops home.  The General Staff mobilized manpower, 
                                                 
35 The Chief of the General Staff took over as Chief of the General Headquarters, one of his deputy chiefs of the 
General Staff stood as Chief of the General Staff, and another general was selected to fill the now empty Deputy 
Chief of the General Staff slot, see, AMR, Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 686, f. 39.  
36 Ardeleanu, Istoria statului major general, 57-58.  
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reorganized the army in 1940, again in 1941, and rebuilt it in 1943 for a final showdown with the 
Soviets in 1944.  The General Staff gained more influence as the war progressed.  In April 1942 
it took over recruitment from the Ministry of Defense.  In July 1942 it tried to declare that it was 
not subordinated to the Ministry of Defense, it was momentarily rebuffed, but by October 1943 
the Chief of the General Staff was considered a minister, with the chiefs of the general staffs of 
the Air Force and Navy his deputy ministers, and able to present views on an equal footing with 
the Minister of Defense during meetings of the Council of Ministers.37  Whether as the General 
Headquarters or General Staff, senior officers did their best to support the Nazi war effort. 
 The infantry arm had 21 divisions during the interwar period, numbered 1st-21st Infantry 
divisions, three (12th, 16th, and 17th Infantry divisions) were disbanded after the territorial losses 
of 1940, plus the Guard Division located in Bucharest.  Six additional reserve infantry divisions 
were mobilized in 1941, but only the 35th Reserve Infantry Division was used in battle.  The rest 
of were cannibalized for replacement troops after 1941.  A fortification division was also created 
in 1941.  Each infantry division consisted of three infantry regiments, a semi-motorized scouting 
group, a single company of anti-tank guns, a pioneer battalion, and two artillery regiments.  They 
were supposed to total of 17,500 men, but few of them were at full strength after June 1941.   
There were three types of infantry regiments.  Those considered elite were ten Vânători 
regiments – literally “hunters” – they had been historically armed with rifles and fought as light 
infantry in the nineteenth century, however, by the interwar period they were equipped the same 
as any regular infantry unit.  There were some exceptions, two Vânători regiments were assigned 
to the Guard Division, plus two motorized Vânători regiments were attached to the 1st Armored 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 315-317.  
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Division to act as mechanized infantry.  There were thirty-three Dorobanţi regiments – from the 
Hungarian darabant borrowed in turn from the German word Trabant for foot soldier – they had 
been territorial units during the nineteenth century, but by the interwar period they were regular 
infantry regiments.  Finally, there were twenty-two Infanterie regiments, these had been created 
more recently and their lineage did not stretch back to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, so 
they lacked any historic designation.  Each Vânători, Dorobanţi, and Infanterie regiment had the 
same triangle organization with three battalions, and each battalion had three companies.38 
 There were three special infantry arms that did not used the regimental system, they were 
the Mountain, Grăniceri, and Gendarme corps.  The Vânători de munte – literally “Hunters of 
the Mountains,” established in late 1916 after German mountain troops inflicted repeated defeats 
on the Romanian Army – were troops trained in mountain warfare.  In 1924, there were just two 
mountain brigades consisting of two mountain groups, a mountain artillery group, and a pioneer 
battalion.  A “group” [grup] consisted of two battalions with six companies each.  By 1940, the 
number of mountain brigades had doubled, and the 1st-4th Mountain brigades had been reinforced 
with another mountain group and a mountain howitzer battalion and renamed “mixed-mountain” 
brigades.  Of 24 mountain battalions, eight were reserve units.  The Grăniceri Corps – “frontier-
guards” – was comprised of eight grăniceri groups, plus a riverine grăniceri group, that patrolled 
the frontiers of Romania during the interwar period.  In 1940, each group was reorganized as an 
infantry regiment, but had inferior weapons and equipment.  In 1941, three grăniceri regiments 
formed the Grăniceri Division, but it was pulled off the front after the battel for Odessa.39   
                                                 
38 Scafeş Armata română, 99-100; Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 42. 
39 Scafeş Armata română, 107, 152; Ardeleanu, Istoria statului major general, 32. 
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The General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie was a militarized police force tasked with 
keeping order in the countryside – municipal police kept order in the cities.  It was divided into 
the Rural Gendarmerie and Operational Gendarmerie.  In the 1920s, the Gendarmerie was under 
the direct control of the Ministry of War, but in 1931 it was placed under the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs.  The Rural Gendarmerie had eight inspectorates across Romania, each with at least one 
gendarme legion with a gendarme company for each county.  The Operational Gendarmerie had 
13 gendarme battalions whose companies were broken up and assigned where they were needed.  
It had two more special gendarme formations – the CFR (Romanian Railway) Gendarme Legion 
and the Dismounted Gendarme Regiment in Bucharest.  In the 1930s, there were approximately 
14,000 gendarmes.  The Romanian Army’s seven corps were each assigned a gendarme battalion 
to function as military police.  On 10 June 1941, the Gendarmerie mobilized more men to assign 
a gendarme company to every corps, division, and brigade.  These gendarmes were under the 
authority of Romanian Army’s Praetoral Service.  Praetors were civil servants who combined 
legal and police authority.  Army praetors ran the military justice system and used gendarmes as 
military police.  A total of 33 gendarme companies were mobilized, approximately 10,000 men.  
Another 12 gendarme battalions were formed for use by the Operational Gendarmerie, four of 
which were assigned to Third and Fourth armies to reinforce their praetoral services.40   
The Gendarmerie played an important role in the Holocaust in Romania, but only those 
gendarmes in military police companies were directly under the control of the Romanian Army.  
The Ministry of Internal Affairs set up 12 legions in northern Bukovina and Bessarabia after the 
                                                 
40 Ovidiu Marius Miron, Jandarmeria română în perioada interbelică, 1919-1941: Mit şi realitate (Lugoj: Editura 
Dacia Euoropa Nova, 2003), 35, 46; Scafeş Armata română, 154-155.   
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two provinces were liberated during July 1941 whose gendarmes carried out the deportations of 
Jews to Transnistria after September 1941.  Another 13 legions were established in Transnistria 
in November 1941, with four gendarme battalions from the Operational Gendarmerie, who were 
assigned to keep order.  These gendarmes guarded Jews in ghettos and camps and some joined in 
massacre of Jews during the winter of 1941-1942.  They continued to guard the survivors during 
1942-1944.  While the focus of this work is on soldiers in the Romanian Army, it is important to 
understand who the gendarmes were and how they were organized.  
The cavalry arm attempted to modernize during the interwar period.  While still trained in 
swordplay, cavalrymen were instructed to ride to battle and then dismount to fight as infantry.  In 
1924, the Romanian Army had two cavalry brigades, with three Roşiori regiments each, plus a 
Călăraşi brigade.  Additionally, there were seven more Călăraşi regiments, one assigned to each 
of the seven corps, to provide a force for reconnoitering.  Again, the respective titles dated back 
to the nineteenth century, Roşiori – literally “Reds” – were regular cavalry, while the Călăraşi – 
literally “Riders” – were territorial cavalry, but unlike infantry regiments these designations still 
had some meaning in the interwar period.  The Romanian Army tried to increase the number of 
cavalry brigades, motorized Roşiori regiments, and turn Călăraşi regiments into permeant units.  
By 1940, the efforts to make Călăraşi regiments permanent were mostly successful, but most of 
the Roşiori regiments could not be motorized.  The number of cavalry brigades had doubled, plus 
an independent Călăraşi brigade was temporarily created using territorial cavalrymen.  In 1941, 
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of the 1st-6th Cavalry brigades only three had a single completely motorized Roşiori regiment.  In 
total, there were 12 Roşiori and 13 Călăraşi regiments formed in brigades or with corps.41 
The armored arm was tiny.  The Romanian Army had organized the 1st Tank Regiment in 
1919, equipped with a few French-produced tanks, and these First World War machines were the 
only armor until 1937.  Initially, Czech-produced light tanks were ordered, then French-produced 
light tanks as well, and finally the 2nd Tank Regiment was established in 1939.  These two tank 
regiments, plus a hodgepodge of tankettes and trucks built by Italian, Hungarian, and Romanian 
manufacturers were organized into a “moto-mechanized” brigade in 1940.  The Romanian Army 
formed the 1st Armored Division in early 1941, modeled on the panzer division, with the help of 
German advisors.  It proved difficult to replace losses in armor or motor vehicles.42 
The artillery arm was divided into army, corps, and divisional artillery.  The Romanian 
Army mostly had outdated artillery from the First World War, plus a limited number of modern 
heavy artillery batteries.  In 1924, the Romanian Army assigned one heavy artillery regiment to 
each of its seven corps, and in 1938 it had enough to form a reserve of heavy artillery for each 
army.  Army artillery consisted of independent heavy artillery battalions, half old and half new 
artillery, and all pulled by horse – plus several more independent motorized anti-tank battalions.  
Corps artillery had motorized heavy artillery regiments, these were the best artillery units in the 
army, and there were eight of them in 1941 – plus several more independent motorized heavy 
artillery battalions.  Divisional artillery consisted of two mixed-artillery (both field and howitzer) 
regiments for each infantry division – plus 18 independent motorized heavy artillery battalions 
                                                 
41 Scafeş Armata română, 114; Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 63-64; claims all Călăraşi had been turned into 
reserve formations by 1940 is belayed by a memoir of a former territorial cavalryman cited in Chapter IV. 
42 Scafeş Armata română, 130; Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 31-39. 
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that could be assigned at different times and places as needed.  The Grăniceri Division received 
only a single artillery regiment.  Every mountain brigade had nine artillery batteries (six field and 
three howitzer) in addition to two battalions of mountain artillery.  Every cavalry brigade had a 
horse artillery regiment – plus a squadron of anti-tank artillery.  The motorized Roşiori regiments 
had motorized artillery batteries and 1st Armored Division had a motorized artillery regiment.43   
A note needs to be made about Romanian terms for deserter.  The word dezertor could 
include those soldiers who deserted to the enemy, deserted to the rear, was absent without leave 
(AWOL), or late from leave.  Soldiers would first be listed AWOL, or “missing at rollcall” [lipsă 
la apel], before being listed as deserters.  If a soldier returned before he was listed as a deserter, 
it’s likely the worst he would face was a flogging.  Soldiers who broke or ran during an attack 
could be labeled deserters, but were generally dismissed as fugari, literally “runners” or “fleers,” 
and gathered up as quickly as possible and put back on the line after minimal punishment.  The 
same is true of trenzări, from the French traînard, meaning “stragglers” or “slowpokes.”  During 
major battles, especially those involving a retreat, Romanian units often lost track of their troops 
and listed some as missing or deserters when they were in fact trying to make their way back to 
their units.  Very few soldiers deserted to the Red Army because they hated communism, there 
were also rumors that the Soviets shot POWs, and actual conditions in POW camps were terrible.     
Since this dissertation is focused on the Romanian Army whenever a unit is mentioned it 
will be Romanian.  Therefore, Third Army will always refer to the Romanian formation, and the 
same for all other units.  German or Soviet formations will always be indicated as such, except 
for German army groups.  The Romanian Army only twice organized an army group, and both 
                                                 
43 Scafeş Armata română, 122-124. 
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times for only a few weeks.  In spring 1940, when the Romanian Army mobilized to its greatest 
extent, it formed Army Group Nr. 1, but it was disbanded after territorial losses shrunk Romania.  
In summer 1941, the Germans directed the Romanian Army to establish Army Group Antonescu, 
which joined in the invasion of the USSR, but after the liberation of eastern Romania it too was 
dissolved.  The German army groups North, Center, and South are so well known that it seems 
unnecessary to indicate that they are German.  Only panzer units will not be indicated as German 
because the use of the word panzer already signals that the unit is not Romanian.   
Organization of the Antonescu Regime 
 While the king was the head of the Romanian Army, between 6 September 1940 and 23 
August 1944, power was wielded by Antonescu who was the Conducător.  This means “leader” 
and is the Romanian equivalent of Duce or Führer.  He was not the first to hold the title.  Carol II 
styled himself as Conducător after he declared a royal dictatorship in 1938.  The title was taken 
by Antonescu when he seized power and forced Carol II into exile, divorcing it from the crown, 
now the youthful Mihai I.  Nevertheless, Antonescu successfully wielded power only because of 
widespread support from the army, civil servants, middle class, boyars, and peasantry.  Like the 
Carlist regime, the Antonescu regime was both authoritarian and popular.    
Antonescu ran Romania using the dictatorship established by King Carol II.  All political 
parties had already been outlawed in 1938, except for a single party meant to support the royal 
dictatorship.  When Antonescu took power in 1940, initially he decided to turn to the Legionary 
movement to fill the role of a political party to legitimize his military dictatorship, but less than 
five months later he suppressed and disbanded the Legion.  He continued to rule without a party 
to support his regime.  Carol II and Antonescu both used national referendums (or plebiscites) to 
lend legitimacy to their authoritarian rule.  Carol II and Antonescu both appointed the ministers 
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to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and ruled by executive fiats called “decree-laws.”  
Antonescu’s second in command was a lawyer named Mihai Antonescu who became the Vice-
President of the Council of Ministers.  Despite their same last names, the two were not related.  
Henceforth, General Ion Antonescu will be referred to simply as Antonescu, and Vice-President 
Mihai Antonescu will always be referred to by his full name to avoid confusion between the two.  
Mihai Antonescu played an important role in shaping domestic and foreign policy, and for long 
periods of time he ran the Council of Ministers.  Such as when Antonescu was with the General 
Headquarters on the front in June-August 1941 or during his serious bouts of illness in July 1942 
and between November 1942 and February 1943.44  The Antonescu regime functioned perfectly 
fine without the Conducător during these times and no one tried to take advantage of his poor 
health to initiate a coup.  Antonescu relied on county prefects to enforce his rule through civil 
servants.  Carlist prefects were replaced by Legionaries in 1940, who in turn were succeeded in 
1941 by officers (primarily reservists) appointed by the Antonescu regime. 
 The Antonescu regime was more than the Conducător, Mihai Antonescu, and a clique of 
intimates.  It was a coalition of officers, specialists, politicians, civil servants, and intellectuals, 
many of whom had previously been Carlists or Legionaries or former members of the outlawed 
Liberal or National Peasant parties, who supported the military dictatorship of Antonescu.  His 
regime functioned effectively because of a national consensus that supported the Conducător.  In 
                                                 
44 During July 1942 Antonescu was sick enough that he had to retire to the mountain town of Predeal for his health.  
The cause of his sickness has been endlessly speculated.  Doctors at the time believed it was malaria or syphilis.  His 
detractors have jumped at the suggestion and argued that his alleged megalomania was in part the result of syphilitic 
madness, see, Ancel, The History of the Holocaust in Romania, 473, 482, 489, 660n9; he was again very ill between 
November 1942 and February 1943 during the crisis at Stalingrad.  The Minister of Defense says the sickness was 
finally diagnosed as malaria and he soon recovered once the correct medicine was given, see, Constantin Pantazi, Cu 
Mareşalul până la moarte: memorii (Bucharest: Editura Publiferom, 1999), 218, 222-223, 234.  
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other histories, Antonescu is presented as a strong dictator, but this overemphasizes his role and 
tempts one to blame him for Romania’s contribution to the Nazi war effort.  He made important 
decisions, such as invading the USSR, deporting most Jews from eastern Romania, demanding 
the Jews of Odessa be expelled from the city, deporting Gypsies, and refusing to make peace 
with the Soviets.  He usually made these decisions, however, after discussions with the Council 
of Ministers who were in agreement.  Furthermore, most of these policies were popular with the 
public and did not trigger mass protests.  While the SSI placed people under surveillance, it was 
not large, nor were its agents particularly coercive under the Antonescu regime.   
Geography of Greater Romania 
 Interwar Romania was greatly expanded by annexations following the First World War.  
The Old Kingdom of Romania is comprised of two former vassal principalities of the Ottoman 
Empire called Wallachia and Moldavia – not to be confused with the contemporary Republic of 
Moldova.  Somewhat confusingly, the Republic of Moldova comprises most, but importantly not 
all, of the territory of the former tsarist province of Bessarabia.  Wallachia is a plain between the 
Carpathian Mountains in the north to the Danube in the south and stretching from the Iron Gates 
in the west to the Danube Delta in the east.  Dobrogea, the region between the delta and Black 
Sea coast, was added to the Old Kingdom after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878.  Moldavia, 
which had included Bessarabia before 1812, is the region that runs north from the Danube delta 
between the Carpathian Mountains in the west and the Prut River in the east.  Romania almost 
doubled in size after successful campaigns by the Romanian Army in 1918. 
 Greater Romania, or România Mare, stretched from the Dniester in the east and almost to 
the Tisa in the west after 1918.  Russian Bessarabia was first to be annexed.  The tsarist province 
included the territory between the Prut and Dniester rivers and its locals were called basarabeni 
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by Romanians.  Many basarbeni actually self-identified as Moldovans because under tsarist rule 
they had not been as affected by Romanian nation-building efforts in previous decades.  Austrian 
Bukovina was annexed next.  It was a small mountainous region to the north of Moldavia and its 
Romanians were called bucovineni.  Transylvania was occupied last.  It consisted of the historic 
province of Transylvania, which in Romanian is called Ardeal, and eastern parts of several other 
Hungarian (Körösvidék/Crișana, Máramaros/Maramureş) and Austrian (Banat) provinces that 
include the Carpathian as well as the Apuseni mountains.  The border of the western frontier was 
decided by the Great Powers and did not run along the Tisa River as many Romanian nationalist 
desired.  Whenever discussing Transylvania elsewhere in this work, it refers to all this territory, 
not just the historic province.  Romanians from the region are called ardeleni.  
 Between August 1941 and March 1944, the Romanian Army helped conquer and occupy 
part of Soviet Ukraine that was dubbed Transnistria by the Antonescu regime.  Again, this name 
can cause confusion with the contemporary breakaway republic of Transnistria that consists only 
of a tiny strip of territory on the eastern bank of the Dniester.  The Romanian-occupied province 
of Transnistria consisted of a wide swath of territory between the Dniester and Bug rivers.  It was 
named after the nationalist term for Romanians living east of the Dniester in the USSR who were 
called transnistrieni.  Most self-identified as Moldovans and Soviet nationalities policy tried to 
turn this imperial identity into a national identity to counterbalance to Romanian nationalism.    
Jews and Gypsies: A Note on Terminology 
 The terms Jews and Gypsies will be used in this work.  This does not mean that the Jews 
of Romania, including many who could trace their origins in the county back centuries, were any 
less Romanian than ethnic Romanians.  The term Romanian Jews seems redundant, however.  It 
will only be used when necessary to differentiate between Romanian and Soviet Jews.  The anti-
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Semitic pejorative Jid or Jidov in Romanian documents is translated as kike.  The word ţigan has 
been translated as Gypsy.  The term is a racial slur, but is the only word used in Romanian Army 
records.  While some might object to using Gypsy rather than an appropriate name for the ethnic 
group, the fact is that any of the accepted versions – Roma, Romani, Romany – can easily create 
confusion for the reader.  Once again, using the term Gypsy is not meant to imply they were any 
less Romanian than ethnic Romanians, nor does it indicate that the author is indifferent towards 
the discrimination faced by the Roma minority in contemporary Romania.  It is purely for the 
sake of simplicity that the choice to use Gypsy has been made.    
Dissertation Outline 
 The dissertation is divided into two parts.  The first focuses on the interwar period and 
Romanian neutrality after the start of the Second World War between 1 September 1939 to 21 
June 1941.  It delves into both the long-term social, political and economic factors that underlaid 
Romanians’ hostility towards “Judeo-Bolshevism” and the proximate causes of the war resulting 
from the Soviet ultimatum of June 1940 that later motivated soldiers in combat and committing 
atrocities.  The second part covers the wartime period from 22 June 1941 to 23 August 1944.  It 
examines the relationship between combat and atrocities, Romanian soldiers’ commitment to 
Hitler’s war of annihilation, and the Romanian Army’s efforts to shore up soldiers’ motivation 
and morale through extrinsic means as the war turned against the Axis.  An epilogue covers the 
events of 23 August 1944 and final campaigns by the Romanian Army until 9 May 1945.   
 The first chapters are thematic.  Chapter II examines the social composition of the 
Romanian Army in the interwar period.  It summarizes the formation and development of the 
Romanian Army between 1830 and 1930 to show that the state did its best to build a modern 
army, but social and economic factors limited its modernization.  Therefore, the Romanian Army 
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had to rely on soldiers’ motivation, reinforced by strict discipline, to make up for deficiencies in 
professionalism, competence, training, and equipment.  Chapter III argues that soldiers possessed 
strong motivation rooted in powerful ideologies.  Nationalism, religion, anti-Semitism, and anti-
communism – and, for a sizable minority, fascism – permeated Romanian society before the war 
and acted as the basis of soldiers’ motivation from 1941 to 1944.  Chapter IV looks at the politics 
of the interwar Romanian Army to prove that the officer corps was conservative, authoritarian, 
and traditional.  It also analyzes the Romanian Army’s efforts to rearm and prepare for war as the 
international situation deteriorated during the 1930s.  The next chapter is chronological.  Chapter 
V covers the events of 1940 – the Soviet occupation of eastern Romania and rise of the 
Antonescu regime riding a wave of popular anger – that were the proximate causes for war. 
 The next two chapters are chronological.  Chapter VI covers the last six months of peace 
and the first four months of war.  During the period between late June and late October 1941 a 
great number of events occurred during the initial weeks of the invasion and the chapter is 
designed to show how closely related combat and atrocity were during the Romanian Army’s 
advance through eastern Romania and into the USSR.  Chapter VII chronicles the events 
between November 1941 to November 1942, again seeking to balance combat and atrocities on 
the front with occupation and atrocities in the rear.  It argues that Romanian soldiers’ motivation 
did not sputter out at the Dniester but continued all the way to the Volga River.  The next two 
chapters are thematic.  Chapter VIII examines extrinsic motivation as the Romanian Army used 
propaganda, coercion, and remuneration to motivate soldiers in combat.  Rhetoric, fear of 
punishment, and a chance to profit reinforced soldiers’ intrinsic motivation.  This chapter also 
discusses morale, its relationship to motivation, and how morale increasingly affected motivation 
after 1943.  Chapter IX investigates the motivation of women and minorities.  It analyzes female 
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volunteerism, Jews in segregated labor battalions, ethnic and religious minority soldiers, and 
Gypsy soldiers.  The final chapter is chronological.  Chapter X covers from November 1942 to 
August 1944 and argues that Romanian soldiers fought committedly at Stalingrad and afterwards 
from the Kuban bridgehead to Crimea to Romania.  Defeat and retreat negatively influenced 
morale, yet most kept fighting, due to a combination of intrinsic motivation, fear of capture or 
Soviet revenge, commitment to comrades, fear of punishment by officers, and a sense of duty.  
Atrocities perpetrated by soldiers against Jews, however, largely ceased during this period for a 
combination of reasons.   
 The Romanian Army did not lack motivation in Hitler’s war of annihilation.  The initial 
orgy of violence against Jews matched popular enthusiasm for the war against communism and it 
did not suddenly disappear after crossing the Dniester in July-August 1941 or during the winter 
crisis of 1941-1942.  The heavy losses suffered in combat became a new means to motivate.  The 
sacrifice of brave soldiers could not be wasted by simply giving up and going home, especially 
as the German Army seemed a hairsbreadth from victory over the threat of “Judeo-Bolshevism.”  
Only after the disaster at Stalingrad and defeat at Kursk in 1943 did enthusiasm wane and morale 
suffer, but soldiers generally remained committed and officers coaxed, threatened, or rewarded if 
their men wavered.  The fear of Soviet or Jewish retribution for crimes perpetrated by Romanian 
soldiers in the first year of the war reinforced motivation later.  While they may have lost faith in 
“final victory” or reacted with cynicism to the rhetoric of “holy war” by 1944, Romanian soldiers 
supported the war against “Judeo-Bolshevism” to the very end of the Antonescu regime.
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CHAPTER II  
SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE ROMANIAN ARMY 
 
In 1941, a Romanian Army with 326,000 soldiers invaded the Soviet Union alongside the 
Wehrmacht, but a century earlier it had not existed.  Small bands of mercenaries motivated by 
lucre that were loyal only to the endless parade of princes in Wallachia and Moldavia had been 
replaced by a large national army motivated by intrinsic factors serving the Romanian state.  This 
military revolution was based on social reforms that converted the peasantry to the new national 
cause.  This chapter will examine the origins and development of the Romanian Army between 
1830 and 1938 focusing on the reforms of the 1870s that created a mass conscript army based on 
universal military service, the expansion of the army during the fin de siècle, and the imperial 
aspirations of the army during the interwar period with the goal of showing how the Romanian 
state placed its trust in the intrinsic motivation of peasant soldiers to fight for the nation.  As part 
of its development, the Romanian state tried to replicate the military innovations in the rest of 
Europe to create a modern army with a professional officer corps.  It proved difficult because of 
social realities, such as a small middle class, wide practice of patronage, corruption, and elitism 
that privileged the upper classes.  Romanian state penury and limited industrialization further 
contributed to the failure to create an efficient army.  In consequence, the army relied on the will 
of its soldiers to try to make up the difference on the modern battlefield. 
A systematic study of the development of the Romanian Army and its social composition 
by the interwar period does not exist.  The Anglophone literature of the last 25 years glosses over 
it: Keith Hitchin’s two volume history covering the formation of modern Romania between 1774 
and 1947 only touches briefly on military matters, the renowned Dracula scholar Radu Florescu 
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wrote a thin monograph on his forbearer Ioan Emanoil Florescu who organized the army, and the 
main Romanian military historians, Glenn Torrey for the First World War and Mark Axworthy 
for the Second World War, both dedicate only a few short paragraphs to the social composition 
of the officer corps.1  The literature in Romanian is nearly as sparse.  Under communism Marxist 
ideology focused historical research on mythologizing workers or peasants and ignoring the old 
military elite.  The state’s foundation of Editura Militară in 1950 initially contributed little more 
than communist propaganda to educate soldiers of the new “popular” army, but by the 1970s it 
was beginning to publish some serious research on Romanian society and the army.  Yet, the 
lion’s share of its publications were operational narratives meant to support the nationalist myth 
with stories of bravery and sacrifice by Romanian soldiers; a tradition that it continues today.  
Nonetheless, as a new generation of post-communist historians emerges, serious work on the 
nineteenth century Romanian Army are beginning to appear.2   
 The modernization of the Romanian Army was divided into three periods.  The first was 
between 1830 and 1856 when “Romania” was comprised of two principalities under a de facto 
Russian protectorate.  Tsarist domination of Wallachia and Moldavia, although still technically 
tributary principalities of the Ottoman Empire, began in 1830 after the end Russo-Turkish War 
                                                 
1 His two volume history of modern Romanian history cover a broad range of political, social, and economic issues 
in a framework focused on Romanian intellectual debates about modernization, see, Keith Hitchins, The Romanians, 
1774-1866 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) and Rumania, 1866-1947 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); started in 
the 1960s as a side project, see, Radu Florescu, General Ioan Emanoil Florescu: Organizer of the Romanian Army 
(Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, 2007); his work on the war consists of a collection of articles and a 
monograph, see, Glenn E. Torrey, Romania and World War I (Iaşi, Oxford, Portland: The Center for Romanian 
Studies, 1999) and The Romanian Battlefront in World War I (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011).  
2 For a summary of Editura militară’s early propaganda efforts, see, Călin Hentea, “Îndoctrinare ca la carte.”  ZF: 
Ziarul de duminică, accessed 2 January 2018, http://www.zf.ro/ziarul-de-duminica/indoctrinare-ca-la-carte-de-calin-
hentea-7730072; a collection of articles by communist historians was translated into English celebrating the 
“popular” history of the Romanian Army, see, Gheorghe Savu, ed., The Army and the Romanian Society (Bucharest: 
Military Publishing House, 1980); a recent monograph explores the Romanian military before 1914, see, Dumitru-
Dan Crîşmaru, Elita militară românească în timpul lui Carol I (1866-1914) (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 2017). 
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of 1828-1829 and ended in 1854 during the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War of 1853-1856.  
The second period was between 1856 and 1866 when nationalists succeeded in 1859 in unifying 
Romania, officially known as the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia.3  The last 
period was between 1866 and 1914 during the reign of King (before 1881 Prince) Carol I.  
During his rule Romania fought its first modern war as an ally of Russia in the Russo-Turkish 
War of 1877-1878.  The Romanian Army expanded radically during the nineteenth century: from 
the princes’ bodyguards in 1830, to two small military forces totaling just 5,600 soldiers in 1848, 
to a unified army of 100,000 in 1877, and finally an army of around 470,000 in 1913 at the start 
of the Second Balkan War.4  The mobilization and equipping of soldiers presented a relatively 
simple and straightforward problem; while the recruiting of qualified candidates for the officer 
corps was more difficult.  The rapid expansion of the army in the late-nineteenth century left the 
army straining to recruit, train, and improve the quality of its officer corps.  Despite its efforts to 
attract educated and qualified officers from the elite of society, the Romanian Army was not very 
successful in creating a sizable or professional officer corps before the Second World War.      
 The reforms enacted in Wallachia and Moldavia by Russian General Pavel Kiselyov, in 
1831 and 1832 respectively, established the basis for the modern Romanian army.  For well over 
a century the Russian and Ottoman empires had fought periodic wars for control of the Black Sea 
with the Russians steadily gaining ground.  By the end of the eighteenth century, the Romanian 
principalities had become a frontier placed under the rule of compliant Phanariote Greek princes.  
                                                 
3 For a detailed examination of the period leading to unification, see, Paul E. Michelson, Romanian Politics, 1859-
1871: From Prince Cuza to Prince Carol (Iaşi, Oxford, Portland: The Center for Romanian Studies, 1998), 27-48. 
4 Dan V. Pleshoyano, Colonel Nicolae Pleşoianu and the National Regeneration Movement in Wallachia, Tran. 
Kathe Lieber (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1991), 7; Cornel I. Scafeş et al., Armata română în războiul de 
independenţă, 1877-1878 (Bucharest: Editura Sigma, 2002), 26; Călin Hentea, Brief Romanian Military History, 
trans. Cristina Bordianu (Lanham, Maryland; Toronto; Plymouth, UK: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2007), 119. 
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Whenever war was declared, the princes were responsible for providing supplies and laborers to 
the Ottoman army.  The Greek War of Independence triggered a new conflict between the two 
empires resulting in the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829.  As they had in the past, the Russians 
quickly occupied Wallachia and Moldavia, but then got bogged down besieging Ottoman forts 
on the Bulgarian side of the Danube.  It was not until the Russians finally broke through the forts 
in the second year of war, allowing them to cross the Balkans to threaten Constantinople, that the 
Ottomans sued for peace.5  The Treaty of Adrianople granted territory and other concessions to 
Russia, independence to Greece, and de facto independence to Serbia, Wallachia, and Moldavia.  
The Romanian principalities became a Russian protectorate, although officially still vassals to 
the Ottoman Porte, and remained under direct Russian military occupation until 1834. 
 The Russian reforms in the principalities, called the Organic Regulations, set up modern 
state institutions and fundamentally altered the nature of military service for Romanians forever.6  
Previously, the military forces in the principalities under Ottoman suzerainty were limited to the 
personal bodyguard of the prince, a few boyar cavalrymen, and frontier guards called panduri.7  
These were the equivalent of Austrian Grenzer, irregular infantry recruited from free peasants 
who provided sons for military service during early adulthood in exchange for tax exemption and 
other privileges.8  Panduri lacked formal military training, combined various functions (border 
security, rural policing, revolt suppression, and service in the Ottoman army), were not regularly 
                                                 
5 For details of the campaign in the Balkans and the Caucasus, see, John Shelton Curtiss, The Russian Army under 
Nicholas I, 1825-1855 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1965), 53-73, 39-45. 
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against Russia in the Romanian Principalities, 1821-1854 (Iaşi: The Center for Romanian Studies, 1997), 103.   
8 For an examination of Austrian Grenzer, see, István Deák, Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of 
the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848-1918 (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 26-27. 
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paid, and did not have clear hierarchy or system of discipline.9  In short, they lacked most of the 
hallmarks of professionalism.  This all changed under General Kiselyov who first introduced the 
regimental system in Romania that created permanent soldiers – called the “National Militia” in 
Wallachia and the “Land Guard” in Moldavia – who received standardized training, uniforms, 
pay, equipment, and weapons.10   The social structure of these forces mirrored that of the tsarist 
army, whereby the boyar class exclusively provided officers and soldiers were taken from the 
peasantry, but there were important differences.  Peasants between 20 and 30 were chosen by lot, 
one soldier for every 70 families, served for six years (not the 25 years required in Russia), and 
only free peasants who owned land or paid taxes were obligated to provide recruits.11  Landless 
serfs who owed unpaid labor and other feudal dues to boyar masters under the system of serfdom 
then still in place could not be recruited.  Therefore, the boyar-serf social structure in Wallachia 
and Moldavia greatly restricted the size of the army because the boyars refused to give up their 
claims on serfs.  Officer cadets called Junkers, borrowing from Russian nomenclature (adopted 
from Prussia by Peter the Great), began their military service in their teens.  The prince approved 
their assignment personally and so they enjoyed the benefits of princely patronage.  The officer 
cadets often had the opportunity to study abroad at the expense of the court, usually in France; a 
perk that continued even after a one-year officer school was established in Bucharest in 1847.12  
The nascent armies of the principalities formed under Russian tutelage were tiny, there were just 
a few hundred officers in the 1840s, but laid the foundations for the modern Romanian Army.  
                                                 
9 Hitchins, The Romanians, 27.   
10 Florescu, General Ioan Emanoil Florescu, 7.   
11 Pleshoyano, Colonel Nicolae Pleşoianu and the National Regeneration Movement in Wallachia, 6.  
12 Florescu, General Ioan Emanoil Florescu, 13-14, 10.   
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 The Russian protectorate ended in 1854.  The Crimean War broke out in 1853 when the 
Russians again occupied the principalities, the Russian Army advanced to the Danube but had to 
retreat under threat of Austrian intervention.  Austrian and Ottoman troops occupied Wallachia 
for the rest of the war.13  The subsequent Russian defeat in 1856 made the end of the protectorate 
permanent.  The Great Powers prioritized maintaining the status quo in the Balkans to prevent 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, so during the peace conference in Paris they decided against 
the unification of the Romanian principalities – against the wishes of local nationalists.  The 
Great Powers did empower the Romanian elites to elect their own princes, rather than have them 
appointed by the Ottoman Porte or approved by Moscow.  Romanian nationalists used the ad-hoc 
divane (parliaments) in Wallachia and Moldavia to carry out a fait accompli by coordinating the 
double election of Alexandru Ioan Cuza, a boyar officer and the Minister of War in Moldavia, as 
prince in both Wallachia and Moldavia.  This de facto unification was reluctantly accepted by the 
Great Powers, much to the anger of the Ottomans, but the Sultan’s protests were ignored.  Prince 
Cuza tasked General Ioan Emanoil Florescu, trained under the Organic Regulations in Wallachia, 
with integrating two militaries into a single national army.  The creation of the Romanian Army 
was officially pronounced on 26 May 1860, although it took several more years to accomplish.14  
While Florescu integrated and standardized the army, Cuza carried out other republican-inspired 
reforms designed to dramatically change Romanian society, politics, and economics.  Regarding 
the army, the most important of reforms took place in 1862, when the officer corps was opened 
                                                 
13 Orlando Figes, The Crimea War: A History (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010), 116, 183-189.  
14 Florescu, General Ioan Emanoil Florescu, 25, 52.  
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up to non-nobles, and in 1864, when the peasantry was emancipated from serfdom.15  These twin 
reforms were extremely important for the future expansion and modernization of the army.   
 The last period of significant army reform took place over the ten years after the fall of 
Prince Cuza in 1866.  A “monstrous coalition” of liberal and conservative boyars carried out a 
bloodless palace coup to depose Cuza after becoming disillusioned with his republican reforms.  
The Romanian elite then turned to a foreign dynasty to legitimize their aspirations for complete 
independence, develop ties to the great royal families of Europe hoping for diplomatic dividends, 
and ensure a conservative executive as a reliable ally for the boyar elite.  The 27-year-old Prince 
Karl (Romanianized as Carol) of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen accepted the offer.  Trained as an 
officer in the Prussian Army, Prince Carol initiated a series of military reforms to “Prussianize” 
the Romanian Army.16  Romania was not alone; all European states rushed to reform their armies 
along the same lines after the stunning Prussian defeats of Austria in 1866 and especially France 
in 1870, considered the premier army in Europe.  The most important reform, made possible by 
the recent emancipation of the serfs, was the law that introduced universal military service for all 
men except “foreigners,” meaning Jews, in 1868.  These reforms created a core of regular troops 
backed by large numbers of reservists that would be mobilized to create a mass army.  Between 
1873 and 1876 army reforms proliferated: promotion based on merit and education, creation of a 
general staff and a war council, reestablishing a one-year officer school (the first one established 
in 1847 had burnt down), passing of a military code of justice, and extending universal military 
service to all male “residents” in 1876, thereby including Romania’s Jewish minority.17   
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These reforms were quickly put to the test in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878.  This 
time triggered by Ottoman repression of Serbian independence, the Russian Army marched into 
Romania, neglecting to ask for permission until the last minute, crossed the Danube protected by 
Romanian troops, and then become embroiled in the siege of Plevna in Bulgaria in a reprise of 
fifty years earlier.  The Ottoman resistance forced the Russians to ask for Romanian assistance, 
and even gave Prince Carol titular command of the Russo-Romanian forces besieging the city.  
The performance of the Romanian Army during the siege was roughly equivalent to that of the 
Russian Army, an impressive display since less than twenty years had passed since unification, 
however, the Romanian Army also showed the same lack of professionalism that afflicted the 
tsarist army.  Romanian officers resorted to mass frontal charges against prepared defensive 
positions without proper reconnaissance that resulted in high casualties.18  After Plevna finally 
fell the Russians advanced on Constantinople without the Romanians and forced the Ottomans to 
sign a humiliating peace.  The Congress of Berlin redrew the map of the Balkans and paved the 
way for Romanian independence in 1881.   
The Romanian Army continued to expand over the next three decades, but while it was 
able to mobilize masses of men it was less successful in properly arming and training soldiers.  
In 1883, Romania joined the Triple Alliance because it needed protection from Russia, which 
had annexed southern Bessarabia (returned to Romania after the Crimean War and the Treaty of 
Berlin gave Dobrogea to Romania as a sop for this wound) and was seen as Romania’s primary 
enemy.  An economic boom fueled by grain production and increasing international pressure due 
to European rearmament allowed a rapid expansion of the Romanian Army after 1900.  In 1877 
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it had mobilized approximately 100,000 soldiers, but by 1913 the Romanian Army mobilization 
had increased by fourfold to over 400,000.  This expansion exacerbated an existing dysfunctional 
relationship between the officer corps and enlisted soldiers.  Sociologist William Ogburn refined 
the theory of “cultural lag” and argued that “various parts of modern culture are not changing at 
the same rate, some parts are changing much more rapidly than others; and that since there is a 
correlation and interdependence of parts, a rapid change in one part of our culture requires 
readjustments through other changes in the various correlated parts of culture.”19  After 1830, the 
Russian reforms sent the Romanian military on a radically different trajectory towards a modern 
army that continued in the 1870s and sped up even more after 1900.  The culture of the officer 
corps, however, lagged behind.  The emancipation of serfs and introduction of universal military 
service did little to change the attitudes of mostly boyar officers, who continued to treat soldiers 
like serfs.  The sons of the educated bourgeoisie were required to provide military service, but 
most did so on a reduced basis or as reserve officers only in times of war, therefore the regular 
officer corps continued to be dominated by boyars who viewed peasant soldiers with contempt.  
Despite a growing number of non-noble officers after 1900 little had changed by 1940.  
The Romanian Officer Corps 
 Officers were exclusively chosen from the ranks of the boyars until 1862 when the officer 
corps was opened to non-nobles, nevertheless, the army remained dominated by boyars and their 
aristocratic culture through the end of the Second World War.  Few from the bourgeoisie chose a 
career as a soldier, so the Romanian Army, straining to find more officer candidates after 1900, 
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turned to the peasantry.  Therefore, in the middle of 1944, even after three years of war and total 
mobilization of society, including bourgeois reservists, most officers – 7,808 of 15,561 – still had 
rural origins.20  In peacetime, the Romanian Army had even fewer middle-class officers because 
most regular officers were recruited from the rural gentry, military families, or well-off peasants.  
The nineteenth century saw the steady erosion of the absolute numbers of boyar officers, a trend 
that accelerated after 1900, but the officer corps continued to define itself as a social elite and 
embraced an aristocratic identity that imitated the imperial armies of Europe.  An obsession with 
social status impeded professionalization and limited the efficiency of the Romanian Army.   
The fact that Romanian society did not radically change during the nineteenth century 
contributed to continued boyar domination of the army.  In 1830, an estimated 90 percent of the 
population lived in the countryside.21  It was only after 1880 that Romania started to modernize 
and towns and cities grew larger, with urban growth further accelerating after the First World 
War, most of which was concentrated in the capital Bucharest.  The working class remained very 
small.22  Despite these developments, in 1930 nearly 80 percent of the population still lived in 
the countryside and Romanian society was relatively unchanged.23  The middle class in Romania 
was a small bourgeois stratum consisting of professionals, intellectuals, and civil servants; army 
social structure reflected Romanian pre-industrial society.  Therefore, in many ways, the German 
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criticism during the Second World War that the relationship between officers and soldiers in the 
Romanian Army resembled that between “lords and vassals” is accurate.24   
 Despite the need to train a growing number of draftees during the fin de siècle period, the 
Romanian officer corps remained small, only around 10,000 in 1913, because the army could not 
attract enough qualified candidates.25  As demand increased the army had progressively opened 
up the officer corps: first to non-nobles from military families, then the bourgeoisie, and finally 
even to peasants.  Two four-year “schools for military sons” were set up in Craiova and Iaşi, in 
1872 and 1881 respectively, with the specific purpose of training non-noble officer candidates.26  
These military families, however, were too few to provide the number of officers required after 
1900.  The middle class used their education to opt out of the regular army by becoming reserve 
officers, allowing them to pursue professional careers or work as civil servants.  Peasants, on the 
other hand, found a career as an army officer very attractive, so many sons from well-off peasant 
families began to enter the officer corps in the decades after 1900.  The only major obstacle for 
peasant officer candidates was the payment of a “horse tax,” and this was only a hindrance if one 
wanted to join the cavalry or the artillery, the more socially elite arms.  The horse tax was 800 lei 
in 1906 and 12,000 lei in 1932 – roughly the equivalent to over a year’s wages of a peasant day 
laborer.27  It was much easier for a peasant to become an infantry officer since only a high school 
education was required.  Therefore, peasants who could afford it sent sons to the liceu (patterned 
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on the French lycée) and those who lacked the means to do that hoped that their sons could earn 
a scholarship to a military high school or obtain a spot with the help of a local patron.    
The army was not an attractive career to the Romanian middle class who could easily 
obtain more financially rewarding work because the mediocre salary of an officer was not very 
attractive.  The Romanian budget for the army in the fin de siècle was low, a dismal three percent 
for most of the fin de siècle before it was increased to 19 percent of the state budget by 1913, but 
this is still low when compared to its rivals: Russia 25 percent, Austria-Hungary 15 percent, and 
Bulgaria 25 percent.28  During the fin de siècle, Liberal and Conservative parties alike prioritized 
the expansion of the economy and the state, including the army, but this drew much of the lower 
middle class into the growing civil service, leaving few to become officers.  By 1901 there were 
102,560 civil servants, roughly 2 percent of the total population, but 10 percent in urban areas.  
Civil servants’ salaries were not that great, roughly half were paid less than 50 lei a month – the 
equivalent to a little more than the average wage of a worker in 1900.29  Some used their position 
in government to make illicit profits, although augmenting one’s salary by corrupt practices was 
not unique to civil servants because some officers were also corrupt, selling regimental supplies 
and equipment or using soldiers as laborers to pay for aristocratic lifestyles.30  While salary may 
have been comparable, however, the middle class still preferred the civil service or professions to 
a career in the army for two more reasons – the provincial nature of army life and army culture.   
 Like most European armies by 1900, the Romanian Army used a regimental system that 
recruited men to the local regimental headquarters at posts that were scattered across the country.  
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Therefore, most junior officers could look expect to be assigned to dull postings in small towns, 
distant from large cities, for many years.31  After becoming the capital in 1859, Bucharest soon 
outstripped all the other Romanian cities in comforts, attractions, and culture; living in the capital 
became the goal of the upwardly mobile youths of Romania’s growing bourgeoisie.  Few among 
them envied the backward conditions officers endured in provincial postings.  For example, the 
Moldavian city of Piatra Neamţ remained without electric lighting, modern plumbing, potable 
water, parks, and even a railroad connection until the modernization of the city between 1907 
and 1918.32  Even in 1941, the countryside seemed a world away from the modern civilization of 
Bucharest.  Emil Dorian, a Jewish medical reserve officer briefly mobilized in early 1941 to set 
up a field hospital for the army in Găieşti, a village 80 km northwest of the capital, recorded.  
Life in Găieşti was like any other draftee’s wartime life.  An endless village, 
stretching out on the road between Tîrgovişte and Piteşti.  The sad rural look of all 
Romanian villages, dusty, with gloomy, poverty-stricken little houses…The 
village has no running water, no electricity.  The so-called toilet was a shed 
outdoors, with a hole in the ground to crouch over.  Its stink, mingling with the 
smell of the linden trees in bloom, reached all the way to my room, where it was 
impossible to keep the window closed.  The only important institution in town, 
where not even a movie house could be improvised, was the coffeehouse.33  
 
A job in the civil service, even a poor paying one, meant that one could enjoy the comforts of life 
in a modernized city that a career in the army could not always offer.  It must be emphasized that 
while an officer’s salary was not attractive to educated urban youths, it was to peasants who saw 
the army as a means of social mobility.  General Nicolae Dăscălescu declared after that war that 
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he became an officer “for only one reason; to get my family out of poverty.”34  Peasants grew up 
in villages more primitive than provincial cities, so coped better with the discomforts of army life 
and were attracted to the social status that came with being an officer that put them in a position 
of authority over others, often for the first time in their life.  Therefore, because the middle class 
shunned the army, the officer corps turned to the peasantry to bolster its ranks. 
The Romanian Army valued middle class skills in mathematics, engineering, medicine, 
and other technical fields, which boyar, military family, or peasant officers lacked.  Therefore, it 
followed a pattern set by Germany that allowed educated youths to serve for a shortened period 
before becoming reservists to make universal military service palatable to the middle class, thus 
the Romanian Army balanced military needs and ambivalence towards military service.  Draftees 
who graduated high school with a baccalaureate attended a two-month course at a reserve officer 
school followed by six-months of service before entering the reserve, while graduates from high 
school without a baccalaureate, or from trade schools, trained for two-months at a reserve NCO 
school and served for 10 months, before leaving the army.35  Senior officers hoped some of these 
skilled youths might stay to make the army a career as officers or NCOs, but few elected to stay 
any longer than absolutely necessary.  Then Captain Ion Grosu recalled that “the youth ran from 
the army like from a fire.”36  These educated draftees were nicknamed teterişti, or TTRs, short 
for Trupă cu termen redus, or “Trooper with Reduced Term.”  University students could apply 
for an annulment of their military service to avoid any service.  Middle-class youths hoped to be 
admitted to the University of Bucharest and there obtain a law degree, the ticket for entrance into 
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the civil service and a comfortable life in the capital.37  In fact, educated youths saw the army as 
a refuge for mediocrities lacking other options.  Ion Manolescu, native of the formerly Habsburg 
city of Timişoara who passed the baccalaureate in 1937, recalled, “I disliked the thought of being 
a soldier in peace time.  Observation confirmed my prejudice as the majority of our officers were 
unusually stupid.  Most of them had failed previously at the special entrance examination to the 
Bucharest University.”  Overruling his protestations, Manolescu’s patriotic father required him 
to enter the army as an officer cadet at the School for Infantry Reserve Officers No. 1 located in 
the oil boomtown of Ploieşti, center of Romania’s oil industry, rather than apply for university.  
There he found life “impossible” since “the whole town stank of tar and pig styes” and boasted 
just a handful of clubs or cinemas for entertainment.38  Luckily for him, the capital was just 67 
km and a short train ride away, so Manolescu spent his leave each weekend in Bucharest.   
Officers’ writings in the interwar period are full of criticism of middle class draftees and 
their supposed lack of patriotism, however, their accusations are false.  In 1941, these young men 
answered the call to serve with enthusiasm and fought bravely on the front, the fact they had not 
wanted to make a career of the army in peacetime did not mean that they did not have motivation 
to fight to defend the country.  Nevertheless, officers saw bourgeois draftees as troublesome: too 
independent, too soft, and too undisciplined.  Indeed, they were less likely to tolerate the insults, 
slaps, or blows that officers were accustomed to doling out to peasant draftees.  Peasant soldiers 
were more accustomed to physical abuse by social superiors and accepted the strict discipline of 
the army more readily.  As the 2nd Călăraşi Regiment advanced to Stalingrad in 1942, Sergeant 
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Emilian Ezechil recalled that a private, a former law student, in his platoon had been slapped by 
an officer during training and instead of taking it or reporting it the private hit back.  After court 
marital he was assigned to 2nd Călăraşi Regiment for a chance to be rehabilitated by bravery in 
combat.39  Regardless of interwar officers’ skepticism of middle-class youths, TTRs were sorely 
needed by the Romanian Army, especially those with technical skills.  Yet even those without 
technical skills were still valued by officers who used educated TTRs in administrative functions, 
which officers often found difficult, boring, beneath them, or all three.  Unfortunately, this meant 
that many TTRs – both junior officers and NCOs – were good administrators in the peacetime 
army, but poor combat leaders when they were called up after 1941.   
 Finally, educated urban youths choose not to stay in the army because they rejected the 
aristocratic culture, strict discipline, and anti-intellectualism of the army.  Those few from the 
bourgeoisie who volunteered for the army often became disillusioned by an officer culture that 
stood in stark contrast to nationalist rhetoric of the army being the “school of the nation.”40  The 
most famous example of this was Anton Bacalbaşa.  The son of the Brăila city police chief, born 
in 1865, he volunteered to serve in the army at age 18, but became disgusted with the conditions 
he found there: physical violence, strict hierarchy, arrogance, ignorance, and what he described 
as prison-like conditions for peasant draftees.  After leaving the army, Bacalbaşa became a writer 
and invented the character of Moş Teaca, or “Old Man Scabbard,” a tragicomic caricature of the 
ignorant and brutal officer.  He named a socialist newspaper after this hugely popular character 
that he edited between 1895 to 1901.41  Central to his criticism of the army was a condemnation 
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of anti-intellectualism in the officer corps.  Indeed, many officers were not well-educated, but 
intellectualism is not necessarily an important requirement for mid-ranking or junior officers.  
Most only need to be trained in combat tactics and leadership, but there were some very well-
educated senior officers on the General Staff.  Nevertheless, Bacalbaşa and others lampooned the 
officer corps as abusive morons because they did not meet middle class expectations of literacy, 
intellectualism, or culture.42  Bourgeois officer cadets were very uncomfortable with the corporal 
punishment meted out by officers that they were sheltered from in their daily life in a city.  Now 
2nd Lieutenant Manolescu recorded, “The ranks were treated like animals.  Beatings, torture and 
deliberate underfeeding were part and parcel of a soldier’s life during his military training.”43  
Thus, many TTRs probably preferred riding out their six or eight months of reduced military 
service at a desk doing paperwork, rather than the difficult work of training peasant draftees.   
 The size of the officer corps increased after the First World War to an estimated 14,500, 
but this was still relatively small because after annexations Romania’s size and its population had 
doubled and the could potentially mobilize 1.5 million men.44  Major Emanoil Leoveanu argued 
in an article he wrote for România militară in 1924 that the boyars who used to make up a large 
number of the officer corps no longer viewed the army as a viable career and sought positions in 
the government or on important boards, while the educated youth also avoided military careers to 
seek better jobs in the liberal professions, thus leaving only a “class of modest men” to volunteer 
for military service out of patriotism.  He ended plaintively, “Few are the blessed who inherited a 
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fortune and equally few are those who through marriage have improved their material state.”45  
While officers from boyar or military families still dominated the senior ranks, Leoveanu shows 
that officers from humbler peasant origins now made up the majority by the interwar period. 
Identity  
By the interwar period boyars had long be a minority in the officer corps, but aristocratic 
culture defined the identity of the officer corps through the end of the Second World War.  This 
was not an accident, but nor was it an inevitable result of the Russian reforms in the 1830s.  The 
brief period of republican experimentation under Prince Cuza during 1859-1866 means that there 
was a real opportunity for the recently established Romanian Army develop an officer corps with 
a very different culture.  This proved unpopular with the conservative boyars who dominated the 
army – it was a group of officers that arrested Cuza in the palace coup of 1866 – who rejected the 
idea of an officer corps with a culture of meritocracy, egalitarianism, and virtue.46  They favored 
instead an aristocratic culture stressing honor, social hierarchy, and Christian knighthood.  The 
officer corps, supported by King Carol I, worked hard to maintain its aristocratic identity even as 
it was increasingly diluted with officers recruited from the peasantry.  The formation of România 
Mare after 1918 only reinforced the imperial pretentions of the officer corps.   
The Romanian officer corps self-consciously aped the older aristocratic officer corps of 
Europe and aspired to their wealth, social prestige, and political influence.  In the absence of an 
advanced war school in Romania – the Superior School of War was only established in 1889 – 
officers went abroad for advanced military training, usually to military schools in France and 
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Germany, but also Austria-Hungary and Italy.  Officers often returned with an inflated sense of 
importance after experiencing the deference accorded to officers abroad in other countries and 
brought back foreign aristocratic idiosyncrasies as well.  As a 1908 army study complained,  
The young Romanian officers who had been in Germany alienated themselves… 
Some from among them made as if they no longer knew the Romanian tongue, 
others returned with monocles and with [other habits] copied from the Prussian 
Junkers, and many more believed they were of a nobility as old as that which they 
imitated, others, finally, had German wives.47 
 
A few ethnic Romanians serving as officers in foreign armies emigrated to join the Romanian 
Army after 1866.  These officers came from Transylvania in the Austro-Hungarian Empire or 
from Bessarabia in the Russian Empire and brought with them the aristocratic norms of those 
armies that only reinforced the aristocratic culture of the Romanian officer corps.48   
 Officers aspired to live a comfortable life to match their aristocratic identity, regardless of 
their actual social origins.  Officers did not live in garrison with their soldiers, in part because the 
army faced a chronic shortage of infrastructure as it struggled to keep up with its expansion after 
1880, but more importantly because officers were expected to maintain themselves in comfort – 
particularly if they were married.49  Local society expected officers to entertain and attend social 
events.  Officers who could not afford these expenses, peasants and rural gentry alike, often fell 
into deep debt or avoided marriage entirely to escape the financial burden.  General Dăscălescu, 
a division and corps commander after 1941, came from a peasant family and could not afford a 
proper home as a young junior officer, he rented a room in a peasant house, much less support a 
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wife and family.  When asked late in life why he never married, he claimed that it was because 
wives were a distraction from military duty because “the husband has to give a lot of time to her.  
She has to be taken to the opera, the theatre, to military clubs, and visits with other officers.”50  It 
was not the distraction of wives alone, but also the costs associated with wives and families that 
discouraged marriage.51  If they did decide to marry, officers tried to find a wealthy woman with 
a dowry, preferably from a boyar family.  They often placed “marriage ads” in newspapers, such 
as this one printed a Bucharest newspaper in February 1941, “Artillery captain with foreign post 
experience, specialized training, owns private automobile, from a good family, brother-in-law a 
general, seeking to marry a woman up to 35 years old with a house and income.”52   
If an officer found a prospective spouse, he then still had to first obtain approval from his 
commanding officer before getting married.  The army tried to discourage regular officers from 
marrying women with bourgeois origins.  General Pantazi, then Minister of Defense, expressed 
dismay in a September 1942 meeting of the Council of Ministers that some officers’ wives had 
taken over Jewish businesses as part of the Romanianization of the economy.53  He was adamant 
that while it was acceptable for the bourgeois reserve officers’ wives to carry out such activity, it 
was totally unacceptable for regular officers’ wives to be involved in what he considered vulgar 
commercial activity.54  This aristocratic aversion to hard work among the officer corps also did 
not encourage many officers to make strenuous efforts when training their men.   
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 Although the principalities had been under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Porte, fighting 
for an Islamic empire for several centuries, a Christian chivalric ethos soon became a central part 
of the identity of Romanian officers.  The simple republican medals introduced by Prince Cuza 
during his seven-year rule were replaced by more ornate medals based on Christian iconography 
under Prince Carol I after 1866.  The culmination of the process of adopting a chivalric ethos 
was the introduction of the Order of Michael the Brave in 1916.  This was the highest award for 
bravery that came with a knighthood and a substantial land grant.55  Like the fabled “Blue Max” 
of the German Army during the First World War, the Order of Michael the Brave was an object 
of obsession for many officers during the Second World War.  The Germans proved astute in the 
using decorations to motivate their allies.56  Honor was a strong part of the identity of the officer 
corps, the motivation for duels or suicides over questions of honor in peacetime, and during the 
Second World War honor motivated officers to lead far forward and inspire their soldiers.  It also 
motivated officers to push themselves and their men to the limit to fulfill orders.   
 Christianity shaped the identity of the officer corps in more ways than just its medals.  
The creation of an independent Romanian Orthodox Church in 1882 played an important role in 
legitimizing the officer corps’ imperial pretentions because it declared the army the defender of 
the true religion.57  King Carol I made a conscious effort to use the Orthodox Church to prop up 
his young monarchy and encouraged close army-church relations.  On 6 April 1870, High Decree 
No. 603 issued by Carol I declared that each regiment or battalion could have a chaplain [preot 
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militar] “belonging to the dominant religion of Romania.”58  The new national army and the new 
national church became closely intertwined.  Officers often patronized local churches near their 
postings by organizing donations, contributing personally, and even providing soldiers as free 
labor for church projects.  After the First World War, officers played an important role in helping 
to build new Romanian Orthodox churches in Transylvania since the region had been dominated 
by Catholic and Protestant elites supported by the Hungarian state who only tolerated Orthodoxy.  
In the Oradea Diocese alone between 1930 and 1940 officers gathered funds to build 70 churches 
and renovate many more.59  During the Second World War, the officer corps repeated its efforts 
of church construction in occupied Soviet territory as part of the “Crusade against Communism.”   
 The aristocratic identity of the officer corps applied not only to boyars, but also by non-
noble “military sons” and peasants who embraced aristocratic values after entering the army.  
These military families often wielded great influence in the army, employing nepotism to their 
advantage, Ion Manolescu discovered when he arrived at reserve officer school.  “Company 
Commander: Radulescu; Platoon Commadner: Radulescu; Tactical Instructor: Radulescu….  I 
soon learnt that the Radulescu family had virtually monopolized the Military Academy.”60  The 
officers from military families became as haughty and arrogant as actual boyar officers, if not 
more so.  Antonescu was from just such a military family and was notorious for his arrogance.61   
General Gheorghe Avramescu, who commanded the Mountain Corps for much of the Second 
World War, is a good example of a peasant adopting the aristocratic identity of the officer corps.  
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Born into the proverbial “modest peasant family” in Botoşani in 1884, he secured a position at 
the highly competitive Infantry Officer School in Bucharest in 1906 and graduated eleventh out 
of a class of 60 in 1908.  The First World War proved a boon for his career as the dire shortage 
of officers after mobilization resulted in his quick promotion.  He was wounded during the war 
and won many accolades, first while fighting the Central Powers and then Hungarian Bolsheviks.  
Today Avramescu is celebrated as a soldier’s general, but he actually had long abandoned his 
peasant roots and adopted aristocratic values, including aristocratic activities such as hunting, a 
hobby he practiced in occupied Crimea. 62  He was so integrated into the aristocratic milieu that 
his daughter married into the princely Sturdza family, whose family lineage stretched back to the 
sixteenth century.  Avramescu is not an isolated example of such acculturation. 
Professionalism  
The Romanian officer corps, using the definition and characteristics of professionalism 
already provided in the introduction, was still at best only semi-professional during the interwar 
period.  The officer corps gained valuable experience in the First World War at great cost in the 
lives of soldiers – including several generals – in the campaigns of 1916-1917, Russian soldiers, 
French material, British loans, and training from Allied military missions prevented collapse.63  
Revolution in Russia empire isolated Romania, while delivering it Bessarabia, the implosion of 
the Central Powers in 1918 allowed Romanian soldiers to occupy Bukovina and Transylvania to 
declare România Mare, and a brief campaign against a weak and disorganized Hungary in 1919 
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consolidated its expansion.  The officer corps had believed that it was a professional force in the 
fin de siècle, but this confidence had been shaken by the disaster of 1916.  After 1919, however, 
because the Romanian Army had removed salon generals scapegoated for defeat, girded itself 
with the panoply of modern industrial war, received training from the Allied victors, and fought 
a successful campaign against Hungary without any Allied help, officers once again felt sure in 
their professionalism and that they had mastered the demands of modern war.   
During the 1920s, the Romanian Army rested on its laurels and officers felt that their role 
in the creation of România Mare justified interwar claims to increased social status that detracted 
from professionalization.  In late 1924, the General Staff chose to publish an article in România 
militară that argued the officer corps should have the same social prestige and be treated with the 
same respect as the Imperial German Army had been before 1914.64  Implicitly, the General Staff 
was claiming that the Romanian Army was an equal to what was generally considered the most 
professional and competent army in recent history.  While the General Staff continued to prepare 
to fight the next war, especially in the 1930s – paying close attention to combat developments in 
the Spanish Civil War – as the storm clouds of war gathered, much of the officer corps’ time and 
energy in the interwar years focused on defending old or obtaining new social privileges instead. 
The difficult economic conditions of the interwar period, made especially acute during the global 
Depression, also exacerbated abuse of soldiers as labor and other corrupt practices by officer.  If 
these economic difficulties greatly damaged the training and equipment of soldiers, they allowed 
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the Romanian Army to improve the quality of officers it recruited during the interwar period and 
maintain relatively high standards of officer training leading up to the Second World War.   
  Romanian officer training lagged behind the rest of Europe before the First World War.  
The first advanced military education institutions established in Romania were the School for 
Artillery and Engineering in 1881 and the Superior School of War in 1889, but even after their 
foundation many officers continued to go abroad for extra training in the latest military sciences 
unavailable in Bucharest.  Since they attended military schools across Europe officers came back 
with different training, tactics, and doctrines from various European armies.  By the First World 
War, however, most of the officer corps had latched onto the military theories of Charles-Ardent 
du Picq and the offensive a l'outrance due in large part to training in France.65  Du Picq’s work, 
published posthumously in 1902, became a sensation among military theorists across Europe.  
He argued that new firepower technology had altered battle less than most believed and that the 
army with the stronger moral strength, not necessarily the greater material resources, could still 
be victorious.66  Romanian theories based on these ideas overemphasized the importance of spirit 
and marginalized firepower, material, and training; officers were trained to expect poorly trained 
and equipped soldiers to charge the enemy and overcome enemy firepower with national spirit.67  
Furthermore, while a smaller number of Romanian officers trained in Germany were well-versed 
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in the doctrine of Aufragstaktik, or “mission tactics,” that expected officers to trust subordinates 
to take the initiative in planning the details of how to carry out a mission after being given a clear 
and concise order, they could not apply it to the Romanian Army as it required intensive training 
that was beyond its capabilities because there were not enough officers, many of whom were also 
disinclined to make the necessary efforts, and officers lacked professional NCOs to assist them.68   
Instead, Romanian officers and soldiers were trained to follow orders to the letter.  Officers also 
lacked practice in conducting large unit operations; the first staff ride took place in 1888 and the 
first royal maneuvers were organized in 1894, repeated every autumn, but usually involved only 
brigades and divisions.  This lack of preparation showed on battlefields in the First World War as 
Romanian generals were soon overwhelmed by the challenge of coordinating corps and armies.69  
Despite two decades for the army to improve its training, preparation, and leadership after 1918, 
the slow advances and costly frontal attacks of 1916 were repeated in 1941, especially by Fourth 
Army.  Third Army performed better in 1941 and improved with experience in 1942-1943.      
 Before 1916, the Romanian Army was top-heavy with too many generals and colonels 
and not enough majors, captains, and lieutenants.70  Furthermore, many obtained their position 
due to social status as members of powerful boyar families, political connections, or royal favor.  
These salon generals spent much of their time gambling at the Bucharest Jockey Club, going to 
social events, or being politicians instead of attending to military duties.  Royal patronage helped 
promote favorites to senior positions.  For example, General Constantin Prezan was an adjutant 
to Crown Prince Ferdinand in 1901 and, unsurprisingly, the close relationship paid off later when 
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following the disaster of 1916, the monarch – now King Ferdinand I – made Prezan the Chief of 
the General Staff in 1917.71  It should be pointed out that the future Conducător was an adjutant 
to Crown Prince Carol before the First World War and Prezan’s staff officer planning operations.  
Both eschewed the stereotype of salon generals and were relatively competent officers as well as 
royal favorites.  Like Prezan, Antonescu’s used his close connections to the future Carol II to 
obtain prestigious posts, but unlike Prezan, he later embarked on a political career.  After 1919, 
the worst salon generals having been purged, the senior ranks of the Romanian Army were filled 
by a new generation of experienced First World War veterans who proved able enough in the 
Second World War.  Royal patronage, however, became even more important after Carol II 
became king in 1930, especially once he declared a royal dictatorship in 1938. 
 There was a clear pecking order among the different arms of the military that was based 
purely upon prestige or social exclusivity and not professional achievement.  The cavalry was the 
most prestigious arm because it expanded the least in the fin de siècle and had the largest number 
of boyar officers still during the interwar period.  These boyar cavalrymen, acording to General 
Pantazi, “provided the model of gestures of honor, loyalty, and generosity in the army.”72  These 
officers mixed in the highest social circles, however, the cavalry’s prestige was diminished by its 
ineffectiveness during the First World War and was supplanted by the glamour of the knights of 
the sky.  The new Aeronautica Regală Română, or Royal Air Force, attracted men from the most 
prestigious boyar families, such as Constantin Cantacuzino, whose family dated back to a Greek 
Phanariote prince of medieval Wallachia, and became a leading fighter ace in the Second World 
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War.73  Nonetheless, the cavalry arm still carried a lot of prestige and political influence, in fact, 
five of the prime ministers of the roughly 35 governments between 1918 and 1945 were former 
cavalry generals, including Antonescu.74  The cavalry did not only produce political soldiers, but 
also competent officers who proved apt pupils under German tutors in 1940-1944.  The cavalry 
officers of better equipped units, such as Colonel (later General) Radu Korne, who commanded 
the 6th Motorized Roşiori Regiment from the Prut to Stalingrad and the reconstituted 1st Armored 
Division in 1944, successfully adapted to German tactics and thinking.   
The First World War demonstrated that the artillery was the king of battle in modern war 
but lacked social prestige because although most artillery remained horse-drawn – thus requiring 
cadets to pay the horse tax – it still had more peasant officers and relied extensively on bourgeois 
TTR officers whose education in math were needed for coordinating indirect fire.  The General 
Staff adopted proven French artillery tactics, even if geared towards positional warfare they were 
still effective, but reliance on TTR officers meant that many artillery officers during the Second 
World War were reservists.  Romanian military historians claim that artillery officers were adept 
in French tactics by 1940 and obstinately resisted attempts by German military advisors to retrain 
Romanian artillery officers in German practices – or simply lacked the time to do so before June 
1941.  The shortage of training and professionalism of artillery officers, especially reservists, was 
more important than biased German arguments that French tactics were too” schematic” and less 
suited for mobile warfare.75  French practices were sound enough if employed by trained artillery 
officers.  During the battle for Odessa, as near a recreation of First World War positional warfare 
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as possible that French practices were designed for, Fourth Army’s artillerymen proved woefully 
unprepared to properly direct bombardments or coordinate with the infantry.  Third Army proved 
to have marginally better artillery officers who improved with experience, but even in battles of 
position as at Sevastopol its artillery had similar problems coordinating with the infantry. 
The infantry was officially celebrated as the queen of battle but lacked prestige because it 
had the most officers with peasant origins.  A few infantry units, however, were still considered 
“elite.”  The Guard Division, an parade formation in Bucharest, differed little from the average 
infantry division, but it was considered the best assignment because it was located in the capital, 
received special attention, got the newest equipment, and took the best draftees.76  Those infantry 
officers seeking promotion or social advancement knew they could do so if they obtained a post 
in one of its two Vânători regiments, so the Guard Division had the pick of the litter of educated 
officer cadets.  The Grăniceri Corps was tasked with guarding the border in peacetime with eight 
lightly equipped grăniceri regiments: two on the Bulgarian border, two on the Hungarian border, 
and four on the Soviet border.  Claims that the grăniceri were elite had more basis in reality than 
the merely socially elite Guard Division.  Grăniceri NCOs and soldiers signed up for longer than 
the usual two-year stint and gained experience on the frontier.77  Their training and experience, 
however, was limited to combating smuggling, policing Soviet refugees, causing scandals with 
Hungarian border guards, and firefights with Bulgarian komitadji.  An internal Grăniceri Corps 
study in 1939 expressed great concern about the quality of its soldiers.  “While in comparison to 
his infantry and light infantry comrades, in most cases, the grănicer soldier is better prepared for 
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war, nevertheless, he is not sufficiently formed, neither for combat or guard duties.”78  The poor 
performance of the Grăniceri Division in 1941, improvised from three grăniceri regiments with 
extra artillery, meant it was not used again after Odessa.  Finally, the Mountain Corps claimed to 
be the infantry elite.  It had a strong esprit de corps, most draftees were ardeleni, and recruited 
officers at the top of their class.  Their special uniforms, green berets, loose golf-style pants, and 
white socks (regular infantry wore puttees) set them apart and played no small role in attracting 
officer cadets.79  The patronage of the Mountain Corps by King Carol II, when it was formed in 
1916 he had been its titular commander as crown prince, and proximity to the summer palace in 
Sinaia, near Predeal, made a posting with a mountain unit second only to Bucharest.  Mountain 
officers were expected to learn to ski, a hobby practiced by the social elite, and regularly mixed 
with boyars, princes, or politicians on the slopes of Predeal during the winter.  When the Soviets 
dissolved the Mountain Corps in 1944, it was in large part because it was a bastion of socially 
connected anti-communist officers.  Mountain infantry did receive special training in mountain 
warfare, officers were trained to take the initiative, and units organized as independent brigades.  
Mountain brigades (later renamed divisions) demonstrated tactical flexibility, high motivation, 
and were more combat effective than the average infantry division on the Eastern Front.   
The tiny armored arm was the “ugly duckling” of the interwar army.  Romania had little 
heavy industry, few experienced engineers, and shortages of equipment that made it impossible 
for it to keep up with the technical developments in armor during the interwar period that forced 
armies to constantly replace rapidly outdated machines; an expense the Romanian budget could 
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ill afford.80  Yet the reason for the lack of attention towards armor went beyond just budgetary 
realities because to aristocratic minded officers the tank was an unattractive weapon of modern 
war.  It was dirty, technical, and lacked the prestige of the cavalry (both horsed and motorized) 
that was expected to be the mobile element in offensive operations.  The tank, as in most armies 
including the French military doctrine adopted by the Romanian Army, was an infantry support 
weapon that was supposed to follow behind the infantry at a slow pace.  Doctrine did not foster a 
mindset for rapid advance or maneuver warfare, moreover, the army purchased French or Czech 
tanks designed for infantry support that lacked speed or maneuverability.  Therefore, tank units 
were staffed by infantry rather than cavalry officers who received limited specialized training.81  
The invasion of Poland and fall of France demonstrated the true value of tanks.  The Romanian 
Army rushed to change attitudes and train better tank crews with the help of the German Military 
Mission to some success.  1st Armored Division performed well in 1941-1942 but suffered heavy 
losses in equipment that could not be readily replaced until 1944. 
After the First World War, the Romanian Army expanded its military education system 
and improved the training of officers.  In 1919 only three officer training schools existed in the 
Old Kingdom for each of the primary arms, infantry, cavalry, and artillery.  Beginning in 1920 
the army created two new infantry training schools in Sibiu, an officer administration training 
school was opened in Oradea the following year, and the artillery officer school was moved to 
Timişoara – all major cities in Transylvania.82  Must of this initial expansion was just integrating 
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infrastructure inherited from the now defunct Austro-Hungarian Army.  New specialized training 
institutions were established in Bucharest in 1927.  With the artillery trainers sent to Timişioara, 
the School for Artillery and Engineering became an independent school for engineer offices, the 
Medical-Military Institute expanded to become the Military Health Institute, and a wholly new 
Military Chemical Institute was established.  These efforts kept pace with a steady growth of the 
enlarged officer corps of România Mare.   
The Romanian Army took advantage of the economic crisis of the Depression to raise the 
level of education required to become an officer in the early 1930s.  Economic stagnation in the 
1920s, followed by budget cuts in the 1930s, meant that obtaining a law degree at the University 
of Bucharest no longer guaranteed a cushy job and bourgeoise youths suddenly found the army a 
much more attractive option.  The General Staff was able to raise the educational requirements to 
become an officer in 1932, officer cadets now had to pass the baccalaureate, and obtaining a spot 
in the reserve officer school became very competitive.83  After an entrance exam, officer cadets 
had to fulfill three years of training to become a second lieutenant.  Each day of officer training 
consisted of six-seven hours of coursework (60 percent training, 30 percent military culture, 10 
percent general culture), three-four hours of individual study, eight hours of sleep, and the rest of 
the time assigned to meals, relaxation, and other activities, such as sports or choir.84  In addition 
to higher standards of education, the Depression temporarily increased the number of officers by 
approximately 2,000 but shrunk again once the economy improved.  The flood of urban youths – 
including Jews, other ethnic minorities, and even a few workers – into the officer corps triggered 
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a minor panic in the army and the General Staff soon worried about the level of “culture” of the 
new officer candidates.85  The Romanian Army needed more middle- or working-class officers 
(and NCOs) because it embarked on a program of rearmament and partial motorization initiated 
during the Depression.  In 1932, the General Staff opened more schools to cope with the sudden 
glut of cadets, which included a new mechanical training center to train officers, and NCOs, to 
maintain the army’s growing (if still relatively tiny) pool of motor vehicles.86   
The Romanian Army continued to train using French military doctrine and developed an 
aggressive defensive strategy in case Romania was attacked.  The General Staff plans focused on 
absorbing attacks, halting them, and then followed up by immediate counterattacks to drive back 
the enemy from Romanian territory.  Once this occurred, then one of Romania’s many military 
alliances should provide it with allies to defeat the enemy.  Therefore, while Romanian military 
strategy was defensive, its tactical training focused on the offensive.  An article in the May 1932 
issue of România militară highlighted the aggressive doctrine of the small, effectively disarmed, 
Austrian Army, “Certainly, a small army, of a state reduced to modest means, could believe that 
it should think rather more about the defense than the attack.”87  Romanian officers needed to 
avoid falling into the trap of a defensive mindset.  Arguments, popular then and since, that an 
excess of French doctrine somehow robbed the Romanian Army of offensive spirit seem more 
than specious.88  It was only when international events had stripped Romania of its allies that it 
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became more defensively-minded – building fortifications in at the end of the 1930s – and even 
then, the Romanian Army advocated extreme aggressiveness if forced to fight alone.  After 1941, 
the Romanian Army proved sufficiently aggressive, it was not doctrine, but shortages in training 
and equipment that limited Romanian unit’s ability to fight mobile campaigns. 
While the new generation of interwar officers may have received better training, it was 
the older generation of officers, with their fin de siècle training and First World War experience, 
who led the army in the 1930s.  Officers from boyar or military families dominated senior ranks 
and officer leadership often attempted to overcome training, equipment, and material shortages 
by sheer force of will.  Instead of calm, clear orders many senior officers resorted to shouts and 
threats.  Major Scârneci’s diary is full off examples, some generals even threatening to shoot him 
if he did not seize an objective, contributing to repeated, poorly supported, and costly attacks in 
1941 that echoed those of 1916.89  Some generals cared more about plaudits or medals than the 
lives of men.  Some of the Germans’ favorite generals, such as General Lascăr were ones willing 
to issue dramatic orders fulfilling their desire for personal glory, but usually resulted in bloody 
frontal assaults or doomed last stands.  A twisted sense of honor bound Romanian generals to the 
Germans as they fought to defend “civilization” against the “Judeo-Bolshevik” threat.90 
Ethnicity  
 Before 1918, ethnicity was not important in the composition of the officer corps, except 
for its official exclusion of Jews and unofficial discrimination of Gypsies.  The Old Romania was 
essentially an ethnically homogenous state but creating România Mare dramatically altered the 
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ethnic make-up of the country.  Romania doubled in territory and nearly tripled the population of 
ethnic minorities (Hungarians, Germans, Jews, Ukrainians, Russians, Bulgarians, and others) 
after the annexation of Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transylvania.  The ethnic minority population 
of România Mare was a third the population.  The most important ethnic minorities in this period 
for officer personnel were Jews and Germans who had diametrically opposed experiences.  
Jews  
When the officer corps was opened to non-nobles after 1862 Jews were excluded.  While 
serfdom was abolished, and other liberal reforms enacted, new anti-Semitic laws prevented most 
Jews from becoming citizens or serving in the new national army.  The General Staff’s need for 
manpower finally changed this, and the 1882 recruitment law declared that all “residents” were 
now subject to conscription, thereby obligating Romanian Jews to fulfill military service, despite 
still being denied Romanian citizenship.91  Jews were 3.3 percent of the population in 1912, one 
of the of the largest ethnic minorities and the Romanian Army could not afford to deprive itself 
of these men.92  Jews drafted into the army discovered they were not welcome in the ranks and 
educated Jews were not allowed to be officers.  Discrimination against Jews did not change over 
time during the fin de siècle, in fact, anti-Semitism in the Romanian Army only hardened.   
The army was an environment where anti-Semitism was openly displayed and cultivated 
by officers and soldiers alike.93  A law in 1875 restricted Jews from becoming officers; a ban that 
a similar law in 1911 reiterated.  Jews with professional training, such as doctors or pharmacists, 
who were qualified to become reserve officers because of their education were forced to serve as 
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lowly privates.  Beginning in 1895, many regiments took the initiative to restrict Jews from even 
becoming an NCO.94  These restrictions were a response to popular hostility towards the idea of 
Jewish officers or NCOs.  It was only after 1919 that the Romanian Army started to allow Jews 
into the officer corps, largely due to pressure from the Western Powers, and even then only as 
reserve officers.95  These policies denied the army the skills of educated Jews, but according to 
senior officers anti-Semitic worldview kept it “pure” from their allegedly corrupting influence.96  
As the ultimate enforcer of law and order, however, the Romanian Army was the unenthusiastic 
protector of Jews from popular Legionary anti-Semitic violence.  After 1940, the officer corps 
embraced anti-Semitism in the ranks and became the principle tool of persecution of Jews.   
The officer corps blamed Jews for the humiliation the Romanian Army by the Red Army 
and local sympathizers as it retreated from eastern Romania after the Soviet ultimatum in 1940.  
The fall of France and the rise of the Antonescu regime radically changed official policy towards 
Jews, who were already seen as disloyal and/or communist sympathizers.  Soon all Jews, not just 
reserve officers or NCOs, were expelled from the army and restricted from military service.97  
Jews were required to serve as forced labor by the army or pay a “military tax” in lieu of military 
service.  The fate of Jews from Bessarabia and northern Bukovina after the army reconquered the 
territory from the Soviets was far worse.   
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Ethnic Germans 
 Romania’s ethnic Germans, who were concentrated in Transylvania – known locally as 
Saxons or Swabians – and Bessarabia.  Those in Transylvania were particularly valued by the 
Romanian Army as many were former Austro-Hungarian officers and the state knew it required 
the support of ethnic Germans who were seen as “an element of order and work, having peaceful 
sentiments.”  They were needed to counterbalance local Hungarians, so the government ordered 
the Romanian Army that ethnic Germans should “be treated like Romanians” when occupying 
Transylvania in 1918.98  This favorable treatment continued into the interwar period and former 
Habsburg officers were assimilated into the army at their former rank, so ethnic Germans made 
up the only sizable minority in the Romanian officer corps through the Second World War.     
 These ethnic German officers were invaluable to the Romanian Army.  Colonels, majors, 
and captains brought with them valuable combat experience learned during the last war, plus a 
few generals, such as Hugo Schwab, Carol (Karl) Schmidt, and Artur Phelps.  Phelps decided to 
abandon the Romanian Army to join the SS in 1939.  He was later followed by many Saxon or 
Swabian peasants who chose to avoid the draft or volunteered to serve in the SS.  Nonetheless, 
Schwab, Schmidt, and most ethnic German officers remained in the Romanian Army and served 
loyally to the end of the war.99  During the Second World War, ethnic German officers played an 
important, but overlooked part in the Romanian Army.  
 The Romanian Army had few Hungarian or Russian officers.  Nationalist propaganda 
depicted Hungary as Romania’s “millennial long” enemy, so there was little trust in them.  Most 
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of the former-Habsburg Hungarian officers from Transylvania left to serve in the new Hungarian 
Army and relocated to rump Hungary.100  Few former-tsarist officers from Bessarabia entered the 
Romanian Army.  Russian officers either answered the demands of the Red Army to serve as 
“military specialists” or joined the ranks of the White armies trying to destroy the Bolsheviks.101  
Few Russian officers chose the less attractive option of joining the Romanian Army.   
Non-Commissioned Officers 
 The Romanian Army lacked a professional non-commissioned officer corps.  The army 
had subofiţeri, or “sub-officers” in Romanian parlance, but they lacked a corporate identity as 
career NCOs.  Most NCOs were peasants, with a few workers or high school educated youths, 
selected from the annual contingent of draftees after a few short months of service – a draftee 
had only to serve two months before being eligible to be promoted to corporal and after another 
two months could be made a sergeant – and a short NCO training program.102  After serving the 
required two years most NCOs chose to leave the army rather than remain a NCO because they 
wanted to get back to interrupted lives, found army life unpleasant, or were hustled out due to 
budgetary cuts.  The lack of career NCOs weakened the institutional knowledge of the army, 
compromised a potentially stabilizing intermediary between officers and soldiers, and made it 
more difficult to inculcate regimental esprit de corps in new draftees.103    
 A few NCOs remained in the Romanian Army after fulfilling their two-year commitment.  
They were called reangajaţi, literally “re-hired.”  Johann Emrich, a Saxon peasant draftee in the 
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early 1930s, decided to stay on as an NCO for a couple more years to save up his wages in order 
to build a house and to pay the marriage dowry still customary in his village.104  Like him, many 
reangajaţi served just a few years more rather than choosing a career as an NCO.  Those who did 
remain often did not provide crucial service to the army as career NCOs; in 1931 over a tenth of 
the reangajaţi were regimental musicians, whose talents were not in leadership or training.105  As 
the Romanian Army tried to improve the quality of personnel in the 1930s, it required reangajaţi 
to make a seven-year commitment, but the requirements to become an NCO remained very low.  
2nd Lieutenant Manolescu later quipped, “No special qualifications were required, though it was 
implied that they should be able to read and write.”106   
Therefore, the NCO corps was divided between reangajaţi and short-term NCOs chosen 
from new draftees that contributed to the difficulty of creating a united NCO group identity.  In 
1931, there were 13,790 reangajaţi and 11,332 draftee NCOs.107  The reangajaţi who decided to 
make the army a career aimed to achieve the rank of sergeant-major who primarily carried out an 
administrative function focused on the regimental economy [gospodărie], rather than effectively 
training conscripts.108  At least reangajaţi chose to remain NCOs, the process of recruiting new 
NCOs from among draftees was less voluntary.  Each spring, officers kept a lookout for likely 
NCO candidates with basic literacy seemingly the most crucial (perhaps only) requirement in the 
new batch of draftees.  Officers promoted draftees from private first class to corporal to sergeant 
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as quickly as possible in order to benefit from their assistance during their short two-year period 
of military service.  These draftee NCOs usually had little say in their promotion. 
Pressured into a position of authority and planning to leave the army as soon as possible, 
many NCOs decided to use their position of power to exploit the next contingent of draftees for 
personal gain.  Captain Grosu later recalled that NCOs “raised in rank – after being pushed by 
us, the officers – rapidly forget that they had also been privates and flaunt behavior [mentalităţi] 
unsuitable of a leader, so much so, that rather than a help, they were harmful, their comportment 
being completely contrary to regulations.”109  In his semi-autobiographical work From Military 
Life, consisting of vignettes of army life before the First World War, Bacalbaşa does not present 
a flattering picture of NCOs.  Sergeants are depicted as bullies who haze new draftees, use their 
fists to enforce discipline, and fleece draftees of any valuable personal items.110  In one vignette a 
sergeant takes an immediate disliking to a draftee showing too much promise by mastering the 
theory and lessons taught very quickly.  Bacalbaşa insinuates that such brightness and initiative 
was resented or feared by the sergeant who proceeds to haze the recruit mercilessly: depriving 
him of sleep, insulting him at every opportunity, and physically pushing him around.  In the end 
the once promising draftee, now broken by the sergeant, goes AWOL.111  Bacalbaşa is far from 
unbiased, but such cases remained common through the interwar period.  For example, Private 
Weiss, a well-off ethnic German from Bessarabia serving as a territorial cavalryman in 1938, 
remembered, “the sergeants were always finding little ways to force us to give them money.”112  
The soldiers in his Călăraşi unit (a polyglot group of Romanians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, and 
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ethnic Germans) had to present themselves at roll-call each morning with pristine uniforms, but 
often small stars on their riding boots would mysteriously go missing, Weiss believed taken by 
the NCOs, and privates would pay the sergeant 10 or 20 lei for new ones to avoid punishment.  
Unfortunately, such abuse by NCOs was a normal part of army life.    
 There were efforts to increase the number and improve the training of NCOs during the 
interwar years.  As part of the general expansion of the military training system after 1918 new 
schools for training regular and TTR NCOs were established, but deficiencies in both number 
and quality of NCOs was never solved.  After 1941, German commanders were shocked by “the 
absence of a non-commissioned officer corps as we know it.”113  The German Military Mission 
began helping to train NCOs in late 1940, but there was far too little time before the invasion of 
the USSR and the war only exacerbated the shortage of NCOs.  The Romanian Army resorted to 
the mass promotion of sergeants and corporals who had distinguished themselves in combat to 
fill the positions of lieutenants and sergeants killed in battle.114  Many NCOs, however, had also 
distinguished themselves as killers during the invasion, initiating pogroms or massacres of Jews.  
The army initiated a crash program to train more NCOs (and officers) in early 1942.  Although 
the quality of NCO training did improve with assistance from German advisors, the Romanian 
Army was never able to train enough NCOs and it remained a significant handicap.  
The Romanian Soldier 
In the 1830s, when General Kiselylov initiated his reforms, the vast majority of peasants 
were held in thrall to the boyars.  The princes of medieval Wallachia and Moldavia were able to 
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mobilize large armies through feudal levies of free peasants, but during Ottoman suzerainty the 
boyars had gradually enserfed the peasantry until they could no longer provide military service to 
the prince.  In the eighteenth century, influenced by Enlightenment ideas, the Phanariote Greek 
princes of the principalities emancipated the serfs, however, they were not given land, nor were 
their feudal obligations revoked – especially the clacă, or unpaid labor owed to the boyar – and 
the boyars again gradually re-enserfed the peasants.  Therefore, only a few free peasants could be 
recruited into the army after the Russian reforms in 1830. 
 The emancipation of the serfs in 1864 was an extremely important event for the peasantry 
and the army.  Romanian society did not immediately change because they were again not given 
enough land and were also required to pay a “redemption tax” similar to the one paid by Russian 
peasants for their emancipation that kept peasants in poverty and working boyar lands as landless 
tenant farmers.  There were some clear improvements.  Peasant no longer had to pay tithes to the 
boyar, respect boyar economic monopolies, or provide 12 days of clacă to the boyar each year.115  
Emancipation marked the starting point after which Romanian society steadily modernized and 
the traditional authority of the boyars was undermined.  This was a long process and the boyars 
fought to hold onto their privileges and power for as long as possible.  It was not until the 1880s 
that Romania finally began to see the effects as cities grew, towns were electrified, and industry 
developed.  Modernization, however, was uneven.  In 1899, illiteracy still dominated the country 
as 78 percent of the total population, and as much as 85 percent in the countryside, could not 
read or write.116  While society changed only slowly, the army changed quickly. 
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 The introduction of universal military service meant that each year a new contingent of 
peasant draftees was inducted into the ranks and as the Romanian Army grew larger it had to rely 
on peasants reporting voluntarily.  Nationalism helped normalize universal military service since 
nationalist rhetoric portrayed the army as the defender of the nation, turning military service into 
a patriotic duty, and conscription became a normal part of peasant life, even a rite of manhood.117  
The education reforms of Spiru Haret in the 1890s that increased rural literacy contributed to the 
spread of nationalism from the urban elite to the rural peasantry.  The 1908 army law established 
the requirements of military service that changed little before the Second World War.  All male 
residents were required to provide some sort of military service between 21 to 40 – seven years 
of possible regular duty, five years in the reserves, three years in the militia, and four years in the 
territorials – with draftees serving a mandatory two years if inducted into infantry and three years 
(to master the difficult skills of horsemanship) if inducted into cavalry.118  While military service 
as a patriotic duty became the norm by the fin de siècle, poor conditions or treatment by officers 
meant that military service was still seen by some soldiers as a kind of punishment.   
The army culture could sometimes be a shock to the newly drafted peasant.  Bacalbaşa 
captures this transition in another vignette.  In it the army barber, a gardener in civilian life, calls 
up draftees to cut their long peasant hair and beards while a soldier drafted the year before yells, 
“Go get your haircut, soldier!  [After he’s done with you] when you go home people will think 
you escaped from prison.”119  The fleecing of new draftees by NCOs follows.  Peasant draftees 
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were confronted with a barrage of unfamiliar military words that they had to learn rapidly or be 
physically disciplined.  Bacalbaşa describes the growing disillusionment of new recruits in army 
life as they watched older soldiers celebrating the end of their two years of military service.  
The recruits looked mournfully at the [departing] reservists, and for them this 
merriment of the freed [soldiers] was not a good sign; why were they celebrating 
so much, seemingly as if they had escaped from jail?  Why?  Is the life of a 
solider not happy?  What?  Did the priest lie, the mayor lie, everyone lie when 
they said what a great pleasure it is to be a soldier?  Did they lie…?120 
 
Things had not changed much by the Second World War.  When Emilian Ezechil was inducted 
into the 2nd Călăraşi Regiment in November 1941, NCOs mocked “the newly arrived recruits in 
an absurd manner,” who had to wear civilian clothes for the first week of training, during which 
time the “mocking reached cruel and even unconscionable heights,” and only once they received 
uniforms did the hazing subside121  New draftees were supposed to be issued new uniforms, but 
often got “old rags” of mismatched tunics, puttees, trousers, and boots.122 
Not every peasant had the same reaction to military life.  Life in the army could be better 
than life at home in the village for many draftees.  Often it was the first time they received steady 
pay that they could spend as they liked or got to see more of the world than just their own small 
village or nearby market town.  The food may have been monotonous, but it was at least regular: 
for breakfast a half cup of sweet tea and a slice of bread, for lunch a vegetable or bean soup three 
times a week and mămăligă (cornmeal mush) the rest of the week, and for dinner leftovers of 
lunch.123  Of course, small army budgets, corrupt officers, and self-interested NCOs could 
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combine to make army life miserable, however, as Sergeant Emrich declared to his family, “in 
the Balkans, to be a soldier in a time without conflict between nations was a blessing.”124   
 Most draftees entering the Romanian Army before the First World War were Romanian 
Orthodox Christians.  The Romanian Orthodox Church was a staunch ally of the state, but its 
influence in the army was limited and lacked a permanent structure before the First World War.  
Because of large numbers of religious minorities entering the ranks during the interwar period 
this changed.  Most of the ethnic minorities, nearly 30 percent of the roughly 18 million 
inhabitants in 1930, were not Romanian Orthodox.125  Added to this was the uncomfortable fact 
that nearly 60 percent of ardeleni from Transylvania were Greek Catholic (Uniate) believers who 
practiced the Eastern Orthodox rite but recognized the supremacy of the Roman Pontiff.126  Due 
to the minority treaty forced on Romania at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 the army adopted 
a policy that mandated that each regimental chaplain to be chosen according to whatever was the 
religious faith of the majority of soldiers in a regiment.  In theory a Uniate or Catholic priest, a 
Protestant pastor, a rabbi, or even an imam could be the regimental chaplain, but in practice since 
most draftees were Romanian Orthodox most regimental chaplains were too.127   
 The creation of the Episcopie militară, or Military Bishopric, in 1921 strengthened army-
church relations.  Its purpose, “the Church will be in the army [italics in original], in other words, 
in an organic way, inside the national military organization.”128  The Orthodox calendar dictated 
the yearly rhythm of the Romanian Army, punctuated by its holidays, while minorities had to do 
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without spiritual guidance from their religious leaders and faced discrimination for their religious 
beliefs.129  By 1924, officers and chaplains were concerned about the “Adventist danger” in the 
ranks.  Transylvania and Bessarabia had small, but growing, groups of Adventists, Baptists, and 
other sects.130  The pacifism, anti-state sentiments, “foreignness,” and especially proselyting zeal 
of neo-Protestant religious sects worried officers.  Catholics, traditional Protestants, and Uniates 
were also viewed with a certain degree of suspicion by Romanian officers.   
 Jewish soldiers were the most suspect group in the army and were viewed with hostility 
by officers and enlisted men alike.  Anti-Semitic officers saw Jews as spies, traitors, or worse 
(socialists or communists) and believed that they posed a security threat, while the anti-Semitic 
rank and file resented having hated Jews placed in any position of authority over them.  Military 
service and wearing a uniform would not protect Jews.  During the retreat from Bessarabia in 
1940, Jewish soldiers were among the first targeted by fellow Romanian soldiers in a wave of 
anti-Semitic violence.131  All Jewish enlisted men were eventually thrown out of the army.   
Officer-Soldier Relations in the Interwar Army 
 Despite the changes in the army and the shift in the social origins of the officer corps 
between 1830 and 1930 the officers of the interwar Romanian Army continued to treat their 
soldiers like serfs.  The Constitution of 1923 guaranteed equal treatment before the law and 
universal male suffrage to peasants.  The monarchy and parliament followed up these actions 
with large-scale land reform to give peasants land, first enacted by a decree-law in 1918 and 
followed by another in 1921 that expanded the amount of land expropriated, especially in the 
                                                 
129 Johann Emrich missed his Lutheran church services and hymns, see, Emrich, In Search of the Lost Ones, 5. 
130 Locot. Gh. Popovici, “Pericolul ‘Adventist’ în Armata,” România militară LVI, Nr. 9 (Septemvrie 1924), 82.  
131 Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania, 39, 41-43. 
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newly annexed provinces where the large landholdings of minority elites were broken up; this 
was the largest redistribution of land in Romania until communist land reform in the 1950s.132  
The state made great efforts to make citizens of the peasants, but officers’ attitudes altered little.  
The officers not only looked down on peasant soldiers, but also consistently ignored their needs 
or training while prioritizing their own comfort and social privileges.   
 The practice most detrimental to the relationship between officers and soldiers, to the 
military preparedness of the army, and to its professionalism was the use of soldiers as labor.  
During the interwar period the officer corps saw soldiers as a source of to exploit for personal 
gain.  Some officers went so far as to equate soldiers with horses in their writings, demonstrating 
the depth of aristocratic contempt for soldiers, who they often saw as little more than beasts of 
burden.133  When officers put soldiers to work the labor was sometimes relatively benign, such as 
having an orderly help an officer’s wife do her shopping or doing chores around the house.  It 
was more damaging when it involved large groups of soldiers being leased out landholders as 
agricultural laborers with the profits going to the regimental economy (or into the pockets of the 
officers) – a practice eventually endorsed by the army quartermaster as official army policy in 
the difficult economic time of the early 1930s.134  The use of draftees as labor was terrible for the 
army because it replaced the training necessary to create competent and professional soldiers and 
had a negative effect on the combat efficiency of the army in 1941.   
Regiments did not hire out all soldiers as labor and usually did so only at certain times of 
year when extra hands were needed, but this did not mean that officers were training soldiers in 
                                                 
132 For details on the land reform laws, see, Roberts, Rumania, 26-28.  
133 General Negrei, “Despre nevoile ofiţerilor şi modul cum ar putea fi uşurate,” România militară LV, Nr. 11 
(Noemvire 1923), 1031.   
134 Watts, Romanian Cassandra, 49. 
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the meantime because of another common practice of simply sending soldiers home on leave for 
extended periods of time.  Officers justified this practice by citing budget shortfalls.  Indeed, the 
interwar period was characterized by a sluggish post-war economy in the 1920s followed by the 
crisis of the Depression in the 1930s.  During these difficult years the state budget was slashed, 
and senior officers decided to send soldiers home on even longer periods of extended leave and 
conscripted fewer each year because it was considered too expensive to feed, house, or pay them 
– much less to train soldiers.  In 1925 the situation was so bad that General C. Dragu warned that  
an [annual] contingent [of draftees] does not do more in their two years of active 
military service than a maximum of 7 months of training, the rest it passes on 
leave, in guards and services, [and] in endless drudgery (for example: work in the 
fields, in vegetable gardens, [gathering] forage, wood[cutting], carrying out 
special missions [delegatii], etc) [author’s italics].135 
 
Even if General Dragu was exaggerating for the sake of his argument, which was the need for 
soldiers to get at least 10 to 12 months of training during their two years of military service, the 
fact that soldiers were not being trained for combat because they were being used as labor or 
simply sent home is painfully evident.  Nicolae Iorga, a respected historian and minister in the 
government formed by King Carol II after declaring a royal dictatorship in 1938, gave a speech 
that year to the officers at the Superior School of War in Bucharest in which he condemned the 
practice of extended leave because it interrupted training and caused soldiers to forget what they 
had learned, so when they were re-called to their unit they returned almost as raw recruits.136  It 
is easy to blame these practices on corruption or dismiss them as pragmatic solutions to interwar 
economic difficulties, but they predated the First World War and continued after the economy 
                                                 
135 General C. Dragu, “Reducerea serviciului militar activ. Aplicarea Principiilor democratice (Urmare şi sfârşit),” 
România militară LVII, Nr. 3 (Martie 1925), 21. 
136 Nicolae Iorga, Stări sufleteşti şi războaie-Sufletful româesc-Îndreptare de ostaşi (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 
1994), 176.  
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improved.  The underlaying issue was the clash between the chronically small state revenue of a 
poor country like Romania and the need for a large army to defend the gains of România Mare.  
During the fin de siècle, Carol I had depended on the Triple Alliance to shield his kingdom and 
make up for the inability to properly finance the Romanian Army.  Romania no longer had such 
a strong alliance to protect itself during the interwar period and military subsidies from Western 
Europe dried up, so that even when a third of the state budget was dedicated to military expenses 
by the late-1930s it was still not sufficient for the army’s needs.137  Officers did not stop, and the 
General Staff continued to use draftees as laborers through the end of the Antonescu regime. 
 Officers remained aloof from their men and often put themselves first before the soldiers.  
They wore uniforms that were of a much higher quality and more stylish than the cheap uniforms 
for draftees.  The beginning of war in 1941 increased demands and exacerbated shortages.  The 
wartime intelligence reports on the morale of the army on the front consisted mainly of officers’ 
complaints about low salaries, cost of living, and the difficulties in maintaining uniforms.138  The 
NCOs seemed to have aped the officers in this respect as well.  Granted, officers required these 
things to be effective commanders, but the reports always prioritized the needs of the officers, 
and to a lesser extent the NCOs, while soldiers were expected to make do.  This attests to the 
lack of concern for their men that permeated the officer corps.  Not all officers were heartless, 
                                                 
137 Christophe Midan, Carol al II-lea şi teroarea istoriei, 1930-1940, trans. Daniela Codruţa Midan (Bucharest: 
Editura militară, 2008); 54.  
138 There are almost too many examples of these complaints to count, but to reference just a few, officer concern 
about inflation in 1941and cost of living, see, ANIC, Fond MR: CM, dosar 56 bis, f. 26; for officers unable to repair 
their boots (soldiers often only had cardboard soled shoes), dosar 56 bis, f. 332; for early 1942 report prioritizing the 
need to get officers a new set of clothes (no mention of that need for soldiers), dosar 137 vol. II, f. 70; a report on the 
dire situation in Crimea in 1943 emphasized the fact officers looked as bad as the common soldiers with worn out 
uniforms and missing their baggage that had been lost in retreats, see, BMMN, Fond Manuscrise, MSS 676, f. 12.  
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especially during the war, and shared in the same privations as their soldiers while fighting in the 
Soviet Union that bound them together in comradeship. 
 The gap between officers and soldiers is most starkly evident in their food and quarters.  
The strict social hierarchy in the officer corps was reflected in different meals: one for high 
ranking officers, one for lower ranking officers, and another for NCOs, while the soldiers all ate 
from a common pot.  The legendary (or depending on one’s perspective infamous) cauldron soup 
[borş la cazan] was a simple, sometimes watered down, soup consisting mostly of beans cooked 
in a large pot.139  The conditions of army barracks also left much to be desired.  There had long 
been a shortage in military infrastructure; before the First World War recruits often bunked in 
tents due to the shortage of barracks.  Soldiers’ barracks had common beds, with several soldiers 
sharing each bunk, lacked bathing facilities, often did not have heating in colder months, and had 
generally unhealthy sanitary conditions.140  In contrast officers lived in houses away from the 
garrison; they even complained if their house lacked a good root-cellar or garden.141   
If they could afford it soldiers augmented their army rations.  Private Weiss and some of 
the other ethnic Germans in his cavalry unit pooled their resources to rent a room in a village 
near their post where they stored extra food because they “always had to buy extra food to 
survive.”142  An order in January 1941 set out an official food allowance: generals 150 lei a day, 
high ranking officers 120 lei a day, lower ranking officers 80 lei a day, master sergeants 60 lei a 
                                                 
139 For concerns about the quality of the “cauldron soup,” see, Căpitan Radu Dinulescu, “Chestiuni de organizare si 
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day, and staff sergeants and sergeants 40 lei a day.143  Privates only got 25 lei a day, a sum so 
low that reports were soon requesting that it be raised to at least 30 lei as “in the current situation 
[of high inflation] it is impossible for a man to feed himself [on that sum].”144  Soldiers were 
expected to augment the bread and meat bought with the 30 lei with vegetables and greens grown 
by soldiers at the garrison in “military gardens.”  It is not surprising that Romanian soldiers later 
regularly pillaged Soviet towns and villages for food when the army had difficulty just feeding 
its soldiers at home, much less on campaign abroad.  This ubiquitous crime was still subject to 
punishment if an officer felt that he needed to make an example to re-impose discipline.     
 Corporal punishment, including flogging, was a common practice in the Romanian Army.  
During training officers and NCOs employed slaps, punches, or kicks to instruct or discipline.  A 
bâtă – a small club or stick – was commonly used if draftees did not learn quick enough.  Those 
training officers or NCOs who were especially brutal were hated by draftees.  Flogging was more 
official, employed less often, and used to punish serious infractions, such as being AWOL or for 
theft.  It was often used to make an example to discourage similar behavior by other draftees.  It 
was administered in a sort of ritual as the offender was bent over a table, dropped his pants, and 
was lashed with a belt by an NCO while the rest of the men in the unit were made to look on.145  
The number of lashes depended on the seriousness of the infraction (or anger of the officer) with 
a maximum of 25, although as little as five might be meted out.  Regulations required a doctor to 
be present to be sure things did not get out of control and not cripple or kill the soldier.   
                                                 
143 Fond MR: CM, dosar 56, f. 1.   
144 Ibid., dosar 56 bis, f. 496, f. 332. 
145 After describing the process one veteran called flogging “Antonescu’s mistake,” see, Ciornei, Iaşi, 2010.  
 89 
 
Corporal punishment remained common during the war.  Officers employed flogging for 
a range of infractions endemic to armies on the front like desertion, looting, and rape.146  They 
also still informally hit soldiers for less serious errors.  Sergeant Evsevie Ionescu recorded a case 
in July 1942 when he was slapped fourfive times by the unit veterinarian who caught him tiring 
out the already overtaxed horses after having overloaded a cart against regulations.147  In another 
passage from 1942 he succinctly describes the nature of corporal punishment in the Romanian 
Army and relationship to army hierarchy that applies equally to peacetime and wartime.  “During 
the march I was insulted by a superior and I was listened to by an inferior, this conforming with 
military rank and indiscipline, [if] the orders are not executed by the soldier exactly, [then] 
without insults [being effective] it is a case for striking [him].”148   
Conclusion 
 The social structure of the army changed significantly in the century following the 
establishment of a modern army by the Russians in the Romanian principalities after 1830.  
These changes particularly affected the social exclusivity of the officer corps.  The aristocratic 
culture of the officer corps was initially fostered by the practice of selecting officers from the 
Romanian nobility begun under the Russians.  Although the social composition of the officer 
corps changed, the aristocratic culture in the army did not weaken, on the contrary, the officer 
corps consciously strengthened its aristocratic identity as the century progressed.  The officer 
corps successfully inculcated aristocratic culture into the non-nobles (military sons and peasants) 
who were attracted to a career in the army; in part, because its aristocratic culture offered them 
                                                 
146 In this case soldiers had raped a 10-year-old girl, see, Vasile Scârneci, Viaţa şi moartea în linia întâi, 129.   
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social status and power they lacked in civilian life.  For peasants the army was a means of social 
mobility.  The army was far less successful in attracting officer candidates from the very small 
urban middle class who did not find army life or the aristocratic culture of the officer corps 
attractive.  The modernization of the economy and the expansion of the state bureaucracy offered 
them much more attractive career opportunities in the growing cities of fin de siècle Romania.  
For them the army was seen as a step down in social status.  Soldiers continued to be taken from 
the peasantry through this entire period as Romania remained an agricultural society with a small 
urban workforce.  Thus, it resembled a nineteenth more than a twentieth century army.   
 The aristocratic identity of the officer corps hindered the development of professionalism 
in the army and contributed to poor leadership and management of soldiers who were treated like 
serfs, regularly abused physically, and used as labor by the officer corps.  The economic realities 
of the interwar Romanian economy exacerbated the situation.  Soldiers did very little soldiering 
during their short two years in the army because much of their time spent on leave, laboring as 
agricultural workers, tending the post’s garden, or working on various construction projects – 
uniforms alone could not create professional soldiers.  These weaknesses negatively affected the 
army’s efficiency in combat on the Eastern Front after 1941.  Nonetheless, during the nineteenth 
century the Romania had developed a relatively effective army that could mobilize a remarkably 
large number of men for such a small, impoverished country.  Its soldiers’ lack of training was 
exacerbated by material and equipment shortages.  Therefore, when the Romanian Army went to 
war again in 1941, the officer corps continued to trust in the spirit of their soldiers to make up for 
its many weaknesses.  
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CHAPTER III 
NINETEENTH CENTURY NATION BUILDING, IDEOLOGY, AND INTRINSIC 
MOTIVATION  
 
In the titanic struggle between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during the Second 
World War, the motivation of the Romanian Army as a Nazi ally has been ignored, marginalized, 
and misrepresented.  Historians have argued that Romanian soldiers lacked motivation to fight 
beyond the borders of România Mare.  This chapter will argue that while Romanian society did 
not adhere to a fascist ideology rooted in scientific racism like Nazi Germany, it did have its own 
potent worldview that coincided with fascism in many ways and motivated Romanian soldiers in 
the challenging campaigns on the Eastern Front, namely: nationalism, religion, anti-Semitism, 
and anti-communism.  These ideologies bound officers and enlisted men together to forge strong 
unit cohesion, made the Romanian Army more effective in combat, and motivated troops to fight 
well beyond the national borders of Romania.  Unfortunately, they also contributed to the mass 
participation of Romanian soldiers in carrying out atrocities against Jews during the war.   
Military historians have developed different theories to explain soldiers’ motivation to 
fight.  John Lynn believes that soldiers’ motivation is based on three basic interests: coercive, 
remunerative, and normative.  Coercion uses or threatens direct physical punishment to force 
soldiers to fight, remuneration uses material reward (land, pay, or booty) to entice, and normative 
uses symbolic and psychological rewards or punishments to persuade.  Lynn argues that the 
French Revolution introduced a fundamental change in normative interest because “the prime 
motivation of volunteers and conscripts was perceived to be their concern for the nation’s 
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welfare.”1  Thus, the nation took precedence over the life of an individual soldier.  This shift in 
normative interest occurred slightly later in Romania than in Western Europe, but a powerful 
nationalism had developed by the end of the nineteenth century.  This chapter will show that the 
Romanian Army relied on soldiers’ normative interest based on defending the nation, buttressed 
by other powerful ideologies that grew more radicalized in the interwar period, to motivate them 
in combat.  These same ideologies were the basis of atrocity motivation too.  This is not to argue 
that coercion or remuneration played no role in motivating Romanian soldiers.  Lynn points out 
that any soldier in any army at any given time is motivated by a combination of these interests, 
and extrinsic motivating factors like coercion and remuneration will be examined in Chapter 
VIII, but neither acted as the primary interest undergirding the motivation of Romanian soldiers 
on the Eastern Front.  During the Second World War, Romanian soldiers fought against Soviet 
“Judeo-Bolshevism” for what they believed was the good of România Mare.     
The conventional wisdom currently holds that coercion was the primary motivator of the 
Romanian soldier on the Eastern Front, however, this idea is based on assumption or anecdote 
and not detailed research.  The recent opening of Romanian archives and publication of firsthand 
accounts make this position no longer tenable.  The misrepresentation of Romanian soldier’s 
motivation began before the war in the Soviet Union.  Red Army political commissars told their 
men that the “imperialist bourgeois-landowning class” in Romania exploited the peasantry and 
following Marxist dogma they prophesied that Romanian soldiers would refuse to fight, and start 
a revolution, if war broke out.  Obviously, Romanian soldiers did fight after 1941, prompting the 
                                                 
1 John A. Lynn, Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791-1794 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 24. 
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Soviets to claim that Romanian soldiers were only fighting due to German coercion – with two 
Germans behind every Romanian forcing them to fight.2  British journalists reporting from still 
neutral Romania between 1939 and 1941 reinforced the idea of German coercion – going so far 
as to describe the arrival of the German Military Mission in 1940 in the terms of an occupation.3  
During 1943, diplomats of the Antonescu regime began to quietly spread arguments in neutral 
capitals that Romanians was forced to keep fighting on the Eastern Front because of the threat of 
German occupation.4  Coercion, however, fails to explain Romanian soldiers’ motivation.  First, 
it ignores the fact that Romanian soldiers enthusiastically participated in Operation Barbarossa in 
1941 and the ethnic cleansing of Romanian and Soviet territory of Jews during 1941-1942.  They 
were not forced into the conflict.  Second, the Wehrmacht spread itself increasingly thinly as the 
German Army advanced into the USSR, so the Germans did not have sufficient forces to coerce 
the Romanians had they had wanted.  By 1943-1944, the Romanian Army could have abandoned 
the war much earlier than it did.  Finally, Romanian officers who used physical coercion liberally 
on the front put their lives at risk.  If in peacetime the use of slaps, punches, kicks, and beatings 
was common on the parade ground, in wartime the situation was very different.  Since the mid-
nineteenth century, firepower required soldiers to be spread out on the battlefield and could not 
be closely supervised by officers, so during battles they relied on soldiers’ intrinsic motivation.  
While on the front, physical punishments were still used in the rear to enforce discipline, but 
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soldiers were less willing to submit to abusive officers.  Romanian soldiers had to be intrinsically 
motivated to fight and if they were not the Romanian Army would have collapsed regardless of 
any attempts by Romanian officers or German units to force them to fight.   
Physical discipline did not disappear in wartime, both informal slaps and official flogging 
continued to be common, but arbitrary physical abuse was less pronounced on the front than on 
the training field.  Officers or NCOs who had been especially brutal or sadistic during training 
often requested a transfer once the unit was ordered to the front, fearing for their life.  Moreover, 
recent interviews with veterans suggest that so long the reason for flogging or beating seemed 
legitimate they were accepted most Romanian soldiers on the front.5  Therefore, while coercion 
played a role – as it does in every modern military – it was to discipline soldiers during training 
or in the rear, not to motivate in combat and most assuredly not to motivate to commit atrocities. 
One must find other reasons to explain why Romanian soldiers fought so committedly alongside 
their German comrades and carried out widespread atrocities against Romanian and Soviet Jews. 
Since the Second World War sociologists have focused on the primary group to explain 
the motivation of soldiers and their effectiveness in combat, but the primary group also played a 
central role in the motivation of soldiers to carry out atrocities.6  The primary group is a small 
number of soldiers in a larger military unit who form tight-knit bonds with each other.  These 
bonds increase the cohesion and effectiveness of the unit overall as soldiers fight not only for 
                                                 
5 A former sergeant major asserted that “if there was one [flogging] a year it was a big deal” and that NCOs were 
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abstract ideas, but also for their friends in the primary group.7  Nevertheless, ideology played an 
important role in reinforcing primary groups formed by Romanian soldiers on the Eastern Front.  
Soldiers can develop stronger primary groups if they share things in common, such as language, 
religion, social origins, or ideology.  Romanian soldiers who shared similar ideological beliefs, 
culture, and prejudices.  Furthermore, nationalism, religion, anti-Semitism, and anti-communism 
not only bound together primary groups horizontally, but also vertically, linking soldiers with 
officers to make class difference less divisive, especially on the front.  Combat motivation and, 
unfortunately, atrocity motivation of Romanian officers and soldiers can be explained in part by 
the formation of strong primary groups that were bound tightly by a consensus on the perceived 
threat of Soviet communism to the nation.  This consensus was basted on long-term underlying 
factors, which this chapter explores, and materialized after the events of 1940.  
The creation of România Mare contributed to the radicalization of ideologies in interwar 
Romanian society.  The state enfranchised the Romanian peasantry and promised them progress 
and privileges as citizens of an ethnic Romanian nation, but soon Romanians saw this dream of 
national unity under multiple threats.  These perceived threats to România Mare were internal, 
both minorities (above all Jews) and corrupted (“Judaized”) Romanians, as well as external, the 
revisionist states of the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Bulgaria who coveted the territories that 
Romania had annexed in 1918.  These fears contributed to the rise of far-right political parties 
focused on King, Nation, and God that used populism to attack the state.  Far-right groups, such 
as LANC, and later fascist groups, the Legionary movement the most successful, promised that 
they would root out the internal threat of Jews, minorities, and “kike-ized” civil servants to keep 
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the nation strong enough to fend off the external threats.  The interwar period, culmination of the 
nineteenth nation-building project in Romania, prepared Romanians of all classes to be ready to 
join in Nazi Germany’s anti-communist crusade after 1941.   
The introduction of universal male suffrage in 1924 created the conditions for a surge of 
populism that pushed politics increasingly to the right during the interwar period and allowed the 
rise of fascism in Romania.8  In her seminal work on Romanian interwar nation building, Irina 
Livezeanu argues that the rhetoric of România Mare focused on the Romanian peasant because 
they were the “lowest common denominator” linking all the newly annexed territories, with their 
ethnically diverse populations, to the Old Kingdom of Romania.  Peasants “became the symbol 
of the nation and the ally of the state.”9  The state enjoined peasants to become educated and join 
the ranks of the middle or working class, but the domination of cities by minority populations 
threatened this nationalist dream.  Thus, while a yawning social gap continued to exist between 
the peasantry and the urban elite, it was bridged by the rhetoric of building România Mare.  The 
uncomfortable fact that nearly a third of the population, an even greater proportion in the cities, 
of interwar Romania was made up of minorities made the coalition between Romanian elites and 
peasants even more important and contributed to the radicalization of interwar ideologies.  Jews 
were singled out by both state institutions and right-wing populists as the scapegoat for the social 
and economic ills that continued to confront the nation during the interwar period.10   
Scientific racism was not a significant motivating factor among the Romanian rank and 
file.  These racist ideas and theories were popular among a small circle of academics and some of 
                                                 
8 Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Knopf, 2004), 42-43. 
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the middle-class elite, however, unlike the other ideologies that will be examined in this chapter, 
theories of eugenics or racial hygiene do not appear to have penetrated down to ordinary peasant 
soldiers.11  Romanian soldiers had more sympathy towards Slavic peoples than German soldiers.  
Nazi ideology, based on decades of elite debates about eugenics that had reached the mainstream 
in German society, categorized Slavs as Untermenschen, or “sub-humans,” unworthy of life.12  
Instead, Romanian rhetoric of “holy war” reinforced sentiments of solidarity with Slavic groups 
based on common Eastern Orthodox religious faith.  Romanian soldiers generally treated Soviet 
civilians and POWs – except for Jews – less brutally than did German soldiers.  Conditions in 
Romanian-occupied Transnistria were markedly better than in German-occupied Ukraine.13  The 
Romanian Army still treated Soviet civilians harshly at times, especially against those who were 
accused of being partisans, but primarily citing military necessity. 
This in no way denies the existence of racism among Romanian soldiers.  Gypsy soldiers 
faced strong racial bias and discrimination in the Romanian Army, and more generally in society, 
but most Romanians did not believe in a racial hierarchy similar to that which undergirded Nazi 
ideology.  The Antonescu regime included a few eugenicists in high government positions that 
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favored anti-Gypsy policies.  In a propaganda book printed in 1941, Antonescu indicated his own 
hostility towards Gypsies when he promised that Jews who had “clandestinely” entered Romania 
would be placed in camps and forced to work “because only this way we will force them to leave 
[the country],” and not just “kikes” but “all the others – Greeks, Armenians, and Gypsies.”14  He 
later tried to deliver on this promise in mid-1942.  Anti-Semitism incorporated some aspects of 
scientific racism.  Nevertheless, when defining a Jew in anti-Semitic legislation in 1940, despite 
scattered references to “biological criteria” and “blood,” the laws continued to be based primarily 
on religious criteria.15  The lack of racial ideology, however, did not inhibit Romanians from 
enthusiastic collaboration with the Germans in implementing the “Final Solution.”  
This chapter addresses the long-term factors that motivated Romanian soldiers to fight 
and commit atrocities during the Second World War.  Romanian society was predisposed to take 
the actions that it did following 1941, especially after the events of 1940 that will be covered in 
Chapter V, because of nationalism, religion, anti-Semitism, and anti-communism.  The interwar 
liberal-democratic governments, the royal dictatorship of King Carol II of 1938-1940, and the 
military dictatorship of the Antonescu regime during 1940-1944 all followed these popular social 
currents.  Richard J. Evans argues that Nazi propaganda in Germany was so successful because it 
“mainly won over people who were already inclined to identify with the values that the [Nazi] 
Party claimed to represent.”16  Romanian fascism won adherents for the same reason.  Carol II 
and Antonescu both kept the Legionaries out of power, but both dictatorships were successful in 
doing so because they inoculated themselves by adopting more radical positions demanded by a 
                                                 
14 Ioan Scutru, ed., Pe marginea prăpastiei: 21-23 ianuarie 1941, Volum 1 (Bucharest: Editura Scripia, 1992), 130. 
15 Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania, 19-23; Romanians differentiated between assimilated and unassimilated Jews, 
so culture, not race was the key factor, see, Steinhart, The Holocaust and the Germanization of the Ukraine, 6-7.   
16 Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 449.   
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society shifting ever further to the right.  The Conducător ruled because he had the support of 
Romanian society.  Romanian soldiers fought, and murdered, alongside the Wehrmacht during 
the Second World War because they believed in Romania’s “holy war,” which was based on 
long-term factors that had deep roots in nineteenth-century Romania.   
Nationalism 
 The traditional narrative highlights nationalism as a factor, but paradoxically in order to 
prove an absence of motivation among Romanian soldiers fighting on the Eastern Front.  The 
conventional argument has been that Romanian soldiers were only motivated to regain national 
territory and that once they liberated northern Bukovina and Bessarabia – lost to the Soviets in 
1940 – they lacked any motivation to take the fight deeper into the Soviet Union.17  This only 
makes sense if one ignores the other important factors motivating Romanian soldiers: religion, 
anti-Semitism, and anti-communism.  The conventional argument doubles down by claiming that 
Romanian soldiers were more interested in fighting Hungary – for northern Transylvanian – than 
fighting the Soviet Union.  This assertation does not stand up to scrutiny either.  It rests on the 
assumption that Romanian officers and soldiers lacked the ability to prioritize the much greater 
Soviet threat over the lesser threat of Hungary.  Regardless, historians have continued to assert 
that Antonescu alone had the strategic vision to prioritize the defeat of communism over war 
with Hungary and had to force Romania to keep fighting in support of Nazi Germany.18   
Only a few senior officers became reticent about the size of the Romanian commitment to 
the Eastern Front in early 1942, but Antonescu easily sidelined them because most officers, and 
                                                 
17 The first significant figure to make this argument was Erich von Manstein in his memoirs, and has been repeated 
ever since, see, Manstein, Lost Victories, 208; Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 61; Beevor, Stalingrad, 83.  
18 For an account that portrays the conflict as “Antonescu’s war,” depicting him as almost singly responsible for 
going to war in 1941 and continuing it after 1942, see, Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 1-5, 8, 69-71, 84-88.  
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soldiers, believed that the USSR was the primary threat to Romania and had to be defeated at all 
costs.  Indeed, the Romanian Army prioritized the Eastern Front until 23 August 1944.  Soldiers 
knew that if they did not defeat the Red Army that northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, which had 
just been liberated through the shedding of their blood, would be lost.  Furthermore, the Soviets 
just might annex more Romanian territory if the Axis lost the war.  Moreover, officers repeatedly 
promised soldiers that the sacrifices they made while fighting in the east would eventually lead 
to the restoration of northern Transylvania in the west.  They believed Nazi Germany would do 
so if they contributed more than the Hungarians.  Additionally, troops encountered Soviet ethnic 
Romanians (Moldovans) as far east as the Caucasus who they saw as long-lost countrymen that 
needed to be liberated from “the Bolshevik yoke.”  Romanian soldiers were highly motivated by 
nationalism and not just for the first few weeks of war, it continued to sustain combat motivation 
in the ranks during combat deep in the Soviet Union for the next several years.  
 Romanian nationalism began to take shape in the early nineteenth century around the 
same time as the Kiselyov reforms.19  It first took root among the educated bourgeoise elite and 
boyars, especially in Wallachia where many boyars sent sons to be educated in abroad, usually in 
Paris.  The nationalism that developed in Romania, and in Southeast Europe more generally, was 
centered on Romantic ideas about ethnicity rather than on Enlightenment ideas of citizenship.20  
                                                 
19 Some historians see the uprising of Romanian panduri lead by Tudor Vladimirescu in 1821, part of the Greek War 
of Independence, that resulted in the end of Phanariote Greek rule and the return of Romanian princes to the thrones 
of the principalities as the first major nationalist rebellion, but the rapid collapse of the uprising seems to belay this 
argument, see, Florescu, The Struggle against Russia in the Romanian Principalities, 98-100.    
20 German romanticism dominated the development of nationalism in the Balkans, see, Branimir Anzulovic, 
Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide (New York and London: New York University Press, 1999), 69-70; R. 
Chris Davies, “‘Historical Truth and the Realities of Blood’: Romanian and Hungarian Narratives of National 
Belonging and the Case of the Moldavian Csangos, 1920-45,” in 'Regimes of Historicity' in Southeastern and 
Northern Europe, 1890-1945: Discourses of Identity and Temporality, ed. Mishkova, Diana, Balázs Trencsényi, and 
Marja Jalava (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 338-339.   
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These romantic ideas focused on the supposed purity of folk language and culture, elevated the 
peasantry as the national ideal, and emphasized a mystical connection to the land – which Jews 
supposedly lacked.  A century of nation building followed.  Romanian serfs’ exposure to these 
nationalist ideas was relatively limited before their emancipation in 1864, but nationalism grew 
rapidly among the peasantry in the 50 years between emancipation and the First World War. 
In the 1890s, a series of education reforms and changing attitudes of peasants towards the 
value of education that increased literacy helped bolster nationalism.  The development of print 
culture is central to spreading nationalism because it provides the means to create an “imagined 
community” beyond one’s own immediate community based on a shared language, history, and 
culture.21  Spiru Haret’s fin de siècle education reforms contributed to the spread of nationalism 
from urban elites to rural peasantry through his program of village school construction, training 
rural teachers, and publishing of periodicals with useful information geared for peasant readers. 
His efforts resulted in a spike in rural literacy; jumping from 15 percent in 1899 to 33 percent in 
1912.22  While peasants initially resisted efforts to enforce universal education they soon came to 
appreciate the value of education, especially for sons since as future husbands and fathers their 
parents expected them to have the skills of literacy and basic mathematics to succeed in business 
dealings in the growing capitalist market or in interactions with the state.  Daughters, however, 
were not expected to need these skills as wives and mothers and their education suffered, so the 
                                                 
21 For the classic discussion of the importance of “print-capitalism” in the development of the imagined community 
of the nation, allowing the spread of nationalism, see, Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on 
the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Revised Edition (London, New York: Verso, 2006), 36-38, 43-46. 
22 Hitchins, Rumania, 171. 
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1930 census reported that 69 percent among men were literate but only 45 percent of women.23  
Therefore, by the interwar period, young peasants drafted into the army were more literate than 
ever before and thus more exposed to nationalist ideas undergirding the normative interest that 
the army depended on to motivate soldiers in combat.   
 While nationalism could bind social classes together it could also set them at odds if the 
different classes had conflicting priorities while both claimed represented the nation.  During the 
second half of the nineteenth century Romanian urban elites told the peasants that they were the 
embodiment of the nation and inadvertently triggered the development of a peasant nationalism 
that ran parallel to bourgeois nationalism.  Village teachers taught peasant youths that they were 
the members of a great nation, officers lectured their men that they were fulfilling a duty to the 
nation through military service, and politicians claimed their authority to lead in the name of the 
nation.  The Romanian language, the language of the peasants, was exalted over the old imperial 
languages (Ottoman or Greek) by national poets, the most celebrated being Mihai Eminescu.  All 
these efforts were perfectly in line with the romantic beliefs of bourgeois nationalists, but while 
nationalists hoped that peasants would take their rhetoric to heart and support them in their 
cause, they did not expect the peasants to use nationalism to pursue their own goals.  Peasants 
could wield nationalism in their own interests just as the middle class did.  When the Romanian 
nation, represented by the peasantry, seemed to be suffering at the hands of the social elite, then 
conflicting visions of the goals between the social classes for the nation set Romanian peasants 
                                                 
23 Ben Eklof, Russian Peasant Schools: Officialdom, Village Culture, and Popular Pedagogy, 1861-1914 (Berkley, 
Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1986), 267, 271-275, 279; Dimitrie Gusti, ed., Enciclopedia 
României: Volum I (Bucharest: Imprimeria Naţională, 1938), 144. 
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against the Romanian elite.  A sign of this divide was a series of local peasant revolts in 1888, 
1889, 1894, and 1900 resulting from the onerous conditions in the countryside.   
This dissonance resulted in a national peasant uprising in 1907.  It began as a local revolt 
in northern Moldavia against unfair rents and had strong anti-Semitic overtones as peasants first 
attacked Jewish middlemen, who collected rents for absentee boyar landowners, and local Jewish 
merchants, to whom many peasants were indebted.  This local revolt quickly became a national 
uprising against the state as a peasant Jacquerie spread south and west to Wallachia.  There were 
fewer Jews in Wallachia, so while anti-Semitism was a motivating factor, it was secondary to the 
economic policies of the state and the boyar elite.  Peasants rampaged through the countryside 
burning boyar manors and tried to seize control of towns or cities as the Romanian elite became 
the primary target of for their anger.  Peasants blamed boyars and the bourgeoise – in league with 
Jews – for exploiting the nation.24  The Conservative government fell, replaced by a Liberal one 
that quickly turned to violence to suppress the revolt.  The state employing reliable cavalry and 
artillery regiments, fearing to call up infantry regiments who might join fellow peasants, whose 
soldiers fired on mobs leaving many thousands dead and wounded.25  This was the nadir of elite-
peasant nationalist relations.  Once calm had been restored the Liberal government enacted some 
half-hearted reforms to redress the plight of the peasantry, but it took the crisis of the First World 
                                                 
24 Hitchins, Rumania, 167-169; Roberts, Rumania, 3-4; Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania, 193-194; 
boyars, especially in Moldavia where the Jewish population was larger, used Jews as middlemen (called arendaşi) to 
draw up contracts and collect rents from peasant tenants.  Boyars and Jews seemed to be allied.  A similar 
phenomenon developed Galicia, see, Keely Stauter-Halsted, The Nation in the Village: The Genesis of Peasant 
National Identity in Austrian Poland, 1848-1914 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 195.  
25 The number of dead remains a debated.  The socialist press claimed 11,000, but official records 2,000-2,500, see, 
Petre Otu, Mareşalul Alexandru Averescu: militarul, omul politic, legenda (Bucharest: Editura militară, 2009), 59. 
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War to finally force the Romanian elite to enact reforms that significantly improved the situation 
of the peasantry and assured their support for the defense of România Mare.   
 The Peasant Uprising of 1907 shook the kingdom to its foundations and the memory of it 
influenced the actions of Romanian leaders in 1940 and 1941.  The uprising was a key formative 
experience for many who later became senior officers during the Second World War, including 
Antonescu.  He was then a young cavalry lieutenant and dispersed a mob of 2,000 peasants that 
were marching on the city hall of Galaţi by ordering his troopers to fire on them; for his actions 
he received a medal and a personal commendation from King Carol I.26  In 1940, as retreating 
soldiers carried out anti-Semitic violence, the General Staff under King Carol II feared a possible 
repeat of a peasant uprising against the state for its failure to defend România Mare.  A year later 
when popular violence against Jews west of the Prut again broke out in pogroms and massacres, 
the Antonescu regime worried it might spin out of control.  Both Carlist and Antonescu regimes 
took measures to keep it from spreading in Romania for fear of a repeat of 1907.   
 Romanian elites complained that peasants lacked enough national consciousness, but they 
simply did not recognize that peasant nationalism had different goals.27   The fact that Romanian 
peasant soldiers remained committed to the nation during the First World War powerful evidence 
of the strength of nationalism among the peasantry by the early twentieth century.  During 1916, 
the Romanian Army lost 39 percent of its soldiers killed, wounded, or captured; all of Wallachia 
and some of Moldavia were occupied by the Central Powers.28  The conditions in unoccupied 
                                                 
26 Accounts disagree on whether Antonescu ordered his troopers to fire into the crowd or over their heads, but 
General Pantazi believed that 20-30 were killed or wounded, see, Pantazi, Cu Mareşalul până la moarte, 13.  
27 For an example of elite complaints about peasants lacking national sentiment, see, Roland Clark, Holy Romanian 
Youth: Fascist Activism in Interwar Romania (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 11.  
28 Torrey, The Romanian Battlefront in World War I, 170. 
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Moldavia, the monarchy evacuated with the Liberal government and set up a wartime capital in 
the provincial capital of Iaşi, were terrible.  The small territory soon overcrowded with surviving 
soldiers, refugees, and a million Russian troops and all exacerbated by a typhus epidemic.29  
There was concern after the February and October Revolutions in Russia during 197 that 
Romanian soldiers would follow the example of Russian soldiers and refuse to respect military 
hierarchy, orders, or discipline.30  The brutal repression of 1907 uprising was only a decade in 
the past and Romanian leaders greatly feared that the peasant soldiers would listen to Bolshevik 
propagandists encouraging them to overthrow the monarchy as part of the world revolution.  On 
5 April 1917, to ensure the loyalty of the rank and file of the Romanian Army, King Ferdinand I 
announced in a speech to soldiers on the front that they would be given land after the successful 
conclusion of the war.31  In addition to land reform, perhaps the most important issue to peasants, 
the government promised universal male suffrage and true equality before the law.  This speech 
helped convinced soldiers to remain loyal to their officers and allowed the Romanian Army to 
successfully carry out the campaigns of 1918 and 1919 that created România Mare.  
During 1918, the Romanian Army fought several anti-communist campaigns.  The 
government used the army to protect the monarchy, try to leverage a better peace treaty with the 
Central Powers in May 1918, re-enter the war on the side of the Allies in November 1918, and 
defeated “Red Budapest.”  First, Romanian troops secured Iaşi in late-1917.  Then they disarmed 
and escorted Russian soldiers out of Moldavia during 1918 – although there were several pitched 
                                                 
29 There were an estimated 500,000 cases of typhus between February and June 1917 alone, see, Ionuţ Isaia Jeican, 
Florin Ovidiu Botiş, and Dan Gheban, “Typhus Exanthematicus in Romania during the Second World War (1940-
1945) Reflected by Romanian Medical Journals of the Time,” Clujul Medical 88, no. 1 (2015), 83. 
30 Torrey, The Romanian Battlefront in World War I, 266.  
31 Scurtu, Istoria românilor în timpul celor patru regi, volumul II: Ferdinand I, 39. 
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battles with Russian soldiers who refused to be disarmed.32  The opening shots of Romania’s first 
anti-communist campaign had been fired.  The Romanian Army occupied Russian Bessarabia on 
23 January 1918, taking advantage of an armistice with the Central Powers, acting more like a 
conqueror than a liberator.  It suppressed revolutionaries inspired by the Russian Revolution.33  
Lenin’s new Bolshevik regime condemned Romania and severed relations with Iaşi; beginning 
over two decades of fraught Romanian-Soviet relations that culminated in the Soviet ultimatum 
of 1940.  A new Conservative government in Iaşi tried to leverage the Romanian Army to obtain 
a better peace treaty with the Central Powers, threatening that Romania would fight on alone if 
the conditions were too onerous, but failed.  Romania signed the humiliating Peace of Bucharest 
in May 1918, but four months later Bulgaria collapsed, prompting the German Army to withdraw 
from occupied-Romania.  Romania declared war on Germany again on 10 November 1918, a day 
before the armistice on the Western Front, and quickly annexed Bukovina and Transylvania.  In 
1919, a war broke out with Hungary and the Romanian Army marched on Budapest to put down 
a newly installed Bolshevik regime there and cemented its claims to România Mare. 
The annexed provinces of România Mare had different levels of national consciousness.  
Nationalism was strongest among ardeleni in Transylvania.  This was the result of decades of 
nationalist local activism and opposition in the Hungarin parliament by the Romanian National 
Party in response to Magyarization policies adopted by Budapest after the Ausgleich of 1867.34  
Nationalism was fairly strong in Austrian Bukovina, again due to Austro-Hungarian nationality 
                                                 
32 Scurtu, Istoria românilor în timpul celor patru regi, volumul II: Ferdinand I, 46; Torrey, The Romanian 
Battlefront in World War I, 268-270. 
33 For details on the occupation of Bessarabia, see, Ibid., 278-281. 
34 Hitchins, Rumania, 222-223.   
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policies during the fin de siècle.35  Romanian nationalism was weakest in Bessarabia due to the 
tsarist policy of Russification implemented after 1812.36  Many basarabeni (most of whom self-
identified as Moldovans) had been sympathetic to Russian revolutionary rhetoric in 1917, and 
were disappointed in Romanian rule, explaining a lack of hostility towards the Soviets in 1940.  
The state began a policy of Romanianization to integrate these provinces into România Mare.    
 Romanianization especially targeted cities in the annexed provinces because they were 
dominated by minorities.  Romanians made up just 58.6 percent of the urban population in 1930, 
compared to 71.9 percent of the total population, and they made up even less of the populations 
of cities in Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transylvania.37  Romanians, whether peasants coming to 
find factory jobs to escape poverty or students in overcrowded universities aspiring to a middle-
class lifestyle, resented the domination of cities by minorities.  Bucharest distrusted the loyalty of 
minorities and resented their economic power.  Interwar Romanian economists become obsessed 
with the idea of creating a Romanian middle class to replace the minority urban population and 
politicians embraced the idea.38  Student nationalist activists became increasingly more radical, 
organizing demonstrations and popular violence against minorities, especially Jews.  Jews lived 
in all the new provinces and were a ubiquitous urban presence in all towns and cities, described 
recently as “a kind of elite-urban common denominator” that was soon targeted by right-wing 
populists.39  All minorities were disliked, but special animosity was reserved for Jews.   
                                                 
35 Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania, 51-56.  
36 For an examination of the success of Russification, see, Livezeanu, Cultural Politics, 93-97; Charles King, The 
Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1999), 41-51. 
37 Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania, 10.   
38 For a detailed examination of these economists, see, Ionescu, Jewish Resistance to “Romanianization,” 8-11.   
39 Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania, 12. 
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After 1918, the Romanian Army adopted the moniker Armata de Intregire, or “the Army 
of Integration,” to take credit for founding România Mare.  The Romanian Army was committed 
to more than simply defending borders, the state wanted to use it to aid in the Romanianization 
of new territories.  While nationalists had described the army as the “school of the nation” since 
the unification of the principalities in 1859, this role took on a new importance as the state hoped 
to use the army to turn ardeleni, bucovineni, and basarabeni into Romanians.  In a speech to a 
conference of officers in 1927 a colonel declared, “The army is the school of the people and 
forms the foundation on which is built the national edifice.”40  The renewed identification of the 
army as an instrument of nationalist progress – rather than just a pillar of the state supporting 
elite interests and the status quo – raised the army’s prestige and helps explain why after 1940 
Romanians trusted in a military dictatorship under Antonescu for the salvation of România Mare.   
 During the Second World War, the Romanian Army press trumpeted nationalism to the 
ranks.  Every issue of Sentinela had a small map of România Mare with the “lost territories” of 
1940 blacked out.  After 1941 the eastern provinces of Bessarabia and Bukovina were restored to 
the map, but northern Transylvania (and southern Dobrogea lost to Bulgaria) remained blacked 
out to remind soldiers of their goal.  Romanian soldiers join an offensive war against the Soviet 
Union, but they always perceived it as a defensive war that had begun in 1940.  It was clear to all 
that they were fighting for the return of all of România Mare and understood that if they wanted 
to hold onto northern Bukovina and Bessarabia they had to destroy the Soviet threat once and for 
all.  Furthermore, once “Judeo-Bolshevism” was destroyed, they believed northern Transylvania 
                                                 
40 Colonel C. Cepleanu, “Educaţiunea Naţională (Conferinţa ţinută ofiţerilor din regimental “Mihai Viteazul Nr. 6” 
în ziua de 16 Februarie 1927),” România militară LIX, Nr. 9 (Septembrie 1927), 25.   
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would be returned by the Germans.41  At the burials of slain soldiers, particularly those in the 
Mountain Corps whose ranks were filled with ardeleni, companies swore oaths to the dead that 
they would only return home from the front through northern Transylvania.42 
Romanian nationalist claims to Soviet territory in the east cannot be ignored.  Historians 
have accepted disingenuous statements made by Romanian diplomats during the Second World 
War of Bucharest’s alleged total disinterest in annexing Transnistria.43  There were nationalist 
dreams of expanding the borders of România Mare further east to bring transnistrieni, the largest 
population of ethnic Romanians, into the national fold.  American historian Charles Upson Clark, 
aided by Romanian funds from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote a propagandistic history of 
Romania in 1922 that included a map with the border of ancient Dacia stretching east to the Bug, 
conveniently including Odessa.44  After 1941, numerous articles about the discovery of ethnic 
Romanian (Moldovan) villages in the USSR to stirred nationalist sentiments.     
It should be clear that Romanian nationalism was a powerful ideology that could and did 
motivate soldiers to fight beyond the interwar borders of România Mare.  Soldiers recruited into 
the army were primed to make sacrifices for the restoration of territory and perhaps even expand 
it due to the nationalist rhetoric they imbibed.  It also made them intolerant of those they saw as 
threats or traitors to their goal that contributed to the bloodshed of innocents.  As the war turned 
against the Axis, nationalism remained important as Romania again came under threat of being 
                                                 
41 Holly Case, Between States: The Transylvania Question and the European Idea during World War II (Standford: 
Stanford University Press, 2009), 67-75. 
42 Scârneci, Viaţa şi moartea în linia întâi, 309.   
43 The main reason the Antonescu regime said it did not want to annex Transnistria was because it assumed that the 
Germans hoped to trade northern Transylvania for Transnistria, see Giurescu, Romania in the Second War, 166-167.  
44 Dacia was a kingdom in classical antiquity that dominated Transylvania, eventually conquered by the Romans, 
see, Charles Upson Clark, Greater Romania (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1922), folded map insert; the 
Romanian origin story focused on the inter-mixing of Romans and Dacians, which cause consternation and much 
intellectual hoop-jumping by the few Romanian eugenicists, see, Solonari, Purifying the Nation, 67-70. 
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occupied, especially because the knowledge of Romanian crimes after 1941 contributed to fear 
of Soviet reprisals, which will be examined in Chapter X.  Romanian soldiers fought for further 
annexations in the east, the liberation all ethnic Romanians, the defense of the nation, and above 
all the “re-integration” of the provinces lost in 1940 to restore România Mare.    
Religion 
 Religion was one of the most important factors in motivating Romanian soldiers on the 
Eastern Front, yet it is hardly acknowledged in histories of the war, despite the open and close 
cooperation between the army and the Romanian Orthodox Church.45  The Romanian Orthodox 
Church wielded great influence during the interwar period.  The patriarch, Miron Cristea, was a 
member of the three-person regency that ruled Romania during 1927-1930 before the restoration 
of Carol II, and when the king declared a royal dictatorship in February 1938 the patriarch served 
as the king’s prime minister until his death in March 1939.  Miron, and his successor Nicodim 
Munteanu who was patriarch until 1948, were nationalists, ardent anti-communists, and publicly 
anti-Semitic in their speeches.  In fact, as prime minister Patriarch Miron initiated the first series 
of anti-Semitic laws that stripped 225,222 Jews (more than a third of all Jews) of citizenship and 
began the process of depriving them of their rights.46  The church and army developed strong ties 
during the interwar period and priests played an important role in legitimizing the “holy war.”   
                                                 
45 Deletant is one of the few Anglophone historians to mention “the religious overtones redolent of a holy war 
between Christianity and Communism” common in wartime writing and reportage, but does not examine this 
phenomenon in depth, see, Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 16; a few edited volumes of primary documents in 
Romanian have appeared that celebrate the patriotic contribution of Romanian Orthodox chaplains during the war, 
see, Manole, Armata şi Biserica; or Gheorghe Nicolescu, Gheorghe Dobrescu, şi Andrei Nicolescu, ed., Preoți în 
tranșee: 1941-1945 (Bucharest: Fundația General Ștefan Gușă, 1999); only very recently has a monograph been 
published that attempts to review the interwar and wartime actions of the church that contributed to the Holocaust 
and the post-war whitewashing of the Romanian Orthodox Church’s past in Romanian memory, see, Ion Popa, The 
Romanian Orthodox Church and the Holocaust (Bloomington Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2017).   
46 Ibid., 20. 
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There are a few possible explanations for this religious blind spot in the historiography.  
The role of the Orthodox Church (or any church for that matter) in the Holocaust is inherently 
controversial and this is especially true in the case of Romania where Orthodox Christianity still 
plays a central role in national identity.  General ignorance of Eastern Orthodoxy probably also 
plays a role, especially among English-speaking military historians.  In addition, the Cold War 
complicated any examination of the Romanian Orthodox Church’s role in the Holocaust because 
anti-communist histories emphasized communist persecution of believers.47  This post-war focus 
on the victimization of the church obscured the role the church played in supporting the Carlist 
and Antonescu regimes’ anti-Semitic policies and Romania’s “holy war” against “godless 
communism.”  Ironically, the Romanian Communist Party also avoided dredging up the nastier 
aspects of the church’s wartime past.  The communists decided to co-opt the church and bring it 
under their control.  After Patriarch Nicodim died in 1948, under suspicious circumstances, the 
“Red Patriarch” Justinian Marina took his place and collaborated closely with the communists.  
Therefore, it was not in the interest of the Romanian Communist Party to harp on the Holocaust, 
especially when the state imposed a religious harmony policy after the 1960s that mandated the 
patriarch and chief rabbi to express unified support for the communist state.48  For these reasons, 
until recently, the role of religion during the war and Holocaust has been sidelined. 
 The activity of the Romanian Orthodox Church during the Second World War remains 
opaque because church archives remain closed to researchers.  Though the church archives are 
unavailable to shed light on the internal workings of the Patriarchate or the Orthodox Mission in 
                                                 
47 Legionaries actually reinvented the movement as a persecuted “spiritual” movement in the context of the Cold 
War, rewriting its history in Communist prisons and in exile abroad, see, Clark, Holy Legionary Youth, 240-243.   
48 Popa, The Romanian Orthodox Church and the Holocaust, 72-73, 99, 101-102.   
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Transnistria during the war, official church periodicals from the time are available.49  The official 
journal of the Military Bishopric during 1940-1944 was Arma Cuvântului, or The Weapon of the 
Word.  Additionally, the records of the Military Bishopric with reports from regimental chaplains 
are accessible in military archives.  These documents reveal the important role played by army 
chaplains that included sermons, ceremonies, conferences, and conducting propaganda – passing 
out newspapers, leaflets, or prayer books filled with nationalist prayers to God for victory to the 
soldiers.  These chaplains provided legitimacy to Romania’s “holy war.”  Officers and soldiers 
were encouraged to see themselves as Christian “crusaders” fighting against the godless menace 
of “Jewish-Communism.”50  The spiritual work of the Romanian Orthodox Church and frontline 
chaplains motivated the faithful in battle against the Soviets and helped justify the destruction of 
“atheistic” communists and “satanic” Jews. 
 As nationalism took hold during the nineteenth century it penetrated the local Orthodox 
clergy.  As each new Balkan kingdom declared independence from the Ottoman Porte, a new 
national Orthodox church split off from the old Greek Orthodox Church under the thumb of the 
Ottoman sultan in Constantinople.51  The new Romanian kingdom worked to create a national 
Orthodox church under its control.52  The nationalization of the Orthodox Church made it more 
legitimate to Romanian peasants – many of whom had worked as serfs on church lands before 
emancipation and had resented its position supporting serfdom.  The Romanian language was 
elevated to the level of a sacred language equal to that of Greek or Slavonic.  These efforts had 
                                                 
49 For a brief overview of the Romanian Orthodox Mission’s activities, see, Dallin, Odessa, 162-164.  
50 It was so common that it was used in intelligence reports, see, Moraru, Armata lui Stalin văzută de români, 111.  
51 Leustean, Orthodoxy and the Cold War, 13.    
52 In 1872 a law created an Electoral Collegium allowing the state to select nationalist clergy to church leadership, 
see, Lucian N. Leustean, “‘For the Glory of Romanians’: Orthodoxy and Nationalism in Greater Romania, 1918-
1945,” Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity 35, no. 4 (August 2007): 718.   
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little impact across the frontier in Bessarabia where the Orthodox faithful (Moldovan and Slav 
alike) continued to view Romanian as limba prostimei, or “the language of simple people,” not 
fit for use in the holy liturgy.53   Regardless, the emergence of a national Orthodox Church in 
Romania boosted the prestige of the nation, state, and army among the faithful.   
 The Orthodox Christianity of Romanians became a central part of the Romanian national 
identity.  The Romanian Orthodox Church fully supported the decision to enter the First World 
War alongside the Entente to liberate Transylvania from the “Magyar yoke.”  Some priests even 
donned uniforms and fought on the frontlines.  After the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the local 
ardeleni, Orthodox and Uniate, welcomed the Romanian Army with joy as the nationalist dream 
was realized.  On 28 May 1919, Miron Cristea, then the Bishop of Caransebeş, the Transylvanian 
diocese of the Romanian Orthodox Church, symbolically blessed the creation of România Mare 
and the “sacred unity of all Romanians” in a ceremony at the grave of Michael the Brave.54 
The Bolshevik seizure of power shook the Eastern Orthodox world as Moscow suddenly 
became the capital of an atheist state and the Romanian Orthodox Church stepped in to take over 
its role as the largest Eastern Orthodox state.  Romanians were horrified by tales of anti-religious 
activism and violence in the Soviet Union across the frontier; those living on the Dniester, which 
now formed the Soviet-Romanian border, watched as the crosses of churches were removed and 
replaced by communist stars on the opposite bank.  Romanians now saw themselves the primary 
protectors of the true faith of Eastern Orthodoxy.  The Romanian Orthodox Church was raised to 
the status of a Patriarchate; representatives from the Constantinople, Jerusalem, Serbia, Greece, 
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Bulgaria, Poland, and the Russian diaspora patriarchates attended the enthronement of Miron as 
patriarch on 1 November 1925.55  The church’s position as protector of Orthodoxy was greeted 
with enthusiasm by Romanians, although it was seen as an upstart church by many in Bessarabia 
and Ukraine – during the Romanian occupation of Transnistria most Eastern Orthodox faithful 
(both Moldovan and Slav) never saw the Romanian Orthodox Church as a suitable replacement 
for the Russian Orthodox Church.56   Such close proximity to the Soviet Union deeply affected 
the church leadership and the lay faithful in Romania, many of whom saw the Soviet Union as a 
tool of the anti-Christ or a sign of the end of days.  During the interwar period, Romanians of all 
Christian faiths believed they stood as a Christian bulwark against communist atheism.   
 Religion was not just an important motivator for the pious peasantry, but also for the less 
religious urban population.  Despite a decline in the religiosity of Romanians, especially among 
those living in urban areas who often only attended church twice a year at Easter and Christmas, 
religion became more important to Romanian intellectuals and educated elites in defining their 
national identity during this same period.57  The sudden inclusion of a large number of minorities 
within the new borders of România Mare challenged the century-long project aimed at creating 
an ethnic nation-state, triggering a debate on how central Eastern Orthodoxy was to Romanian 
national identity.  The annexed provinces brought Catholics, Greek Catholics, Protestants neo-
Protestants, and Jews into the nation; Romanian Orthodox Christians comprised just 72.6 percent 
of the population after 1919 – compared to 91 percent before the war.58  All of these minorities, 
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including Jews from Wallachia and Moldavia who had been denied it before 1916, were granted 
citizenship and equal rights.  This threatened not only to change Romanian citizenship but also 
Romanian identity.  Nationalist intellectuals opposed changing the definition of national identity.  
Nae Ionescu, a philosopher of religion, declared in a public letter that while it might be possible 
that minorities could become “good Romanians” in the sense of being respectable citizens, it was 
impossible that they could never be “real Romanians” because they were not Eastern Orthodox.59  
Ionescu was just one of many intellectuals who continued to stress the importance of religion to 
national identity during the interwar period, and later many of them were attracted to the fascist 
Legionary movement and its brand of mystical Romanian Orthodox nationalism.60  Thus, while 
the urban bourgeoisie was less religious than the peasantry – often also more cynical towards the 
Antonescu regime’s propaganda during the Second World War focused on “holy war” – religion 
still played an important part in their identity as Romanians.   
 Orthodoxy was also a central pillar of army identity, reinforced by the Military Bishopric 
of the Romanian Orthodox Church.  The Military Bishopric remained rather ineffectual under its 
first two bishops, but with the appointment of Partenie Ciopron in 1937, it asserted a greater role.  
Ciopron, a little-known figure in the army virtually ignored by historians, was appointed on 8 
October 1937 and, unlike his predecessors, was relatively young, just 41.  Moreover, he was a 
combat veteran of the First World War who had been wounded on the front as a “soldier priest.”  
While a strict taskmaster, he was known as a hardworking religious leader, and supported the 
army without reservation.  In a speech he gave when he was appointed bishop he declared that,  
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On the front, with weapon [in hand,] I threw out the enemy; from today onwards, 
with the weapon of the word of the gospel – supported [secondat] by the military 
priests – I will preach, from one corner of the country to the other, to the 
Romanian soldiers: faith in God, faith and obedience to the King, love of the 
fatherland, [and] unconditional discipline.61  
 
During his tenure Ciopron expanded the number of military priests from 30 in 1937 to 108 by 
1943, one chaplain per regiment, making sure that each regiment that left for the front did not 
lack confessional support.62  These priests held officer rank (Ciopron himself was a brigadier 
general) and were kept extremely busy conducting services, burying slain soldiers, and visiting 
the wounded.  While the Romanian Orthodox Church lent its official support to the “holy war,” 
Patriarch Nicodim personally donated his monthly salary to the army during the war, the clergy 
of the Military Bishopric had direct influence on the motivation of soldiers on the front.63  Priests 
legitimized Romania’s “holy war” and emphasized supposed connections between Judaism and 
communism in their sermons.  Additionally, chaplains incorporated propaganda into “national-
patriotic-religious” sermons with topics like: “the holy duties of the solder,” “reifying love and 
devotement to the country through faith in God,” and “the spirit of sacrifice for one’s nation 
[neam].”64  The activity of these chaplains on the Eastern Front is notable because they and their 
Christian rhetoric played a role in legitimizing the war as a “crusade” after 1941.   
 The religious identity of Romanian soldiers significantly influenced their treatment of 
Soviet citizens, many of whom were Russian Orthodox.  Romanian Orthodox soldiers viewed 
Slavs much more ambiguously than German soldiers, often with pity or solidarity; Protestant or 
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Catholic Germans lacked this shared cultural connection.  Romanian soldiers were shocked by 
the desecration of churches and icons they found in the Soviet Union.  The memoirs and journals 
of soldiers are filled with admiration for the beauty of Russian icons, brought out from hiding by 
peasants, and the sincerity of the Slavic faithful.65  At times an almost evangelical fervor seems 
to have gripped the Romanian Army as it advanced into the Soviet Union.66  Unlike Germans, 
who saw themselves as racial “supermen” conquering Lebensraum, or “living space,” from the 
Slavic “sub-humans” for the benefit of the German Volksgemeinschaft, or “racial community,” 
Romanians viewed themselves as liberators of the oppressed from Soviet oppression, including 
religious freedom for Eastern Orthodox brethren.67  This does not mean that Romanian soldiers 
refrained from committing crimes against Soviet citizens – unfortunately, plunder, rape, and 
murder were not uncommon – nonetheless, Romanian soldiers were markedly less brutal towards 
Soviet citizens than German soldiers.  Romanian and Soviet Jews (and “fanatical” communists), 
however, were placed outside this Christian community and targeted for destruction.   
 When the Antonescu regime announced the invasion of the Soviet Union, Romanians 
soldiers, regardless of class origins, enthusiastically embraced the call for a “crusade against 
communism.”  On the frontline of Christianity, they had felt threatened by the menace of “Judeo-
Bolshevism” for several decades and anticipated a final showdown that would culminate in the 
destruction of atheist communism alongside their German allies.  The close connection between 
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national identity and religious faith made the loss of “holy” Romanian territory even more keenly 
felt.  The anti-Semitic rhetoric of Romanian Orthodox clergy over the years and the anti-Semitic 
policies enacted by the patriarch as prime minister between 1938 and 1939 helped set the stage 
for the crimes committed against the Jews east of the Prut after 1941.   
Anti-Semitism 
 The influence of anti-Semitism in the Romanian Army during the war has largely been 
ignored in nationalist military histories, which focus narrowly on army operations, but has a 
central role in Western histories of the Holocaust in Romania.  An important purpose of this 
work is to integrate these two narratives to demonstrate that Romania’s “holy war” cannot be 
properly understood isolated from the events of the Holocaust perpetrated by Romanian soldiers, 
as well as vice versa, that the Holocaust in Romania and Transnistria cannot be fully understood 
in isolation from the campaign at the front.  The two, combat and atrocity, were inextricably 
linked.  Therefore, it is necessary to understand how widespread anti-Semitism was in Romanian 
society during the interwar period and how deeply intolerance was rooted in the hearts of most 
Romanian officers and soldiers who joined in Operation Barbarossa.   
  Modern anti-Semitism built upon a long anti-Jewish tradition in Romania.  This anti-
Jewish bias was based on religious differences and Christian hostility of Medieval Europe.68  In 
Romanian folklore, peasants imagined “the Jew” as a godless, even demonic, being because the 
devil could supposedly influence Jews more easily than Christians who were divinely protected 
by baptism.69  Moreover, Jews were attributed satanic talents and the ability to mislead and cheat 
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the trusting Christian.  Other stereotypes described Jews as intelligent and deceitful.70  This anti-
Jewish bias made it easy for Romanian anti-Semites in the nineteenth century to stereotype Jews 
as economic exploiters, particularly as capitalism extended into Eastern Europe and Jews seemed 
to profit the most from its economic and social changes.  There was a surge in reported cases of 
blood libel, the myth that Jews needed the blood of a Christian child to make matza for Passover, 
in Eastern Europe after 1881 depicting Jews as literally draining life from Christians.71  Pogroms 
occurred with increasing regularity, such in 1899 when university students in Iaşi attacked Jews 
on the street and vandalized Jewish shops.  Anti-Semites mustered new economic arguments in 
their political attacks on Jews.72  Jews were blamed for all the ills of society and portrayed as an 
obstacle to national progress as Jews occupied key positions in finance, commerce, and industry.  
These polemics poisoned Jewish-Christian relations, especially in times of economic hardship, 
such as after the First World War and during the Depression.73  Politicians encouraged peasants 
to blame “Jewish speculators” for their financial hardships, scapegoating Jews for the failure of 
the state to deliver on promises for a better life after the sacrifices to create România Mare.  The 
fact that most Jews, whether eking out a living in rural shtetls or in working-class slums of cities 
in eastern Romania, were also suffering from crippling poverty during the interwar period was 
ignored by Romanians.  They were convinced that “cunning” Jews were cheating Romanians of 
the country’s wealth and destroying the nation.  In 1930, as the Depression began to really bite 
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into the economy, the state passed a law requiring traders (mostly Jews) to forgive the debts of 
clients (mostly Romanian peasants) that hurrided the collapse of Jewish-owned businesses.74  In 
August 1937, Patriarch Miron publicly attacked Jews as “parasites,” pronouncing that, “One has 
to be sorry for the poor Romanian people, whose very marrow is [being] sucked out by the Jews.  
Not to react against the Jews means that we go open-eyed to our destruction.”75   
 Inspired by intellectual developments elsewhere in Europe, some Romanian anti-Semites 
also began to employ racial arguments against Jews.  Nicolae Paulescu, the discoverer of insulin, 
argued that Jews were a degenerate race because their demonic spiritual nature manifested itself 
physically in intellectual and biological inferiority.  As Minister of Health and Social Protection 
in 1926, he issued a report that claimed that Jewish men were immoral, had much higher rates of 
venereal disease, and were a danger to Romanian society because they spread disease.  Paulescu 
was also convinced that Jewish men impregnated poor Christian women forced into prostitution 
who were further impoverished by the need to raise mixed-raced children.  In The Lechery of the 
Kikes, a pamphlet based on his ministerial report published several years later, Paulescu warned 
Romanians that using the nefarious means of venereal disease and racial miscegenation Jews 
planned “to exterminate us.”76  Scientific racism became more common among the educated 
middle class during the interwar period, but remained less influential among peasants. 
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 Anti-Semitism permeated all levels of society and bound peasants and elites together.77  
The Romanian state passed a series of anti-Semitic laws between 1866 and 1918 restricting the 
rights of Jews, periodically tried to expel them, and turned a blind eye to popular anti-Semitic 
violence.  Romania became notorious for its treatment of Jews, so much so that at the Treaty of 
Berlin in 1878 the Great Powers forced Romania to adopt a minority clause in its constitution, 
but discrimination continued as politicians found ways around it.78  The state avoided awarding 
citizenship to Jews and the constitution restricted naturalization of Jews on a case by case basis, 
even then it required special dispensation by the king or a parliamentary vote, so just 529 Jews 
became citizens before 1913.  The only exception was special legislation that granted citizenship 
to 883 Jewish soldiers who fought in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878.79  This suggested to 
assimilated Jews that patriotic military service might offer a path to eventual acceptance.   
 Jews answered the call to serve their country in the First World War, but their experience 
was ambiguous at best.  During the war they faced discrimination, accusations of treachery, and 
even violence; but at its conclusion they appeared to have overcome the worst, proven their 
loyalty, and would finally be accepted as Romanians.  Approximately 25,000 Jews served in the 
army during the First World War.  Jews fought on the front lines and worked as sorely needed 
doctors, who exposed themselves to deadly diseases and enemy fire while treating wounded near 
the front line.  However, Jews were never fully accepted by the Romanian Army.  For example, 
the professionals who served as army doctors were not allowed to wear any insignia of officer 
rank on their uniforms.80  Later, under the Antonescu regime, Jewish veterans who did not serve 
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on the frontline had their veteran status revoked because anti-Semites argued that the supposedly 
cowardly Jews had escaped to the rear to avoid the dangers of combat.81     
 In addition to cowardice, Romanian soldiers accused Jews of treachery.  Spymania swept 
through the ranks of the Romanian Army after the disastrous defeats of 1916 forced the army to 
retreat to Moldavia, and officers and soldiers blamed treasonous Jews for undermining the war 
effort.82  Jews were accused being spies and many of them were tried and executed by military 
courts on flimsy evidence.83  During (and after) the war, Jews were accused of enthusiastically 
collaborating with the German authorities in occupied Wallachia because they were “foreign” 
and sympathized with German culture.  The Romanian Army used similar arguments to blame its 
embarrassing retreat from eastern Romania in 1940 on Jews, but this time associating Jews with 
Soviet communism.  Jewish doctors in uniform were assigned a Romanian guard to prevent 
treasonous activity.  Propagandists and intelligence officers created anti-Semitic material that 
reinforced soldiers’ anti-Semitism.  Romanian anti-Semitism in the First World War laid the 
groundwork for the anti-Semitic violence carried out by soldiers during the Second World War.  
After 1919, patriotic assimilated Jews added the names of sons killed in battle to those of the 
Jewish fallen in the Romanian War of Independence (the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878) 
inscribed on ceremonial plaques outside the entrance to synagogues in Bucharest.  Jews finally 
became citizens, but by 1922 it already appeared that Jewish dreams of acceptance were in vain.   
 The following years saw an outbreak of anti-Semitic violence, beginning in Romanian 
universities among disgruntled students who resented competition from Jewish students.  The 
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“Generation of 1922” boycotted universities in an attempt to force the establishment of a quota 
system to limit the number of Jews (and other minorities) permitted to attend university.84  The 
students soon turned to intimidation and violence: shouting down professors in class for teaching 
Jews, carrying weapons on campus, and finally attacking, beating, and even murdering Jews – 
sympathetic juries acquitted many of the murderers.85  These student activists spread violence 
across Romania without any real fear of serious consequences as they organized demonstrations.  
In Bessarabia student activists got into fights with Jews who were members of the socialist Bund 
or Zionist groups and willing to meet violence with violence. 86  Local police usually declared the 
Jews to be the aggressors, and even accused Jews of provoking the anti-Semites so that Jews had 
examples of abuse to report to make the local authorities look incompetent or embarrass the state 
internationally.87  In December 1927, student activists launched a pogrom in the Transylvanian 
city of Oradea, beating Jews, destroying Jewish property, and burning Torah scrolls in the street. 
The authorities sent in the local regiment to restore order, but the military cordon did not end the 
violence because officers and soldiers sympathized with the mob and mostly just watched.  They 
intervened only if things out of hand or seemed to threatened Christians or their property.88   
Anti-Semitism was a powerful ideology adopted by almost all political parties, but it was 
taken to new extremes by the far-right groups during the interwar period.  One of the first was 
Liga Apărării Naţionale Creştine (LANC), or the League of National Christian Defense, formed 
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by the noted law professor Alexandru C. Cuza at the University of Iaşi.  He became a mentor to 
the right-wing student activists of the “Generation of 1922,” including the future fascist leader 
Corneliu Codreanu.  Cuza’s rhetoric mixed old anti-Jewish rhetoric of the “satanic people” with 
new ideas of scientific racism.89  LANC was a single issue party lacking a platform other than 
anti-Semitism, nevertheless, it proved able to attract a large portion of the electorate, especially 
in Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Moldavia where Jews were most numerous and the economy was 
most depressed following the First World War.90  LANC ultimately failed since the other major 
parties offered broader political platforms in addition to anti-Semitic rhetoric to attract voters.   
It should be emphasized that there was no monolithic “Semitic” group in România Mare.  
European Jewry was incredibly diverse with assimilationists, traditionalists, socialists, Zionists, 
liberals, conservatives, Hasidim, urban, rural, Sephardic, and Ashkenazi – just to name a few of 
the various forms of Judaism.91  This diversity was especially evident in Romania, which had 
perhaps the most diverse population of Jews in Europe after the First World War.92  The Jews in 
the Old Kingdom of Romania were divided between assimilated (Romanian speaking) Jews of 
mostly concentrated in Bucharest and various Moldavian cities and Orthodox (Yiddish speaking) 
Jews dispersed in rural shtetls, especially in Bukovina.  The annexation of Russian and Austro-
Hungarian territory brought further diverse communities of Jews.  The former Hapsburg lands 
contained assimilated (German or Hungarian speaking) Jews and rural Satmar Hasidic (Yiddish 
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speaking) Jews, while Bessarabia brought more shtetl Jews along with urban (Russian speaking) 
Jews that included both middle-class professionals and workers.  In relative numbers, the Jewish 
population of Romanian remained small after the formation of România Mare in 1918, just 4.0 
percent, but in absolute numbers it tripled, from 239,967 to 728,115.93  This increased acted to 
rekindle fin de siècle anti-Semitic hysteria about a “Jewish invasion.”  Anti-Semites inflated the 
number of Jews, claiming a million or more lived in România Mare, and called for “the complete 
elimination of the kike element in the country.”94   
The Bolshevik revolution added a new element to anti-Semitism in the interwar period as 
Jews, especially in Bessarabia, quickly became closely associated with communism.  For many 
Romanians, the “godless” Soviet Union was viewed as the new homeland of “the Jew.”  Right-
wing groups also began denouncing “Judeo-Bolshevism” in their speeches.  Army intelligence 
reports during the interwar period argued that all Bessarabian Jews were dangerous communist 
sympathizers, responsible for all left-wing agitation, and could not be counted on to be loyal in a 
future conflict with the Soviet Union.95  In 1939, senior officers pushed to preemptively intern all 
“proven” threats identified by intelligence, but the Carlist General Staff declined to do so.96  The 
officer corps blamed the failure to lock up “Jewish-Communists” for the chaos during the retreat 
from eastern Romania in 1940, so the Antonescu regime ordered all Jewish men in Moldavia to 
be intern leading up to the invasion in 1941 due to the threat of “Judeo-Bolshevism.” 
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 Anti-Semitism was already deeply engrained in Romanian society before the First World 
War and it only grew more radical during the interwar period.  Romanian soldiers recruited into 
the army brought this bigotry with them and also had officers who held similar beliefs, so when a 
crisis threatened Romanian soldiers of all ranks were already predisposed to see Jews as a threat. 
Anti-Semitism, especially when mixed with anti-communism, proved to be a powerful motivator 
for both officers and soldiers, uniting them across class lines in a “holy war” against the USSR.  
The close association of Jews, especially those in eastern Romania after 1940, with communism 
led to their eventual destruction in 1941. 
Anti-Communism 
 Anti-communism, more commonly known as anti-Bolshevism in the 1920s and although 
the term was gradually replaced in the 1930s both terms were still used interchangeably during 
the Second World War, rapidly permeated Romanian society.  Historians have not explored anti-
communism in the Romanian Army in any real depth, at best they mention offhand that officers 
were anti-communist.97  This ignores the importance of anti-communism in soldiers’ motivation 
during 1941-1944.  In a sense, anti-communism was the mid-wife of România Mare because in 
the confused aftermath of the Russian Revolution the Romanian Army fought a series of border 
conflicts against a myriad of revolutionary groups (Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and nationalists of 
all stripes) in Bessarabia, which continued well into the 1920s, and a major campaign against the 
short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919.  While officers developed strong anti-communist 
sentiments, the widespread aversion to communism that also quickly penetrated down to the rank 
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and file soldiers during the interwar period that cannot be ignored.  While peasant soldiers may 
not have been well-educated, they understood in practical terms that communism represented an 
existential threat to their way of life.  Therefore, this section will demonstrate that both officers 
and soldiers were bound together by anti-communism and it motivated them in combat and to 
commit atrocities on the Eastern Front, particularly against “Jewish-Communists.”   
 Romanian soldiers were a reliable force against the new Bolshevik threat.  Shortly after 
the creation of the Moldavian Democratic Republic in Bessarabia in December 1917, its leaders 
invited the Romanian Army to occupy the region because of growing chaos and violence caused 
by revolutionary groups.98  Romanian troops maintain law and order in Bessarabia until it joined 
Romania in April 1918.  As the Romanian Army occupied Transylvania during December 1918-
March 1919, it had to suppress an uprising of revolutionary peasants supported by a Bolshevik 
force of 2,000-3,000 men in Bessarabia around the city of Hotin on the border with Russia.  On 
11 January 1919, the small garrison in Hotin was overrun with reports of Bolsheviks atrocities 
against Romanian soldiers and civil servants.99  Reinforcements soon arrived, retook the city, and 
carried out bloody reprisals against civilians suspected of being Bolsheviks.  In a foreshadowing 
of the brutal anti-partisan warfare after 1941, General Headquarters ordered that all Bolshevik 
forces “will not be counted as organized troops.  Consequently, these bands will not enjoy the 
laws that apply in war to regular troops.  All will be treated without mercy, completely and 
                                                 
98 Hitchins, Rumania, 271-273. 
99 This description by Constantin Kiritescu in a history of WWI published in 1934 gives a good example of anti-
Communist propaganda. “All along the Dniester, from Atachi to Hotin, the victims of the Bolsheviks offer the 
terrified onlookers a spectacle our of a Dantean vision.  Bodies of hanged Romanian soldiers dangling from the 
branches of trees or telegraph poles.”  Quote reproduced in Marin C. Stănescu, Armata română şi unirea Basarabiei 
şi Bucovinei cu România, 1917-1919 (Constanţa: Ex Ponto, 1999), 231.  
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radically exterminated.”100  The Romanian occupation of Transylvania allowed Bolsheviks to 
seize power in Budapest.  Béla Kun’s Hungarian Soviet Republic promised to defend all territory 
claimed by Hungary and called on help from Lenin’s Red Army in Russia, threatening Romania 
with a two-front war with Bolshevism.  A Hungarian attack on 15 April 1919 tried to preempt an 
invasion being planned by the Romanian Army, Romanian forces soon broke through to advance 
on the Tisa, where they halted to await political developments in Paris and military events to the 
north where Hungarian forces were fighting a small Czechoslovak army.  The Red Army seized 
Odessa and threatened to invade Bessarabia during May-June.  On 17 July, the Hungarian Army 
attacked Romanian forces on the Tisa, the Romanian Army gleefully counterattacked, crossed 
the Tisa, and quickly advanced on “Red Budapest,” which fell on 3 August.  Béla Kun fled and 
the Romanian Army occupied Budapest until March 1920. 
 Following these campaigns, anti-Bolshevik rhetoric was already well-developed in the 
Romanian Army.  General Gheorghe Mărdărescu, named Supreme Commander of all Troops in 
Transylvania in 1919 and commanded half of the estimated 48,000 Romanian soldiers involved 
in the campaign against the Hungarian Soviet Republic, proclaimed in his 1921 account of the 
war that, “Anarchy and terror, enthroned in Hungary by [the Magyar Bolshevik regime], ended 
under the knee of the Romanian Army that brought, through its action, the reestablishment of the 
previous rights of Magyar citizens, assuring the order, wealth, life and honor of all.”101  Similar 
rhetoric was employed during the Second World War after the invasion of the USSR.  Now with 
                                                 
100 Otu, Mareşalul Constantin Prezan, 279. 
101 General Gheorghe Mărdărescu, Campania pentru desrobirea ardealului şi ocuparea budapestei (1919) (Baia 
Mare: Editura Marist, 2009), 180-181. 
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the western border secured, the Romanian Army refocused its attention on the eastern border and 
for the next decade repelled a series of small incursions by Bolshevik forces.     
 Romanian nationalism encouraged ordinary soldiers to see communism as an evil foreign 
ideology.102  The promises of the Liberal government of Ion Brătianu, as well as the actions of 
“Peasant King” Ferdinand I and “Mother of the Wounded” Queen Marie during the First World 
War, further won support from the peasantry who looked forward to a better future in România 
Mare.103  Some observers believed that the mere promise of land reform was enough to buy the 
peasants loyalty, but whatever the reason (or reasons), Romanian peasants remained loyal to the 
state and did not heed revolutionary Bolshevik rhetoric during 1917-1919.  Soon, the nascent 
anti-communism of Romanian peasants was reinforced by waves of refugees escaping from the 
Soviet Union who brought stories of privation and death under the Bolshevik regime. 
 There were two major waves of refugees from the USSR during the interwar period.  The 
first was between 1918 and 1925, as tens of thousands fled the chaos and violence of the Russian 
Civil War and communist persecution following the victory of the Bolsheviks.  Bucharest soon 
boasted a sizable White Russian émigré community.  After a period of relative calm, a second 
exodus of desperate refugees began flooding across the Romanian-Soviet border between 1930 
and 1934, fleeing persecution and famine in Ukraine.104  Stalin had led the Communist Party in 
enacting policies of collectivization and de-kulakization in 1929, which used violence to force 
                                                 
102 A report by a Major G. Lucasievic on 10 March 1918 already claimed that Romanian peasants were less 
susceptible to “Russian communist theories” than the local Slavic population of Bessarabia.  His wording is a bit 
ambiguous (he could be associating Communism with Russians or just with the geographic region), but the hostility 
to Bolshevism is already clear, see, Stănescu, Armata română şi unirea Basarabiei şi Bucovinei cu România, 40-41.   
103 Scurtu, Istoria românilor în timpul celor patru regi, volumul II: Ferindand I, 39, 33. 
104 Alexandru-Murad Mironov, “And Quiet Flows the Dniester: Life and Death on the Romanian-Soviet border, 
1918-1940,” in Arhivele Totalitarismului 19, no. 3 (2011): 39.  
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peasants onto collective farms called kolkhozes and requisitioned grain needed to export to sell 
to fund the rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union.  These brutal tactics used by the Soviets 
created conditions that resulted in a mass famine that killed millions of Soviet peasants.105  The 
famine was not a remote event for Romanian peasants, as it was to civilians in Western Europe 
who could minimalize or ignore the catastrophe, because it occurred just over the border in and 
the famine hit Soviet Ukraine particularly hard.  A wave of starving refugees trying to escape the 
famine and Soviet power risked the dangerous crossing into Romania.106   
The Soviet-made famine in Ukraine demonstrated to Romanian peasants just how much a 
threat communism was to their way of life and threatened their dream of România Mare.  These 
refugees, many of whom were Soviet Moldovan peasants, brought with them stories of violence, 
loss, starvation, and even cannibalism.  The refugee crisis became most acute during the winter 
of 1931 and according to a contemporary report, “shootings [by Soviet border guards] took place 
every night [on the Dniester], dead and wounded are found daily, because the flight from the 
U.S.S.R. continues without interruption since the moment the Soviets came to power.”107  On 4 
March 1932, the issue of organizing relief for transnistrieni (Soviet Moldovans) who were still 
in Ukraine suffering from the famine was debated in the Senate.108  The fate of Soviet peasants 
was well-known in throughout Romania.  Bessarabian German Immanuel Weiss remembered,  
I knew how the communists treated their people.  We were so close to the Russian 
border that news from Odessa came over.  I remembered a family by the name of 
                                                 
105 Kulak was a term for well-off peasants applied to any peasant who opposed Soviet power, see, Sheila Fitzpatrick, 
The Russian Revolution, New Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 125-126; probably 3.3 million dead, 
see Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 53.  
106 A Romanian functionary in Bessarabia in 1932 told a British visitor that at least 100,000 refugees had entered 
Romania by then, see, Donald Hall, Romanian Furrow (London: Bene Factum Publishing Limited, 2007), 164.  
107 Moraru, La hotarul românesc al europei, 106.  
108 One of the members of the senate even considered the idea of attempting to negotiate a population transfer “that 
through the League of Nations, persons who want to cross into the Soviet Union will be exchanged for those who 
desire to abandon the ‘Soviet paradise,’” see, Ibid., 108-109.   
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Hein escaped over the Dniester…The Soviets took everything away from the 
farmers…We had heard how the people over there had nothing to eat.  If they had 
a garden, the Soviets took even that away.  People were reduced to eating soups 
made from cowhides or sheepskins and from leeks growing wild.109 
 
Consequently, while Romanian peasants may not have understood Marxist-Leninist theories, 
they understood that communism meant losing one’s land and animals by violence, being forced 
onto a kolkhoz, and probable starvation.  Additionally, the fact that Romanian peasants had just 
received land after the First World War made them anxious not to have it taken away.  As one 
Transylvanian peasant told a British journalist in June 1940, “We chose Germany because we 
hate and fear Bolshevism and want to continue to have our own plots of land to till.”110 
Anti-communism pervaded state, army, and society in Romania.111  The local Romanian 
Communist Party was reviled, in large part because most members were ethnic minorities – Jews 
were especially overrepresented in its ranks, but also many Hungarians, Bulgarians, Ukrainians, 
and Russians – but especially since the party, following the party line from Moscow, supported 
the break-up of România Mare.112  The USSR never recognized the annexation of Bessarabia by 
Romania.  Instead, the Soviets created the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 
1924 with the aim of trying to attract basarabeni from across the border to the Soviet cause.  It 
also presented the specter of a future Soviet republic formed from Bessarabia and even Moldavia 
seized from a dismembered România Mare.113  The threat of a war with the Soviet Union loomed 
over Romania throughout the interwar period.  The Romanian Army had to routinely suppress 
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Bolshevik-inspired revolts in Bessarabia, such as the Tatarbunar uprising of ethnically Russian 
and Ukrainian peasants in 1924, and the province remained under martial law for most of the 
interwar period.114  There were several war scares in Romania and numerous border incidents, 
both real and imagined, with the Soviets.  The threat finally became real when the Soviet Union 
demanded northern Bukovina and Bessarabia or face invasion in 1940.   
The Romanian Army’s participation in the invasion of the USSR in 1941 only reinforced 
anti-communism in the ranks as officers and soldiers experienced the “communist paradise” of 
Soviet propaganda firsthand.  Soldiers pitied the terrible conditions faced by Soviet peasants.  A 
few Romanian officers were impressed by the extent of the industrialization of agriculture that 
the Soviet policy of collectivization had accomplished, such as tractors and other industrial farm 
equipment or impressively large American animal breeds on the kolkhozes.  Nevertheless, most 
Romanian soldiers were convinced that the average Red Army soldier hated communism and 
was forced to fight with a “pistol to their neck” held by fanatical communist political commissars 
that were supposedly mostly Jews.115  The Romanian army press highlighted real and fabricated 
Soviet atrocities in newspapers to reinforce fear and hatred of communism, reinforced by rumors 
of Romanian POWs being murdered by Soviet soldiers, stories readily believed by soldiers. 
Communism presented a common threat to officers and soldiers alike, both to society and 
to the very existence of România Mare.  Communism threatened the to the social position of the 
                                                 
114 Romanian authorities insisted that uprisings were caused by Soviet provocateurs or spies while Soviet authorities 
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officer corps that officers from boyar and military families felt was their right, and that peasant 
officers had struggled to obtain through decades of work, training, and sacrifice.  Therefore, the 
Soviet threat was as much a personal threat as it was an ideological one.  Additionally, peasants 
had a clear example of what they could expect under Soviet power due to the Ukrainian famine, 
and greatly feared collectivization.  Therefore, when the USSR shattered the sanctity of România 
Mare in 1940, officers and soldiers were anxious to take revenge and more than ready to assist 
Nazi Germany in trying to destroy the Soviet state.  Anti-communism was a powerful motivation 
in combat against the Red Army and in committing atrocities against Romanian and Soviet Jews.   
Fascism 
If nationalism, religion, anti-Semitism, and anti-communism was not enough motivation, 
there was another ideology that motivated many Romanian soldiers during the Second World 
War that combined all the above into a potent cocktail – fascism.  Romania had one of the largest 
fascist movements in Europe during the interwar period, the Legion of the Archangel Michael, 
and many members, former members, and sympathizers fought on the Eastern Front.  The very 
success of the fascist movement in Romania was due to the strength of these other ideologies in 
Romanian society.  Fascism fed off and reinforced nationalism, religion, anti-Semitism, and anti-
communism and appealed to individuals from all social classes: peasants, boyars, intellectuals, 
priests, bourgeois professionals, civil servants, workers, and army officers.  Yet, while fascism 
had wide popular appeal, it failed to successfully compete with the major political parties – the 
Liberal and National Peasant parties – at the ballot box because the traditional parties radicalized 
their own platforms in response to pressure from the far-right populists.  Additionally, when the 
Legionaries came close to being brought to power in a coalition with the National Peasant Party, 
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King Carol II used the state to crush the Legion.  Therefore, while fascism was not a primary 
motivator for Romanian soldiers it played a role in radicalizing the army on the Eastern Front.   
Romanian fascism is one of the few subjects to attract significant interest from Western 
scholars in recent decades.  The historiography of Romanian fascism got its start in 1970 when 
Nicholas Nagy-Talavera, a Jew from northern Transylvania that fell under Hungarian occupation 
in 1940 and who was deported to Auschwitz in 1944, wrote a comparative history of Hungarian 
and Romanian fascism.116  As Holocaust history became mainstream in the following decades, 
Romanian fascism moved from near obscurity to a niche field.  German scholars dominated it 
until the fall of Communism, aided by access to a wealth of Romanian materials held in German 
archives, and in 1985 Armin Heinen published his seminal work on the Legionary movement.117  
Once archives in Romania became accessible a steady stream of new research was produced by 
Anglophone scholars culminating in Roland Clark’s recent significant contribution.  Romanian 
researchers, previously discouraged from studying Romanian fascism, have begun to produce 
serious scholarship, such as Dana Beldiman’s work on Legionary-army relations.  Romanian 
fascism and its first leader Corneliu Codreanu remain a controversial subject in Romania today, 
as indicated by the recent publication of two biographies on “the Captain.”118 
The Legion of the Archangel Michael, a small group founded in 1927 by the law student 
and ultranationalist activist Corneliu Codreanu, grew to a mass movement within a decade and 
                                                 
116 His seminal work was republished in a second edition, see, Nicholas M. Nagy-Talavera, The Green Shirts and the 
Others (Iaşi, Oxoford, Portland: The Center for Romanian Studies, 2001). 
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contributed to the radicalization of society and politics in Romania.  At its height, the Legion had 
272,000 members, and many more supporters or sympathizers.  In comparison, the Romanian 
Communist Party never had more than 5,000 members, and its membership dropped drastically 
after the Soviet ultimatum of 1940 stripped away Romanian territory to approximately 1,000.119  
In 1930, Codreanu created the Iron Guard, a paramilitary group, within the Legion; at the time 
and until recently many referred to the Romanian fascists as the Iron Guard, but the Legionary 
movement is more correct.  After violent electioneering, Iron Guard was outlawed by the state in 
1933, but the Legionary movement continued to organize its election campaigns under the thin 
guise of a legitimate political party Totul pentru Ţara, or Everything for the Country, officially 
headed by a hero of the First World War General Gheorghe Cantacuzino – scion of princely 
boyar family.  The Legionary movement’s greatest political success was after the Depression in 
1937, when it obtained almost 16 percent of the vote.  The popularity of the Legion prompted 
King Carol II to increasingly embrace more radical right-wing and anti-Semitic policies through 
the 1930s, so the Carlist regime would not lose favor with the Romanian public.120  The 
suppression of the Legion in 1938 practically destroyed it and only briefly revived in 1940-1941.   
The Romanianization policies pursued by the state fostered rise of fascism in Romania.121  
A group of ultranationalists coalesced who were not content to settle with creating a Romanian 
middle class by slowly pushing out bourgeois minorities and advocated a nationalist revolution 
instead.  They planned to “cleanse” the country of its minorities, especially Jews, and to “purify” 
the nation of Romanians who were communists, selfish aristocrats, or corrupt elites.  These 
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ultranationalists rejected liberalism as “foreign” or “Judaized,” condemned political corruption, 
and were prepared to use violence to achieve their goals.122  Many Romanians were attracted to 
the Legionary movement and its rhetoric about the need to create a “new man” as part of a fascist 
revolution that would purify Romania.123  Legionaries saw the army as a tool of the corrupt state 
and defender of the status quo, especially since the Romanian Army was used to suppress right-
wing violence.  Right-wing demonstrations often resulted in confrontations between activists and 
soldiers, although violence was usually avoided.124  Legionary criticism of the Romanian Army, 
however, was muted because of its prestige and Codreanu hoped to find allies in its ranks. 
The Legionary movement was born from the anti-Semitic student movement in 1922 and 
took anti-Semitism to new extremes.  Legionaries introduced the new idea that Jews were both 
capitalist exploiters and communist sympathizers, and despite the obvious contradiction in these 
positions many Romanians readily accepted these new accusations.  The Legionaries argued that 
all communists were Jews, as Codreanu explained, “When I say Communist, I mean Jew.”125  In 
their worldview, Moscow was run by Jews and Legionaries harped on about the threat of “Judeo-
Bolshevism,” or as Codreanu put it in his earthier language popular with peasants and workers, 
“kike-communism.”  The Legion matured at a time when the Nazi Party was solidifying power 
in Germany, Hitler’s success presenting a new model to follow, and inspired Codreanu’s efforts.  
The early tactics of the Legionaries were street brawls, intimidation, murder, and assassination.  
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After 1933, it turned towards electioneering and propaganda to win popular support at the ballot 
box, aiming to be brought to power legitimately.    
At a time when Romanian diplomats were trying to balance foreign policy between the 
weakening international League system and the growing power of revisionist Nazi Germany, the 
Legionaries openly supported a pro-Axis foreign policy.  In 1937, Codreanu said, “I am against 
the Little Entente.  I am against the Balkan Entente and I have no attachment to the League of 
Nations in which I do not believe.  I am for a Romanian foreign policy with Rome and Berlin.  I 
am with the states of national revolution against bolshevism.”126  The Legionary movement was 
as concerned with the threat of the Soviet Union as it was with domestic “kike-communism” and 
identified the Soviet Union as its “satanic” homeland.  Communism at home and abroad needed 
to be wiped out according to the Legionary movement.    
Many Romanians were attracted to the religious mysticism of the Legionary movement.  
The Legionaries believed that the Romanian nation required a redemptive rebirth that could only 
occur through the power of Eastern Orthodoxy; the Legion itself was named after the Archangel 
Michael who defeated Satan.127  Legionary rhetoric became popular with many village priests.   
These local priests and their families were often nearly as poor as the peasants in the village and 
shared their hostile attitudes towards the “Judaized” state and corrupt clergy in Bucharest.128  
Some priests were ultranationalists, a few joined the Legionaries and many more sympathized 
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“white” married clergy and “black” celibate monks, see, Ware, The Orthodox Church, 291. 
 138 
 
with it.129  The Romanian Orthodox Church never really felt threatened by the Legionaries and 
priests or theology students who became Legionaries could still have successful careers in the 
church.  The Romanian Orthodox Church was more than sufficiently nationalistic, anti-Semitic, 
and anti-communist to absorb ultranationalist or fascist priests.   
Young men joining the army would likely have had some exposure to Legionary ideas.  
Whether from sympathetic priests, student activists, or from the “captain” himself – Codreanu 
rode through villages in the countryside in the style of a haiduc leader (these bandit chiefs were 
celebrated in folk tales as a sort of Balkan Robin Hood) to spread his message and win peasant 
votes.  Legionary rhetoric was popular and attracted members from all classes.  Nevertheless, the 
state, army, church, and traditional political parties offered Romanians many other outlets for 
their nationalist, religious, anti-Semitic, and anti-communist convictions, thereby limiting the 
Legionaries’ success.  When the elections of 1937 seemed close to putting the Legionaries into a 
position where they might be brought to power through a coalition government with the National 
Peasant Party King Carol II decided to violently suppress it.  In a manner of months, the Legion 
was reduced from a mass political movement to a small terrorist organization.  
The influence of the Legionary movement on the atrocities committed against Romanian 
and Soviet Jews by the Romanian Army after 1941 was indirect because of its repression by the 
royal dictatorship created in 1938.  The Legion had a brief period of resurgence after September 
1940 when the National-Legionary State was established under the joint rule of Antonescu and 
the new fascist leader Horia Sima, but the Legion was again repressed by Antonescu, using the 
Romanian Army, after a Legionary rebellion in late January 1941.  This cemented Antonescu’s 
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hold on power through a military dictatorship.  Despite the Antonescu regime’s surveillance, 
persecution, and repression of Legionaries deemed a threat to the state between 1941 and 1944, 
as well as Legionary antipathy towards Antonescu, many Legionaries, ex-Legionaries, and 
Legionary sympathizers served in the Romanian Army on the Eastern Front.   
After 1941, Legionaries conscripted into the Romanian Army had to hide or change their 
political convictions, but most found it relatively simple to fit into army culture and could pursue 
interwar goals of ethnic purification, alliance with Nazi Germany against “Judeo-Bolshevism,” 
and even territorial expansion.130  Legionaries (and followers of LANC called Lanceri) in the 
ranks of the Romanian Army were a contributing factor in the outbreak of anti-Semitic violence 
by soldiers during the army’s retreat from eastern Romania in 1940, and rapid radicalization of 
anti-Semitic violence when the army returned to liberate northern Bukovina and Bessarabia in 
1941.  Beginning in 1942, hundreds of Legionaries served on the front in battalions formed from 
political prisoners and soldiers sentenced for various crimes with the possibility of rehabilitation.  
The officers who commanded these rehabilitation battalions greatly valued the motivation of the 
Legionary soldiers who fought at Stalingrad, in the Kuban bridgehead, in Crimea, and in defense 
of Romania. Therefore, while fascism was not a primary motivator for Romanian soldiers during 
the Second World War, it did cast a long shadow that influenced the army’s actions after 1941.    
Conclusion 
 When the Romanian Army invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 nationalism, religion, anti-
Semitism, and anti-communism motivated the soldiers to fight and to commit atrocities.  Peasant 
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conscripts brought these beliefs with them into the army where both regular and reserve officers, 
with the help of regimental chaplains, reinforced them through patriotic speeches and education. 
Two decades of right-wing populism, radicalized by fascist activism, unintentionally prepared 
Romanian peasants to enthusiastically participate in Hitler’s war of annihilation.  These factors 
motivated Romanian soldiers in combat against the Red Army and committing atrocities against 
Jews and communists during the invasion in 1941, but when the Wehrmacht failed to destroy the 
Soviet Union Romanian soldiers remained motivated (even as morale waxed and waned) to fight 
and commit atrocities through 1944.  Therefore, while the Romanian Army was not motivated by 
racial or class ideology like either of the primary belligerents, it was still motivated by powerful 
ideologies that sustained officers and soldiers on the Eastern Front.  
 It should be emphasized that while anti-Semitism was prevalent throughout Romania, the 
Antonescu regime only completely unleashed it against the Jews of eastern Romania east of the 
Prut.  Antonescu believed in “orderly” Romanianization of Jewish property and businesses and 
wanted to find a way to rid Romania of its Jewish population, but he also feared the chaos and 
anarchy of popular anti-Semitic violence.  On 18 September 1940, Antonescu promised Wilhelm 
Filderman, a Jewish community leader in Bucharest, after taking power that “if [Filderman’s] 
coreligionists do not sabotage the government, neither directly nor behind the scenes, politically 
or economically, the Jews will not suffer.”131  Ironically, the Conducător’s anti-Semitic bias had 
him convinced that the Jews were so influential politically and powerful economically that they 
could derail his regime, so he believed the state to move slowly with the Romanianization of the 
                                                 
131 Wilhelm Filderman, Memoirs and Diaries, Vol. 1: 1900-1940, ed. Jean Ancel (Jeruslaem: Yad Vashem and Tel 
Aviv University, 2004), 36-37.   
 141 
 
economy and hoped to find a way to force Jews to emigrate abroad to remove them physically.  
Crucially, his promise did not include Jews then under Soviet occupation in northern Bukovina 
and Bessarabia that Antonescu held responsible for the humiliation of the Romanian Army in 
1940.  Nevertheless, despite Antonescu’s promise, Jews suffered persecution and violence at the 
hands of Legionaries between September 1940 and January 1941 with whom he shared power in 
the National-Legionary State.  Legionary police attacked Jews and looted Jewish property while 
Antonescu watched, frustrated with the disorder and worried it might trigger a Jewish boycott of 
the economy, but unwilling to intervene on behalf of Jews.   
He only halted the violence after the Legionary rebellion, but he still did not hold true to 
his word to Filderman.  Romanianization continued under the Antonescu regime along the lines 
advocated by interwar Romanian economists, Jews would be squeezed out once Romanians with 
the skills to replace them were found or trained, and then gotten rid of through forced emigration.  
During 1941-1944, the state targeted Jews west of the Prut for “legal” expropriation of property, 
special taxes, and forced labor; for a brief period in 1942 it began preparing for the deportation 
of Jews to German death camps in Poland.  Yet, as harshly as the Antonescu regime treated the 
largely assimilated Jews west of the Prut it was less severe than the treatment meted out to less 
assimilated Jews east of the Prut in eastern Romania and Transnistria.132  In 1941, inspired by the 
anti-Semitic violence initiated by soldiers and civilians in eastern Romania, the Romanian Army 
legitimized their actions and then the Antonescu regime chose to “cleanse the terrain” of Jews in 
northern Bukovina and Bessarabia through mass deportations to the east.   
                                                 
132 Culture, not race, determined treatment, see, Steinhart, The Holocaust and the Germanization of the Ukraine, 6-7.   
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Romanian soldiers were highly motivated on the Eastern Front.  The Antonescu regime 
could not have fought the war or carried out mass deportations of Jews east of the Prut in eastern 
Romania to ghettos and camps in Transnistria without the support of soldiers, gendarmes, elites, 
civil servants, peasants, and workers.  After 1941, nearly all Romanian society supported the 
“crusade against communism.”  The long-term causes were nationalism, religion, anti-Semitism, 
and anti-communism, but it was the events of 1940 that unified the country behind Antonescu.
 
 
 143 
 
CHAPTER IV  
THE POLITICS OF THE INTERWAR ROMANIAN ARMY 
 
This chapter will examine the politics of the Romanian Army between 1922 and 1939 to 
prove that the assumed pro-Western sympathies of the officer corps were skin deep at best and 
show that Antonescu was as much a politician as a soldier who managed to position himself near 
the reins of power.  Previous histories of the politics of the interwar Romanian Army are few, 
limited to a technical focus, and either avoid addressing later wartime crimes or openly apologist.  
The extent to which the Romanian Army participated in Hitler’s war of annihilation in the USSR 
can be best understood in the context of officer corps’ mentality and its politics.  While the army 
maintained a veneer of apolitical neutrality, the officer corps was as roiled by interwar Romanian 
political changes the same as society and played an important role in supporting an increasingly 
authoritarian monarchy.  The officer corps largely remained immune to the lure of the Legionary 
movement but sympathized with many of its beliefs, as illustrated by its support of anti-Semitic 
policies enacted by the royal dictatorship after 1938.  After 1940, the officer corps embraced the 
military dictatorship of Antonescu, hoped for a war against the USSR alongside the Wehrmacht, 
and once war broke out officers legitimized and expanded anti-Semitic violence.   
The primary account of the politics of the interwar Romanian Army is Larry Watts’ semi-
biographical history focused on Antonescu.  In this study Watts depicts interwar army politics as 
a binary clash between professionalism and traditionalism – identified with Antonescu and Carol 
II respectively.1  Watts unfairly places most of the blame for the army being ill-prepared for war 
                                                 
1 Watts, Romanian Cassandra, 17-20, 44-53, 75-98. 
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in 1941 on corrupt politicians, claiming that the state failed to provide the army with the funds, 
materials, and weapons it required.  He also, inaccurately, describes Antonescu as an apolitical 
and professional modernizer opposed by incompetent senior officers in league with the morally 
bankrupt monarch.  In truth, Antonescu exploited the debates on army reform to launch his own 
political career.  His monograph on the wartime Antonescu regime, Dennis Deletant focuses on 
Antonescu’s anti-Semitism and his responsibility for the Holocaust in Romania, which Watts’ 
apologist narrative avoided.2  Despite his more critical perspective, Deletant still accepts Watts’ 
depiction of Antonescu as an apolitical military profession, regardless of the fact that he sought 
political influence and eventually wielded dictatorial power.3  To attribute his seizure of power to 
simple circumstance, luck, or fate (although contingency undoubtedly played an important role) 
without also taking into account the general’s political acumen is mistaken.  Finally, due to his 
later importance Antonescu has loomed large in histories of the interwar period, decidedly more 
so than his actual activities and influence in the Romanian Army at the time merit.  This chapter 
will broaden the scope to the politics of the Romanian Army to show that the state did all it could 
to provide the funds that senior officers asked for, there was little disagreement about the need to 
modernize, and that the officer corps’ politics were deeply conservative.   
                                                 
2 Watts’ book ends in 1940 with only a short afterward on the war years.  He claims that, “Another of Antonescu’s 
unsung, and even more frequently denied, successes was his de facto protection of the Romanian Jews under his 
control from the systematic murder of the Final Solution,” see, Ibid., 345; Deletent basically picks up where Watts 
left off with a generally apologist account of Antonescu’s wartime regime, but focusing on the Holocaust.  He 
argues that Antonescu “was aware of the implications of the ‘Final Solution’ for the Jews in Nazi-occupied 
Europe…and made his own particular contribution to the solution of the ‘Jewish Problem’ by deporting Jews from 
Bessarabia and Bukovina to Transnistria,” see, Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 1.  
3 Deletant often uncritically quotes Antonescu, for example when Antonescu told Hitler in a June 1941 meeting that 
he “was neither a politician nor diplomat.  He was born a soldier and wanted to die one.”  The irony of this statement 
(Antonescu was acting as both a politician and a diplomat as dictator and had been a diplomat in Paris after the war 
and active in politics since 1934) seems to have been lost on the author, see, Ibid., 70.  
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Antonescu was not a progressive, apolitical, professional soldier; in fact, he embodied the 
traditional social mores and semi-professionalism of the officer corps.  While he may have had a 
competent operational mind, as some claim, he clearly exploited political connections to advance 
his career as deftly as any empty-headed salon general.  Born into a distinguished military family 
in the city of Piteşti in 1882, Antonescu’s father was an officer who married into a modest boyar 
family.  Two of his three uncles were also officers.  Dumitru Antonescu was a general (with red 
hair like his nephew) and Ilie Antonescu was a colonel.  Although both men died prematurely – 
Dumitru from an illness and Ilie from a wound suffered in combat in 1916 – but they encouraged 
their nephew to pursue the family vocation and helped advance his career while a junior officer.4  
After finishing primary education, Antonescu studied at the School for Military Sons in Craiova 
before attending officer training school and receiving a commission as a 2nd lieutenant in 1904.  
Antonescu’s family connections soon came in handy as Colonel Antonescu, and his step-father’s 
– his father had divorced his mother and she had remarried – brother Colonel Baranga were both 
royal adjutants who presented their nephew to King Carol I and Crown Prince Ferdinand.5   
Due to these connections, Antonescu was easily accepted into the Special Cavalry School 
in Târgovişte, which set him on the fast track for promotion.6  His first post was in the Danube 
port city of Galaţi with the 1st Roşiori Regiment, where he later fended off a peasant mob during 
the Peasant Uprising of 1907.  In the following years, he attended the Superior School of War in 
Bucharest, special General Staff command courses, and by 1913 he was already a captain on the 
staff of the IV Corps under General Prezan.  Now Lt. Colonel (soon Colonel) Antonescu made 
                                                 
4 Pantazi, Cu mareşalul până la moarte, 1, 5. 
5 He met with the king and crown prince after passing his exams, see, Ibid., 9.   
6 Easterman, King Carol, Hitler and Lupescu, 14.  
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his reputation in military circles during the First World War working under General Prezan, who 
commanded Fourth Army in 1916 before being promoted to Chief of the General Staff (in charge 
of General Headquarters) in 1917, planning operations.  In 1919, Antonescu traveled with Prezan 
to attend the Versailles Conference.  Soon after royal patronage landed him a plum assignment as 
the Romanian military attaché to Paris (expanded to include Brussels and London, although he 
mostly stayed in Paris, primarily to negotiate arms deals) between 1922 and 1926.  Antonescu 
had not been the first choice.  Initially, the French had selected another officer proposed by the 
Romanians for the post in 1920 because the French military attaché in Bucharest reported that 
while “[e]xtremely industrious, [and] of great military worth,” Antonescu was also “extremely 
vain,” “chauvinistic,” and “xenophobic,” so he would not aid closer Franco-Romanian military 
relations.  The French military attaché spoke from wartime experience when as chief of staff of 
the French Military Mission he interacted daily with Antonescu and the two had clashed often.  
The French advisors often did not hide contempt for Romanian officers, causing resentment and 
conflicts between the allies during the war.  The French military attaché assumed that Antonescu 
would probably not show “any sign of gratitude for the services made by France.”7  
As this short biography shows, Antonescu was the embodiment traditional army society.  
He was a graduate of the elite cavalry school, an arch-conservative, an elitist, an ultranationalist, 
and a patron of the monarchy.  He was also an anti-Semite.  Antonescu once failed an officer 
candidate, who had been doing well in his exam, after he discovered that the candidate’s mother 
was Jewish.8  Historians have emphasized his supposedly “rabid” anti-Semitism and “extreme” 
                                                 
7 Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 38; Torrey, The Romanian Battlefront in World War I, 187-188.   
8 He boasted about this in a Council of Ministers meeting, see, Solonari, Purifying the Nation, 119-120.   
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xenophobia, mainly to try to place all the blame for the Holocaust in Romania on his shoulders, 
but his attitudes were rather unremarkable in the officer corps.  It was instead his acerbic speech, 
volatile temper, and blunt manner that set him apart from other officers and worried the French 
military attaché.  Furthermore, he held the same unprofessional attitudes as most army officers.  
Antonescu also was not a political novice who just happened to be in the position to take power 
in 1940.  He was a competent politician who used his relationship with the monarchy to advance 
his political career in the 1930s, becoming a nationally known figure after the Škoda Scandal in 
1933, and courted the far right to increase his influence.  Antonescu is not the focus of this work, 
but he played a central role in the decision to go to war, created the situation in which Romanian 
soldiers perpetrated atrocities against Jews, and personally ordered the deportation of Jews from 
eastern Romania and later Odessa – that resulted in more massacres.  Therefore, it is necessary to 
show Antonescu for who he was during the interwar period, not an apolitical military reformer, 
but instead an opportunistic right-wing politician with a military background.   
 Antonescu was not the only general turned politician in the interwar period.  The first was 
General Alexandru Averescu, a cavalryman who command Second Army during the First World 
War, who made the transition from military to civilian sphere to become prime minister in 1918, 
1920-1921, and 1926-1927.  Averescu was reputed to be the most gifted operational mind in the 
army in 1916 and his role in the battles of 1917 was glorified in the press, making him extremely 
popular.9  Averescu quit the army to enter politics after the armistice was signed with the Central 
Powers.  In April 1918, he formed Liga Poporului, or the People’s League, a right-wing populist 
                                                 
9 In reality, Averescu’s slapdash “Flămânda Maneuver” in 1916 trying to cross the Danube was an abject failure and 
an example of “strategic adventurism.”  He disobeyed General Headquarters orders to halt Second Army’s attack in 
July 1917, part of the Kerensky offensive, when the Russians collapsed further north.  Averescu’s decision resulted 
in useless casualties and exposed his army, see, Torrey, The Romanian Battlefront in World War I, 81-89, 206-209. 
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group, soon renamed Partidul Poporului, or the People’s Party. 10  The People’s Party’s rhetoric 
included a heavy dose of anti-Semitism that accused the Liberal Party of being in the pockets of 
corrupt Jews; LANC and the Legion later used similar rhetoric.  Averescu’s People’s Party had 
great success in 1920, obtaining nearly 45 percent of the vote, and brought the general to power.  
He proved a mediocre politician and disappointed the peasantry because his liberal policies did 
not match his populist rhetoric, so they turned to Iuliu Maniu and his National Peasant Party.11  
Averescu set an example that other politically ambitious officers tried to follow later.   
The Politics of the Officer Corps 
 The officer corps itself was not politicized.  During its brief history the Romanian Army 
remained firmly under the control of civilian leaders – boyar oligarchs (Conservative or Liberal) 
and the monarchy – and did not develop a tradition of trying to seize political power.  Romanian 
civil-military relations were very good through the First World War, primarily because state and 
army goals coincided: military expansion, modernization, and special privileges for the officer 
corps.  Pliable salon generals bent to the will of Ion Brătianu who dominated fin de siècle politics 
in Romania. The absence of civil-military conflict continued through the interwar period.   
The Romanian Army’s limited involvement in politics is illustrated by the “Stere Case.”  
On 27 March 1930, three generals publicly walked out of a commemoration for the unification of 
Bessarabia with Romania because of the presence of Constantin Stere.  Stere was a leader in the 
recently elected National Peasant government and disliked by officers for several reasons.  First, 
and foremost, during the First World War he had been anti-Entente during neutrality, preferring 
                                                 
10 The league attracted a hodgepodge of former members of the defunct Conservative Party, intellectuals, former 
officers, and veteran soldiers who had served under the general, see, Otu, Mareşalul Alexandru Averescu, 257-258. 
11 Averescu tried to come to an understanding with the Liberals, see, Hitchins, Rumania, 396-397, 407-409. 
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war against Russia to free Bessarabia, and remained behind in German-occupied Wallachia and 
collaborated.  Second, Stere’s fin de siècle peasant populism, called poporanism, which opposed 
socialism, advocated for peasant voting rights, and supported peasant co-operatives was deemed 
too close to socialism for officers’ comfort.12  The generals’ walkout stunned the county.  The 
Liberal opposition used it to discredit the National Peasant government, arguing it was alienating 
the army and creating the conditions for a military coup, so Maniu had to dismiss Stere.13  The 
fact that such a small act of protest by senior officers was so shocking shows just how rarely the 
Romanian Army openly participated in politics.  Yet the Romanian Army’s lack of politicization 
does not mean that individual officers did not hold political beliefs.   
 The majority of officers were politically conservative: monarchists, nationalists, and anti-
communists.  Yet historians have mistakenly fixated on the Francophilia of the Romanian elite to 
paint officers as liberal.  According to conventional wisdom, the Francophilia of the officer corps 
impeded Romanian relations with the Germans during the Second World War because of their 
deep commitment to the liberal-democratic values of Western Europe, however, there were no 
signs of republicanism or even a strong commitment to liberalism in the officer corps during the 
interwar period.14  There is a great difference between enjoying a trip to Paris, speaking French 
at a party, or preferring French haute cuisine to traditional Romanian fare and believing in liberal 
democracy, secular tolerance, or the rule of law.  While some Romanian officers attended French 
military schools, there is little proof that time in France inclined any to adopt republican political 
                                                 
12 For details on Stere’s development of poporanism before the First World War, see, Hitchins, Rumania, 72-75. 
13 Scurtu, România în timpul celor patru regi, volum III: Carol II, 64-65. 
14 Deletant again uncritically quotes Antonescu when he describes the Romanian elite as “Francophiles,” see 
Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 86-87; Axworthy claims that training in France made officers pro-French “and by 
extension pro-Western,” but offers no evidence to support this claim, see, Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 60.   
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ideals.  In fact, the French Army’s officer corps held conservative and aristocratic values, which 
French politicians of the Third Republic saw as antithetical to republicanism and argued that the 
French Army as “an alien body within the state.”15  Thus, it is doubly unlikely Romanian officers 
were liberalized while training in France.  The Dreyfus Affair, a notorious scandal centered on 
the punishment of a Jewish officer – Alfred Dreyfus – unjustly accused of military espionage by 
the French Army, divided France between Dreyfusards, those who believed in his innocence, and 
anti-Dreyfusards, those convinced of his guilt, in 1894-1906.  Romanian officers’ Francophilia 
leaned more towards the France and values of the anti-Dreyfusards (many of whom later joined 
the Vichy regime): tradition, honor, clericalism, militarism, discipline, and anti-Semitism.16  The 
fig leaf of Francophilia, so often invoked by Romanian diplomats during the Second World War, 
and by historians since, in an attempt to win Western sympathy against the Soviets and to prove 
Romania was only a “reluctant” ally of Nazi Germany, falls away when one acknowledges the 
murderous policies against Romanian and Soviet Jews carried out after 1941.   
 The Romanian Army discouraged political discussion in the ranks, nevertheless, soldiers 
still held political convictions and formed different factions within the army.  Regular officers or 
NCOs had long been restricted by law from voting in elections.  After the royal dictatorship had 
outlawed all political parties in 1938, 2nd Lieutenant Manolescu recalled that senior officers tried 
to muzzle political debate among all soldiers, especially middle-class reserve officers who were 
more likely to be sympathizers of the Legionary movement, but spirited debates continued in the 
ranks.  “Politics were officially banned,” he wrote, “but unofficially we grouped together and 
                                                 
15 Ralston, The Army of the Republic, 3. 
16 Ruth Harris, Dreyfus: Politics, Emotion, and the Scandal of the Century (New York: Picador, 2010), 3, 7, 11.   
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formed little cells of legionaries or socialists; little cells of nobodies, dominated by cadet X, Y or 
Z in accordance with the galvanizing effect of their personalities.”17  Manolescu was one of the 
few socialists in the officer corps and was persecuted by other officers for his left-wing beliefs.18  
During the 1930s, two important factions formed in opposition to each other within the officer 
corps, Carlists and populists.  A third faction, militarists, consolidated power after the other two 
factions were discredited between June 1940 and January 1941.   
The Carlist faction developed in the late 1920s and consisted of officers who supported 
the restoration of the Crown Prince Carol and later, when he became King Carol II in 1930, his 
drift towards royal dictatorship.  Carlism was not limited to the army but was a wider political 
movement that attracted supporters from the political elite of all parties, the middle class, and the 
peasantry who looked for a strong leader in the difficult years of the Depression.19  Crown Prince 
Carol renounced his claim to the throne in 1925, in favor of his four-year-old son Mihai, because 
he wanted to divorce his wife (fulfilled in 1928) and continue an affair in exile with his mistress.  
Officers’ attraction to the exiled prince is not obvious at first glance because he had a checkered 
military past at best.  During the First World War, Prince Carol had crisscrossed the front visiting 
regiments to encourage the troops, however, he deserted his post in August 1918 to elope and got 
married in secret in German-occupied Odessa.20  The incident was hushed up by the government, 
                                                 
17 Manolescu, Permitted to Land, 8.   
18 “My life became a misery.  Lieut.-Colonel Procop had his eye on me.  Since the day I had spoken so freely 
approving of Codreanu’s death I became his sole object of persecution.  Everybody in the regiment noticed it, and 
the other officers imitated him.  Instead of consolation or tacit sympathy, I got cold looks, harsh commands, and the 
worst jobs.  For hours I had to drill with my platoon…I could hear the ranks grumble…worse of all was the fact that 
even the soldiers took liberties with me,” see, Ibid., 26.  
19 Scurtu, România în timpul celor patru regi: Carol II, 67. 
20 His lover was Jeanne Marie Valentine “Zizi” Lambrino, who being the daughter of a Romanian boyar family, was 
not a suitable match for the crown prince who was meant to marry into one of the other European royal families.  
For a (sympathetic) account of Carol’s First World War antics, see, Paul D. Quinlan, The Playboy King: Carol II of 
Romania (Westport, Connecticut; London: Greenwood Press, 1995), 30-46.       
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the marriage quickly annulled, and a meeting of the monarchs, politicians, and generals placed 
him under 75 days arrest in a remote monastery.21  After 1919, the prince suppressed his playboy 
lifestyle long enough to marry Princess Helen of Greece in 1921 and quickly sire a son before his 
infatuation with Elena “Magda” Lupescu, daughter of assimilated Jewish converts to Christianity 
who was utterly unacceptable as a match for the crown prince, resulted in his exile.  Yet despite 
these scandals, Carlist officers supported the prince’s return because they saw in him the chance 
for a young and dynamic ruler who would provide the stability and strong leadership that they 
believed Romania needed.  Moreover, many senior officers, including Antonescu, had invested 
much time and effort into building a relationship with Crown Prince Carol expecting it to pay off 
in promotions and prominent positions once he was king.  The prince’s exile was a major blow to 
these ambitious officers who now hoped that his restoration would benefit them as well. 
Carlism gained followers after 1925 because many thought his exile unfair and political 
crisis was followed by economic crisis.  King Ferdinand I, despite his wartime reign and grand 
moniker as “King Integrator,” was neither charismatic nor very popular, moreover, he was easily 
dominated by Ion Brătianu, the venerable leader of the Liberal Party, and more embarrassingly 
was outshone by his charismatic wife Queen Marie.22  “Poor Fritz” had a weak personality and 
after 1925 he was also physically weak from cancer.  Brătinau feared that Prince Carol might try 
to reclaim the throne and anticipating Ferdinand I’s death, the prime minister pushed through a 
special act on 4 January 1926 that reaffirmed Mihai as the only legitimate heir to the throne and 
that a regency would rule until he came of age, which Brătianu expected to control.  Following 
                                                 
21 Quinlan, The Playboy King, 43-44.  
22 Torrey, The Romanian Battlefront in World War I, 5.  
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Ferdinand I’s death on 20 July 1927, the regency – composed of Prince Nicolae (Carol’s weak 
and immature younger brother), Patriarch Miron, and President of the High Court of Justice 
Gheorghe Buzdugan (a trusted, if aged, Liberal) – began to rule for the six-year-old King Mihai 
I, but Brătinau unexpectedly died soon after and in his absence the Liberal Party soon fractured,  
removing his guiding influence and making the regency ineffectual 23  Carlist sympathies in the 
army, and society in general, grew under the unpopular regency.  Brătianu’s death also removed 
a major obstacle to the return of the exiled prince.  In 1929, the death of Buzdugan and the Wall 
Street Crash both greatly weakened the fragile regency.  After a failed first attempt in May 1928, 
with public opinion strongly supporting the return of Carol and the political parties divided, the 
exiled prince took advantage of the chaos to organize his restoration.24   
The Carlist faction dominated the Romanian Army from the restoration of King Carol II 
on 8 June 1930 to his abdication on 6 September 1940.  The monarch patronized his favorites in 
the army and Carlist senior officers closest to the king joined the camarilla that formed around 
him.  Carol II’s camarilla of politicians, industrialists, boyars, and officers who used the king as a 
patron to obtain favors and profited from corruption in exchange for subsidizing the king’s lavish 
lifestyle.25  Most of the officer corps did not benefit so directly from royal patronage, however, 
Carol II offered the stability to that authoritarian-minded officers believed that Romanian society 
needed in the political and economic turmoil of the time.  They also hoped that the king would 
                                                 
23 Scurtu, Istoria românilor celor patru regi, volumul II: Ferdinand I, 162, 155; Liberal Party leadership passed to 
his brother Vintilă, who died in 1930, and then their younger brother Gheorghe, see, Hitchins, Rumania, 413, 384. 
24 For details on his first attempt, halted by alert British authorities, see, Quinlan, The Playboy King, 92-94; Ivor 
Porter, Michael of Romania: The King and the Country (Glourcestershire: Sutton Publishing, 2005), 26-27. 
25 Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 41; some revisionist historians have recently tried to describe members of the 
camarilla as lobbyists, see, Mihaela Camelia Ilie, “Processing the Political Image of a King: An Overview of the 
Interwar and Communist Discourse about Carol II of Romania,” Revista de Stiinte Politice 47 (2015), 207-208.  
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patronize the officer corps by helping obtain the funds that they believed the Romanian Army 
required, including subsidies for officers’ special privileges.   
Very few officers were attracted to a small populist faction in the Romanian Army.  The 
populist faction was made up of officers disillusioned with the corruption and status quo politics 
of the Old Kingdom and believed that the creation of România Mare offered society a chance to 
reform.  Many of the populist officers were junior officers or reserve officers who believed that 
the Romanian Army needed to be reformed and improved too.  These officers gravitated towards 
the various populist leagues and parties that multiped after the adoption universal male suffrage.  
These populist officers supported Averescu’s People’s Party and then Maniu’s National Peasant 
Party in the 1920s, sadly disappointed by their poor performance when in power.  The populist 
faction briefly believed in the promise of Carlism.  King Carol II’s rule, however, proved another 
disappointment to the populist officers turned to the Legionary movement as it grew in strength 
in the 1930s.  While populist officers sympathized with the Legion, they did not usually join the 
Legionary movement or the All for the Country Party because officers believed that they should 
be apolitical and participation in politics was officially restricted by army leadership.  Therefore, 
most Legionary officers were junior reserve officers unrestrained by culture or law.   
Carol II loved the pomp and circumstance of the military, but he could offer little to its 
officers because his restoration marked the beginning of the worst period of the Depression in 
Romania between 1930 and 1933.  During these years the army’s budget was slashed drastically 
– in 1932 alone it was reduced by over half – and for a time Romania’s military expenditure was 
the lowest in Europe.26  Also, the king’s camarilla quickly made his name a byword for greed, 
                                                 
26 Watts, Romanian Cassandra, 47.  
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corruption, and self-interest.  Major Ernest Urdăreanu, who acted as the gatekeeper to the king, 
was the most notorious Carlist officer.  He was a “a typical cavalry officer,” who could speak 
flawless French, but was not very bright or well-read; he also was conniving, unscrupulous, and 
ambitious.  Urdăreanu managed to worm his way into a position as a royal adjutant in the palace 
and profited from the camarilla who showed him with gifts in exchange for access to the king.27  
Carol II’s reputation for corruption is probably exaggerated because it benefited contemporaries 
(and later historians) to blame him for all the problems of the 1930s, nonetheless, the monarch’s 
reputation supplied the Legionaries with plenty of materials for attacks against his corruption.28  
Madame Lupescu, the king’s “Jewish” mistress who followed him from exile, soon became the 
object of profound hatred among the far-right populists.  They believed her baleful influence was 
corrupting the monarchy and undermining the nation.29  A few populist officers came to believe 
they should employ the violent tactics of the Legionaries to save the crown from corruption.  
Legionaries tried to attract populist officers to their movement.  Dana Beldiman believes 
that ideology was the primary reason why a few, mostly young, officers joined the Legion and 
cites commonalities between Legionary and army values: discipline, respect of hierarchy, spirit 
of sacrifice, swearing oaths, patriotism, monarchism, Romanian Orthodoxy, anti-communism, 
and military organization.30  Additionally, she emphasizes the idealism of junior officers who 
were disgusted with the perceived hypocrisy of senior officers that they believed were more 
                                                 
27 Quinlan, The Playboy King, 148.  
28 Unflattering stories about Carol abound.  The most vulgar were about his supposedly insatiable sexual appetites, 
but these stories seem based less in fact than in interwar tabloid journalism, Legionary propaganda, and Communist 
era anti-monarchy propaganda, see, Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-
1999 (New York: Penguin, 1999), 443; Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History, New Edition 
(New York: Picador, 2005), 85-86; Ilie, “Processing the Political Image of a King,” 212-213. 
29 Easterman, King Carol, Hitler, and Lupescu, 73; Quinlan, The Playboy King, 143.   
30 Beldiman, Armata şi Mişcarea Legionară, 33. 
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motivated by self-interest and opportunism than patriotism and honor.31  Beldiman, however, 
misses a material motivation for populist officers.  In the uncertain economic conditions of the 
Depression, few junior officers could look forward to promotion, increased pay, or more power. 
Therefore, the motivation of populist officers who became Legionaries was probably not purely 
ideological, if it had been far more officers would have joined than did.  The egalitarian rhetoric 
of the Legionary movement promised an end to patronage and corruption in favor of merit.  This 
would create new opportunities for frustrated junior officers by removing supposedly corrupt (or 
“Judaized”) officers from positions of leadership.  The red-haired Antonescu was surrounded by 
rumors about his ethnic origins because in Romania red hair was traditionally associated with 
Jews.32  Later in 1941, when Legionaries and Antonescu were vying for power, the Legionary 
press accused Antonescu of being a “Jew-lover” under the control of a “Judeo-Masonic plot” 
who was delivering the country into the hands of “satanic elements.”  He hurriedly refuted these 
accusations in propaganda booklet printed to defend his anti-Semitic credentials.33 
Despite a few superficial similarities between the values of Legionary movement and the 
Romanian Army only a few officers chose to join the Legion.  Most had joined the army because 
they were either from the social elite, or else aspired to join it, thus they so were opposed to the 
egalitarian rhetoric of the Legionaries.  Furthermore, most officers saw the Legionaries as 
immature hooligans creating chaos, in contrast, the officer corps identified itself as the defender 
                                                 
31 Beldiman, Armata şi Mişcarea Legionară, 29.  
32 Easterman, King Carol, Hitler and Lupescu, 14; in traditional folk superstition “men who had red hair and beard 
and/or freckled faces were called ruddy men. It was believed that ‘they are Jews,’ or that they are descended of 
them,’ or that ‘they have their traits,’” see, Oişteanu, Inventing the Jew, 59-61.  
33 Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 65; Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania, 57; for Antonescu’s refutation of these 
accusations and defense of his firm, if gradual, Romanianization policies, see, Scurtu, Pe marginea prăpastiei, 129.  
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of order and stability.34  Antonescu believed that the Legionaries were amateurish and naïve.  In 
the margins of an army intelligence report on the Legion that included an excerpt from a speech 
by Codreanu refusing to create a detailed political program, which the Legionary leader touted as 
an antidote to party politics as usual, Antonescu harrumphed, “Not serious.  It is not possible to 
improvise the program of the simplest family farm in a single night, let alone that of an organism 
as vast as the modern state.”35  Legionaries were considered a threat and populist officers were 
kept under close surveillance by military intelligence.  Only a few retired generals (openly) and 
junior regular or reserve officers (secretly) joined the Legionary movement, so they had limited 
influence in the Romanian Army.  Only for a brief period between September 1940 and January 
1941 during the National-Legionary State did officers court the Legion more seriously. 
The militarist faction took shape between July and September 1940 when Carlist officers 
were discredited after abandoning Romanian territory without a fight and lost their patron after 
the king abdicated.  Militarist officers coalesced around Antonescu.  His political maneuvering 
during the interwar period had placed him in the position to seize power from Carol II, although 
the 19-year-old king Mihai I who succeeded his father (for a second time) technically remained 
the head of state.  Antonescu began his political career as a Carlist and was appointed by the king 
as Chief of the General Staff in the wake of the Škoda Scandal in 1933, but he quickly came into 
conflict with Carol II and broke with him by 1934.36  The general turned to right-wing populism 
next to aid his political ambitions.  Antonescu hedged his bets, courting a number of right-wing 
populist groups, primarily the National Christian Party – a fusion of LANC and (Transylvanian 
                                                 
34 Clark, Holy Legionary Youth, 38; Scurtu, Pe marginea prăpastiei, Vol. 1, 20. 
35 Watts, Romanian Cassandra, 144.  
36 Solonari, Purifying the Nation, 118.   
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poet) Octavian Goga’s National Agrarian Party organized by Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg 
in 1935 – and the Legionary movement.37  These contacts soon bore fruit.  Antonescu became 
Minister of Defense in Goga’s short two-month government before Carol II declared a royal 
dictatorship in 1938 and fired him.38  Antonescu’s Legionary connections paid off two years later 
during in the crisis following the Soviet ultimatum when, in a desperate bid to save his position 
on the throne, Carol II turned to him to form a government acceptable to the Legion.  Instead, the 
general was able to force the king to abdicate and declare the National-Legionary State.   
The National-Legionary State soon proved compromised as Antonescu came into conflict 
with the Legionaries over the issue of immediate fascist revolution or continued law and order.  
During September 1940-January 1941, Antonescu and like-minded militarist officers feared the 
egalitarian rhetoric of the Legion and subsequent chaos Legionaries caused carrying out their 
goals that they believed threatened to cripple the state at a time when the General Staff needed to 
be preparing for war.  When the Legion tried to seize power in a spontaneous and disorganized 
uprising in late-January 1941 they were quickly defeated by the army.  The Legionary uprising 
was presented as a rebellion against the legitimate rule of Antonescu who offered order, stability, 
and the restoration of România Mare.  To further discredit them, Antonescu also began to lump 
Legionaries and Communists together as a threat to the established social order.39  The militarists 
                                                 
37 Rebecca Haynes, “Germany and the Establishment of the Romanian National Legionary State, September 1940,” 
The Slavonic and East European Review 77, no. 4 (Oct. 1999), 705.   
38 Watts, Romanian Cassandra, 163; at the time Carol II also stated that, “This is the last attempt [to cooperate] with 
this unstable and ambitious man,” see, Solonari, Purifying the Nation, 120.   
39 The Antonescu regime cited the “parallelism of methods on procedures between Legionarism and Communism.” 
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migrating from the village to the city (especially Gypsies) as representing the poorest and laziest of the countryside, 
and he believed that the working class (whether Legionary or Communist) were a danger to the security of the state, 
see, Ciucă, Stenogramele şedinţelor consiliului de miniştri guvernarea Ion Antonescu, Vol. II, 181.   
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began to imagine an even greater role for the army in society and politics after January 1941 and 
Antonescu effectively ruled Romania through a military dictatorship until August 1944.40   
The army had not planned on taking control of the state during the interwar period, but 
when Antonescu seized power he quickly convinced the officer corps that he was only doing so 
out of necessity to save Romania and they backed his military dictatorship.  Antonescu talked of 
his position as Conducător as being forced on him by destiny, speaking of himself in messianic 
terms.41  This feeling was shared by many officers because democracy, the monarchy, and even 
the Western Powers seemed to have failed.  Romanian officers felt that they must abandon their 
traditional apolitical ideal and reluctantly bear the burden of leading the state in a time of great 
crisis.  The nation now stood exposed to the whims of the Soviet Union and the Romanian Army 
seemed to be the only institution left to defend it.  The officer corps fully supported Antonescu 
because officers believed that he would not only maintain order, but also purify the nation and 
redeem România Mare through a war against the USSR alongside the Wehrmacht 
Interwar Romanian Politics 
Democracy was never very strong in Romania.  During the nineteenth century, political 
control was exercised by a boyar oligarchy, whether under the Liberal or Conservative party, that 
ruled over the peasant majority who mostly could not vote.  The king decided when to call for a 
new government that then organized the elections in its favor.  The Liberal Party dominated by 
courting the support of the more numerous “little boyars” and the bourgeois elites by promising 
liberalization, modernization, economic development, and extending voting rights to propertied 
                                                 
40 The militarization of Romania affected all parts of society and economy, see Hitchins, Rumania, 479. 
41 Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 69, 81-82.   
 160 
 
elites.  The Conservative Party drew its support from the “great boyars” whose power was rooted 
in massive landholdings and fought a delaying action against Liberal ascendency.  The violent 
repression of the Peasant Uprising of 1907 by the army under the Liberals showed the thinness of 
the veneer of democracy in Romania.42  The end of the First World War radically changed the 
political landscape because the Conservative Party collapsed – due to its pro-German attitudes, 
collaboration during the German occupation, and the signing of the Peace of Bucharest in 1918 – 
and universal male suffrage introduced true mass politics for the first time.   
The introduction of mass politics initiated a new debate between two groups in Romania, 
described by Keith Hitchins as “Europeanists” and “Traditionalists.”  The Europeanists were 
mostly Liberals who wanted to continue with their project of modernization and liberalization in 
imitation of Western Europe while the Traditionalists were right-wing populists who sought an 
“organic” and uniquely Romanian path to modernity based in the peasantry and Orthodoxy.43  In 
the aftermath of the First World War a myriad of right-wing groups with Traditionalist beliefs 
formed: the Peasant Party, the People’s Party, the Vlad Ţepeş League, LANC, and others – some 
lasting only a few years.  The Liberal Party continued to dominate Romanian politics because of 
its organization, continuity, and electoral fraud, however, the Liberal Party had now become the 
establishment under constant attack by the growing power of populist groups.     
The most successful populist group was the National Peasant Party, a 1926 fusion of the 
(Old Kingdom) Peasant Party and the (Transylvanian) National Party under Maniu.  In 1929, it 
won in a landslide, obtaining just over 77 percent of the vote, which was a double victory for the 
                                                 
42 Conservatives and Liberals were united in the face of the peasant threat, see, Hitchins, Rumania, 94-97, 114-115. 
43 For an examination of this intellectual debates, see, Ibid., 292-319. 
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populist right because it was the Liberal Party that had organize the elections.  This was the first 
time that the party that organized the elections had lost, despite the normal political chicanery at 
the polling places.44  The new National Peasant government quickly proved a disappointment, 
however, because once in power it acted little differently from the Liberals and proved unable to 
solve the problems caused by the sudden crisis of Depression that started soon after the election.  
In a move to buttress his failing government, Maniu decided to appeal to the upsurge in Carlism 
to negotiate the restoration of Carol II.  He hoped that the new king would feel indebted to him 
and support the National Peasants against the Liberals, the party that had exiled the prince.   
Carol II had other plans and sought to increase his power by associated himself with the 
Romanian Army.  The monarchy had been a martial one since Carol I, the royal crown was made 
of iron from melted down Turkish guns taken after the siege of Plevna in 1877, but Carol II took 
militarism to new heights in the 1930s.  The monarch recognized the value of militarism as a tool 
for domestic politics.  One of his first acts, within a week of his restoration, was to make Prezan 
and Averescu the first marshals of the Romanian Army for their wartime leadership.  He used the 
official ceremony in October 1930 as a public relations event to celebrate the Romanian Army in 
the First World War and emphasize crown’s central role as head of the army in creating România 
Mare.45  Carol II of course whitewashed his own wartime record.  Carlism proved popular and its 
militarism won over the officer corps, which supported the king throughout the turbulent decade, 
and when Carol II declared a royal dictatorship he raised himself to the rank of marshal.  Only a 
few officers in the small populist fraction within the officer corps turned against the king. 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 413-414.  
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Populist officers were not anti-monarchy, but anti-Carlist and some came to believe that 
they had to take action to save the monarchy from itself.  Madame Lupescu personified for many 
on the far right the corruption of Carol II, but the king refused to abandon her and getting in her 
good graces soon became the quickest way to gain favors from the king.46  Industrialists, such as 
the rivals Nicolae Malaxa and Max Auschnitt (born to Jewish parents in Galaţi he converted to 
Catholicism in 1934), plied the king, his mistress, and members of the camarilla with houses, 
cars, cash, and other expensive gifts; Carol II skimmed large amounts from the state budget as 
well.47  A few populist officers became convinced that the restoration of Carol II was a mistake 
because he was under the influence of corrupt Jews who were threatening to destroy Romania by 
undermining the Romanian Army.  The continued economic crisis of the Depression had slashed 
the army budget, and prevented promotions, further disillusioning these populist officers. 
A group of officers decided that they would take radical action inspired by the Legionary 
movement.  Legionaries supported monarchism, but they despised Lupescu and other Jews in the 
camarilla and opposed the typical election chicanery that the National Peasant government had 
continued after taking power.  During the 1933 elections, Codreanu responded by creating “death 
teams” to make sure the Legionary message was heard, trigging a year of electoral violence, and 
on 10 December newly elected Liberal prime minister, Ion Ducă, outlawed the Iron Guard.  On 
29 December, a group of Legionaries assassinated him in reprisal.  The assassins did not try to 
escape and proudly declared their actions as patriotic when arrested and tried.48  A state of siege 
                                                 
46 According to one insider, “If a person approved of their relationship, he was the King’s friend; if he opposed it, he 
was his enemy,” see, Quinlan, The Playboy King, 124.   
47 Hannah Pakula, The Last Romantic: A Biography of Queen Marie of Roumania (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1984), 394. 
48 Clark, Holy Legionary Youth, 100.  
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was declared, and censorship increased; the Liberal government made these temporary measures 
permanent in March 1934 and renewed them each year.49  The “selfless” and “honorable” act of 
the assassins was admired by populist officers who sympathized with the Legionaries and their 
anti-corruption, anti-Semitic arguments.  In April 1934, eight disillusioned officers including a 
lieutenant-colonel, a major, and several captains led by General Victor Recup and inspired by the 
Legionaries planned to throw grenades at the royal motorcade, but the conspiracy was betrayed 
by a sergeant who overheard their plans.  The conspirators were arrested, sentenced to ten years 
in a military prison, and fined 110,000 lei.  At the court martial, they invoked patriotic motives, 
arguing they had hoped to kill Lupescu to remove her corrupting influence over the king.50  The 
group was an isolated case; however, the officer corps remained a reliable ally of Carol II.   
The Legionaries continued to attract a few populist officers.  On 20 March 1935, retired 
general and First World War hero Gheorghe Cantacuzino-Grănicerul, under Codreanu’s urging, 
formed the All for the Country Party.51  The All for the Country Party became a legal cover for 
the outlawed Legion to return to politics and Carol II allowed it to function because he hoped to 
persuade the Legionaries, who were firm monarchists, to accept him and harness their popular 
support.  As the Legionary movement grew in power Antonescu began to meet with Codreanu 
and other Legionary leaders between 1935 and 1937.52  In the 1937 elections, the king’s chosen 
party, the Liberals, received just below 40 percent of the vote, while the National Peasants got 
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just over 20 percent and All for the Country got almost 16 percent.  While the Liberal Party won, 
it did not reach the 40 percent benchmark required by a 1926 electoral law for a party to obtain a 
“premium” of an extra 50 percent of the seats in parliament designed to give the victorious party 
an unbeatable supermajority.53  Without these extra seats the Liberals would be outnumbered by 
in parliament. The election results shocked Carol II who feared a coalition of right-wing groups.  
The National Peasants opposed Carlism, and the fact that Maniu had agreed to an electoral truce 
with Codreanu raised the possibility that they would form a coalition with the Legionaries and 
other far-right groups to form a government.54  This possibility was even more likely because the 
Liberal Party was divided between anti-Carlists and Carlists, who had unified during the election 
but could very well split apart again after this defeat.  Threatened by this far-right alliance hostile 
to his reign, Carol II asked the National Christian Party under Octovian Goga, a personal friend 
of Antonescu, to form a government, despite having only won 10 percent of the vote.   
The Goga government lasted just two chaotic months before Carol II declared his royal 
dictatorship on 20 February 1938 and passed a new authoritarian constitution making him the 
Conducător.  Codreanu was arrested for libel in April, his trial lasted three days, Antonescu and 
Maniu both testified on behalf of the fascist leader, but the verdict was guilty and Codreanu was 
sentenced to six months in prison.  He was then tried for sedition soon after, again quickly found 
guilty, and sentenced to ten years hard labor.  Codreanu did not serve it.  On 30 November 1938, 
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under orders from the king, he and 13 other Legionary leaders were taken from Jilava Prison to 
be strangled and shot.55  The official story was that they were shot while trying to escape.  The 
rest of the Legion came under intense state repression and remaining leaders went underground, 
breaking it into small, isolated factions arguing over who was the successor to Codreanu.  Horia 
Sima emerged as the most influential and began reorganizing the Legionary movement in hiding 
from Bucharest.56  Carol II got the troublesome Antonescu out of the way by demoting him from 
Ministry of Defense to commander of III Corps in Chişinau, the provincial capital of benighted 
Bessarabia and about as far from Bucharest as possible, effectively exiling him.   
Nonetheless, even from afar Antonescu was a thorn in the side of the king.  He toured the 
prisons of Chişinau, traditionally filled with leftist activists (including Zionists and Bundists) and 
communists, but now filled with Legionaries.  The Legionaries faced difficult prison conditions; 
at a time when soldiers received 16 lei a day for food, inmates were allocated just 3 lei’s worth of 
food a day.57  Antonescu wrote a report that publicly called for conditions for the Legionaries to 
be improved, much to the annoyance of Carol II, so Patriarch Miron’s new government declared 
that the report was biased and ignored it.58  Antonescu had III Corps taken away from him and 
was passed over for promotion, causing him to resign from the army.  Therefore, the Legionary 
movement and right-wing populists had been temporarily stymied by Carlist authoritarianism.   
 The royal dictatorship of King Carol II did away completely with liberal democracy and 
Prime Minister Patriarch Miron continued anti-Semitic policies begun by the Goga government 
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in an attempt to neutralize far-right criticism of the king being a “Jew lover”.  The state restricted 
Jews from liberal professions, limited their civil rights, and stripped hundreds of thousands of 
their citizenship.59  The king outlawed political parties and created Frontul Renaşterii Naţionale, 
or The Front of National Rebirth, a fascist-like party that many Liberals and National Peasants 
joined – except leaders like Maniu and Gheorghe Brătianu.  As Conducător, Carol II appointed a 
government of unelected specialists, technocrats, and military officers who passed laws by fiat.60  
This is how Antonescu later ruled – royal dictatorship paved the way for military dictatorship.  
Carol II reorganized the youth movement he created in 1935 to counter the Legion called Straja 
Ţarii, or The Country’s Guard, along Nazi lines and dissolved all others, including Scouts.  The 
officer corps remained solidly Carlist and backed the royal dictatorship during 1938-1940.   
During interwar period, the Romanian Army was used to suppress popular threats, in the 
1920s these were mostly left-wing revolts in rural areas, but in the 1930s they were mostly right-
wing demonstrations in cities.  The Rural Gendarmerie kept order in the countryside, municipal 
police – reinforced in certain places by units of the Operational Gendarmerie – patrolled cities, 
however, when revolts or demonstrations proved beyond the ability of gendarmes or municipal 
police to handle soldiers had to be called in to restore order.61  The countryside of Bessarabia 
proved to be the most revolutionary.  In Hotin and Tatarbunar, in 1919 and 1924 respectively, 
ethnically Russian and Ukrainian peasants inspired by Soviet propaganda and agents revolted.62  
These uprisings were suppressed by the Romanian Army and Bessarabia remained under martial 
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law until the late-1920s.  Chişinău was never completely turned over to civilian administration 
because the city was seen as a dangerous center of communist subversion, especially because it 
was also major Jewish population center.  The Romanian Army retained extra-legal powers that 
allowed it to restrict freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and other civil rights, which is 
why Chişinău’s prisons were always filled with political prisoners.63  Bucharest’s ineffective and 
corrupt administration from Bucharest and the Romanian Army’s authoritarian rule contributed 
to alienating minorities and many basarabeni (Moldovans) in the province by 1940.64   
During the 1930s, cities across România Mare became the scene of right- and left-wing 
demonstrations due to the poor economic conditions resulting from the Depression and the rise 
of the Legionary movement.  As democracy turned towards populism and then fascism, King 
Carol II used the Romanian Army to meet threats to the status quo.  2nd Lieutenant Manolescu 
recorded that by 1938 officer cadets were being trained in “military legislation, [martial law], 
and so on, just in case of emergency, should the civil administration fail to deal with the growing 
danger of Fascism.”65  Officers proved more comfortable using deadly violence against left-wing 
workers, who they feared, than against right-wing activists, with whom they sympathized.   
The anti-communism of the officer corps meant that officers had few qualms following 
orders to suppress leftist demonstrations, even by Romanian workers in the growing industry in 
the Old Kingdom in Bucharest.66  During the worst years of the Depression, the National Peasant 
government implemented several rounds of “sacrificial curves” [curbe de sacrificiu], a series of 
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austerity measures meant to reduce government expenditure that cut salaries and pensions 10-12 
percent.  After three years of cuts during 1931-1933 the salaries of state employees, including 
CFR (state railway) workers, had been reduced by nearly 50 percent.67  Worker discontent and 
communist activism grew, so a state of siege was declared in all industrial cities (Bucharest, 
Ploieşti, Timişoara, Iaşi, Cernăuţi, Galaţi) where Romania’s estimated 600,000 workers lived.  In 
January 1933, CFR workers in Bucharest found out that they not get paid unless they had proof 
of paying their taxes and bad weather caused many to be temporarily laid off.  A communist-led 
union organized a series of strikes on 28 January, 2 February, and 15 February leading to more 
radical demands until the army was sent in to quell the workers.  When communists among the 
workers allegedly fired at the soldiers and officers ordered them to open fire on the strikers and 
killed three workers, wounded another 40, and arrested 1,200 on 16 February.68  Following this 
show of force, many workers began to look to the Legionaries to advocate for change.   
Officers found it more problematic when they were called on to suppressed right-wing 
demonstrations whose ideals they shared and/or sympathized with.  During the 1927 Oradea 
pogrom, the army was called in, but did little to protect Jews or Jewish property against the anti-
Semitic mob.  Since far-right students were seen by many officers as mere hooligans, not serious 
threats like communists, they used less violence.  For example, in 1935 soldiers and gendarmes 
in Bucharest fired shots into the air and used their rifle butts to disperse crowds led by students 
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bent on attacking Jews and their property.69  Such minor clashes between were common through 
the 1930s, but as the Legion grew more powerful they were taken more seriously by officers. 
After 1938, Carlist officers backed the royal dictatorship because it seemed the best way 
to preserve the social status quo.  Armand Călinescu, a close confidant of the king who served as 
Minister of Internal Affairs and later became Prime Minister after the death of Patriarch Miron in 
1939, led the crackdown on the Legionary movement, including imprisonment, torture, and the 
murder of Codreanu and other leaders.  Officers made no protest.  The conservative officer corps 
distrusted the egalitarian rhetoric and chaotic violence of the Legionary movement and preferred 
a strong state under a strong leader, especially as war again threatened Europe.  On 21 September 
1939, a team of nine Legionaries ambushed and killed Călinescu in revenge.  They were arrested 
and machinegunned by soldiers in the exact spot of the assassination, left in the street for days – 
guarded by soldiers who kept back the crowds – as a warning to not join the Legion.  So long as 
Carol II preserved the territorial integrity of România Mare the officer corps would support him 
and his regime, but the establishment of the royal dictatorship put Carol II in a position that if 
anything went wrong there was no one else to blame except him as Conducător.   
Army Budget Debates 
 After the First World War, the Romanian Army had new prestige and pushed for larger 
budgets than it had had previously.  In 1916 the army had been unprepared for war, particularly 
regarding modern weapons, equipment, and stocks of ammunition, and was determined not to be 
caught unprepared again.  The expanded borders of România Mare increased army concerns as it 
was exposed to three hostile and revisionist neighbors – the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Bulgaria 
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– that demanded a large, well-armed, and well-trained army in case of a war with one or all of 
these foes.70  Romania now lacked a Great Power alliance to shield it as the Triple Alliance had 
before 1914, and gained a dangerous new ideological foe in the Soviet Union, both exacerbated 
the weakness of Romania’s strategic position.  While the officer corps never felt like the army’s 
budget was large enough, particularly complaining about officer salaries, the state did all it could 
to provide the army the necessary funds despite Romania’s economic impoverishment.   
 The politicians of România Mare tried to construct a new system of alliances to insulate 
the Romanian Army from having to fight alone if attacked.  The USSR was the primary threat, 
especially after 1929 as Stalin’s Five Year Plan expanded and mechanized the Red Army. The 
Treaty of Versailles had limited the size of the Hungarian and Bulgarian armies, both of which 
remained small, weak, and almost completely un-motorized through the interwar period and the 
Second World War.71  The various threats resulted in a confusing tangle of alliances.  The “Little 
Entente,” a defensive alliance supported by France consisting of Romania, Czechoslovakia, and 
Yugoslavia aimed against Hungary signed in 1920 and ratified in 1921, was a poor substitute for 
a true Great Power alliance.  A bilateral anti-Soviet defensive alliance with Poland was signed in 
1921 after the Polish-Soviet War.  In 1934, Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey joined the 
Balkan Pact, pledging to suspend all territorial claims against each other in favor of maintaining 
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 222, 252.   
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the status quo, isolating Bulgaria.  Finally, Romanian diplomats put their faith in the League of 
Nations because they believed that the strategy of collective defense espoused by the Geneva-
based organization was the best way to protect România Mare.  Romanian officers, however, 
were always skeptical of collective defense, and their skepticism only grew stronger in the 1930s 
as the League system proved dysfunctional, weak, and began breaking down under pressure from 
the Axis.  Senior officers advocated for budgets that would allow the army to go it alone.72   
 Romanian military thinkers published their arguments and theories about military reform 
in preparation for future conflicts in România militară.  The General Staff first started publishing 
its official journal in 1897, the declaration of war in 1916 halted publication of new issues until 
1921.  The General Staff printed issued until 1946 when the pro-communist government closed it 
for good.  Inside its pages were debates over budgets, theory, war industry, and length of military 
service.  All of these debates directly affected Romanian society.  The Romanian Army tried its 
best to improve its preparation for a modern industrial war during the interwar period, but it was 
still unable to defend its borders by itself by 1939, a fact made clear by the events of 1940.     
War Industry  
 After the First World War, Romanian leaders all agreed that Romania needed to develop 
a domestic war industry capable of producing the material required to fight a modern industrial 
war.  The Romanian Army did not want to have to rely on imports of weapons, munitions, and 
equipment as they had during 1916-1919.  In 1913, the army had only enough ammunition for 
                                                 
72 One officer claimed that the League system had made war more dangerous because its policy of collective defense 
encouraged states to mount surprise attacks, see, Maior Alex I. Ţenescu, “Câteva consideraţiuni asupra războiului şi 
în special asupra războiului viitor,” România militară, LXXIV, Nr. 3 (Martie 1937), 39; Zara Steiner, The Triumph 
of the Dark: European International History, 1933-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 1-4, 9-10, 132. 
 172 
 
four days of combat.73  Prime Minister Ion Brătinau, as part of the negotiations leading up to the 
Romanian declaration of war in 1916, demanded that the Entente supply the Romanian Army the 
munitions of which it was desperately short, but despite Allied efforts, it faced shortages at the 
end of a long supply route through Russia.74  After 1919, the army argued that the state needed to 
intervene in the economy to build up vital war industries to be prepared for the next war.75  
These demands did not fall on deaf ears.  In the 1920s the Liberal government developed 
a policy under the motto prin noi înşine, or “by ourselves,” that prioritized the development of 
Romanian industry through government subsidies and protectionist trade tariffs with the goal of 
national autarky to escape economic subordination and dependence on the West.76  This was a 
continuation of its fin de siècle platform that favored modernization and industrialization along 
Western European lines.  Despite the depressed agricultural economy after the First World War, 
Liberals continued to favor industry over agriculture, exacerbating the weak rural economy and 
contributing to peasant discontent, but the nationalist rhetoric of autarky combined with military 
arguments proved convincing.  Parliament passed legislation in 1925 on “Industrial Enterprises 
connected with National Defense.”  It awarded contracts to expand munition factories at Copşa 
Mica and Cugir, with the help of British arms manufacturer Vickers, and founded the Romanian 
Aeronautical Industry (IAR) at Braşov, with French capital and technical support.77  Much of the 
imported plant equipment, however, was left to rust beyond repair on the docks in Constanţa due 
                                                 
73 Hentea, Brief Romanian Military History, 112.   
74 Torrey, Romania and World War I, 102; Torrey, The Romanian Battlefront in World War I, 17-18, 183-184.   
75 “Military industry was, then [in 1916], in an embryonic state, and that private industry was unable to satisfy the 
needs of the army, because of a lack of preparation.”  The war wrecked its industry.  The army argued that the state 
must rebuild it with the help of “sacrifices” by the nation, see, Colonel Pascal, “Note asupra infiinţarei unei industrii 
militare in România,” România militară LIII, Nr. 9-10 (Septembrie-Octombrie 1921), 895-896.   
76 Hitchins, Rumania, 365. 
77 Watts, Romanian Cassandra, 46. 
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to incompetence and never made it to the munitions factories, which by 1933 were already in 
serious debt.78  During 1920-1930 an estimated 2.3 billion lei were spent on armaments, but just 
100 million lei went to new armaments produced by Romanian war industry, 1.2 billion lei were 
invested in IAR and aircraft design and production, and 1 billion lei spent paying for munitions 
and armaments ordered from the French before 1918.79  The Romanian Army continued to rely 
on a supply of arms imported from France, and after 1930 from Czechoslovakia, to make up for 
what could not be produced locally.  The General Staff struggled throughout the interwar period 
to provide just the small arms necessary for the large infantry army it needed to deter revisionist 
aggression, and was even less successful in acquiring new artillery, tanks, and motor vehicles.  
The Soviet threat loomed over Romania during the interwar period.  As one officer 
warned, “We must be on our guard, war is being prepared on the borders of the nation in the 
East, and the Bolshevik doctrinaires want to impose utopian ideas by the force of the Red Army, 
for this purpose they make every sacrifice and spend over 100 billion lei annually!”80  The Soviet 
Five Year Plan only increased these worries, especially as the Depression crippled the Romanian 
economy at the same time the Red Army grew by leaps and bounds.  Then the Nazis took power 
in Germany, accelerated German rearmament, and destabilized the European status quo, placing 
greater pressure on the Romanian Army to deter Hungarian revisionism (supported by Rome and 
Berlin).  The duel threats from east and west convinced the General Staff it needed to expand the 
size of the Romanian Army, which in 1934 it planned to increase to 26 infantry divisions, plus 
                                                 
78 Martin Thomas, “To Arm an Ally: French Arms Sales to Romania, 1926-1940,” Journal of Strategic Studies 19, 
no. 2 (1996), 244-245.   
79 Watts, Romanian Cassandra, 46.   
80 Maior N. Diaconescu, “Technica revoluţionară a Bolşevismului,” România militară LX, Nr. 7-8 (Iulie-August 
1928), 131.   
 174 
 
cavalry and artillery regiments.  The decision to maintain such a large army, relative poverty of 
Romania, and the lingering effects of the Depression meant that there was little left over for an 
extensive rearmament program that the General Staff also knew was needed.81  Nonetheless, it 
began to rearm, hoping that the French would deliver arms and subsidize most of the bill.   
Beginning in 1935, the state annually increased the army budget because the League was 
weakening, Europe was rearming, and the economy was improving.  Senior officers continued to 
argue for more investment in war industries because “even the small and agricultural countries to 
seek to establish during peacetime a war industry and prepare their private industry, to be able to 
adapt quickly to produce the necessary material.”82  The breakdown of the League system caused 
by the Axis and the threat of revisionism meant few politicians or civilians questioned the army’s 
arguments for large military budgets.  Parliament passed a series of extraordinary credits, part of 
a ten-year rearmament program, and the military budget rose to 29 percent of the total national 
budget in 1935 to 35 percent in 1936.  Over the next three years around a third of the budget was 
dedicated to military expenses.83  This radically altered the kind of arms deals Romania had been 
making with the French, which had been for military surplus or small quantities of modern arms, 
to large orders of high-grade modern equipment.84  The French proved unable to provide them. 
The ten-year rearmament program passed on 27 April 1935 prioritized modernization and 
motorization of the Romanian Army as it attempted to keep up with the European arms race.  Its 
goal was to modernize the arms and equipment of 22 infantry divisions, three cavalry divisions, 
                                                 
81 Thomas, “To Arm an Ally,” 239.   
82 General M. Skeleti, “Naţiunea armată, materialul modern şi specialiştii,” România militară LXXIII, Nr. 12 
(Decemvrie 1936), 9.  
83 Midan, Carol al II-lea şi teroarea istoriei, 54.  
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three mountain brigades, and form an armored brigade.85  In the 1920s, the military had focused 
on creating a Romanian aircraft industry, rather than a motor or armor industry, because aircraft 
were recognized as an obviously revolutionary weapon.  The First World War, the Romanian-
Hungarian War, and the Soviet-Polish War seemed to suggest that cavalry still had a place on the 
modern battlefield, especially in the expanses of Eastern Europe with limited logistical networks.  
A motorized army would require an extensive, and expensive, expansion of infrastructure (roads, 
bridges, and rail) which was beyond the ability of the state to finance.86  During 1940-1944, the 
General Staff would use tens of thousands of Jewish forced laborers to improve its highway and 
rail network to bolster Axis logistics.87  Investment in the aircraft industry yielded some results.  
By 1939, Romania possessed the largest Balkan air force and had locally produced IAR-80 
fighters, but most IAR-produced aircraft were training or reconnaissance types.88  
In the late 1930s, French arms producers proved increasingly hesitant to sell arms to the 
Romanians.  In part because Romanian credit was bad, and the French government refused to 
underwrite the purchases, but also because the French Army needed arms for its own program of 
rearmament that few arms left over to sell abroad.89  The French Army was also skeptical that 
such an investment would be put to good use because they believed that the Romanian Army was 
hopelessly inept and unprofessional.  The French also had to subsidize its more important allies 
                                                 
85 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 27-28. 
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against Nazi Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.  Therefore, Romania shifted its procurement 
of armaments to Czechoslovakia.  On 6 February 1936, the two states signed an agreement for 
2.5 billion lei of armaments and soon most new weapons, approximately 70 percent, were made 
by Czech companies.90  Private Czechoslovak investors helped Romania to pay for some of these 
military expenses.91  After 1938, however, Romania increasingly turned to Nazi Germany as a 
source for arms because it was able to pay in oil and raw materials that Nazis desperately needed 
for their growing war economy, instead of hard currency demanded by the Western Powers who 
were well-supplied with oil and raw materials from their colonies.92  Germany controlled even 
more of the Romanian Army’s source of armaments after March 1939 when Hitler ordered half 
of Czechoslovakia occupied and seized the large Czech arms industry.    
The Romanian Army tried to keep up with the increasingly pace of European rearmament 
in the 1930s.  Romania’s interwar army budgets were relatively substantial, much larger than its 
local rivals Hungary and Bulgaria and comparable to its Little Entente allies of Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia, but tiny in comparison with the USSR or Nazi Germany (see Table 1).  
 
 
Table 1.  Romanian Military Expenditure (in millions of dollars) in comparison with Southeast 
European states, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union, 1934-1938.  
 
Year     Romania   Hungary       Bulgaria     Yugoslavia       Germany        Soviet Union  
1934        27                   13                  6                 36                     546                 10461 
1935        66                   19                  8                 35                     723                 13882 
1936           62                   21                10                 36                   1498                 17449 
1937        48                   25                11                 42                   2090                 20045 
1938        56                   30                12                 48                   4675                 23404 
 
                                                 
90 Paul N. Hehn, A Low Dishonest Decade: The Great Powers, Eastern Europe, and the Economic Origins of World 
War II, 1930-1941 (New York: Continuum, 2002), 263; Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 29.   
91 Czechoslovak investment, however, remained limited, see, Hehn, A Low Dishonest Decade, 264-265. 
92 Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, 402; for details, see, Haynes, Romanian Policy Towards Germany, 74-82. 
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Table 1 Continued.  Romanian Military Expenditure (in millions of dollars) in comparison with 
Southeast European states, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union, 1934-1938. 
 
Note: the US dollar equivalents are rough estimations using 1938 exchange rates (172.4 lei, 5.1 
pengö, 114.0 lev, 54.9 dinar, 2.4 Deustche Mark, and 5.3 rubles to the dollar respectively). 
 
Source: Romanian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslavian expenditures, see League of Nations, 
Armaments Year-Book, Nineteenth Year, 718, 426, 215, 906; Romanian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, 
and Yugoslavian exchange rates in 1938, see, S.D. Zagoroff, Jenö Végh, and Alexander D. 
Bilimovich, The Agricultural Economy of the Danubian Countries, 1935-1945 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1955), 91; German and Soviet expenditures and exchange rates, see, 
Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark, 331, 441, 1069. 
 
 
 
Officers’ Salaries 
Much of the interwar army budget went to paying officers’ salaries.  The General Staff 
had to prioritize officer salaries in its budget because the officer corps was the heart of the army 
without which it could not function.  Draftees could be paid much less because military service 
was required by law, but the officer corps needed to attract qualified candidates who would make 
a career out of the army.  Romania faced high inflation after 1919, resulting from the First World 
War, which made it difficult to offer salaries that could attract qualified candidates.93  Moreover, 
low salaries threatened to demoralize those officers in the ranks who felt that their sacrifices in 
the war were unrewarded and envied bourgeois professionals or civil servants.  The Depression 
ended any fear of a mass exodus of officers from the army since the economic situation of the 
middle class was now much worse than outside the army, and the crisis actually swelled the size 
of the officer corps as educated youths sought a position with steady pay.  
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The most severe disappoint in the officer corps about salaries was during the 1920s.  One 
general in November 1923 indignantly declared, “The officer is not paid for his work and even 
more than that: he is not even able to survive [nu este nici intretinut].”94  He went on to describe 
how inflation had raised the cost of living 17 times, and complained that while the money spent 
on soldiers and horses had increased by 20 times that officers’ salaries had only quadrupled.  He 
concluded by arguing that the officer corps was becoming disgusted with the army and that many 
were leaving the army for better opportunities elsewhere.  The solution, he wrote, was to either 
drastically raise the wages of officers to a proper living wage or give officers special privileges.  
A detailed list of these privileges followed that included: subsidized food for the officer (and his 
family), a clothing allowance to the officer in addition to his pay (also for his family), a housing 
subsidy, special scholarships for officers’ children, family access to military doctors and dentists, 
family access to entertainment on base, a transportation subsidy, a horse subsidy, and a stipend 
for the “extra-military activity of the officer.”95  Obviously this general had a vested interest in 
portraying the conditions in the army as bad as possible, but the post-war inflation was real and 
officers faced worsening conditions.96  Captain Grosu remembered that in his artillery regiment 
that officers were expected to make up for short-falls in the budget from “local resources” to feed 
and house soldiers, which he said meant form the officer’s “own pocket.”97  Indeed, most reserve 
officers left the army in the 1920s to return to civilian life, although for more reasons than pay.   
                                                 
94 General Negrei, “Despre nevoile ofiţerilor şi modul cum ar putea fi uşurate,” România militară LV, Nr. 11 
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(Noemvire 1923), 1034-1038 
96 Beldiman, Armata şi Mişcarea Legionară, 30. 
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Some in the General Staff feared that the officer corps was becoming backwards since it 
could only attract peasants to become officers, so officers’ pay was prioritized.98  Total army 
expenditure increased from 3,217,745,000 lei in 1924 to 6,253,327,000 lei in 1927 with much of 
it dedicated to paying the salaries of officers.99  The number of officers also increased during this 
period from 11,379 in 1924 to 14,724 in 1929.100  In 1928 the industrial spurt resulting from the 
Liberals’ prin noi înşine policy sputtered out.  In 1929, the faltering economy was then hit by the 
Depression and the army budget was slashed.101  Nevertheless, the General Staff continued to 
prioritize officers’ pay.  The 1931 army budget totaled 6,618,289,000 lei with over half, some 
3,517,358,000 lei going to the pay of officers, NCOs, and civilians employed by the army.  The 
pay of ordinary soldiers amounted to just 71,311,000 lei.  The budget also included further funds 
for special allowances to subsidize officers’ other personal expenses (see Table 2).    
 
 
Table 2.  Budget of the Romanian Army, 1931 
 
Expenditure on Staff:          Lei (000’s) 
 
 Pay of Officers, NCOs, and Civilians employed by the Army  3,517,358 
 Grants (to officers and cadets abroad)           42,257 
 Indemnities for representation              2,087 
 Temporary Staff             16,860 
 Allowances for food, equipment, and lighting        320,638 
 Pay of Men              71,311 
 Missions               68,857 
 Traveling expenses              24,000  
 Instruction             136,000 
 
                                                 
98 The Roman and Tsarist empires were used as examples of imperial collapse as a result of the weakening of 
“culture” in the officer corps and lower classes taking leadership positions in the army, see, Colonel I. Teodorescu, 
“Intersul pe care îl poartă ‘Intelectualitatea omânească armatei,’” România militară LV, Nr. 7 (Iulie 1923), 639.   
99 League of Nations, Armaments Year-Book, Fourth Year, 746.   
100 League of Nations, Armaments Year-Book, Eighth Year, 266.  
101 Hitchins, Rumania, 371-372 
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Table 2 Continued. Budget of the Romanian Army, 1931 
 
Expenditure on Material:  
 
 Food          1,135,052 
 Forage             284,578 
 Fuel, heating, and Lighting           232,366 
 Equipment            220,922 
 Ammunition             285,575
 Engineering material and communications            20,006 
 Health Service              36,512 
 Geographical Service                   969 
 Technical studies and experiments              2,850 
 Monuments, cemeteries, etc.            53,272 
 Office Supplies             10,783 
 Transport of Material             29,581 
 Other expenditure             79,383 
 
Various Expenses:  
 
 Subsidies and Subscriptions            12,147 
 Various Incidental Expenses            13,645 
 
State Taxation on Buildings and Motor Vehicles:             1,289 
 
Total Ordinary Expenditure         6,618,289 
 
Source: League of Nations, Armaments Year-Book, Seventh Year, 771. 
 
 
 
Captain Grosu remembered the period between 1929 and 1930 as the worst of the crisis, when 
his artillery regiment did not receive pay for several months, could not even feed their animals, 
and created “a situation of total demoralization.”102  This situation was temporary, plus officers 
were prioritized over soldiers and the situation improved after 1934.    
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Training  
Interwar army budgets also affected the attempts of the army to improve the training of 
its soldiers.  Like all European armies in the interwar period, the Romanian Army debated the 
importance of manpower versus technology.103  The new technology of industrial war prompted 
some officers to argue in favor of a smaller army made up of long service professionals relying 
on new technology, firepower, and intensive training to make up for their small numbers, instead 
of a mass army of short service conscripts with only limited training.  The threat of attack along 
Romania’s exposed borders, plus its small industry, and its poorly educated peasant population 
meant that an expensive army of professionals equipped with modern technology was unrealistic.  
The General Staff chose to maintain a large force of cheaply trained recruits.104  This required 
the army to prioritize the training of the officer corps who provide the professional core required 
for a modern army that trained the yearly contingent of new recruits, similar to the situation in 
the French Army at the same time.105  The General Staff resisted attempts to shorten the period 
of military service to less than two years and successfully extended military service required by 
citizens by introducing pre-military training in 1935.  The quality of soldiers’ training, however, 
remained poor throughout the interwar period, with some slight improvements after 1938.    
During the interwar period, senior officers identified many deficiencies in the training of 
Romanian soldiers and debated how to improve training, but most officers continued to treat the 
soldiers as they always had and neglected their training.  The accepted practices of using soldiers 
as labor and granting soldiers extended leave greatly restricted the amount of time that soldiers 
                                                 
103 Jeremy Black, Avoiding Armageddon: From the Great War to the Fall of France, 1918-1940 (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2012), 87. 
104 This same debate was played out in Italy with the same result, see, Ibid., 88.  
105 Citino, Quest for Decisive Victory, 211. 
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actually trained for combat and in 1933, during the nadir of the army budget due to Depression 
cuts, soldiers may have received as little as five months training.106  The conditions endured by 
draftees during this time were grim: overcrowding, poor food, equipment shortages, and illness.  
The General Staff prioritized the officer corps and to cut costs it simply reduced the number of 
draftees from 171,306 in 1930 to 158,941 in 1931 and just 120,602 in 1932.  Higher numbers of 
draftees did not return until 1937, but even than fewer than at its height in 1929 (See Table 3).   
 
 
Table 3.  Size of the Romanian Army and Officer Corps, 1924-1939. 
 
Year  Officers NCOs/Soldiers  Total 
 
1924  11,379  135,564  146,564 
1925  12,344  127,483  139,827 
1926  12,293  128,483  140,776 
1927  13,436  136,333  149,769 
1928  14,658  170,968  185,626 
1929  14,725  171,414  186,139 
1930  14,387  171,306  185,693 
1931  15,334  158,941  174,275  
1932  15,724  120,602  136,326 
1933  16,596  124,789  141,385 
1934  16,478  124,921  141,399 
1936   15,296  115,643  130,939 
1937   14,890  149,635  164,525 
1938  13,613  147,946  161,559  
 
Source: League of Nations, Armaments Year-Book, Eighth Year and Fourteenth Year, 266 and 
717.   
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Officers usually sent soldiers home in November, so as not to have to feed or house them during 
the cold winter months.107  Target practice was also severely wanting.  Soldiers often just had the 
theory of aiming explained to them and were allotted just six rounds for target practice annually; 
instead of the hundreds of rounds needed to train skilled riflemen.108  Obviously, the standards of 
combat training did not improve significantly during the interwar years.  In response to a British 
journalist asking about the poor conditions facing Romanian soldiers a few years later, an officer 
responded that “the ability of the peasant soldier to live on next to nothing does away with many 
of the requirements considered essential to the soldiers of Western Powers.”109  This statement 
betrays a callousness Romanian officers’ attitudes towards their soldiers, but also illustrates the 
difficult position the Romanian Army found itself in because it had little choice except prioritize 
the officer corps over draftees during the lean economic years of the early 1930s.    
Desperate find resources to equip and train more expensive cavalrymen and artillerymen 
(and motorcyclists), the General Staff relied the old practice of Trupa cu schimbul, or literally 
“trooper in shifts.”  This system had territorials carry out military service in shifts [schimburi], 
one week of training during which the territorial was expected to supply his own food, uniform, 
horse (or motorcycle), and feed (or fuel), followed by three weeks off.110  During that time his 
horse (or motorcycle) would be used by other solider.  At least a brigade of Călăraşi continued 
this practice to 1940.  These territorials served twice the normal time of draftees.  Since most 
                                                 
107 General Al. Teodorescu, “In preajma nouei legi de recrutarea,” România militară LVII, Nr. 12 (Decemvrie 
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artillery was still horse-drawn there was also an Artilerist cu schimbul.  This system allowed 
multiple soldiers to train using the same horse (or train in mechanics and maintenance using the 
same motorcycle).  The army had better-off peasants (or lower middle-class families) provide the 
horse (or motorcycle), oftentimes minorities.  Private Weiss recalled, “The state really profited 
from us [Bessarabian] Germans that way.  Of the sixty-four in our squadron, forty were Germans 
and the rest were Bulgarians, Romanians, and Russians who used our horses to train.”111  He did 
like that the system allowed them to spend most of their time at home to focus on farming.  The 
army benefited from the horses (or motorcycles) the system provided, however, it is questionable 
how effective the training of these territorials was and in the case of mobilization there would not 
be enough horses (or motorcycles) for everyone.  The system functioned well enough to produce 
one somewhat-trained and one poorly-trained cavalryman (or motorcyclist).   
In addition to combat training, the army prioritized teaching personal hygiene and health 
to soldiers.112  Personal hygiene and health are important for soldiers to be effective on the front.  
During the First World War, disease had ravaged soldiers and civilians in overcrowded Moldavia 
where tens of thousands died from disease, especially typhus.  Lectures focused on preventing 
diseases like malaria, tuberculosis, and typhus as well as combating alcoholism and venereal 
disease.113  The training was not just for combat, but for modernizing the countryside.  Since the 
middle of the nineteenth century the state focused on improving the health of the nation through 
                                                 
111 Wieland, Bessarabian Knight, 16.  
112 Medic General de divizie dr. I. Antoniu şi medic Lt.-colonel dr. I. Bălănescu, “Rolul armatei in educaţia sanitară 
a poporului,” România militară LIII, Nr. 3 (Aprilie 1921), 429-432.   
113 Medicul Lt.-Colonel Bălănescu, “Privire Generală asupra higienei militare (Urmare),” România militară LV, Nr. 
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rural hygiene projects.114  The state saw the army as the “school of the nation” where peasants 
could be educated to become better citizens.  As an officer put it in 1923, “The training, which 
you give to soldiers, must be serious, orderly, methodical and heated with the sacred fire [of 
nationalism], so it not only perfects the soldier, but throws light in the depths of the villages, 
[which] still remain in darkness.”115  Peasants were supposed to enter the army, learn modern 
ideas and practices, including personal hygiene, and take them back to the village.   
This training was probably the most successful of any during the interwar period because 
the Romanian Army prevented any major outbreaks of disease during the Second World War.116  
The threat of disease, however, was also used to justify the murder of tens of thousands of Jews 
suffering with typhus, cholera, and other diseases in 1941-1942.117  During the interwar period, 
the stigma of being bearers of disease was affixed to Gypsies and was one of the reasons used to 
justify the deportation of 25,000 Gypsies in mid-1942 to camps in Transnistria.  The threat of 
typhus was used as an excuse to bar the repatriation of Gypsy survivors during 1943-1944.118      
Civil-Military Relations 
While civil-military conflict was limited in Romania during the interwar period it was not 
absent.  The state generally acquiesced to army demands without protest, but its plan to introduce 
pre-military training was fiercely debated for five years before being adopted.  Also, corruption 
scandals periodically put the army in the center of Romanian politics and damaged the reputation 
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115 Medicul Lt.-Colonel Bălănescu, “Privire Generală asupra higienei militare (Urmare),” România militară LV, Nr. 
4 (Aprilie 1923), 386.   
116 Jeican, “Typhus Exanthematicus in Romania during the Second World War,” 85, 89.   
117 Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania, 205.   
118 Order Nr. 20.771 of 20 January 1943 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs prevented the repatriation of Gypsy 
families on the grounds that they supposedly risked spreading typhus in Romania, see, Viorel Achim, ed., 
Documente privind deportarea ţiganilor în Transnistria, Vol. II (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 2004), 143.   
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of the officer corps, particularly the Škoda Scandal of 1933, however, the effects of the scandal 
proved fleeting and did not significantly affect the ability of the army to obtain a large budget for 
its massive rearmament program shortly thereafter.  During the interwar period, the army won its 
few clashes with civilian politicians and generally succeeded in getting what it wanted.   
Pre-military Training  
The most controversial issue in civil-military relations during the interwar period was the 
debate over the need for the introduction of pre-military training, or “pre-regimental training,” as 
it was called while it was debated.  Pre-military training was the practice of having youth fulfill 
some form of military service or training before the normal age of conscription at 21 in order to 
have draftees better prepared when they entered the ranks.  The Romanian Army successfully 
argued for its implementation, but pre-military training had mixed results at best.     
The debate over pre-regimental training was initiated by an article in the October 1929 
issue of România militară entitled, “The Need for the Introduction of Pre-regimental Training at 
Home [la noi]” signed anonymously with the initials “A. B. C.”  The author argued that Romania 
was falling behind the rest of Europe in the adoption of pre-military training, which it could not 
afford.  He cited “handsome results” in Germany and Italy, whose “totalitarian” states allegedly 
could mobilize their entire national manpower in a short period of time in case of war, and was 
very worried by the adoption of pre-military service by Romania’s hostile neighbors Hungary 
and the USSR.119  The revisionist states threatening România Mare seemed to be preparing their 
                                                 
119 “In Hungary it is well known how things stand in [this] matter of a second army, composed of [youth groups], 
outside of the Magyar army, and this [second army] exists because of the obligation of the youth to respond to the 
summons of military officials.  As for Soviet Russia the situation is even clearer: all youths are obligated to attend 
sessions on military training, target practice, maneuvers, campaigns, etc., and those who do not respond to the 
summons, which are true military concentrations, are considered guilty of avoiding military duties, exactly like 
 187 
 
populations for war and Romania could not risk falling behind.  He declared, “Our country, 
sooner or later, will have to fall in step with the same rhythm with all the other countries that of 
social, military, and general reforms.”120  The article outlined a two-year program of pre-military 
training beginning at age 19.  The first year, four months “national-patriotic-religious” training, 
would be followed by a second year of four months of intensive training in various weapons and 
technical skills.  Training would take place one-two times a week, led by officers and NCOs 
provided by the regular or territorial army.  The author argued that while pre-military training 
may seem expensive it would save money because it would reduce the length of active service to 
18 months.  More importantly, it was needed to prepare to defend România Mare.   
This article triggered a firestorm of opposition in the civilian press.  National Peasants 
believed that pre-military training would militarize the nation, reduce education (as young men 
would spend more time preparing for combat than going to school), damage the physical health 
of youths, make war more likely, and end up just becoming an extension of military service.121  
The merits and details of pre-military training were intensely debated over the following years.  
The army’s champion of pre-military training, General Virgil Economu argued that pre-military 
service was “a national obligation” that was “not against the spirit, neither the soul, and even less 
against the physical health” of Romanian youth.122  On the contrary, he argued that pre-military 
training would actually improve the physical and moral health of the nation as youths learned to 
                                                 
soldiers in the regular army,” see, A. B. C., “Nevoia introducerii pregătirii preregimentare la noi,” România militară 
LXVI, Nr. 10 (Octombrie 1929), 43  
120 Ibid., 44.   
121 General Virgil Economu, “Pregatirea preregimentară (Urmare),” România militară, LXVII Nr. 1 (Ianuarie 1930), 
3. 
122 Ibid., 7.  
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discipline their bodies and minds.123  Pre-military training was finally introduced in 1935 by the 
Liberals as the international situation in Europe deteriorated.  Rather than depend on collective 
security backed by the League or one of its other alliances, Romanian diplomats decided upon a 
policy of armed neutrality that required the state to maintain as large of an army as possible as a 
deterrent to Hungarian and Soviet threats, so pre-military training seemed a good solution.   
After pre-military training was finally introduced, it proved to be almost as much of a 
disaster as civilian opponents had predicted, although for different reasons than they had argued.  
Pre-military training did not contribute to the further militarization of society because it proved 
fairly unpopular among the peasantry who disliked the extra burden and parents resented losing 
their sons’ labor to training.  Pre-military training took place on weekends and holidays, making 
it even less popular, and generally consisted of physical exercise, basic drill, patriotic speeches, 
and sometimes stultifying lectures on hygiene, religion, and military topics.  Not all youths 
disliked pre-military training.  Gheorghe Netejoru remembered, “Even if some complained of so 
much soldiering, I actually really liked the training.”124  Nonetheless, the pre-military system was 
poorly organized and territorial officers did not seem interested in taking their responsibility for 
training youths seriously.  Pre-military training centers often lacked resources and equipment.125  
As in the rest of the army, corruption was common and officers in charge of pre-military training 
sometimes defrauded the youths they trained.  There was no system in place for punishing those 
who did not attend, so absenteeism was common.  Army leaders tried to provide incentives by 
                                                 
123 General Virgil Economu, “Pregatirea preregimentară (Urmare),” România militară LXVII, Nr. 5 (Mai 1930), 4; 
General V. Economu, “Instrucţie preregimentară, România militară LXXI, Nr. 1 (Ianuarie 1934), 62.   
124 Netejoru, Şi eu am luptat în est, 26; Weiss had no bad words for it either, see, Wieland, Bessarabian Knight, 15. 
125 Maior Mihai Mihăilescu din M.S.M, “Instrucţia pre şi post militară,” România militară LXXVII, Nr. 3 (Martie 
1939), 53-54.  
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promising that those who fulfilled pre-military training and received a certificate of completion 
could to be promoted to the rank of an NCO in half the normal time (one month to become a 
corporal or two months be become a sergeant) once they began their actual two year military 
service and cut six months off the end of that service reducing the length of military service to 18 
months.126  It is doubtful that pre-military training made youths more qualified to become NCOs 
in such a short time and only exacerbated the lack of professionalism among NCOs.  Regardless, 
most youths turned up regularly to pre-military training because it was their patriotic duty. 
Ironically, it seems the youths most interested in completing pre-military training were in 
fact Legionaries that senior officers did not want to be in the Romanian Army.  The Legion was 
growing in size at the time pre-military training was introduced, and Codreanu encouraged his 
followers to attend (and to fulfill regular military service) in order to learn discipline and basic 
military skills that he believed were needed for a future fascist revolution.  He also suggested 
that Legionaries try to become pre-military instructors so that they could recruit from among the 
youths required to attend the pre-military training courses.127  This may help explain why many 
Legionaries, ex-Legionaries, and Legionary sympathizers were NCOs on the Eastern Front.  The 
majority of Legionaries survived the suppression of the Legion in January 1941 by Antonescu 
and were mobilized for the invasion of the Soviet Union in June later that year.  They contributed 
to the rapid radicalization of the violence against Jews carried out by the army.   
 
                                                 
126 At the end of pre-military training each pupil received one of the three certificates: “Complete pre-military 
training,” “Incomplete pre-military training,” or “No pre-military training,” if the young man had missed more than 
12 times (of the 40 to 50 courses during the training year) or had “an insubordinate spirit,” see, League of Nations, 
Araments Year-Book, Eleventh Year, 710-711.   
127 Clark, “Fascists and Soldiers,” 412-413. 
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The Škoda Scandal 
In March 1933, the army was rocked by the Škoda Scandal which revealed corruption at 
the highest levels in the Romanian Army to an outraged public.  On 10 March, an investigation 
into financial irregularities led officials from the Office of the Military Prosecutor to the office of 
Bruno Seletzki, the representative of the Czechoslovak arms manufacturer Škoda that supplied 
the Romanian Army with much of its armaments, in Bucharest  There they found a bonanza of 
top secret Romanian military documents: correspondence, reports, ciphers, statistics, army plans, 
future projects, and even army personnel files of senior Romanian officers.128  Minister of Justice 
Mihai Popovici and Minister of Defense General Nicolae Uică, encouraged by Prime Minister 
Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, who replaced Maniu as leader of the National Peasant Party, staged a 
cover-up and quashed the investigation.  They even allowed Seletzki to return to his office and 
destroy a large portion of the records.  Another member of the National Peasant Party, however, 
raised the issue in parliament on 22 March and called for an official inquiry.  The Škoda scandal 
dominated Romanian politics for the rest of year.  The inquiry revealed that for a decade Seletzki 
had been bribing Romanian military and civilian leaders to secure armament contracts for Škoda 
that were 18 to 25 percent higher than bids of other foreign and local arms manufacturers.129   
As the details of the scandal were uncovered more and more people were implicated, but 
it was difficult to prove guilt or innocence.  The destruction of documents by Selezki allowed the 
Liberal opposition to turn the scandal into a witch hunt because there was no way for anyone to 
definitively prove their innocence, and many in the National Peasant government were accused 
                                                 
128 Watts, Romanian Cassandra, 61.  
129 Marius-Cătălin Preduţ, coord, “Afacerea SKODA - Romania si Cehoslovacia,” EuroAvocatura.ro, accessed 1 
April 2016, http://www.euroavocatura.ro/articole/189/Afacerea_SKODA_-_Romania_si_Cehoslovacia. 
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of selling out Romania to foreigners.  General Dumitru Popescu, Secretary to the Minister of 
Defense, committed suicide during the investigation.130  His suicide was widely perceived as an 
admission of guilt, deepened the scandal, and contributed to the collapse of the National Peasant 
government in November 1933.131  This scandal was a boon for Romanian industrialists Malaxa 
and Auschnitt, prominent members of the king’s camarilla, who favored the expansion of the 
local Romanian arms industry because they wanted the lucrative arms contracts for themselves.  
Carol II and the new Liberal government decided to appoint Antonescu as Chief of the General 
Staff in the aftermath of the scandal with a mandate to reorganize and reform the army. 
The appointment brought Antonescu national notoriety for the first time.132  He was well-
known in the officer corps for his First World War activity, arrogance, acerbic personality, and 
demanding standards.  After finishing his assignment as military attaché in Paris, negotiating a 
100 million franc credit for French arms, he became head of the Superior School of War during 
1927-1930.133  Antonescu was notorious for extremely difficult officer exams, he was nicknamed 
roşul, or “the red one,” a reference to his thinning red hair, by officers talking about him behind 
his back, but distinguished himself as the only head of the Superior School of War who never 
gave a lecture or published on military subjects.134  He spent much of his time looking for an 
important political position and for a brief period in 1928 became the Secretary to the Minister of 
Defense.  The Škoda scandal, his reputation for incorruptibility, and the patronage of Carol II 
resulted in Antonescu suddenly vaulting to the head of the Romanian Army as Chief of the 
                                                 
130 Watts, Romanian Cassandra, 63.   
131 Scurtu, România în timpul celor patru regi, volum III: Carol II, 150-151.   
132 Watts, Romanian Cassandra, 61.  
133 Dennis Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 39. 
134 Grosu, Memoriile unui ofiţer de informaţii, 170; Easterman, King Carol, Hitler and Lupescu, 15 
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General Staff over more senior generals.  Antonescu used this appointment to embark upon his 
political career that soon placed him in opposition to the king and later brought him to power. 
In retrospect, the Škoda Scandal was purposefully drawn out by Liberals to discredit the 
National Peasant government and accomplished little except to reward the king’s industrialist 
cronies in the camarilla with lucrative contracts.  The quality and quantity of arms produced by 
Škoda was superior to that of local Romanian industry (whose inferior arms already benefited 
from protective tariffs passed by previous Liberal governments) or the post-war surplus being 
sold to Romania by the French at the time.  Antonescu actually argued that the quality of new 
Škoda artillery was too good because it required the purchase of new modern shells, the cost of 
which he claimed was prohibitive as it would bankrupt the army, which he believed was as an 
underhanded Czech business trick meant to exploit the Romanian Army.135  Ironically, in 1934, 
Antonescu resigned from his position as Chief of the General Staff over the issue of importing 
Czechoslovak small arms that he considered necessary for his army reform program that was 
blocked by the new Minister of Defense General Angelescu.136   
Conclusion 
 This chapter has shown that Antonescu was a typically traditional officer.  Furthermore, 
we see that the Romanian Army was relatively successful in obtaining the funds it needed from 
the state to arm, equip, and train the army between the wars within the financial constraints of 
the country’s poor peasant economy.  The Romanian officer corps proved a staunch supporter of 
authoritarianism, held conservative political beliefs, and embraced the increasingly anti-Semitic 
                                                 
135 Antonescu railed against the “useless throwing away of billions over the frontier” rather than seeing it as realistic 
costs of modernizing the artillery, see, Watts, Romanian Cassandra, 68; he also opposed procuring trucks built by 
Malaxa as “they were considered useless or not urgently needed,” see, Pantazi, Cu mareşal până la moarte, 66. 
136 Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 39. 
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mood after 1938.  While Romania’s exposed strategic position prompted officers to support the 
League in trying to maintain the European status quo, they did not believe in the values of liberal 
democracy and were already looking towards armed neutrality to pursue their own goals. 
During the interwar period there was little foreshadowing of the dominant role that the 
Romanian Army and the officer corps under Antonescu would come to play in the Second World 
War and in the Holocaust.  In fact, as the defender of established social order, the army was 
called upon to curb the worse abuses and violence perpetrated by the right-wing populists and 
the Legionary movement.  Additionally, while the army was political, it was not politicized.  Just 
like any state institution, the army participated in politics within its sphere of legitimate interest, 
particularly to convince the civilian government to approve the budgets or enact reforms that 
army leaders consider necessary for national defense.  There was very little civil-military conflict 
during the interwar period in România Mare.  Carol II provided stability that the officer corps 
desired and continued to prioritize the military, maintaining the support of most the officer corps, 
except for a few populists.  A few individuals, like Averescu, Antonescu, and Cantacuzino-
Grănicerul, used their military backgrounds to enter politics and courted right-wing populism.  
Nevertheless, while the officer corps held conservative political beliefs it did not try to seriously 
interfere in Romanian politics.  Instead, the army was content to support the social status quo 
when called upon, whether in response to left- or right-wing threats to the nation.  The right-wing 
political believes of the officer corps, however, help explain why the Romanian Army was so 
committed to defeating the Red Army and perpetrated so many against Jews after 1941. 
 During the interwar period the primary threat to Romanian security was the Soviet Union.  
The Treaty of Versailles effectively neutralized the militaries of Hungary and Bulgaria, while the 
Red Army grew in strength.  In response, the Romanian Army sought to prepare to fight a large-
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scale war against its threatening neighbor.  The events of 1940 proved to the officer corps that it 
could not do it alone and needed a powerful ally to protect its territorial integrity and help defeat 
the Soviet threat once and for all.  Therefore, in 1941 Romania was prepared to mobilize a large 
infantry army with a few motorized units, a supporting air force, and led by mostly competent 
officers for the invasion of the USSR.  The Romanian Army was willing to fight as an ally of the 
Wehrmacht because of the intrinsic motivation of soldiers (nationalism, religion, anti-Semitism, 
and anti-communism) that contributed to their enthusiastic participation in the “holy war” against 
the Soviet Union to destroy the perceived threat of “Judeo-Bolshevism.”  
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CHAPTER V 
1940: HONOR, HUMILIATION, AND OCCUPATION 
 
On the morning of 6 January 1940, King Carol II arrived with his royal train in Chişinău 
to celebrate Epiphany.  The city was chosen because of its proximity to the Romanian-Soviet 
border, part of a three-stop tour of the threatened frontiers in the West, South, and East, designed 
to reassure the country that the Romanian Army was ready to defend România Mare.  The royal 
visit consisted of a gathering of representatives from the counties of Bessarabia, a mass religious 
ceremony by Romanian Orthodox clergy at the Cathedral of Christ’s Nativity, and culminated in 
a military parade.  The king’s speech asserted Romania’s claims to Bessarabia, expressed his 
solidarity with its minority population, and promised “an enemy will never be able to place even 
a foot on what is holy and eternally Romanian!”1  Just over six months later, however, Carol II 
ordered the army to withdraw from eastern Romania without a fight.  The decision humiliated 
the officer corps, led to Carol II’s downfall, and united Romanian society against the USSR.   
 This chapter argues that the occupation of northern Bukovina and Bessarabia by the Red 
Army in June 1940 played a decisive role in Romanian soldiers’ motivation after 1941 because 
they considered the Soviet occupation a de facto start of hostilities.2  Since Matatias Carp wrote 
his “Black Book” in 1947, Holocaust historians have recognized the Soviet occupation of eastern 
Romania as and important step in the cumulative radicalization of Romanian society on the way 
to the atrocities of 1941.  Romanian military historians largely gloss over the events of 1940 and 
                                                 
1 Regele Carol II, “Cuvântarea M.S. Regelui La Chişinău,” Sentinela, 15 Ianuarie 1940, 1.   
2 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 14.   
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instead begin histories in 1941; during communism this was taken to an even greater extreme as 
histories started in 1944.  Since Romanian military historians skip the events of 1940 there is no 
detailed account of the Soviet occupation or the Romanian Army’s withdrawal.  Those works on 
the subject focus almost exclusively on the humiliation of Romanian soldiers and civilians and 
their victimization at the hands of the Soviets and “Jewish-Communists.”3  Political historians, 
starting with exiled diplomats apologizing for the Romanian alliance with Nazi Germany, have 
looked at 1940 more closely, but create a false equivalency between the Soviet, Hungarian, and 
Bulgarian occupations and focus on proving Bucharest was driven towards Berlin reluctantly.4  
The Carlist regime used events in eastern Romania to create a myth of Jewish betrayal that the 
Antonescu regime continued to propagate.  The General Staff helped to craft this myth to shift 
the blame for the humiliating retreat onto Jews that was readily embraced by bigoted Romanian 
soldiers and civilians.  This chapter also argues that violence against Jews in 1940 was initiated 
from the bottom-up by soldiers, joined at times by civilians, and in a few cases enabled by mid-
ranking officers.  The General Staff, army hierarchy, and discipline acted as momentary breaks 
on anti-Semitic violence from the top-down in 1940 – especially west of the Prut River.  
                                                 
3 For a nationalist account that compares the events to Christ’s passion, but is light on military details, see, Mihai 
Pelin, Săptămîna patimilor (23-28 iunie 1940): Cedarea Basarabiei şi a nordului Bucovinei (Bucharest: Compania, 
2008); editors at the AMR in Piteşti published a three volume edited collection of army documents on the Soviet, 
Hungarian, and Bulgarian occupations of eastern Romania, northern Transylvania, and southern Dobrogea (one 
volume for each) with limited commentary that takes all army reports at face value, so they include original anti-
Semitic reports depicting Jews as communists who abused the Romanian Army during the retreat and atrocities by 
soldiers that are implied to be justified responses, see, Florica Dobre, Vasilica Manea, Lenuţa Nicolescu, ed., Anul 
1940: Armata romană de la ultimatum la dictat, Documente. Vol. I-III (Bucharest: Editura Europa Nova, 2000). 
4 Diplomats in exile pushed this narrative, see, Alexandru Cretzianu, Relapse into Bondage: Political Memories of a 
Romanian Diplomat (Iaşi-Oxford-Portland: The Center for Romanian Studies, 1998); recently military historians 
have focused on the period leading up to 1940, but primarily to defend the honor of the Romanian Army by showing 
why the decision to not fight the Soviets in 1940 was the correct decision and only briefly address the actual retreat 
from eastern Romania and they also take the army reports from 1940 about “Jewish-Communists” at face value, see, 
Midan, Carol al II-lea şi teroarea istoriei; Dan Prisăcaru, În avanpostul luptei pentru supravieţuire: Apărarea 
naţională a României şi frontul secret în vâltoarea anilor 1938-1940 (Bucharest: Editura militară, 2014).  
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 The Soviet occupation of northern Bukovina and Bessarabia had a much greater effect on 
the Romanian Army than the subsequent loss of northern Transylvania to Hungary or southern 
Dobrogea to Bulgaria because it was much more traumatic.  As painful as the loss of these other 
territories was, especially northern Transylvania, the army’s withdrawal from them was calm and 
orderly, in contrast to the chaotic and embarrassing retreat from eastern Romania.5  There are 
several reasons why the Soviet occupation was worse than the others.  First, the decision to give 
up territory without a fight in June was a greater shock than it was later in September because the 
Soviet ultimatum came unexpectedly, while the Second Vienna Award occurred after weeks of 
negotiations, which better prepared the public for the loss.6  Afterwards, an official explained to 
a British journalist why the decision to not fight in 1940 shocked Romanians. 
Roumania [sic]was not prepared for territorial concessions.  Everyone had made 
material sacrifices for the organization and equipment of the army and for 
fortifications…At the New Year, the King visited the West, East and Southern 
frontiers and declared that we shall defend them.  The whole nation was 
convinced that, although we were surrounded by enemies who would all attack us, 
probably at the same time, we should not yield except after a struggle.  The nation 
was prepared spiritually for such a fight.7   
 
Second, the Soviet occupation was rapid, accomplished in just days by motorized and armored 
forces, whereas the Hungarian or Bulgarian army was not motorized, so later occupations were 
implemented only slowly in phases.  Furthermore, the Romanians were able to extract conditions 
from Hungary and Bulgaria that prevented a repeat of the embarrassing flight from the Soviets.  
The slower pace allowed officers to maintain a sense of honor during the retreat as well.  Captain 
Alexandru Ionescu Saint-Cry described the evacuation of Cluj, the capital of Transylvania, as the 
                                                 
5 In comparison to Transylvania, Dobrogea was not seen a truly Romanian province, made up mostly of minorities, 
and in 1940 the Romanian population was largely indifferent to its loss, Solonari, Purifying the Nation, 95-97. 
6 Giurescu, Romania in the Second World War, 36-38.  
7 Easterman, King Carol, Hitler and Lupescu, 214.   
 198 
 
last soldiers departed he saw Romanian flags replaced by Hungarian ones across the city, “I was 
then overcome with a thought which I had to speak: ‘Do not worry, now we leave, but surely we 
will return.’”8  Such solemn reflection was impossible in eastern Romania as units fled helter-
skelter before advancing Soviet columns and some officers besmirched the army’s honor with 
acts of cowardice, panic, and incompetence.9  Lastly, the population of eastern Romania did not 
respond to occupation in the way that the army expected.  Some recalled sad-faced basarabeni 
asking retreating soldiers, “Who are you leaving us with?”  Contemporary reports, however, 
indicate widespread national indifference on the part of bucovineni and basarabeni and some 
Romanians even joined in pro-Soviet demonstrations.10  In northern Transylvania, on the other 
hand, ardeleni organized angry, pro-war demonstrations protesting the decision to withdraw.11  
Local Jews became the scapegoat to explain away the pro-Soviet attitude shown by much of the 
population of eastern Romania and became the target for anti-Semitic violence.12   
 Perhaps the most important result of the Soviet occupation of eastern Romania was that it 
created the conditions for Antonescu to seize power.  He understood, and shared, the feelings of 
anger, humiliation, and bellicosity in Romanian society – and in the officer corps particularly.  
Immediately after he seized power on 6 September 1940, Antonescu told the people in a radio 
broadcast that “we must clean [our] wounds, gather [our] strength, pick up [our] honor, and 
ensure the future.”13  His message galvanized the public and gave soldiers a new purpose, the 
                                                 
8 Vasile Bărboi, Gheroghe Ioniţa, Victor Atanasiu, şi Alesandru Duţu, ed., Armata română în vâltoarea războiului 
(Bucharest: Editura “Vasile Cârlova, 2002), 36.   
9 Easterman, King Carol, Hitler, and Lupescu, 215.   
10 Bărboi, Armata română în vâltoarea războiului, 37; Dobre, Anul 1940: Armata romană de la ultimatum la dictat 
Vol. I, 153-154; Pelin, Săptămîna patimilor, 131.   
11 For example, a crowd of 4,000-5,000 in Cluj shouted, “We want war!” in late-August 1940 while Romanian and 
Hungarian diplomats negotiated, see, Dobre, Anul 1940: Armata romană de la ultimatum la dictat, Vol. II, 124.   
12 Solonari, Purifying the Nation, 162.   
13 Teodorescu, Mândria vânătorului de munte, 28.   
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redemption of România Mare, which contributed to the formation of a national consensus that 
underpinned Romania’s “holy war” against “Judeo-Bolshevism” after June 1941.   
Neutrality and Defensive Preparations 
 The Romanian Army began serious military preparations after the Sudeten Crisis and 
Munich Conference of September 1938.  Already as early as 1936, King Carol II had directed his 
diplomats to adopt a policy of neutrality, rather than rely on the British and French who backed 
the faltering League.14  Central to the success of neutrality was maintaining a large army to deter 
invasion.  Additionally, the policy of neutrality allowed Romania to court Nazi Germany, both as 
a counterbalance to the Soviet Union and a source of badly needed arms.  At the same time, the 
Romanian Army embarked on a costly construction program of frontier fortifications along the 
exposed borders to try to further deter hostile neighbors.  The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact suddenly 
upended Romania’s balancing act between the Western Powers and Nazi Germany. 
 In response to increased tensions after the Sudeten crisis, Carol II ordered the Romanian 
Army to expand.  On 19 September 1938, the General Staff decided not to release soldiers after 
the end of their two-year service, allowing units to be brought to full strength without needing to 
mobilize.15  The international situation only worsened.  In February 1939, General V. Economu 
declared, “war has already begun.  Austria and Czechoslovakia have been invaded.  Although 
they did not defend themselves, the act of war was consummated.”16  Hungary’s re-introduction 
of universal military service on 15 February 1939 further increased concerns.  In response, the 
General Staff called up soldiers from extended leave.  On 21 March 1939, a week after German 
                                                 
14 Haynes, Romanian Policy towards Germany, 170.   
15 Midan, Carol al II-lea şi teroarea istoriei, 106.  
16 General V. Economu, “Războiul care vine,” România militară LXXVII, Nr. 2 (Februarie 1939), 3.   
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(and Hungarian forces) occupied rump Czecho-Slovakia, the General Staff believed a Hungarian 
invasion was imminent and received orders to partially mobilize, adding 500,000 more soldiers. 
The General Staff activated three armies, First, Second, and Fourth, each assigned a respective 
threatened frontier in Transylvania, Dobrogea, and Bessarabia.  Recruiting stations were quickly 
crowded with more men than they knew what to do with creating confusion: peasants misread 
mobilization orders, overly zealous gendarmes gathered up all eligible men, and peasants flushed 
with patriotic fervor rushed to report.17  2nd Lieutenant Dumitru Teodorescu, stationed in Sibiu in 
Transylvania, recalled, “Near midnight, the city and barracks were ‘flooded’ with reservists.  A 
single cry stirs the city barracks, “Weapons, weapons!  Give us weapons!”18  Romanian soldiers 
were ready to defend the borders of România Mare. 
 The General Staff accelerated the construction of fortifications on Romania’s frontiers.  
The first significant efforts had begun in March 1937 in Transylvania.19  On paper these defenses 
were impressive, a veritable Romanian version of the Maginot Line: concrete casements, anti-
tank ditches, observation and command posts, protected passages, minefields, and barbed wire.  
For the most part, however, these fortifications remained imaginary and those sections that were 
finished were irreverently nicknamed “Carol’s dyke” rather than “the Carol Line,” as in official 
parlance.20  In a disastrous misreading of the international situation the Carlist regime believed 
that revisionist Hungary (backed by Nazi Germany) was the most immediate threat because the 
USSR had joined the League of Nations in 1934 and seemed to favor collective defense.21  The 
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General Staff placed its faith in a resurrected Franco-Russian alliance to secure its eastern flank.  
By the summer of 1940, work had progressed furthest along the western border with 316 of 510 
or 62 percent of planned casements completed, compared to 127 of 1033 or just 12 percent in 
Bessarabia and 24 of 498 or a paltry 5 percent in Bukovina.22  It appears that a sizable portion of 
the funds for the fortifications was embezzled and there were reports that construction materials 
were sold off for illicit profit.23  The announcement of an unforeseen non-aggression pact on 24 
August 1939 between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union suddenly changed the primary threat 
from the western to the eastern frontier.     
 The German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 followed by a Soviet invasion on 
17 September plunged Europe into war and isolated Romania.  Instead of royal maneuvers that 
fall, Carol II ordered the General Staff to fully mobilize the Romanian Army.  On 6 September, 
the General Staff mobilized another army that was assigned to reinforce eastern Romania.  Third 
Army, commanded by General Iosif Iacobici, guarded Bukovina.  Fourth Army, commanded by 
General Nicolae Ciupercă, defended Bessarabia with III, X, and Cavalry corps in reserve.  These 
forces were placed under Army Group Nr. 1 (also known as Army Group Siret), activated on 22 
September under General Nicolae Tătăranu.  By October an astounding 1.1 million soldiers were 
under arms, stretching army resources to the breaking point and triggering shortages in weapons, 
material, transport, and horses.24  The most critical shortage, however, was officers.  Therefore, 
the General Staff encouraged TTR sergeants, like George Crisan a 32-year-old Baptist lawyer 
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from Transylvania, to become reserve officers after a brief training program.25  That winter the 
army maintained 800,000 soldiers; a massive number compared to the interwar high of about 
186,000 soldiers.  In spring 1940, the General Staff mobilized even more men to try to deter the 
Soviets from attacking, until 1.2 million soldiers were enlisted.  By summer, after nearly a year 
of mobilization many soldiers presented a pitiable sight due to the General Staff’s difficulties in 
feeding, clothing, and sheltering them all.  After visiting Transylvania in early June 1940, a 
British journalist described the condition of the Romanian soldiers she saw as “appalling.”   
Those privates who could afford it hired beds in peasants’ cottages; the rest slept 
in stations, in barns, in cowsheds or in the open.  No facilities were provided for 
washing; they were nearly all covered with lice.  Few outside Bucharest had 
complete uniforms.  One would have army boots, another a cap, a third trousers, 
and a fourth a rifle.26   
 
She believed that the soldiers were “discontented and unhappy.”  In contrast, in May 1940, Army 
Group Nr. 1 reported that while there were shortages in food, equipment, pay, and financial aid 
to families, soldiers’ morale was “excellent,” citing good discipline, improvement in the attitude 
of reserve officers, and soldiers’ goodwill during mobilization.  Tătăranu concluded by praising a 
sergeant from 8th Infantry Division for breaking up a Zionist meeting of 50 Jews (and refusing to 
take a bribe), the 56th Infanterie Regiment for feeding 120 poor children and donating icons to a 
local church, and 8th Artillery Regiment for donating 2,500 lei to build a school.27 
 The financial costs of mobilization on Romanian society was great.  Since the beginning 
of the ten-year rearmament program in 1935, the state had levied heavier taxes on the population 
to pay for military expenses.  These excise taxes in the form of stamps were applied to common 
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goods to fund rearmament, IAR, and later the Carol Line.28  Yet even these measures could not 
provide the military with enough to cover all its costs.  Mihail Sebastian, a famous Jewish writer 
and playwright from Bucharest serving as a private in early 1940, noted officers exhibiting what 
he termed “military rapaciousness.”  Officers expected subordinates to provide whatever the unit 
required, without any concern about how or with what funds, often forcing soldiers to scrounge 
or purchase what was required themselves.  He wrote in his diary that if “the company is missing 
a bridle, we buy one ourselves.  If there is need of three hundred plates and three hundred sets of 
cutlery, we buy them ourselves.”29  Since the General Staff did not provide funds, officers looked 
to soldiers, especially Jews they assumed were wealthy, to provide what they needed.  
Following orders from the General Staff, Fourth Army began to form labor detachments 
from minority draftees in late 1939, freeing up Romanians for training, and by April 1940 there 
were an estimated 70,000 minority soldiers in 63 labor detachments tasked with constructing the 
fortifications on the borders.30  The General Staff divided minorities into three types: Category I 
were Romanians who were members of suspected religions (Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
Pentecostals, Baptists, Inochentişti, Stilişti), Category II were ethnic minorities (Czechs, Poles, 
Turks), and category III were ethnic minorities with irredentist homelands or elsewise seen as 
hostile (Jews, Hungarians, Russians/Lipovans, Ukrainians, Bulgarians).31  Fourth army formed 
labor detachments from men in categories II and III – with a few NCOs from category I assigned 
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to assist regular officers put in charge.32  Not all minorities were relegated to labor detachments 
and those who had trained with combat or support units before 1939 stayed with their unit.  
 All this occurred during the so-called “Phony War” in Western Europe as Anglo-French 
and German forces sat inert facing each other on the Franco-German border.  In Scandinavia, 
however, the war was far from phony and the Red Army invaded Finland on 30 November 1940.  
For Romanian diplomats, who believed no good could come from the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 
and correctly suspected it contained secret protocols in regard to Bessarabia, the Soviet-Finnish 
“Winter War” confirmed fears that the Soviet Union was willing to use naked aggression to seize 
former Russian territory.33  Bessarabia had been a bone of contention between the two countries 
since its annexation in 1918 and continued to be even after official relations between Romania 
and the USSR were finally re-established in 1934.34  The Soviet Union’s anti-Romanian rhetoric 
became increasingly hostile after 1939.  In November 1939, Romanian intelligence reported that 
a Soviet admiral in Riga had boasted of a coming attack on Romania after the Soviets dealt with 
Finland.35  On 29 March 1940, Molotov announced to the Supreme Soviet that the USSR might 
annex Bessarabia and the Soviet press quickly began to rail against Romanian “oppression” in 
Bessarabia.36  Romanian diplomats kept a close eye on events in the Winter War because they 
feared that once the Finnish Army was defeated then it would be Romania’s turn to be invaded.  
Nevertheless, according to the high-ranking Carlist diplomat Alexandru Cretzianu, Romanian 
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leaders saw a “glimmer of hope” in the Winter War because of the widespread outrage the Soviet 
invasion created in capitals across Europe that “made us think that the Russia of Stalin had at 
long last been seen in its true colors, and that henceforth the Soviets could never again benefit 
from the trust or support of the great Western democracies.”37  By this point the Soviet threat 
was seen as a greater threat to Romania than German-backed Hungarian revisionism.   
The conclusion of the Winter War in March 1940 again put the Romanian Army on high 
alert.  Romanian officers came to the same conclusions about the poor performance of the Red 
Army against the Finnish Army as the rest of Europe and viewed the Soviets with contempt.38  
Romanian officers’ disdain for the Red Army would make it even harder for them to accept the 
king’s decision in late June 1940 to abandon northern Bukovina and Bessarabia without a fight, 
especially when the example of Finland, with a population of less than four million compared to 
Romania’s over 18 million, having faced down the Soviet colossus so fresh in their minds.  The 
Finnish soldiers were lionized in the press and held up as an example to Romanian soldiers in the 
official army newspaper Sentinela to emulate in case the Soviets invaded eastern Romania. 
For 45 days, in a very small country, about which almost nothing is known, 
although it is not far from us, a war is being carried out that is amazing the whole 
world…The example of the Finns proves to the whole world that when a people is 
imbued with love for country and nation, any attempt to destroy it fails.39 
 
The Romanian Army, to the dismay of its officers, was not fated to win worldwide acclaim by a 
determined, if ultimately futile, resistance to Soviet aggression in 1940.  Instead, in the wake of 
the Fall of France, Carol II ordered them to carry out an ignominious retreat. 
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Soviet Ultimatum and Occupation of Eastern Romania 
 The fall of France on 25 June 1940 removed the last obstacle to Moscow’s plans to seize 
formerly tsarist Bessarabia, and even more territory.  The Red Army, which had maintained large 
forces near the border for months, began moving to the frontier and throughout 26 June signs of 
Red Army activity, such as smoke from company kitchens, camouflaged armor, and dust clouds 
from marching soldiers were observed by Romanian soldiers across the border.40  At 10 pm, the 
long feared Soviet ultimatum was delivered by Molotov to Gheorghe Davidescu, the Romanian 
ambassador in Moscow, beginning a crisis that eventually toppled the Carlist regime.  Although 
Romanian leaders had anticipated a Soviet ultimatum, unexpected and harsh terms still shocked 
them.  Predictably Moscow demanded, “To return Bessarabia to the Soviet Union at any price,” 
but surprisingly added, “To transfer to the Soviet Union the northern part of Bukovina, with its 
frontiers, according to the adjoining map.”41  Formerly Habsburg northern Bukovina had not 
been part of the Russian Empire, and the demand surprised the Romanians (and the Germans).  
Furthermore, the small-scale map and the thick pencil used to draw the new border in Bukovina 
left the fate of many towns and villages unclear – especially in the Herţa region.42  Finally, the 
Soviet ultimatum required a response in just 17 hours or war would be declared.   
 Any hope to delay a decision or negotiate better terms was dashed.  At 4 am on 27 June, 
Army Group Nr. 1 was placed on alert, following plans that “our firm decision that we will fight 
if we are attacked must come off clearly to the Soviets.”43  Army Group Nr. 1 had 20 infantry 
divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, and 1 mountain brigade that faced the Kiev Military District with 
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43 infantry divisions, 3 motorized infantry divisions, 10 cavalry divisions, and 11 tank brigades; 
roughly three to one odds – not counting the Red Army’s massive manpower reserves or the Red 
Air Force’s overwhelming superiority over the Romanian Royal Air Force.44  Despite these odds 
some Romanian leaders believed resistance could be successful, at least in the sense of stymying 
the Red Army, forcing Moscow to negotiate, and reducing Soviet demands – like in Finland.  
Ambassador Davidescu declared, “I do not doubt for a moment that our resistance could paralyze 
the Soviet forces, which rest in large part on legend and are led by incompetent ‘officers.’”45  At 
a meeting of the Crown Council, however, General Florea Ţenescu, Chief of the General Staff, 
and General Ioan Ilcuş, Minister of Defense emphasized overwhelming Red Army numbers, 
unfinished defenses, German pressure to accept the demands, and the threat of Hungary and/or 
Bulgaria invading as well – raising the specter of partition like Poland – to convince the council 
that the military option was unrealistic and dangerous.46  At the next meeting, 19 voted to accept 
the Soviet ultimatum, with six opposing and one abstention.47  Shortly thereafter, a message from 
Moscow arrived that set the start of the Soviet occupation for 2 am on 28 June 1940, demanded 
key infrastructure, industry, and materials not be destroyed or removed, and gave the Romanians 
just four days to evacuate.  The Carlist regime immediately acquiesced to these demands.     
 The Crown Council deliberations of 27 June were secret. Soldiers remained convinced 
that they would fight, including General Ciupercă, who later asserted, “There was no indication, 
however vague, of a possible retreat.”48  Commanders made few preparations to retreat, which 
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resulted in confusion once the last-minute decision was taken not to resist.  At 2 am on 28 June, 
General Georgy Zhukov, then commander of the Kiev Military District, ordered the first Soviet 
units to cross the border, some of which opened fire on Romanian units who had not yet received 
orders to retreat.49  The General Staff’s order to retreat only went out at 4 am to Army Group Nr. 
1.  It ordered all units to rapidly evacuate Bessarabia and organize a line of defense on the Prut 
River, added that Cernăuţi, Chişinău, and Cetatea Albă should all be evacuated by 7 pm on 28 
June and surrendered an hour later by mayors (not military personnel), but beyond this the plan 
was vague.  The General Staff instructed contact be made with Soviet commanders to coordinate 
movements and avoid incidents but did not say how this would be accomplished.  These orders 
were nearly useless, so the retreat had to be improvised by commanders on the spot and resulted 
in chaos.50  Additionally, battalion and company commanders with positions far forward on the 
frontier did not receive orders until midday or even later, and it took another two to three hours 
for units to begin to retreat, meaning many units did not get moving until the early afternoon.51  
Lastly, while mentioning Cernăuţi, the General Staff avoided mentioning the fate of northern 
Bukovina and confusion over the new border led to the first Romanian deaths of the war.   
 The news Bessarabia would be abandoned initiated a stampede.  Private Weiss recalled 
waking up in the early morning to the noise of wagons and automobiles in the streets, “Normally 
it would be quiet in Ismail [a city on the Danube].  Our landlady, a Romanian officer’s wife, told 
us, ‘The Russians crossed the border.  Our army had four days to clear out of Bessarabia.’”52  He 
was not the only one caught unprepared.  Major Nicolae Ciobanu, a member of III Corps staff, 
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recalled that the order to retreat “fell among us like a bolt of lightning.  We were not prepared for 
this eventuality [but] for resistance.”53  Romanian units rushed to get moving west, grabbed what 
they could, often looted local stores, and then headed to the nearest bridge, ferry, or ford.   
The Kiev Military District’s primary objectives on 28 June was to occupy the whole of 
northern Bukovina, the northern part of Bessarabia, make incursions all along the Dniester, and 
seize crossings along the Prut as it continued south.  The rest of central and southern Bessarabia 
would be occupied in the following days.  Soviet motorized formations could simply drive across 
the old Polish-Romanian border into northern Bukovina, but to descend into northern Bessarabia 
the Soviets had to organize a river crossing.  A permanent bridge at Hotin was too far west and 
was used to support the advance on Cernăuţi.  As Soviet motorized formations raced to Cernăuţi, 
two pontoon bridges were thrown across the Dniester at Moghilev and Iampo1, men and vehicles 
began crossing at 2 pm and soon two brigades were across.  This crossing was carried out in near 
combat conditions with Soviet units firing on the other bank and amphibious craft employed at 
some places.54  In addition to the main crossing, Red Army forces crossed at other points on the 
Dniester all the way down to Cetatea Albă, located near the mouth of the river spilling into the 
Black Sea and where communist parades started in the early afternoon.  Soviet units reached 
Cernăuţi at 5 pm as the main Red Army force advanced on four axes converging on the city of 
Bălţi in northern Bessarabia.55  Due to the time required to cross the Dniester there were few 
incidents between the two armies on the first day, but panic soon reigned in the cities.    
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 During the afternoon of 28 June order began to break down in Cernăuţi, Chişinău, and 
Cetatea Albă.  Refugees crowded into train stations trying to escape, communist sympathizers 
began to demonstrate, and soldiers started to loot or get drunk, especially if officers abandoned 
them.  The news that Soviet forces were near only worsened the situation.  In Cernăuţi Captain 
Epifanie Cozărăscu recorded, “After the lunch hour the sinister rumbling of Soviet tanks, coming 
closer and closer, began to be heard.”56  In towns and cities across the region spontaneous pro-
Soviet demonstrations took place.  A young man scaled the Cernăuţi town hall at 10:30 am to rip 
down the Romanian tricolor and hoist up a communist red flag; he was shot dead by a soldier.57  
At 1 pm Army Group Nr. 1 ordered a general retreat to the south, aiming for Danube crossings, 
because Soviet forces had already reached crossings over the Prut – in places as early as 12:30 or 
2:30 pm.58  A few times, such as the Rădăuţi bridge, Soviet tanks seemed about to try to cross the 
Prut and were shot at by Romanian troops.59  The last overcrowded train left Cernăuţi at 2 pm.  
Many soldiers and civilians feared that the Red Army just might continue its advance across the 
Prut and occupy Moldavia as well, perhaps even the whole of Romania.   
 With significant Soviet forces across the border, incidents between the two armies began 
to multiply.  There had been isolated incidents during 28 June, but no deaths until Soviet troops 
arrived at 4 am on 29 June in Herţa.  The territory around the town was part of the Old Kingdom, 
but it jutted north towards Cernăuţi and the Soviets were not about to respect a border dating to 
1775 if it fell on the Soviet side of the line drawn by Stalin in Moscow.  Romanian soldiers had 
no idea that Herţa had been signed away too.  Red Army soldiers in two armored cars ordered 
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Captain Ioan Boroş, commander of 1st Battery of the 16th Artillery Regiment, to surrender his 
unit.  According to a witness, Captain Boroş believed that the arrival of Soviet forces in Herţa 
was a mistake, so he and 2nd Lieutenant Alexandru Dragomir approach the Soviets accompanied 
by several soldiers.  2nd Lieutenant Dragomir made the mistake of firing in the air with his pistol, 
apparently attempting to intimidate the Soviets, prompting the Red Army soldiers to open fire, 
killing Boroş, Dragomir, and a private named Iancu Solomon.  Ironically, the first casualties of 
the Romanian Army during the Second World War were two Romanians and a Jew.  The events 
in Herţa did not bode well for the rest of the Romanian withdrawal.   
On Saturday 29 June, the Soviets continued to ignore “evacuation zones” established by 
the General Staff in an attempt to prevent further incidents and chaos.  Red Army units reached 
Chişinău in central Bessarabia that morning.  As Soviet mechanized units progressively cut off 
escape rounds west across the Prut, the arrival of Soviet airborne troops at Bolgrad, an important 
railway hub in southern Bessarabia, further complicated the Romanian retreat.  Romanian reports 
indicate that the Gudarevici Detachment, a Red Army airborne brigade with an estimated 1,200 
men, landed across southern Bessarabia; some by air transport unloaded at various airfields and 
the rest by four-engine aircraft carrying 10-18 parachutists each dropped at low speeds in a large 
drop over villages inhabited mostly by Bulgarians near Bolgrad.60  These airborne troops set up 
rallying points, confiscated vehicles, and advanced to Bolgrad.  The sudden appearance of these 
airborne troops spooked General Gheorghe Atanasescu, commander of Cavalry Corps, who fled 
across the Danube to Galaţi.  Atanasescu spun a tale involving “terrorist threats” in Bolgrad and 
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a close escape by train with Soviet parachutists hot on his heels to justify his action.61  This story 
was one of many that soon turned a few isolated pro-Soviet demonstrations into a narrative of 
betrayal and humiliation by “Jewish-Communist” fifth columnists.  An angry General Ciupercă 
ordered Atanasescu to return the next day to parley with Colonel Gudarevici to try to get his 
Soviet airborne soldiers to reopen Bolgrad for rail traffic, so the Romanians could complete the 
evacuation of soldiers, refugees, and war materials.   
Romanian units increasingly reported attacks by communist “bands” made up of Jews, 
other minorities, and a few “delinquent Romanians” as the retreat entered its second day. 62  The 
few confirmed cases of ambushes occurred in towns or cities.  On the first day of the occupation 
in Socorca, a town on the Dniester near Iampol, a convoy of city buses requisitioned to evacuate 
civil servants and their families was ambushed, leaving behind burning vehicles and four dead.   
The “tragedy at Socorca” was blamed on Jews and soon became a cause célèbre that lent validity 
to fantastic tales of Jewish treachery spread by refugees fleeing the Soviets.63  General Ciupercă, 
believed that in different places people treated the retreating troops differently.  “The population 
of the cities and towns is completely hostile to us in contrast to that of the villages, [which is] sad 
and benevolent.” 64  While his observation is probably based on Ciupercă’s prejudice against the 
large Jewish and Russian populations in Bessarabian towns and cities – while in the countryside 
Romanians, Ukrainians, and Bulgarians predominated – urban areas were indeed more likely to 
be dangerous for evacuating troops as more workers who might be attracted to Soviet ideology 
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lived in cities or towns.  Additionally, places like Chişinău had remained under martial law the 
longest during the interwar period, so anyone nursing a grudge because of rough treatment under 
Romanian rule could take out their anger on the retreating forces.  Lastly, towns and cities were 
where Soviet soldiers or representatives arrived first and they encouraged the local inhabitants to 
perform social revolutionary acts targeting the retreating Romanians.   
 A description of the evacuation of a town is found in the semi-autobiographical account 
of Elvera Ziebart Reuer, an ethnic German from southern Bessarabia, based on her experiences 
as a young woman.  On Sunday 30 June, the rumor reached her town, Arciz, that Soviet troops 
were about to arrive at the train station.  She and a friend went to watch and found most of the 
Russian youths of the town already there and waving flags to welcome the Soviet soldiers.  This 
impromptu welcoming committee also included a number of Jewish youths, while other German 
youths crowded nearby, watching “out of curiosity.” 65   As this was going on, Romanian soldiers 
were loading up carts with goods looted from German shops in the town.  A train pulled into the 
station, met with shouts and flag-waving by the crowd, but Soviet infantry did not come pouring 
off the train as expected.  Instead, a few partisans jumped down from a wagon, handed out rifles 
to some youths in the crowd, including a Jewish boy Reuer recognized, and then disappeared.  
Disappointed the crowd began to disperse, but as a soldier in a wagon turned a nearby corner a 
shot rang out and the driver slumped. 66  The two girls tried to help the wounded soldier but were 
roughly interrogated by a suspicious Romanian sergeant.  Eventually, they were set free after the 
wounded soldier regained consciousness and cleared them.  By the end of the day the Romanians 
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soldiers had gone.  Red Army soldiers had replaced them, crowding the town’s streets with 
tanks, trucks, and carts – they had intercepted the carts Romanian soldiers had loaded down with 
the looted goods, which the Soviet soldiers then kept for themselves.67  Similar events occured in 
towns and villages across northern Bukovina and Bessarabia during the withdrawal.   
 As they overran Bessarabia, Soviet columns that overtook Romanian units often disarmed 
and sometimes humiliated them before allowing those who wanted to cross the border.  Officers 
took the brunt of the humiliation because Soviets saw them as capitalist exploiters to be punished 
for their crimes, in comparison they saw soldiers as the exploited downtrodden and treated them 
favorably hoping they would join the revolution.  Soviet officers encouraged Romanian soldiers 
to turn against their officers, who often had their epaulettes torn off to reenacted events in the 
Russian Revolution.68  This was especially humiliating to regular officers due to their concern 
for honor.  Soon after crossing from Iampol to Cosăuti on the first day, a Red Army unit captured 
Captain Ioan Iepure, leading a squadron from the 3rd Călăraşi Regiment, along with a lieutenant 
and his men.  The two officers were degraded, mocked, and spit upon by locals in the presence 
of Soviet officers – only a few of the officers actually participated.  Iepure was so humiliated that 
after being released he committed suicide.69  Captain Arnold Hansenhöhrl in the 10th Vânători 
Regiment also shot himself after his company was disarmed during the retreat.70  The suicides of 
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both were celebrated at the time and used to inflame anger against “Jewish-Communists.”  Now, 
Hansenhöhrl, an ethnic German, has been written out of the nationalist history of the war. 
Romanian units struggling to reach the border suffered high rates of desertion, especially 
those with large numbers of basarabeni or local minorities.  Private Weiss’s cavalry squadron 
loaded boats in Ismail on the Dniester for several days, he and other ethnic Germans in uniform 
found excuses to stay on the Bessarabian side of the river before deciding to desert the night of 
28 June.  He and eleven others sneaked out to the edge of town at dawn and then slowly crawled 
through a wheat field until 4 pm when it felt safe enough to stand up and head home.71  General 
I. Mihail Racoviţă, commanding 2nd Cavalry Division, claimed that Jewish soldiers were the first 
to desert, implying a “Jewish-Communist” connection, although he admitted most Jews stayed in 
their units.  Commanders quickly suspected the loyalty of basarabeni (Moldovans).  At 6 am on 
28 June, III Corps ordered that “the commanders of all regiments will order the withdrawal of 
ammunition distributed to Bessarabian soldiers.”72  They had good cause for concern.  Officers 
promised their men that if they would be allowed to return home after successfully evacuating, if 
they so desired, but many basarabeni chose to desert – especially if overtaken by Soviet troops.  
One officer recalled, “All Bessarabian soldiers, who threw down their weapons, took with them 
all equipment with which they had been equipped, even taking carts with horses, loading the 
baggage of officers and soldiers from the [Old] Kingdom, they put [these things] in the carts and 
all left for their homes in Bessarabia.”73  The loss of these carts further impeded the retreat by 
slowing down Romanian formations and limiting what could be evacuated.   
                                                 
71 Wieland, Bessarabian Knight, 22-24.   
72 Pelin, Săptămîna patimilor, 121. 
73 Midan, Carol al II-lea şi teroarea istoriei, 277.     
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Soviet propaganda tried to encourage desertion using loudspeakers, air-dropped leaflets, 
and mixing Red Army troops with Romanian soldiers.  The efficacy of this Soviet propaganda is 
debatable, and most soldiers who deserted did so because they did not want to leave their homes 
and families, not out of sympathy to Soviet ideology.  Private Weiss remembered, “We didn’t 
feel proud to be deserters from our country, even though Bessarabia didn’t exist anymore.”74  
When overtaken by Soviet units, Red Army officers told soldiers from Bessarabia to surrender 
their weapons and go home, an option most took.  The soldiers of the 6th Roşiori Regiment, after 
crossing the Prut to safety, demanded to be allowed to return home or they would desert and left 
behind just the officers and six soldiers from the Old Kingdom.75  The choice between nation and 
home was a difficult one.  Lieutenant Ştefan Airinei recalled, “Every one of them, I believe, had 
to decide alone if they were going to remain [in Bessarabia] or cross the Prut with us….I almost 
physically felt the pain of my heart breaking.  What historical moment was I living…that of 
1812, when Bessarabia was torn [from Romania by Imperial Russia] the first time, did it feel the 
same then?”76  But while Romanian officers and soldiers had sympathy for basarabeni and their 
situation, they had none for Jews from Bessarabia and never forgave their “betrayal.” 
 Romanian officers and soldiers immediately accused Jews for allegedly taking the most 
initiative in deserting, participating in humiliating the army, and collaborating with the Soviets.  
Vladimir Solonari recently observed that Romanian reports about the retreat reveal a division of 
the Bessarabian population in three groups: Romanians saddened by the withdrawal, Christian 
minorities who waited passively for the Soviets, and Jews who took initiative in humiliating and 
                                                 
74 Wieland, Bessarabian Knight, 25.   
75 Dobre, Armata romană de la ultimatum la dictat, Vol. I, 156-160.   
76 Selections from Ştefan Airinei’s memoirs quoted in, Pelin, Săptămîna patimilor, 131. 
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attacking the army.77  This pattern was no accident, or simply bias, but was purposefully fostered 
by the General Staff.  In response to the Soviets claiming that the Red Army had not abused or 
impeded Romanian soldiers in any way and that any losses were the result of the indiscipline on 
the part of Romanian soldiers, the General Staff sent out an order on 8 July 1940 for all units to 
gather material evidence of “abuses committed against elements of the army, State, and civilian 
population by the Jewish and communist population under the protection, or at the urging of the 
army of the USSR, and even by elements of that army.”78  Anti-Semitic officers, who were only 
too eager to blame Jews for their woes, wrote reports that told the biased General Staff exactly 
what it wanted to hear.  Again and again, army reports depicted Jews as acting like Soviets “even 
before” the Red Army appeared: wearing red cockades, blocking trains of refugees, ripping up or 
spitting on the Romanian flag, destroying churches, executing officers and civil servants, and 
carrying out other acts of anti-Romanian terror.79  Indeed, some Jewish youths were members of 
“combat companies,” groups organized since tsarist times to protect Jews and Jewish property in 
case of pogroms, and began sporting red ribbons.  These were usually poor working-class Jews 
in cities who were more sympathetic to the promises of communism.80  Some Jews joined with 
groups of basarabeni and other minorities who humiliated retreating units and organized isolated 
attacks on Romanian soldiers.81  These few examples triggered a growing wave of anti-Semitic 
violence that grew stronger as Romanian soldiers retreated west across the Prut.  
                                                 
77 Solonari, Purifying the Nation, 161.   
78 Fond Armata 3-a, fond 135, f. 2, 7.   
79 Dobre, Armata romană de la ultimatum la dictat, Vol. I, 63-64.   
80 Don Levin, The Lesser of Two Evils: Eastern European Jewry under Soviet Rule, 1939-1941. trans. Naftali 
Greenwood (Philidelphia-Jeruslaem: The Jewish Publication Society, 1995), 38.   
81 Surivoris’ Yizko (memorial) books corroborates this, see, Ancel, The History of the Holocaust in Romania, 74.   
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The first reports of Romanian units murdering Jews began to trickle in on 29 June.  The 
11th Călăraşi Regiment claimed to have been attacked outside Bălţi early in the day and reported 
that its counterattack left “a few dead and wounded Jews,” but one has to wonder, especially in 
light of subsequent events in Galaţi and Dorohoi, if Jews were really responsible or if indeed an 
attack actually occurred.82  It is more likely they killed easily identifiable scapegoats.  Romanian 
troops not only believed they were surrounded by “Jewish-Communist” bands, but blamed Jews 
for inciting local Christians against them.  Red Army columns that stopped Romanian formations 
were soon joined by peasants, including basarabeni.  Colonel Constantin Berlescu, commanding 
6th Roşiori Regiment, reported peasants “gathered on the margins of the road and on the edges of 
the forest; as a beast lying in wait for his prey, they waited for the Soviet tanks to come and to 
disarm our units,” after which they seized the regiment’s materials, horses, and luggage that they 
then divided up amongst themselves.83  Since most of the horses and carts used by the Romanian 
Army were requisitioned from the peasantry, peasants felt that it was well within their rights to 
take these things before they were evacuated and lost for good.  Soldiers believed that only the 
presence of Soviet soldiers or “Jewish-Communists” could explain such treachery.     
After repeated complaints about Red Army interference, Romanian diplomats in Moscow 
managed to obtain a concession from Molotov to delay the deadline for evacuation a day to noon 
on 3 July.  General Ciupercă ordered Fourth Army to save as much material as possible and said 
soldiers needed to be inspired by “bold” officers.  He ordered units to form strong rearguards to 
enforce the agreed upon withdrawal plan, gave them permission to fire on Red Army troops if 
                                                 
82 Midan, Carol al II-lea şi teroarea istoriei, 280.  
83 The colonel’s full statement is translated and quoted in Solonari, Purifying the Nation, 163.   
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necessary, and demanded that “any attempt at rebellion by the population will be sanctioned as 
such” – meaning swiftly and brutally like the Tatarbunar revolt in 1924.84   Ciupercă stressed that 
it was vital for units not to hold the new withdrawal line set for 1 July and not abandon it earlier 
than planned.  Soviet units that approached needed to be turned back to allow time to evacuate.  
In some places officers were successful.  2nd Lieutenant Ion Iliescu, commanding a company of 
the 2nd Dorobanţi Regiment, set up a roadblock with barbed wire and when a Red Army column 
tried to drive through threatened to open fire.  Iliescu’s bluff and bluster temporarily halted the 
Soviets.85  Such success was isolated, however, and with parachutists in the rear and motorized 
units able to rapidly find new routes around Romanian road blocks the chaos continued.   
While Molotov may have made promises in Moscow, it did little to change the attitude of 
Red Army troops on the ground who continued to harass Romanian units during 30 June.  Soviet 
airborne troops cemented control over Bolgrad, blocking most rail traffic in southern Bessarabia.  
General Atanasescu, slinking back under orders after his embarrassing flight across the Danube, 
made his way to Bolgrad to negotiate with the Soviets to let Romanian trains through.  Colonel 
Gudarevici proved uncooperative.  He said he had no knowledge of any delay in the evacuation, 
told Atanasescu the Romanian Army needed to hurry up, and broke a promise to allow several 
blocked trains to cross the border.86  Fourth Army became increasingly worried about a possible 
Soviet invasion of Moldavia and began to mine the bridges across the Prut and Danube.   
While General Ciupercă obsessed over keeping bridges out of the hands of the Soviets, 
hordes of disorganized, tired, and angry Romanian soldiers arrived west of the Prut or south of 
                                                 
84 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 309, f. 103. 
85 Bărboi, Armata română în vâltoarea războiului, 33.   
86 Fond Corpul de Cavalerie, dosar 87, f. 87-91. 
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the Danube in cities with large Jewish populations.  Refugees from Bessarabia streamed into the 
cities on the new frontier, bringing tales of Red Army and “Jewish-Communist” atrocities.  They 
were soon further crowded with basarabeni and minorities, including Jews, trying to cross into 
Bessarabia before the border closed.  Citizens in these cities expected to be the next to fall to the 
Soviets and viewed both arriving and outgoing refugees with suspicion.  A volatile mixture.    
Galaţi Massacre and Dorohoi Pogrom 
 The arrival of demoralized soldiers destabilized Moldavia and triggered a wave of anti-
Semitic violence, spreading along units’ routes of retreat and railway lines, which convulsed the 
region between 30 June and 3 July.  In many places the violence was reminiscent of traditional 
pogroms: beatings, looting, and destruction of property.87  It soon became deadly.  In two places 
Galaţi, located on the Danube in southern Moldavia, and Dorohoi, in Bukovina close to the new 
northern border, the violence spiraled out of control and hundreds of Jews were murdered.  After 
reports of these two massacres, the General Staff ordered measures be taken to halt popular anti-
Semitic violence out of fear it would trigger “true uprisings” against the state.88  Senior officers, 
who were junior officers during the Peasant Uprising of 1907, remembered only too well just 
how quickly localized popular anti-Semitic violence could turn into a national peasant uprising.  
Fear, frustration, and anti-Semitism were the primary reasons for the widespread violence against 
Jews in Moldavia.  Attacks on trains, in isolated villages, and cities were primarily initiated by 
soldiers from the bottom-up, only in some places did mid-ranking officers enable their soldiers’ 
                                                 
87 The first modern pogroms occurred in Russia in 1881, targeting property and spreading along railways, and had 
certain unspoken rules.  While Jewish property could be destroyed, Jewish lives were spared, but usually after an 
obligatory beating.  Only if Jews offered armed resistance did Christians murder them.  Over the next three decades, 
however, pogroms in Russia became dealier as the old unspoken rules were discarded, see, John Doyle Klier, 
Russians, Jews, and the Pogroms of 1881-1882 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 58-59, 67, 84.   
88 Dobre, Armata romană de la ultimatum la dictat, Vol. I, 99.   
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desire for revenge or civilians joined in the violence, but where they did soldiers became more 
murderous.  The violence of 1940 foreshadowed what was to follow a year later in 1941.   
There was widespread terror in Romania that the Red Army would not stop at the Prut.  
Gheorghe Ioniţă, a high school student in Iaşi in 1940, remembered an atmosphere of trepidation 
created by rumors sweeping the city after news of the retreat from eastern Romania broke.  Iaşi 
lay just 15 km from the Prut.  Ioniţă recalled that, “The news that the Russians crossed the border 
before the terms that they themselves had established aroused indignation and panic.  Will they 
stop at the Prut?  Or will they cross further to the Siret?  Skepticism and fear wreaked havoc.”89  
Lurid tales of Jews raping Romanian women in the streets of Ismail, “Jewish-Communist” bands 
attacking refugees, Jews torturing and murdering priests, and all other kinds of alleged Jewish 
perfidy quickly spread.  Press reports reinforced these stories and radio broadcasts as early as 29 
June reported Jews organizing pro-Soviet demonstrations, throwing stones at retreating officers 
and soldiers, and other similar anti-Semitic polemics.90  During the retreat, Romanian soldiers 
were under strict orders to avoid firing on the Red Army and provoking incidents, however, their 
orders did not mention civilians or stop reprisals against alleged traitors.  Influenced by soldiers’ 
anger, some mid-ranking officers chose to succumb to their own frustrations and anti-Semitic 
beliefs and issued orders targeting Jews for violence, torture, and summary executions.    
Most of the deadly violence was diffused in the countryside or on trains, places where the 
overstretched gendarmes and municipal police could not easily patrol to keep order.91  Marching 
through the Jewish shtetls common in Bukovina or traveling in crowded train cars soldiers could 
                                                 
89 Bărboi, Armata română în vâltoarea războiului, 34.   
90 Dorian, Quality of Witness, 100-101; Ancel, The History of the Holocaust in Romania, 72-73.  
91 Pogroms were partly the result of a breakdown in state control.  A weak state with overstretched security forces 
often had a hard time dealing with them, see, Klier, Russians, Jews, and the Pogroms of 1881-1882, xiii, 18-25.  
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attack and murder Jews with little chance of being stopped or held accountable by the authorities.  
A subsequent investigation by the Prosecutor of Suceava County in Bukovina uncovered a wave 
of anti-Semitic murders by soldiers: 30 June in Costănaţ Jewish Private Lax Burăh was killed by 
two unidentified soldiers, 1 July in Şerbăuţi Gendarme Sergeant Bojic shot four Jews, 2 July in 
Gărurani Max Rudic and Fişel Salilnger were shot by unidentified soldiers, the same day in 
Comăneşti soldiers of the 14th Infantry Regiment shot five Jews, and again the same day at the 
railway stop in Soloneţ platform gendarmes of the 1st Military Police Company shot two Jews.92  
Soldiers on trains targeted fellow Jewish soldiers.  Despite having endured the retreat they were 
now seen as traitors, disarmed, beaten up, and, if lucky, turned over to the authorities at the next 
station.  If unlucky, they were killed in various cruel ways, thrown from trains, shot, and even 
bayonetted – in many cases egged on by civilians.93  “We have saved them from reserve duty,” 
soldiers joked to passengers after they threw two Jewish soldiers from a train and then shot them 
once the fall did not kill them.94  For days the bodies of injured, dying, and dead Jewish soldiers, 
and Jewish civilians, were found along the railways of Bukovina and Moldavia.  The violence 
traveled as far away as Transylvania, where Private Moise Pasos was found near a train station in 
Alba Iulia County on 5 July with a head wound because he had jumped from a train to escape 
being beaten by a group of soldiers from a regiment returning from Bessarabia.95   
In most cases individual or small groups of soldiers targeted isolated Jews, but when mid-
ranking officers chose to act on their own anti-Semitic prejudices the scale of violence increased.  
                                                 
92 J. Alexandru, L. Benjamin, D. Brumfeld, A Florea, P. Litma, S. Stanciu, ed, Martiriul evreilor din România, 
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Major Valeriu Carp, commanding 3rd Battalion in the 16th Infantry Division, took the initiative to 
order his men to round up “suspicious” Jews from the countryside of Dorohoi County as his unit 
retreated through Bukovina.  Following a short interrogation most were summarily executed.  In 
the village of Ciudei, soon to be turned over to the Soviets, Carp ordered eight Jews gathered in 
the village center be executed on 30 June.  Another victim was tortured, his body was reportedly 
cut up into pieces, before being murdered.96  A week later, Carp had another 34 Jews, gathered 
from surrounding villages in Rădăuţi and Storojineţ counties, shot.97  According to one account, 
all were tortured before being shot, likely in an attempt to elicit confessions or as punishment for 
alleged treachery, and two Jewish soldiers in Carp’s unit were supposedly required to take part in 
a firing squad – probably to prove their loyalty by executing these “traitors.”98  It is important to 
point out that Carp did not order an indiscriminate bloodbath of all Jews, rather he still required 
“evidence” that they were a possible fifth column threat before executing them.   
The situation for Jews in cities was usually safer because authorities had more personnel, 
municipal police and gendarmes, which could patrol more easily.  In Iaşi, the provincial capital 
and a major Jewish population center, whenever things threatened to get out of control police or 
gendarmes stepped in and prevented violence from turning deadly.  Scuffles broke out between 
soldiers and Jews heading east to Bessarabia through nearby Ungheni.  Soldiers believed Soviet 
troops were stripping basarabeni refugees arriving in Moldavia of their property at the border, so 
they wanted to confiscate all goods from Jews going the opposite direction in retaliation.99  Jews 
were attacked on the street and Jewish stores looted in Iaşi.  Fearing a pogrom, the 4th Gendarme 
                                                 
96 Carp, Holocaust in Rumania, 238-239.   
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Regiment began carrying out patrols both night and day on 4 July, so when there was an incident 
between soldiers and a Jewish innkeeper the following day that spread panic among the Jewish 
community gendarmes were on hand to quickly restored order.100  The same precautions were 
taken in other cities, such as in Vatra Dornei on 3 July, then the location of the headquarters of 
the Mountain Corps, “In order to prevent possible disorder in [the city] as well as attacks against 
Jews.”101  These measures were implemented in large part due to events in Galaţi and Dorohoi a 
few days earlier when order had broken down.  
 The first major massacre occurred at the Galaţi train station on 30 June.  In the days since 
the Soviet ultimatum the large port city on the Danube of 100,000, including about 13,000 Jews, 
had become crowded with refugees fleeing Bessarabia, with tales of “Jewish-Communists,” and 
a larger number of basarabeni, Jews, and other minorities trying to cross into the Soviet zone.102  
Romanians viewed anyone heading east as communist sympathizers, but saw Jews as especially 
dangerous threats to the security of the Galaţi.  The trains were interrupted early in the morning 
because Red Army parachutists had seized Bolgrad and created a backlog of basarabeni, Jews, 
and minorities at the train station that soon numbered around 2,000.103  The station gendarme 
commander, concerned about security and the danger of “Jewish-Communists” who might rise 
up in support of a Soviet attack, ordered Jews separated from the group and marched to an empty 
field next to the station where they could be kept under guard until they were transported across 
the border.  Just how many Jews were held there is unclear and reports are contradictory, but it 
was in the hundreds and perhaps near a thousand of men, women, and children.  These Jewish 
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civilians were left out in the open with no shelter from the sun, hour after hour, with no food or 
water, in an increasingly stifling June heat as the day progressed. 
Finally, in late-afternoon, things boiled over.  The crowd became angry, demanding to be 
allowed to leave or placed immediately on trains to the border, and threatened to overwhelm the 
cordon of gendarmes.  Suddenly, a pistol shot rang out, probably fired by an officer to intimidate 
the crowd, but nervous guards began firing on the crowd with rifles and machineguns wounding 
and killing scores.104  The shots created panic on the nearby crowded train platforms, a situation 
not helped by the fact that another officer decided that shooting his pistol in the air was the best 
way to calm the crowd.105  As the killing progressed, some Jews broke away and escaped into the 
streets, but they were pursued by gendarmes who were soon joined by civilians convinced they 
were under attack by fifth columnists supporting Soviet parachutists.  They helped track down, 
corner, and murder the Jews.  Teodor Giugaru, a local merchant, joined in the hunt after caving 
in the skulls of several Jews who tried to hide in his shop with a thick stick.106  After a half hour 
the gunfire weakened, followed by isolated shots, before subsiding completely.  The first reports 
all described the massacre as an attempted uprising by “Jewish-Communists,” claiming that the 
gendarmes been fired on by armed Jews in the crowd and nearby houses. They were so alarming 
that the Royal Resident in Galaţi demanded the army send troops to restore order.  Fourth Army 
diverted two infantry battalions – about to be sent across the Danube to suppress another alleged 
“Jewish uprising” reported in Reni earlier that day that was suppressed by local forces who left 
dozens of slain Jews in the streets – to Galaţi.107  The exact number of Jews killed in Galaţi is 
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hard to determine.  The official reports do not mention specific numbers or only suspiciously low 
numbers like 10 to 12, the post-war communist prosecutors claimed around 400 dead, while the 
day after Radio Sofia reported 280 Jews killed in a “battle” with guards.108  Yet even as Radio 
Sofia’s broadcast went out another major massacre was underway to the north in Bukovina.   
The Dorohoi pogrom broke out on 1 July.  After the Soviet ultimatum this small city of 
15,800 people, including roughly 5,800 Jews, was suddenly just 20 km from the new border and 
the Red Army.  The city was an interwar LANC and Legionary stronghold with a long history of 
hostility towards local Jews.109  That morning several Romanian units retreating from northern 
Bukovina crowded into the city, including the 8th Artillery Brigade and the 3rd Grăniceri Group – 
one of the four “elite” grăniceri formations that policed the Soviet border in peacetime – and the 
local 29th Infanterie Regiment that had many Jews.  Refugees too were passing through Dorohoi, 
spreading stories of Jewish treachery in northern Bukovina.110  A few witnesses later claimed 
soldiers marked Christian homes with a large letter “C” in the morning, prompting local 
Christians to prominently display crosses or icons, but this was most likely rumor after the fact 
and does not convincingly prove premeditation for the pogrom.111  It should have been a solemn 
day as Private Solomon, killed alongside Captain Boroş and 2nd Lieutenant Dragomir two days 
earlier in Herţa, was being buried with full military honors in the local Jewish cemetery. 
 The situation in Dorohoi remained relatively calm until 2 pm when the shots of the honor 
guard during the burial appear to have triggered a reaction from angry and panicky soldiers.  The 
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29th Infanterie Regiment sent 10 Jewish soldiers, under the command of a Christian sergeant, to 
act as the honor guard at the ceremony.  Matatias Carp claims the shots came from the western 
part of the cemetery, insinuating they were fired by Romanian conspirators as a pre-arranged 
signal to start the pogrom, but there is no proof and his argument seems based on conjecture.112  
Likely, the shots fired by the honor guard for Private Solomon attracted the unwanted attention 
of soldiers from the 3rd Grăniceri Group who were unaware of what was going on.  The honor 
guard, having completed its task, was leaving as the rest of the party went to the funeral parlor, 
but at the gate of the cemetery the Jewish soldiers were halted by an officer with a platoon of 
soldiers from 3rd Grăniceri Group who ordered them disarmed.  It seems that finding armed 
Jews, regardless of being in uniform, was enough “evidence” for the officer to order their 
execution as probable fifth columnists – only about 10 minutes after they had acted as an honor 
guard for a Jewish soldier killed defending Romanian soil.  Soldiers then began a frantic search 
for other “Jewish-Communists” in the city.  They began with those in the funeral parlor whose 
proximity seems to have been proof enough to condemn them; the whole group – including eight 
women, three children, and an 80-year-old man – were shot.113  The chaos began to spread across 
Dorohoi as frenzied soldiers, shouting about Bolshevik infiltrators, attacked Jews, looted stores, 
forced their way into Jewish houses, and murdered those deemed suspicious or guilty.   
This description of what occurred that afternoon is supported by the testimony of George 
Brăilescu-Gotlieb.  As he worked in his dental office on a patient, he heard shots starting in the 
early afternoon, first isolated and then more frequent.  Suddenly, a group of soldiers burst into 
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his office and dragged him into the street, still wearing his dental coat, propelling him by blows 
from rifle butts to a headquarters that had been set up nearby in a Jewish school where he joined 
20-25 other Jews who had been gathered for interrogation by a group of officers.114  Brăilescu-
Gotlieb discovered they were accused of having fired on Romanian soldiers from the windows of 
houses.  A machinegun squad stood outside, with bodies of slain Jews laying all around, waiting 
for the order to execute the prisoners.  He was convinced they would all suffer the same fate, 
however, the officers ordered soldiers to first search the homes of those arrested and when “not a 
single trace of a weapon or something compromising” was found they were spared.115   
Brăilescu-Gotlieb was lucky since what constituted “something compromising” could be 
very innocuous.  Mundane items, especially radios, but also literature deemed communist, red 
cloth allegedly for signaling enemy planes, even a simple wire construed as an improvised radio, 
condemned many as “Jewish-Communists.”116  Some Jews were shot for just being on the street.  
Those who could sought shelter with sympathetic Christian neighbors.  A patrol sent by the 29th 
Infanterie Regiment to investigate the disturbances nearly had its Jewish soldiers murdered, but a 
Captain Stino intervened to prevent further military fratricide.  The pogrom raged for three hours 
during which time bestial crimes were carried out: ripping out beards, cutting off ears to get gold 
jewelry, slashing off breasts, and mutilation of genitals of victims.  At 5 pm a sudden, powerful 
rainstorm drove soldiers off the streets to seek shelter indoors, temporarily halting the violence, 
but it took until late in the evening to restore order.117  By then approximately 200 Jews were 
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dead, although the official figure was just 52 killed and 17 wounded.118  Following the Dorohoi 
pogrom, the General Staff took measures to prevent anti-Semitic “aggressions” elsewhere. 
Ironically, it was also fear of Soviet invasion that encouraged senior officers to halt the 
violent activity of their subordinates.  Romanian leaders believed that the Soviets would use the 
anti-Semitic violence as a pretext to advance further into Romania because the Soviets had used 
a similar argument to justify their occupation of eastern Poland, citing chaos and the danger to 
“kindred Ukrainian and Belorussian people.”119  Fourth Army warned on 2 July, “In general, the 
army and the population evacuated from Bessarabia are expressing revolt against the Jews.  
More serious anti-Semitic demonstrations on the part of the army not excluded.”120  General 
Ţenescu ordered “severe measures to stop [anti-Semitic violence], which could have unfavorable 
effects in the current situation.”121  Soviet interwar nationalities policies included Jews in their 
“friendship of peoples,” supported the development of a secular Yiddish language and culture, 
and so it was not a great leap for anti-Semitic Romanians to fear that Jews were also considered a 
kindred Soviet people by Moscow.  Additionally, intelligence reports claimed that Jews in 
Moldavia were trying to provoke the Red Army to cross the Prut.  A 5 July police report claimed 
that Jews from Iaşi had sent a delegation to meet with a general in Soviet-occupied Bălţi to 
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complain that Jews were being shot in Iaşi and urge him to occupy the city, but he turned them 
down – supposedly citing the fact that the Romanians had already complied with Soviet demands 
and there was no justification for further occupation.122  Nevertheless, Romanian leaders worried 
that if anti-Semitic violence continued to spread disorder throughout Moldavia and the state lost 
control that the Soviets would take advantage of the situation to invade.   
Almost as if to punctuate these fears of a Soviet invasion, a skirmish occurred midday on 
2 July at Giurgiulesţi.  Fourth Army had established a defensive bridgehead in the town, located 
on the other side of the river from Galaţi, to try to keep a toehold in southern Bessarabia to finish 
evacuating materials until the official withdrawal deadline the next day, but the local Red Army 
forces were determined to push the Romanians across the Danube by the original deadline.  The 
arrival of Soviet tanks panicked the Romanian battalion in the bridgehead resulting in a company 
being captured.  Still holding the road and rail bridges, the Cavalry Corps negotiated the turnover 
of the disarmed soldiers, including two wounded, and once the last one crossed they blew up the 
Giurgiuleşti bridges at 6:30 pm.123  General Ciupercă thought the Soviets might responds with an 
attack and ordered the Soviets be told that the bridges were blown up “by a regrettable mistake.” 
At the same time, he pushed for authorization to blow up all the bridges on the Prut as well.124 
The events in Dorohoi greatly alarmed the General Staff who feared that it signaled the 
start of a breakdown in discipline in the ranks, so it took action to restore order and reorganize its 
scattered and demoralized army.  In a report to the Grăniceri Corps, the General Staff wrote that 
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it had been informed of 3rd Grăniceri Group’s “excesses” during its retreat, including throwing 
Jews from trains and perpetrating the Dorohoi pogrom, and concluded with a sharp reprimand.   
Even if these excesses on the part of the grăniceri soldiers might be justified, as a 
reaction to the violent events [bruscările] suffered during the withdrawal from 
Bukovina, nevertheless they cannot be tolerated under any condition because such 
events can degenerate into actions with grave nature and consequences, the first 
being the weakening of military discipline in units.125   
 
General Constantin Sănătescu, commander of VIII Corps who was assigned to investigate the 
pogrom, pretended shock about the events, remarking “I am surprised by these acts of banditry 
committed by what I thought were elite units.” 126  The army blamed the pogrom on two captains 
Gheorghe Teoharie and Constantin Serghie, yet neither one was seriously punished, and made 3rd 
Grăniceri Group the scapegoat for all of the army’s crimes committed against Jews in 1940 – no 
other unit was sanctioned for crimes against Jews.  Despite scores of attacks, looting, and murder 
only a few individual soldiers and gendarmes were held responsible. 
As a 4 July report from Fourth Army attests, anti-Semitic violence did not immediately 
stop because many Romanian soldiers who had become separated from their units and continued 
to trickle across the border were dead set on taking revenge on Jews.127  Revealingly, soldiers 
resented the new, less indulgent attitude towards anti-Semitic violence, especially as gendarmes 
began arresting troops for looting, torture, and murder.  Some even interfered in the punishment 
of fellow soldiers for anti-Semitic crimes of which they were often equally guilty or did not see 
as crimes, but rather as patriotic or justified.  For example, some of Major Carp’s troops attacked 
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the Comăneşti gendarme post where three comrades were being held “for anti-Semitic activity,” 
looting and murder, to spring them from custody.128  However, increased patrols by gendarmes 
and officer threats finally brought anti-Semitic violence in Moldavia under control. 
Wounded Honor 
 The new border was officially established on 3 July 1940.  Despite the hysteria about 
“Jewish-Communist” bands, only nine soldiers were killed and five wounded during the retreat, 
but 62,503 were missing, including hundreds of NCOs and officers, almost all from Bessarabia 
who chose to stay behind.  Additionally, the army had significant material losses: 67,079 rifles, 
6,134 pistols, 1,080 submachineguns, 277 machineguns, 43 mortars, 147 artillery guns, and tons 
of ammunition.129  The loss of northern Bukovina and Bessarabia sheared an area of 59,762 sq 
km with 3,776,000 inhabitants from România Mare, although roughly 200,000 refugees fled to 
the Old Kingdom.130  While these manpower and material losses were serious, the retreat from 
Bessarabia was not a complete disaster and most Romanian units withdrew without significant 
losses, particularly ones without large numbers of soldiers from Bessarabia.  Nevertheless, the 
humiliation of the retreat deeply wounded the officer corps’ sense of honor.  
 Once safely across the Prut, officers were forced to confront their sense of dishonor and 
explain their humiliating retreat.  Romanian officials, officers, and even the king had continued 
to promise to fight right up to the last minute.131  The Iaşi high school student Gheorghe Ioniţă 
recalled the hostility towards the soldiers who arrived in the city after retreating from Bessarabia. 
Soldiers spilled onto the streets with weapons, cannons, vehicles, horses and carts.  
People looked at them with rebuke.  Why were they not allowed to fight?  Perhaps 
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they would have died under the folds of the tricolor flag, but [dying for the nation] 
has been the soldier’s mission since the beginning of time.  How will they, and 
their posterity, bear the burden of abandoning the holy Romanian earth from the 
swath of earth of [medieval king] Ştefan the Great without a fight…132 
 
The General Staff reassured officers and soldiers that they had not dishonored themselves and 
tried to convince their men that not resisting was even more honorable since it was supposedly 
more difficult than fighting.  The 7 July 1940 issue of Sentinela reassured soldiers that while 
they had withdrawn without a fight it was not “from cowardice” because the Romanian soldier 
“was not and never will be a coward” and promised the setback was temporary. 133  The loss two 
months later of northern Transylvania to Hungary and southern Dobrogea to Bulgaria once again 
without a fight, exacerbated the sense of dishonor.  As 2nd Lieutenant Teodorescu retreated from 
Transylvania in September he wondered, “Were we somehow guilty?”134   
The humiliation of the Romanian Army was even greater in the eyes of the officer corps 
because of the contempt in which they held the Red Army and its officer corps.  They saw the 
Red Army as a poorly disciplined mass of different ethnicities and races (Russians, Ukrainians, 
Jews, Central Asians) led by incompetent officers who were controlled by “Jewish” political 
commissars.135  Romanian army reports condemned Red Army officers for being “high-handed” 
[samovolnicia] and “lacking gallantry” [lipsă de cavalerism].136  Overall, despite its encounter 
with the Red Army in northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, the Romanian officer corps remained 
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remarkably unimpressed with the Red Army.  As one report summarized, “Good drivers and 
mechanics.  The officers, troops[,] especially those in in the infantry, very poorly trained and 
undisciplined.  The majority of the tank crews were drunk.  Weak material.  Old and worn-out 
tanks.”137  It seems clear that many officers believed they could have and should have resisted 
the Red Army, which helps explain why most officers now turned against Carol II.   
 Widespread popular disgust with Carol II’s decision to abandon the provinces without a 
fight triggered attacks on the royal dictatorship from all sides.  In statements sent to the Council 
of Ministers by leaders of all the outlawed parties, including Iului Maniu’s National Peasants and 
Constantin Brătinau’s Liberals, declared, “The Romanian people…cannot understand why, when 
the army had to defend the country’s frontiers, it was ordered to withdraw in haste and give the 
enemy a free hand to occupy the two provinces, leaving three million Romanians to the mercy of 
the USSR.”138  Antonescu also sent a letter to the Carlist government that protested the surrender 
of northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, which he described as the culmination of a long line of 
mistakes by the king.139  Politicians was responding to public outrage, harnessing it to undermine 
Carlsim, and then in turn contributing to intensified public anger against the monarch.   
In the politically charged atmosphere, Antonescu began to reach out to opposition leaders 
seeking a new alliance to bring him into a position of power and continued to publicly criticize 
the king.140  Carol II ordered him arrested on 9 July.  Due to his links to the Legionaries, German 
diplomats worried that Antonescu might be murdered while in custody like Codreanu previously 
and told the Carlist government that his imprisonment could negatively impact German relations 
                                                 
137 Dobre, Armata romană de la ultimatum la dictat, Vol. I, 135.   
138 Quote cited in Giurescu, Romania in the Second World War, 32.   
139 Solonari, Purifying the Nation, 121.   
140 Watts, Romanian Cassandra, 216-217.   
 235 
 
with Romania.  This prompted the king to release Antonescu, but then he sent him to the isolated 
Bistriţa monastery in the Carpathian foothills where he was kept under house arrest.141  For the 
moment Carol II had neutralized the troublesome general, but Antonescu’s persecution at the 
hands of the king and his open opposition to the unpopular decision to abandon eastern Romania 
to the Soviets was not soon forgotten by the officer corps or the public.   
National Legionary State to Military Dictatorship 
 In the aftermath of the Soviet occupation Romania’s other revisionist neighbors, Hungary 
and Bulgaria, made territorial demands on Transylvania and Dobrogea respectively, but this time 
the Romanians could delay occupation by negotiation.  The talks were held in Romania, at Turnu 
Severin with the Hungarians and at Craiova with the Bulgarians, beginning in mid-August, and 
dragged on for weeks.  The talks with the Hungarians soon deadlocked and forced Nazi Germany 
to intervene before the two sides came to blows.142  On 30 August, a German-Italian commission 
unveiled the Second Vienna Award that ceded a great swath – 42,243 sq km with a population of 
2,628,238 – of northern Transylvania to Hungary that prompted another flood of refugees to the 
Old Kingdom, totaling around 230,000.143  On 7 September, an agreement with Bulgaria ceding 
southern Dobrogea – 6,921 sq km with a population of 425,000 – was signed.144  The pressure 
from Berlin, combined with fears of a Soviet attack in the east if war broke out with Hungary or 
Bulgaria, which threatened Romania with the same fate as Poland in 1939, again convinced King 
Carol II to order a withdrawal from these regions without a fight.  While it was probably the best 
decision at the time, it was fatal to the survival of his royal dictatorship.   
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 The news of further territorial concessions caused protests to break out against Carol II 
across Romania.  Romanians demanded, “Where are the planes for which we paid [the special 
stamp tax]?  Where are the arms for which we paid the [army] endowment tax?  Where are the 
munitions for which we paid the rearmament taxes?”145  The Hungarian Army slowly occupied 
northern Transylvania between 5 and 13 September 1940.  Hungarians troops advanced timidly 
because they lacked motorized units, had orders not to fire, and Romanian officers preemptively 
disarmed and sent home Transylvanians – ardeleni and minorities – who did not want to leave 
with the army to the Old Kingdom.146  The Bulgarian takeover was even more drawn out and not 
completed until October.  Ironically, both were completed later under the new Antonescu regime.  
Large demonstrations, joined by Legionaries, took place in Braşov, Cluj, Oradea, Sighişoara, and 
Bucharest.147  Carol II called Antonescu from house arrest and asked him to form a government 
after the Second Vienna Award caused the collapse of Ion Gigurtu’s ultranationalist government 
left no other options than him or an all-Legionary government under Horia Sima.148   
Antonescu was free of any association with the decision to cede northern Transylvania 
because he had resigned from the army on 12 July after his internment in Bistriţa.  His reputation 
of honor, discipline, and incorruptibility was in stark contrast to the much-maligned reputation of 
the king for corruption, incompetence, and self-interest.  Furthermore, Antonescu’s close links to 
the far right, the Legion specifically, made him appear to be only figure who was both acceptable 
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to right-wing populists and able to restore order.  The favorable opinion of German diplomats in 
Bucharest to Antonescu did not hurt either.  Lastly, he could command the respect and loyalty of 
the officer corps, which was showing signs of discontent after the humiliation of a second major 
withdrawal – a few officers openly participated in the demonstrations against the king and those 
sympathetic with the Legionaries helped arm crowds in early September.149  When Carol II ask 
Antonescu to become prime minister, he did not immediately accept and demanded that the king 
grant him full dictatorial powers.  The desperate king agreed, with the caveat that he retain his 
position as head of the army and that all major decisions still had be co-signed by the monarch, 
and Antonescu accepted these conditions on 5 September. 150  The decision to allow the king to 
remain the titular head of the army had important repercussions years later on 23 August 1944.  
The next day, however, crowds continued to demand the king’s resignation and Antonescu was 
informed of a plot by the king and Carlist generals to assassinate him, so he demanded that Carol 
II abdicate and go into exile.151  In order to increase pressure on the king, he ordered the police 
and army to not fire on demonstrators outside the royal palace who were chanting for the head of 
the king.152  That evening Antonescu again requested that Carol II abdicate and told him that he 
could not assure his safety if he did not.153  Finally, in the wee hours of 6 September, Carol II 
succumbed and agreed to abdicate in favor of his 19-year-old son, who became King Mihai I (for 
the second time), and went into exile with Madame Lupescu and a few others in his camarilla.   
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On 9 September 1940, Antonescu adopted the title of Conducător, used by Carol II since 
1938, and declared the foundation of the National-Legionary State.154  Antonescu’s government 
was comprised of Legionaries, specialists, and military men; he hoped to forge a lasting alliance 
between traditional conservatism and far-right populism.  He ended the state’s persecution of the 
Legion and brought them to power.  Sima became deputy prime minister and five more ministers 
were Legionaries – Internal Affairs, External Affairs, Public Instruction, Communication, and 
Health.  Legionaries replaced Carlist prefects in all 50 of Romania’s administrative counties.155  
Antonescu shared the responsibilities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with the retired General 
Constantin Petrovicescu, another Legionary.  Thos split personality government soon began to 
fray.  In the following months, Legionaries spread chaos and destabilized Romanian society as 
they tried to carry out a fascist revolution, attacked Jews, and pursued radical economic reform.  
Their violent version of Romanianization literally threw Jews out of business, extorted cash, 
stole goods, and seized property.  Legionary violence, plunder, and arbitrariness in carrying out 
these policies during this time created tensions between them and increasingly pro-Antonescu 
civil servants.156  The situation quickly deteriorated over the following months.   
In the meantime, Antonescu needed the Legion’s support until he consolidated power.  “I 
did not have the whole army on my side,” he recalled later and Carlist officers still held most key 
positions in the army.157  His first move was to gather around himself trusted officers, beginning 
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with General Pantazi.  The 52-year-old was only four years younger than the Conducător, born 
into a military family, a fellow cavalryman, and a longtime friend who stood by Antonescu when 
the king’s ire against him was strongest.158  A few hours before the king abdicated, Antonescu 
summoned Pantazi from Transylvania, where he had just taken over the new armored division, 
and when he arrived that afternoon made him Sub-Secretary to the Minister of Defense, held by 
Antonescu, and military commander of the capital.159  This put a trusted colleague in charge of 
security in the capital in case Carlists tried a countercoup.  Antonescu dismissed senior Carlist 
officers, officially because they had “contributed through their stance to the moral state that 
caused the turning back [carmirea] of the country’s borders, without the army firing so much as 
a shot.”160  He was able to scapegoat them and remove a political threat at the same time.  With 
his position secure, the Conducător turned his attention to restoring morale in the officer corps.   
Antonescu promised the officer corps a break from Carlist corruption, restoration of its 
honor, and redemption of România Mare by arms at the proper moment, but until then it had to 
wait and endure.  The Germans supported Antonescu’s seizure of power because he seemed the 
best chance to enforce the Second Vienna Award as Carol II was discredited and popular anger 
was such that it seemed that Romania and Hungary might go to war over Transylvania.161  On 8 
September 1940, in the first issue of Sentinela after taking power, Antonescu told the army it had 
to bear the burden of losing northern Transylvania – the occupation was completed a week later.  
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He said that Romania’s “friends” Germany and Italy had been asked to step in to arbitrate, the 
army had to abide by the decision they had reached, a war with Hungary was then inopportune, 
and Europe should be grateful for Romania’s sacrifice.162  In the next issue, Antonescu focused 
on discipline, which he called “the first law” of his regime, and told soldiers to master the “inner 
enemy” of disorder.163  Legionary anarchy stood in stark contrast to his goals. 
After being brought to power the Legion began a reign of terror against Jews that most 
Romanians supported, or at least tolerated, but soon an influx of opportunists entering its ranks 
began to abuse their power, and often did not limit their violence to Jews.164  Anyone could be a 
target: Romanians with anti-Legionary pasts, beggars, gamblers, drunks, anyone suspicious, and 
of course minorities – especially Jews, but also Hungarians, Germans, Bulgarians, Gypsies, and 
others.  Sima tried to set up a dual state with Legionary police, courts, press, charity, and other 
institutions.  Antonescu became frustrated with Legionary anarchy, “if everyone interferes, if 
everyone gives orders and intervenes – according to one’s own free will and time – the collapse, 
under the present internal and external circumstances of the country, will come most rapidly.”165  
On the night of 26 November, a group of Legionaries carried out an outrage that alienated most 
Romanians when they broke into the Jilava Prison outside Bucharest and killed 65 prominent 
Carlists being held there.  At the same time, two other groups murdered Nicolae Iorga, a widely 
respected historian and interwar politician, and Virgil Madgearu, an accomplished economist, in 
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their homes; both were ardent nationalists.166  Antonescu and Sima were seen together in public 
for the last time four days later at the official reburial of the slain Legionary leader Codreanu.   
As the Legionaries ran amok, Antonescu focused on foreign policy and building a close 
relationship with Hitler to prepare to restore România Mare.  He told Pantazi, “I was brought to 
power following the destruction of the borders, my mission is to rebuild the country’s borders,” 
and he believed that there was no way to do it without the support of Nazi Germany. 167  The fall 
of France convinced Antonescu Nazi Germany would dominate Europe for the foreseeable future 
and was the only counterbalance to the USSR.  He was not along.  The events of 1940 convinced 
almost all Romanians that they needed Nazi Germany.  The king asked for an alliance, territorial 
guarantee of Romania’s borders against the Soviet Union, and a German Military Mission, but 
Berlin waited until after the Second Vienna Award to agree and made an alliance conditional on 
accepting the loss of northern Transylvania.168  Carol II, the camarilla, and Carlist officers were 
willing, even bringing in a few Legionaries to prop up the king’s government, but popular anger 
against the royal dictatorship was too strong and the Legionaries demanded too much power.169  
The camarilla pushed the king to enlist Antonescu.  The Germans sounded out Antonescu about 
accepting the Second Vienna Award in exchange for an alliance and a German Military Mission 
before the king brought him to power.170  After Antonescu forced out Carol II, his reputation and 
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Legionary support allowed him to quickly convince the public to support an alliance with Nazi 
Germany because they knew he would fight to restore România Mare. 
Antonescu quickly asked for a German military mission be sent to Romania to show the 
alliance was protecting the nation from “Judeo-Bolshevism” and merited tolerating the Second 
Vienna Award until it was destroyed.  Hitler sent four separate military missions: an umbrella 
German Military Mission, a German Army Mission, a German Air Force Mission, and a small 
German Navy Mission.  The benefit of these missions was twofold.  First, Antonescu trusted the 
mere presence of German soldiers would act as a deterrent to the Soviets and, second, German 
advisors would train Romanian officers and NCOs in new tactics and mobile warfare to use in 
future battles to redeem România Mare.  The first German units entered Romania on 12 October 
1940.  Initially just an infantry division, but reinforced in mid-December with a panzer division, 
totaling over 22,000 men.171  The began training Romanian troops in early 1941. 
The presence of German military formations in Romania was not met with the hostility 
expected by observers.  British journalist Clare Hollingworth attributed the lack of animosity to 
an apathetic population who “appear to be past feeling anything or caring about anything” due to 
a rapid series of disasters: territorial losses, abdication, and earthquake.172  It seems more likely 
that Romanians had come to agree with Antonescu and saw comfort in every piece of modern 
German military equipment (tank, airplane, gun, or truck) crossing the border and each fresh-
faced, confident German soldier they encountered.173  Additionally, soon after they arrived the 
Germans received favorable press due to an unexpected opportunity to provide humanitarian 
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assistance when an earthquake struck Romania on the night of 9/10 November and men of the 
German 13th Motorized Infantry Division joined in the rescue efforts in Bucharest.174  Of course 
there were a few whose anger over the loss of northern Transylvania ran deep, leading to insults 
and scuffles, and Romanians grumbled about inflation that came with Germans soldiers.  Forced 
civility and inflation seemed reasonable prices to pay for protection from the Soviets, even to the 
few ardent anti-Nazis.175  Romania’s signing of the Tripartite Pact on 23 November 1940, where 
Antonescu and Hitler met for the first time, cemented the alliance with Nazi Germany.   
The first signs in Romania of a coming war between Nazi Germany and the USSR began 
to appear in December 1940.  Todt Organization construction teams came to northern Moldavia 
to strengthen bridges to carry at least 25 tons.  Shortly after General Erik Hanson, commander of 
the German Military Mission, asked Antonescu that the Romanians undertake their own efforts 
to strengthen all bridges along major routes through the rest of Romania.  The General Staff did 
what it could to fulfill the German requests.  Hanson organized war games with the General Staff 
and other senior officers to exposed them to German tactics and operational doctrine.176  During 
the winter and spring of 1941 the Germans carried out significant training with the Romanian 5th, 
6th, 13th, 18th, and 20th Infantry Divisions.  The three so-called “model divisions,” the 5th, 6th, and 
13th Infantry, and the newly formed 1st Armored Division received the most attention.   
                                                 
174 German soldiers had been the first to arrive at the Carlton House, a downtown apartment building that he 
collapsed and helped alongside Legionaries and soldiers, see, Waldeck, Athene Palace, 273. 
175 The worst examples of Romanian “hatred” of the Germans at this time that one British journalist recorded were 
averted gazes and a thrown bottle, hardly serious, see, Easterman, King Carol, Hitler, and Lupescu, 217; these 
complaints about German soldiers causing inflation were not only legitimate but very perceptive of Romanian 
peasants, as German soldiers had enormous purchasing power that drove inflation across Europe, see, Götz Aly, 
Hitler’s Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare State (New York: Holt Paperback, 2006), 94-97, 
103-105; an April 1941 intelligence report recorded that, “Romanian intellectuals consider the presence of German 
troops as necessary, being convinced that in the current international situation, through them we can guarantee calm 
and the borders of the country, against the danger from the east, see, Fond MR: CM, dosar 56 bis, f. 13.   
176 Pantazi, Cu mareşalul până la moarte, 111-112.   
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Before Antonescu could take Romania to war he needed to reign in the Legion and secure 
the home front.  A second meeting between Hitler and Antonescu on 14 January 1941 convinced 
the Conducător that he had the Führer’s backing in his conflict with Sima and the Legion.177  An 
opportunity presented itself on 20 January when a German officer, a certain Major Döning, was 
assassinated in Bucharest by a Greek citizen – there is an unresolved mystery as to his motive or 
if he was a British agent.  Antonescu blamed General Petrovicescu for the murder, called him 
corrupt and incompetent, and removed him as co-Minister of Internal Affairs.178  Legionaries 
took to the streets spontaneously in support of Petrovicescu, protests spread to other cities across 
the country, but it became most violent and the stakes were highest in Bucharest.  An estimated 
3,000 Legionaries occupied police headquarters, seized the national radio station, and protested 
in the streets.179  From police headquarters Legionaries took pot-shots at the Ministry of External 
Affairs, where Antonescu had his office and the Council of Ministers met.  Alexandru Cretzianu, 
the diplomat had survived the fall of Carol II and found a post in the new government, visited the 
ministry that afternoon.  When he arrived the Conducător was explaining to aides that they had 
to remain on the defensive and wait for troops to arrive.  A staff officer took Cretzianu aside to 
tell him the situation was serious, and they were in a race against time.180  Six infantry regiments 
and a battalion of tanks soon arrived in central Bucharest, however, with orders to shoot anyone 
who failed to remain 550 yards away.181  Soldiers engaged in pitched battles with Legionaries 
holed up in buildings.  The fighting continued all night as the crackle of small arms and booms 
                                                 
177 Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 64.   
178 Solonari, Purifying the Nation, 134.   
179 Clark, Holy Legionary Youth, 230.   
180 Cretzianu, Relapse into Bondage, 227.   
181 Clark, Holy Legionary Youth, 231.   
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of tank fire echoed across the city.  In the morning when Cretzianu returned, he found a “more 
reassuring [sight] than the night before.  The Presidency had been transformed into a general 
headquarters.  A swarm of Staff officers, red-eyed and unshaven after a sleepless night, were 
pouring over large-scale maps of the city or speaking on the telephones.”182   
The Capital Military Command was so intent on clearing Bucharest of Legionaries it did 
not attempt to halt the atrocities committed by the rebels against the capital’s Jewish community 
during the rebellion – anti-Semitism assuredly influenced officers’ lack of concern.  Legionaries 
believed Antonescu’s moves against them were a “Judeo-Masonic plot” and targeted defenseless 
Jews.  They invaded two Jewish neighborhoods in Bucharest and arrested approximately 2,000 
Jews who they loaded onto trucks and transported to sites where they were beaten, tortured, and 
rape.  Additionally, 25 synagogues, 616 shops, and 547 homes were devastated.183  Legionaries 
also targeted non-Jews, especially communists.  Yet, even as Legionary violence peaked during 
21-22 January, the Capital Military Command never considered changing tactics and continued a 
methodical, slow clearing of Bucharest.  At the improvised army headquarters, Cretzianu heard 
telephones ringing endlessly and asked why these appeals for help coming in from across the city 
were ignored.  The Capital Military Command was not going to disperse its soldiers into small 
groups and risk being defeated in piecemeal fashion, he was told, instead the “proper thing to do” 
was “to have a strong concentration of troops, that seized the town by slowly spreading like an 
oil stain.”184  The Germans sat on the sidelines.  At one point a column of German tanks drove 
                                                 
182 Cretzianu, Relapse into Bondage, 229.   
183 Clark, Holy Legionary Youth, 231-232.   
184 Cretzianu, Relapse into Bondage, 229.   
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through the city as a show of support for Antonescu to try to convince the Legionaries to give up 
and negotiate with the army, but it did not play a major role in ending the rebellion.185   
The Capital Military Command finally cleared the last pockets of Legionary resistance in 
the early morning hours of 23 January after three days of fighting.  By that time many hundreds 
of Jews had been murdered in Bucharest, the official numbers reported only 118, but the Jewish 
Federation estimated that around 630 were killed and 400 more were missing.186  Legionaries did 
not kill as many in other cities.  The Romanian Army reported 21 killed and 53 wounded among 
the soldiers involved in the street battles with at least twice that number of Legionaries killed and 
hundreds more wounded in Bucharest – many more were killed and wounded across the country 
in other cities.187  The Antonescu regime arrested thousands more.  Despite concerns Legionary 
cells continued to function, the Legion had effectively been destroyed and most former members 
quickly accommodated themselves with Antonescu’s regime – some in high positions.188  A few 
irreconcilable Legionary leaders, including Sima, fled into exile in Nazi Germany.   
Conclusion 
 In the year between King Carol II’s ceremonial visit to Chişinău in January 1940 and the 
bloody suppression of the Legion by Antonescu in January 1941 had transformed Romania.  The 
fall of France and the Soviet ultimatum fell like twin blows on the Carlist regime.  The retreat 
from northern Bukovina and Bessarabia was a humiliation for the Romanian Army and triggered 
a wave of anti-Semitic violence initiated by angry Romanian soldiers in the ranks and halted by 
                                                 
185 Heinen, Legiunea “Arhanghelul Mihail,” 422-423; Waldeck, Athene Palace, 348-349. 
186 Solonari, Purifying the Nation, 135.   
187 Giurescu, Romania in the Second World War, 74-75; one British reporter estimated 2,000 killed (including Jews) 
in Bucharest and 11,000-12,000 in the rest of Romania, see, Hollingworth, There’s A German Just Behind Me, 184. 
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the General Staff.  The Second Vienna Award toppled the already teetering royal dictatorship of 
Carol II since his personal dictatorship placed the blame squarely on his shoulders for the loss of 
România Mare.  The loss of territory robbed the army of manpower that forced the General Staff 
to disband First and Second armies, only a shadow First Army of around five divisions guarded 
the western frontier against any Hungarian attack until August 1944.  The subsequent National-
Legionary State proved unsustainable, but Antonescu regime’s power struggle with the Legion 
did not signal an improvement in the situation of Romanian Jews.  In fact, his decision to prepare 
to join the coming war against the Soviet Union set the Romanian Army down a path to commit 
even greater anti-Semitic violence in eastern Romania than it had in early July 1940.  
 The bloody events in Bukovina, Bessarabia, and Moldavia reveal that the initiative for 
anti-Semitic violence came from the bottom-up instead of the top-down.  Army hierarchy and 
discipline still acted as brakes on the atrocities of Romanian soldiers against Jews in 1940.  A 
year later these brakes were removed by the Antonescu regime that first legitimized atrocities by 
soldiers and expanded by mid-ranking officer, and then increased the scale of mass murder even 
further when it ordered the deportation of Jews from Bukovina and Bessarabia.  It also extended 
atrocities to Romanian-occupied Transnistria and on the front in the Soviet Union.  The wave of 
atrocities in June-July 1940 highlights the importance of mid-ranking officers in the process of 
transforming soldiers’ popular anti-Semitic violence into systematic mass murder.  The character 
and decisions of individual colonels, majors, and captains significantly influenced the extent of 
atrocities – as the case of Major Carp makes clear.  While in 1940 several mid-level officers had 
taken the initiative to harness the intrinsic motivation of soldiers to organized systematic murder 
of Jews deemed suspicious, a year later senior officers would issue explicitly anti-Semitic orders 
that most mid-level officers enthusiastically carried out in eastern Romania.   
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 Wounded honor was a significant motivator for the Romanian Army, and not just in 
committing atrocities but also in combat.  The humiliation of the officer corps during the retreat 
from northern Bukovina and Bessarabia in 1940 left many officers eager to redeem themselves 
by covering themselves in martial glory in combat against the Red Army.  Similarly, soldiers 
were anxious to defend their country from the threat of “Judeo-Bolshevism” and deal a death 
blow to the Soviet Union alongside their new powerful ally the German Army.  These factors 
explain the motivation of the army in combat after 1941.  There is every indication that had King 
Carol II survived the backlash after the Soviet ultimatum, and Second Vienna Award, the nation 
would have supported the invasion of the USSR and the Carlist regime would have supplied the 
Wehrmacht troops it requested.  It is probable that soldiers would still have taken revenge against 
Jews they blamed for 1940 whether or not Antonescu or Carol II was Conducător. 
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CHAPTER VI  
1941: INVASION, LIBERATION, AND REVENGE 
 
“Soldiers, I order you: Cross the Prut!”  Every Romanian veteran remembers this laconic 
order from Antonescu, but it was actually part of a much longer grandiloquent proclamation of 
the invasion of the USSR on 22 June 1941 penned at General Headquarters.  While the rest of 
the proclamation was almost immediately forgotten, this short sentenced electrified the army.  
Soldiers noted it in their journals, propaganda repeated it ad nauseum, and it still resonates with 
veterans today because it expressed the desire for revenge for humiliation of 1940 that would be 
expunged by liberating eastern Romania.1  Romanian soldiers on the front volunteered to cross 
the Prut under fire, so that they might be the first to set foot on that “holy soil.”   
 In Bucharest people entered the streets to celebrate the “holy war.”  Mihai Antonescu, left 
behind to run the government while Antonescu was with General Headquarters, emerged with 
the king and other leaders to greet a cheering crowd at the royal palace.  All knelt in prayer for 
victory and cheering crowds followed him to the German and Italian legations.2  Alice Voinescu, 
a 56-year-old theater critic with liberal political views, recorded a more cynical account of the 
day.  She went to church after listening to the “bombastic” declaration of war, she did not see 
anyone kneeling in prayer on the street, her impression of the crowd at the palace was that it was 
small and anemic, and even thought Bessarabia might not be worth the sacrifice of a war.   
No matter how justified opportunism is in our case, [it’s in] vain!  This war is 
immoral.  We should only take what is ours.  God willing!  At the very least, [our 
                                                 
1 For whole proclamation, see, Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 629, f. 223; Major Scârnesci seemed to only have heard the 
beginning of the order, see, Scârneci, Viaţa şi moarte în linia întâi, 111; Alexandru Birou şi Constantin Iancu, Să te 
împaci cu…tine (Constanţa: Editura “Nelinişti metafizice,” 2009), 21. 
2 Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 82-83. 
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soldiers ought] to wash away the shame of being brothers with [Nazi] bandits, by 
a soldierly behavior beyond reproach, to rediscover our virtue…!3  
 
Voinescu was one of the few who questioned the war and her hope that Romanian soldiers would 
be disciplined and virtuous was soon dashed by news from the front of mass atrocities.   
 This chapter charts the period preceding Operation Barbarossa, initial invasion, liberation 
of eastern Romania, and operations east of the Dniester including the battle for Odessa.  It argues 
that while the Antonescu regime anticipated a German-Soviet war sometime in the near future, 
the Romanian Army was remarkably uninformed of exactly when it would occur and so its plans 
for the liberation of northern Bukovina and Bessarabia were thrown together at the last minute.  
This included decisions on how to treat Jews and communists in eastern Romania.  The evidence 
indicates that anti-Semitic polices were primarily improvised at the last minute and that much of 
violence against Jews was initiated by soldiers, junior officers, or mid-ranking officers, although 
it was soon endorsed by the General Headquarters.  The myth of “Jewish-Communist” treachery 
during the retreat in 1940 triggered a “franc-tireur” mania in the ranks in 1941.  Troops searched 
for civilians, usually Jews but also local Russians, Ukrainians, and Romanian collaborators, who 
they accused of new attacks on the Romanian Army and murdered innocent men, women, and 
even children in reprisal.  General Headquarters reinforced the franc-tireur mania based on the 
myth of “Jewish-Communist” fifth columnists by issuing orders that legitimated soldiers’ anti-
Semitic hysteria and approved summary execution of alleged franc-tireurs – east of the Prut.  
Romanian soldiers were also influenced by SS troops following in the rear who found Romanian 
officers, NCOs, and soldiers to be more than willing executioners.   
                                                 
3 Alice Voinescu, Jurnal, Vol. I (Bucharest: Polirom, 2013), 302.   
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As the anti-Semitic violence ebbed and flowed with military operations the narrative is 
designed to demonstrate how combat and atrocity were interrelated.  Such an approach has not 
been taken before as Romanian military historians have blinders on against the Holocaust when 
writing about the campaign and Holocaust historians focus on atrocities and victims.  The Iaşi 
pogrom takes center stage in histories of the war due to the number of victims and location west 
of the Prut in Moldavia, rather than to the east in territories annexed by the USSR after the war. 
At the time the Romanian Army tried to shift blame to the Germans or Legionaries.  Antonescu 
and General Headquarters blamed undisciplined soldiers and reserve officers, but he ordered an 
investigation later that held Legionaries and Germans responsible.  In the war crimes trials after 
the war, Antonescu was accused of orchestrating the Iaşi pogrom.  For decades under Ceauşescu 
communist nationalist historians minimized it and shifted blame to the Germans and a few evil 
Legionaries.4  This narrative remains popular after 1989.  Beginning in the 1980s, Jean Ancel 
began pushing an intentionalist interpretation of the Iaşi pogrom that argued it was premeditated 
and ordered by Antonescu, but recent scholars like Vladimir Solonari have begun to question this 
version of events.5  This chapter argues that the Iaşi pogrom was spontaneous, not planned, and 
caused by a combination of factors that were fostered unintentionally by the Romanian Army. 
General Headquarters condemned the breakdown in discipline and public order west of 
the Prut and prevented more pogroms in Moldavia, but its reaction to atrocities east of the Prut 
was very different.  Near the front, the General Headquarters tolerated and even encouraged 
massacres in eastern Romania and explicated ordered reprisals in Odessa while in Bucharest the 
                                                 
4 Aurel Kareţki şi Maria Covaci, Zile Însângerate la Iaşi (28-30 iunie 1941) (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1978).  
5 He briefly addresses the pogrom and Ancel’s problematic arguments, see, Solonari, Purifying the Nation, 164-167. 
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Antonescu regime in Bucharest organized the mass deportation of Jews from eastern Romania to 
Transnistria.  Since other historians have focused on the decision making at the top in Bucharest 
and deportations of Jews carried out by gendarmes of the Ministry of the Interior they will not be 
covered in detail.  This chapters focuses on officers and soldiers on the front who had little say in 
the decision of the Council of Ministers in Bucharest to “cleanse the terrain,” but still played an 
important role in shaping the Holocaust in Romania due to intrinsic motivation.   
Preparations for War 
 After seizing power, the Antonescu regime prepared for war, but not for Nazi Germany’s 
war against the USSR.  Antonescu did not know about Hitler’s December 1940 decision ordering 
German High Command to begin planning an invasion of the Soviet Union, initially set for May 
1941, because it was kept a strict secret.6  Additionally, German High Command did not initially 
plan on needing Romanian Army support.  The small size of the German Military Mission when 
it arrived in December 1940 did not suggest imminent war and only a handful of divisions joined 
it before April 1941.  Instead, the General Staff planned for a defense of Moldavia in case of new 
Soviet aggression.  The Antonescu regime’s challenging first winter made even this difficult.   
 The territorial losses of 1940 wreaked havoc with the economy and exacerbated shortages 
that hindered the Romanian Army.7  The General Staff demobilized most soldiers in October, but 
those remaining showed signs of discontent after nearly a year in uniform.  The unusually harsh 
winter increased concerns about families and in December there was a spike of soldiers absent 
without leave and protests, such as in Fourth Army where a few soldiers refused to eat at meals 
                                                 
6 For details on Hitler’s decision, see, Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich at War (New York: Penguin, 2008), 160-
162. 
7 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 403, f. 222; especially in cities cut off from usual markets, see, Ciucă, Stenogramele 
şedinţelor consiliului de miniştri guvernarea Ion Antonescu, Vol. III, 490. 
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because “they have been concentrated too long and their families were dying of hunger” and the 
58th Pioneer Battalion refused to board a train when it did not get Christmas leave.8  The isolated 
protests were quashed, but financial aid to soldiers’ families was also increased.  The Legionary 
rebellion was a bigger threat, but its failure to attract popular support made Antonescu confident 
the officer corps, social elite, and peasantry supported him.  On 27 January 1941, he replaced the 
Legionary ministers with generals who supported his goals of reforming the state and restoring 
România Mare.  General Constantin Voiculescu got just an hour’s notice to be sworn in with the 
other new ministers and later claimed that initially he was not actually sure what position he had 
been given, “How I came to be Minister of Labor, I don’t know!”  In July 1941 he accepted the 
assignment as military governor of Bessarabia in much the same way.9  Antonescu trusted these 
men not only because as officers they followed orders, but also because they shared his political 
beliefs.  The selection of these men later had important ramifications during the Holocaust.  
During February-March 1941, approximately 500,000 soldiers of German Twelfth Army 
traversed Romania to cross the Danube to stage in Bulgaria for an attack on Greece and created a 
new challenge.  Wherever they went some German soldiers inevitably got drunk, got into fights, 
drove recklessly, and even assisted local ethnic Germans in evading the draft.  These incidents 
kept the German Military Mission and General Staff busy smoothing over resulting tensions.10  
Additionally, cash-flush Germans bought up large amounts of goods to send home, exacerbating 
inflation and shortages and creating some resentment. At the same time, however, Romanians 
                                                 
8 The army arrested 12 NCOs identified as the ringleaders of the strike, stripped them of their rank, and sentenced 
them to three-five years in prison, see, Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 403, f. 26; dosar 573, f. 49.   
9 USHMM, RG-25.003M, Selected Records from the Romanian Ministry of Defense, 1940-1944, Fond Ministerul 
de Război: Cabinet, dosar 293, c. 121A-122A.  
10 German troops were protected from prosecution by local law, see, DiNardo, Germany and the Axis Power, 99. 
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profited a great deal from the brisk trade.  When German Eleventh Army arrived in May Third 
Army ordered towns and cities to form “citizen committees” to encourage friendly Axis relations 
by welcoming German units, visiting with German officers, and ministering to German sick.11 
 On 2-5 March 1941, Antonescu organized a plebiscite designed to show that the nation 
was behind him.  It consisted of a simple yes or no vote without a secret ballot with 2,960,298 in 
favor and 2,996 against, while it is easy to discount the accuracy of the 99 percent result in favor 
of the Antonescu regime, the fact that voters turned out in numbers equal to an interwar election 
and not protesting by staying home suggests Romanians overwhelmingly supported the alliance 
with Nazi Germany.12  The fate of Yugoslavia convinced any remaining doubters.  After a coup 
by Serbian officers toppled the pro-Axis government, German High Command planned and then 
invaded Yugoslavia, defeating and occupying it during 6-17 April, all without Romanian support 
because it wanted to conserve Antonescu’s forces for Operation Barbarossa.13  The breakup of 
Yugoslavia, with Italy, Bulgaria, and Hungary annexing slices, discouraged Carlist officers from 
considering a coup against Antonescu.  On 28 April 1941, the new Minister of Defense General 
Iosif Iacobici declared, “The recent events in Yugoslavia demonstrate to us what misfortune can 
be produced if the army conducts its own politics.  The army… must follow the path prescribed 
by the government…From now on officers who manifest in any way against comrades from the 
German Army, will be considered practicing politics and will be removed.”14  These were mostly 
wasted words because most Carlist officers already supported the alliance with Nazi Germany.   
                                                 
11 Some local elites, angry about Transylvania, had ignored the Germans, see, Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 305, f. 157. 
12 Giurescu, Romania in the Second World War, 94; Pantazi, Cu mareşalul până la moarte, 127.  
13 Moreover, the majority of the army was still demobilized and unready for combat, see, Pantazi, Cu mareşalul 
până la moarte,, 124; the German High Command also discounted the Romanian Army’s ability to participate in the 
rapid mobile operations envisioned against Yugoslavia, see, Chirnoaga, Istoria politică şi militară, 167.  
14 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 305, 99.  
 255 
 
 The long, harsh winter delayed the start of training until April.  Romanian officers did not 
know war was rapidly approaching, now planned for June, and German advisors were too few to 
re-train the whole army.  Yet even had Romanian officers known or had more German advisors, 
deficiencies in training and professionalism were rooted in social factors unable to overcome in a 
few short months, or even years.  While German advisors helped to train some officers, NCOs, 
and soldiers, most Romanian officers focused on whipping (often literally) the new contingent of 
draftees into shape and concentrated on close-order drill, so soldiers would march handsomely in 
the annual national day parades on 10 May.  On 14 May 1941, General Alexandru Ioaniţiu, 
recently promoted Chief of the General Staff, wrote a scathing report on the state of training after 
two years of European war.  He dismissed excuses claiming the events of 1940 derailed training, 
he blamed officers for failing to prioritize it and squandering what little they did by focusing on 
drill.  He ordered drill limited, practical training increased, and greater focus on offensive tactics. 
Recent events had proven “that only through offensive and movement can victory be obtained.”15  
He ignored another factor affecting training, using soldiers as free labor.  The Antonescu regime 
prioritized agriculture over training that spring, granting prefects the right to use soldiers, horses, 
and carts to help with the planting, so there would be a bountiful harvest.  It affected even elite 
units; mountain troops plowed fields or transported seeds and up to 30 percent of cavalrymen did 
not return from leave to train as they had been diverted to labor in the fields.16   
The transfer of German Eleventh Army to northern Moldavia in May alerted Antonescu 
that something was afoot.  General Eugen von Schobert arrived in Piatra Neamţ on 24 May to 
                                                 
15 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 370, f. 92-96.  
16 Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 374, f. 11, 18; Fond Corpul de Cavalerie, dosar 228, f. 240.   
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take command of the German divisions arriving on the Prut and met with Antonescu to discuss 
developments.  Within days the General Staff began ordering corps commanders to call up their 
reserves and fill out the units already mobilized and on 31 May, since the Conducător had gone 
already to Odobeşti (near Focşani) to set up General Headquarters in southern Moldavia, Mihai 
Antonescu led the first meeting of the Council of Ministers that discussed preparations for war.17  
Therefore, when Hitler summoned Antonescu for a meeting in Munich on 12 June he suspected 
they would discuss Romania’s participation in a coming German-Soviet war. 
The Conducător was the first Axis leader to be sounded out by the Fürhrer about the war 
with the Soviet Union.  On the record, the two discussed why war with the USSR was necessary.  
Antonescu came prepared and immediately offered to put all military, political, and social forces 
of Romania at Hitler’s disposal for “the great event that was approaching.”  Hitler then asked if 
the Romanians would join the Germans in the days after if war broke out and Antonescu replied 
that Romanians would insist on fighting from day one.  Hitler offered Antonescu command of an 
Axis army group, with General von Schobert its “German liaison,” to liberate eastern Romania.  
Hitler remained vague about the exact date of the start of the war and Antonescu argued that any 
delay threatened Axis chances of defeating the USSR.18  Off the record, they discussed the fate 
of Soviet Jews and communists.19  Hitler probably informed Antonescu of the Commissar Order, 
a plan to execute Soviet civil servants, Red Army political commissars, Jews in the Communist 
                                                 
17 Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 118, 69; Ciucă, Stenogramele şedinţelor consiliului de miniştri guvernarea Ion 
Antonescu, Vol. III, 554.    
18 Vasile Arimiae, Ion Ardelanu, Ştefan Lache, şi Florin Constantiniu, ed., Antonescu-Hitler: Corespondenţă şi 
întilniri inedite (1940-1944): Vol. I (Bucharest: Cozia Ed.-Co, 1991), 95, 103-104. 
19 What was said in this off the record meeting can be pieced together, see, Gerhard Weinberg, “Hitler and the 
Beginning of the Holocaust,” in Lessons and Legacies, Volume X, Back to the Sources, Reexamining Perpetrators, 
Victims, and Bystanders, ed. Sara R. Horowitz (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2012), 6, 11n4, 11n5. 
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Party, and all other “radical elements” captured during the invasion.  He also mused about Nazi 
plans to deport Soviet Jews east of the Urals after victory.20  This conversation influenced the 
Antonescu regime’s later decision to deport Jews from eastern Romania to Transnistria. 
 As the dictators debated the fate of Jews east of the Prut, the Romanian Army was taking 
measures against Jews to the west of the Prut.  Since May, senior officers put Jews under greater 
surveillance and ordered radios confiscated, but they pushed for more radical measures.  Third 
Army warned units in Bukovina on 12 July of possible communist fifth column activity in the 
rear and vaguely ordered units to take precautionary measures.  Commanders initiated various 
policies.  The 8th Infantry Division proposed immediately evacuating 20 “communists” from 
Ştefăneşti and then deporting all Jewish men 18-50 to camps in southwest Wallachia. The 
Mountain Corps restricted Jews from making phone calls, traveling, or working in telegraph or 
telephone exchanges.21  Officers, and soldiers, were convinced Jews could not be trusted. 
 On 18 June, Hitler finally informed Antonescu that Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of 
the USSR, would start four days later.  Hitler claimed he was forced to act to eliminate the threat 
of the Soviet Union, reaffirmed his promise that Antonescu would command an army group, and 
explained the “initial mission” of the Romanian Army: 1.) its primary goal was to defend against 
any Soviet attacks by air bombardment or airborne assault on the oil fields near Ploieşti and oil 
infrastructure, particularly the Cernavoda bridge over the Danube and the port at Contanţa,, but 
at the same time pin down Red Army forces by threatening an attack by seizing bridgeheads over 
                                                 
20 Hitler had not yet decided on the “Final Solution.”  It took months Operation Barbarossa began for Nazi leaders to 
decide to kill all Soviet Jews and more before Hitler approved plans to murder all Jews in Europe, see, Christopher 
Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of the Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942 
(Lincoln: University Press of Nebraska; Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2004), 424-428; Evans, The Third Reich at War, 
175-178, 221; Donald Bloxham, The Final Solution: A Genocide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 198. 
21 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 411, f. 17, 16.  
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the Prut; 2.) the Romanian Royal Air Force was also to prioritize defending the oil industry; 3.) 
once Army Group South advanced through Galicia, Army Group Antonescu would then attack to 
keep the Red Army from retreating across the Dniester.22   The General Staff furiously prepared 
for the deadline.  Romanian commanders received their first offensive operational plans – every 
plan since September 1939 had been for a defense – on 19 June.23  That same day civilians began 
to be evacuated from an area 3-4 km behind the border and all “suspect” Jewish men were to be 
evacuated under guard to be sent to Târgu Jiu internment camp in southwest Wallachia.24  It was 
expanded on 21 June to all Jewish men 18-60 in villages between the Siret and Prut; wives and 
children were also evacuated, but only to the nearest city.  Moldavian cities began to fill up with 
Jews, ironically increasing in the minds of generals the danger of Jewish uprisings in those cities.  
Pressure to deport all Jews from Bukovina had been building in the officer corps since August 
1940, when General Atanasescu, now fired from command of Cavalry Corps, argued that Jews 
were “a permanent danger” because they were in cahoots with Soviet agents and spies.25  The 
General Staff was anxious that the alleged Jewish perfidy of 1940 not be repeated. 
As the Romanian Army girded itself for war it also prepared to take revenge for 1940.  In 
a proclamation to Fourth Army, General Ciupercă crowed over the chance to erase the “shameful 
stain” of 1940, “I feel that the moment approaches to make [the Soviet Union] pay, dear soldiers.  
With the help of God, and our great ally [Nazi Germany], I have unshakeable faith that we will 
succeed in returning the borders of the Country to the Dniester…earth fattened with the marrow 
                                                 
22 Arimiae, Antonescu-Hiter, Vol. I, 107-109. 
23 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 875, f. 95.  
24 Fond Armata 3-a, dsoar 426, f. 66, 67; Fond Corpul de Cavalerie, dosar 361, f. 70, 66 
25 Ibid., dosar 90, f. 45.  
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of our ancestors.” [Underlined in original.]26  The SSI and army intelligence made lists of Jews, 
Ukrainians, Russians, and a few Romanians who “did evil” to Romanian soldiers, civil servants, 
and civilians during the Soviet occupation in 1940-1941 to be arrested.27  The Commissar Order 
may have been disseminated verbally to officers in Third Army.  In interrogations after the war, 
officers of the 7th Roşiori Regiment claimed that on 21 June its commander, Colonel Gheorghe 
Carp, held a conference in Botoşani in which he announced the invasion would begin the next 
day and explained, “a verbal order was given that when we cross the Prut we will exterminate 
Jews who mocked Romanian units during the evacuation of Bessarabia in 1940.”  While it’s 
tempting to take these statements at face value and point the finger of blame toward Antonescu, 
there is little evidence except these biased post-war testimonies of such verbal orders. 28  It’s 
more likely the orders originated with Carp (conveniently dead by the post-war interrogations) or 
the officers themselves.  Regardless, the officers claimed the meeting was secret and they did not 
inform their men of the verbal order until they crossed the Prut on 2 July, so whether or not there 
was such a verbal communication of the Commissar Order it did not go out to soldiers until the 
last minute.  It did not matter, however, because soldiers proved willing to carry it out and many 
also took the initiative because they were motivated to destroy “Judeo-Bolshevism.”  
Operation Barbarossa and the Iaşi Pogrom: 22 June to 1 July 
Romanian civilians living near the frontier had no need to wait for a radio announcement 
to know the war had begun, citizens in cities like Rădăuţi, Dorohoi, Iaşi, Galaţi, and Tuclea, were 
awoken by the sound of artillery fire and aircraft buzzing overhead.  There were no celebrations 
                                                 
26 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 629, f. 208.  
27 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 624, f. 17-20;  
28 Fond Documentar, dosar, 8178, f. 76; Ancel never found written orders and built his arguments on the assumption 
of verbal orders, rather than initiative from below, see, Ancel, The History of the Holocaust in Romania, 214, 219. 
 260 
 
like in Bucharest since they were within range of Soviet artillery.  Soviet bombers attacked cities 
too, soon including Bucharest and Ploieşti.  In many places in Moldavia, where Romanians had 
dreaded a Soviet invasion for the last year, the declaration of war and bombardments triggered a 
mixture of relief and fear.  For the first week and a half, Axis forces remained on the defensive, 
awaiting the arrival of Army Group South, during which time the Red Army tried to fight the 
war it was trained for – an immediate counterattack to take the war to the enemy’s soil.29 
Romanian-German forces limited their attacks to incursions to seize bridgeheads.  Army 
Group Antonescu resembled a backwards S: Third Army, now under General Petre Dumitrescu 
(formerly First Army commander), comprised of the Mountain Corps, facing north in Bukovina, 
and the Cavalry Corps, acting as a pivot with part facing north in Bukovina and the bulk facing 
east on the Prut; German Eleventh Army, commanded by General von Schobert, with German 
XI, XXX, LIV, and Romanian IV corps all facing east on the Prut down to Ungheni east of Iaşi; 
Fourth Army, still led by General Ciupercă, comprised of III, V, and XI corps, facing east on the 
lower Prut; and II Corps facing north on the Danube.  Gruparea Aeriană de Luptă (GAL), or the 
Air Combat Group, and Luftflotte 4 provided air defense for the army group.30  On 22 June Third 
Army began probing Soviet defenses in Bukovina, while German Eleventh and Fourth armies 
seized bridges and carried out combat crossings of the Prut with German pioneers aiding to ferry 
Romanian troops across due to a shortage of boats, and II Corps engaged in artillery duels on the 
Danube.  German Eleventh Army created bridgeheads at Bădărei, Sculeni, Stânca, Lingurari, and 
Ţuţora; and Fourth Army at Albiţa, Fălciu, Bogdăneşti, Rânzeşti, and Cotu Morii.31  The Soviets 
                                                 
29 Catherine Merridale, Ivan’s War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945 (New York: Picador, 2006), 24-26. 
30 DiNardo, Germany and the Axis Powers, 111.  
31 Barboi, Armata Română în Vâltoarea Războiului, 51.  
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counterattacked the small and vulnerable bridgeheads that were held by mere handfuls of troops 
and a Romanian platoon at Albiţa was immediately driven back across the Prut.   
As these small skirmishes seesawed back and forth, the Red Air Force began a strategic 
bombing campaign. While Ploieşti and Constanţa were key targets, Soviet aircraft from Odessa 
and Crimea also struck cities and towns across Moldavia to interdict Axis movements. 32  With 
Soviet airfields so close, citizens in Suceava, Botoşani, Iaşi, Vaslui, Bârlad, Galaţi, Brăila, and 
Sulina experienced an unending series of air raid alarms – both real and false – that quickly took 
a psychological toll.  Romanian air defenses were weak but had some early successes.  On the 
morning of 23 June, Lieutenant Hoira Agarici scrambled his Hurricane fighter at an airfield by 
Constanţa and shot down three bombers over the port – he soon became a national celebrity.33  
But even the best-organized defenses could not intercept every attack, and Romanian passive air 
defense was far from satisfactory: few (and substandard) air raid shelters, fewer radar stations, 
weak ground observation, and incomplete blackout.34  Moreover, Romanian active air defense, 
reinforced by German formations not under its control, concentrated its limited fighter squadrons 
and anti-aircraft batteries around Constanţa, Bucharest, and Ploieşti, exposing Moldavian cities.  
Prefects anticipating heavy civilian casualties ordered mass graves be dug, often using Jewish 
forced laborers.  The repeated air attacks spread panic and paranoia as rumors quickly spread that 
Jews were signaling the Soviet pilots with bolts of red cloth during the day or fires in chimneys 
at night, even that Jews who had emigrated from Moldavia to Bessarabia in 1940 were piloting 
                                                 
32 Bellamy, Absolute War, 177. 
33 Complete with a catchy tune that rhymed his name with the Romanian word for Bolsheviks [bolşevici].  “Agarici 
has gone to hunt bolşevici,” see, Benes, Rumanian Aces of World War 2, 15-16.  
34 Alexandru Armă, Bucureşti Sub Bombardamente (1941-1944) (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 2015), 17; Germans 
complained about incomplete blackout for months, see, Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 283, f. 94-95; dosar 314, f. 458. 
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the aircraft to drop bombs with deadly accuracy.35  Whenever cities were bombed at night reports 
flooded in of “red rockets” in the sky, allegedly fired from Jewish neighborhoods, for a simple 
reason.  The “red rockets” were tracers from anti-aircraft batteries, but civilians were convinced 
they were signals to pilots from Jewish fifth columnists to Soviet pilots.36  News and rumors of 
setbacks on the Prut did not reassure anxious civilians close behind the front.  
Soldiers were not immune to rumors, paranoia, or panic.  During the night of 22/23 June, 
the 3rd Călăraşi Regiment reported that civilians in Siret, a town in Bukovina near the front, were 
shooting at soldiers guarding a bridge, so the Cavalry Corps Praetoral Service sent Lt. Colonel 
Muşatescu.  He ordered police to search homes for shooters, investigated reports Ukrainian and 
Lipovan (Russian Old Believers) civilians were shooting at soldiers in other villages, arrested a 
lawyer hiding a Jewish family from evacuation, and oversaw the evacuation of civilians.  Luckily 
for Ukrainians and Lipovans, he concluded Red Army soldiers had fired the shots, so no one was 
executed.37  Most soldiers were so poorly trained and inexperienced that they were more amateur 
militia than professional soldiers, so they were easily spooked and confused when they were shot 
at (or thought that they were).  They often decided that they were being attacked by treacherous 
civilians: Ukrainians, Russians, Lipovans, and above all Jews.  General Headquarters kept up a 
constant flow of orders warning about saboteurs, spies, and parachutists, who allegedly received 
support from Jewish fifth columnists, which further confirmed soldiers’ fears. 
As the initial surprise of the Axis attack wore off, Red Army counterattacks intensified.  
German-Romanian troops had expanded the Sculeni bridgehead, but on 25 June the Red Army 
                                                 
35 Ancel, Prelude to Mass Murder, 75-76.   
36 Armata 4-a, dosar 781, f. 76, 78; CMC, dosar 269, f. 26, 118, 120, 121; Arma, Bucureşti Sub Bombardmente, 24. 
37 Fond Corpul Cavalerie, dosar 292, f. 413-414.  
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counterattacked and after the town changed hands four times the Germans ordered an evacuation.  
Similar counterattacks occurred elsewhere, one Romanian bridgehead was described as a tiny 
“nest of projectiles.”  On the Danube the Soviets managed land troops on the opposite bank after 
driving off the Romanian defenders with artillery fire.38  Civilians from Sculeni evacuated with 
the Axis troops and on 27 June Captain Ion Stihi ordered troops from the 6th Vânători Regiment, 
with the help of Christians from Sculeni, to separate Jews from among the refugees, forced them 
to dig a mass grave, and shot 311 for allegedly firing on soldiers or directing Soviet artillery fire. 
Among the dead were a few women and children.  This early massacre set the pattern of future 
violence.  Soldiers primarily targeted Jewish men, but often swept up women and children, as 
communist agents.39  Individual guilt was less important than the perception of collective Jewish 
responsibility for the Romanian losses suffered in combat against the Red Army. 
The news of the Sculeni defeat contributed to an outbreak of anti-Semitic violence in the 
nearby city of Iaşi initiated by soldiers that same day.  A year before, strong policing prevented a 
pogrom, but this time police had their authority undermined by the army, officers got swept up in 
the myth of “Jewish-Communist” fifth columnists, and after a quick buildup a spark of fear lit an 
explosion of violence.  Iaşi was one of the largest cities in Moldavia with over 100,000 people, a 
key rail hub, and close to the front, so it came under repeated attack.  On 24 June alone, the city 
experienced seven air raids, although many were false alarms, and was bombed again two days 
later causing more damage and killing around 200, including 38 Jews.40  A few with the means 
sought shelter in the countryside, but Jews were not allowed to leave, and most poor Romanians 
                                                 
38 Duţu, Armata română în război, 26-28; RG-25.003M, Reel 2, dosar 3751, c. 25, 76, 95-96.  
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remained.  People felt exposed and helpless, some blamed corrupt civil servants or incompetent 
officers for inadequate defenses, but most blamed “Jewish-Communists” for signaling Soviet 
pilots.41  The city had long been a den of LANC and Legionary activism.  The press contributed 
to growing anti-Semitic hysteria by publishing stories of Soviet agents and Jewish spies.  The 
Iaşi garrison commander ordered police and gendarmes to search Jewish homes who arrested 
500 (mostly male) Jews for having flashlights or red cloth, allegedly for signaling Soviet pilots, 
and took them to Police Headquarters to be interrogated – often beaten or tortured.42  The women 
were released quickly, but men were also released for insufficient evidence after refusing to 
confess to signaling Soviet aircraft.  This was frustrating to soldiers who were convinced of 
Jewish guilt and believed that the lack of evidence only meant that Jews were too clever to leave 
any for dimwitted (or possibly corrupt) officers to discover, so they began to take matters into 
their own hands.  Led by Sergeant Mircea Manoliu, incidentally a Legionary, men from the 13th 
Dorobanţi Regiment began shooting Jews after they were released and soon even before arriving 
at Police Headquarters.43  This was the beginning of popular anti-Semitic violence, soon joined 
by civilians, which spiraled out of control in Iaşi in the following days.  
 The commander of the Iaşi garrison, Colonel Constantin Lupu, was preparing to evacuate 
all Jewish men from the city at the same time.  That same day, also in response to the reversal at 
Sculeni, Antonescu called Lupu to order him to deport all Jewish men in Iaşi as soon as possible 
to the camp in Târgu Jiu in southwest Wallachia.  Iaşi was just 25 km from Sculeni and General 
Headquarters was worried because as early as July 1940 Fourth Army had predicted if war broke 
                                                 
41 Eaton, The Origins and Onset of the Romanian Holocaust, 75. 
42 Ioanid, Holocaust in Romania, 68.   
43 Sergeant Manoliu was investigated most thoroughly immediately afterwards and court martialed by the army, 
becoming the scapegoat for the pogrom due to his legionary past, see, Carp, Holocaust in Romania, 142.  
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out the army could expect “rebellious actions in Iaşi on the part of the Jews.”44  The army had 
already evacuated thousands of Jewish men from frontline villages successfully, trains arrived in 
Târgu Jiu with thirsty and hungry men, but not corpses.  It had never tried anything on this scale 
before, however, since close to half the population, or about 45,000, was Jewish.  Lupu was told 
to coordinate with an SSI team, municipal police, and CFR (state railroad) personnel, but soon 
events overtook Lupu and a half-finish plan was brutally implemented to deadly effect.   
In response to reports of gunfire on 27 June and looting under the cover of the blackout in 
the night during 27/28 June, the Iaşi Prefect ordered patrols in the city increased, but police soon 
discovered that they were nearly powerless to halt the growing chaos.  Around 10 am on 28 June, 
soldiers of 13th Dorobanţi and 24th Artillery regiments entered the Jewish Tătăraşi neighborhood 
(also known as the Abattoir Quarter due to its Jewish slaughterhouse) to search for hidden radio 
transmitters they were convinced Jews were using to signal Soviet bombers.  The search quickly 
turned into a pogrom as civilians joined soldiers in beating Jews and ransacking their property.  
When municipal police tried to intervene, Sergeant Manoliu called over a passing German patrol, 
as Iaşi was in German Eleventh Army’s sector, who he told his search for radios had failed only 
“because the police were protecting the Jews.”45  The Germans allowed the searches to continue 
and watched the Romanian abuses.  Nicolae Crăciun, a policeman, reported he found troops with 
rifles trained on families of Jews, many beaten and bleeding, and civilians egging on the soldiers.   
Every attempt we made to stop the action described above was fruitless, and I 
even put myself at risk by trying, since they might have shot me or lynched me, 
since the citizens were agitated against the police.  They screamed that [the 
police] belonged to the Jews and had been bribed by them.46 
 
                                                 
44 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 272, f. 55; Ancel, Prelude to Mass Murder, 26.  
45 Carp, Holocaust in Romania, 186. 
46 From a longer translated quote from Ancel, Prelude to Mass Murder, 90-91.   
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The police – who were not all so sympathetic towards the abused Jews – were intimidated by the 
mob and cowed by rebellious soldiers supported by the Germans, so they contacted Lupu and an 
army praetor came with gendarmes who halted the pogrom and placed Sergeant Manoliu under 
arrest for a short time before releasing him.47  Calm was temporarily restored to the city. 
 Order was breaking down not just because of anti-Semitism, but also due to institutional 
confusion.  There was a bewildering array of groups in Iaşi with overlapping duties: city police, 
gendarmes, local garrison troops, soldiers of the 14th Infantry Division, SSI agents, and German 
LIV Corps units.  Post-war prosecutors, and later Jean Ancel, argued that these men conspired to 
plan the pogrom on direct orders from Antonescu.48  In reality, there was no conspiracy, only 
anti-Semitic paranoia, groupthink, and confusion.  With the declaration of war, city police and 
gendarmes lost authority to the army, but were still tasked with maintaining order; 14th Infantry 
Division had most of its soldiers spread in the countryside defending the frontier, so in time of 
crisis had few soldiers available; the local garrison had no authority over German patrols in the 
city; and SSI agents had special authority over soldiers to root out communist threats.   
 The final spark occurred during the night of 28/29 June when at 9 pm an air raid alarm 
sounded.  Aircraft flew over the city, anti-aircraft guns opened fire (misidentified as “rockets”) 
and by 10 pm police were receiving reports from Romanian and German patrols that they were 
being shot at from rooftops by communist snipers.  The patrols shot back and searched Jewish 
homes, but never found any snipers.49  German patrols got swept up in the panic and reported 
                                                 
47 Carp, Holocaust in Romania, 148.  
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taking casualties to the Romanian military authorities.50  When two recently arrived Romanian 
infantry units began crossing the dark and unfamiliar city on their way to the front they added to 
the confusion, both reported being fired on, and by 3 am panicked troops in both columns were 
shooting up streets with all their weapons, including 53 mm cannon.  Soldiers grabbed Jews from 
buildings they believed that they had been fired on from and shot many on the spot.  An initial 
report recorded 300 dead and 50 wounded Jews that first night, but the army stopped counting as 
Iaşi descended into chaos over the next few days and Jews were murdered by the thousands.51    
 “That Sunday,” as locals later referred to 29 June, soldiers, gendarmes, civilians, and a 
few German soldiers began massacring the Jewish men of Iaşi, some women and children fell 
victim too.  As the day dawned, Romanian authorities were beginning to realize that despite all 
the gunfire during the night there were few casualties – discovering later not a single soldier was 
killed.  Soldiers and gendarmes pulled Jews into the streets, made easier because many families 
had gathered in improvised basement bomb shelters, anyone who resisted or was found with 
items deemed suspicious were shot on the spot.  Jewish men were sorted from women, children, 
and elderly.  Romanian and German soldiers organized “convoys” of Jews sent on to improvised 
collection points (local police stations; 13th Dorobanţi Regiment, SSI, or gendarme headquarters; 
a Jewish school; a gymnasium; the Jewish slaughterhouse) or directly to Police Headquarters to 
be interrogated, just as they had in days previously except on a mass scale.52  Anyone who fell 
behind or dropped their hands from over their head was shot.  Prison cells at Police Headquarters 
were already stuffed with Jews, so its courtyard was used as overflow.  Already at 9 am 1,000 
                                                 
50 It took until 5 July for the Romanians to confirm there were none, see, RG-25.004M, Reel 45, dosar 108233, vol. 
64, c. 80. 
51 RG-25.004M, Reel 13, dosar 2983, vol. 323, c. 886. 
52 Ancel, Prelude to Mass Murder, 143-144. 
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Jews had arrived, and by noon the number increased to 3,000-4,000.53  Civilians emboldened by 
the soldiers began to loot Jewish homes and businesses as disorder spread. 
Officers believed “Jewish-Communists” along “with very weak elements of Romanian 
communists” had sniped at soldiers to hinder troop movements and trigger a public panic.54  The 
Jewish uprising senior officers had anticipated for a year finally seemed to be happening.  While 
officers wanted to halt the pogrom, they contributed to the violence by their biased pusillanimity.  
General Gheorghe Stavrescu, commander of 14th Infantry Division and ranking Romanian army 
authority in Iaşi, visited the Police Headquarters several times on Sunday.  At 11 am he gave a 
speech to the Jews penned in the courtyard, guarded by machineguns, in which he admitted that 
not all Jews were guilty and promised to release women, children, and elderly, but warned that 
men would be interrogated and shot if found guilty.55  Many of the women, children, and elderly 
did not leave because they waited for the men to be released and they feared crossing what had 
quickly become a dangerous urban environment as mobs of civilians roamed the streets.  They 
encouraged soldiers to kill Jews, lead soldiers or gendarmes to Jewish neighbors, and gathered 
along routes taken by convoys to spit on, throw rocks or bottles at, beat with sticks or iron bars, 
and murder Jews.  These mobs consisted of Romanians of all walks of life, like the tax-collector 
who wrote a list of Jews in his building, armed himself with a pistol, and directed troops to arrest 
them.56  Those few who tried to shield Jews, including a few local police, were accused of being 
“sold to the Jews” and sometimes murdered, like an engineer shot by an officer shouting, “Die 
                                                 
53 Some witnesses after the war placed the number even higher at 5,000, see, Carp, Holocaust in Romania, 151.  
54 RG-25.004M, Reel 35, dosar 40010, vol. 89, c. 314.  
55 Carp, Holocaust in Romania, 152; Ancel, Prelude to Mass Murder, 167.   
56 Ancel, Prelude to Mass Murder, 136, 141. 
 269 
 
you dog, with the Jews you’re protecting.”57  German patrols participated in the roundup, sorting, 
and abusing Jews, but many just watched.  By 1 pm a few Germans from the Todt Organization 
gathered at the Police Headquarters to watch Romanian soldiers beat Jewish men to coerce them 
into confessing to being snipers.  The number of Jews in the courtyard had increased.  Although 
hundreds were released after interrogation and given a paper with the word liber (“free”) written 
on it, convoys continued to arrive and soldiers who did not recognize the liber slips brought Jews 
back.  News of the liber papers spread among Jews and a few, knowing they were innocent, went 
to collection points in the hope of obtaining a liber slip to be protected by it, but this scrape of 
paper could not protect them from the enraged mob.58  At 3 pm, air raid sirens wailed again, and 
panicked officers slammed shut the gates at the Police Headquarters courtyard before running for 
cover.  Inside, terrified Jews tried to escape to find shelter, the sheer press of humanity killed a 
few who were crushed underfoot or against fences, and some began to break out or jumped the 
fence.  Romanian guards fired into the crowd.  Machineguns and rifles killed hundreds instantly, 
then soldiers – joined by some Germans – condoned off the area to hunt down the Jews that had 
fled, and most were shot on the spot after being captured.59  Many more were left to die of their 
wounds.  Machinegun fire had scythed down most victims in a few minutes, the hunt continued 
for another hour, probably killing an estimated 1,000 Jews and terrorizing the survivors. 
After this bloody massacre, officers tried to restore order to Iaşi, but remained convinced 
that Jews presented a real threat.  General Stavrescu posted an order on the streets declaring that 
“enemy terrorists” had tried to “produce panic and disorder,” ordered a curfew between 7 pm and 
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5 am, required all firearms be turned in by 5 pm (or face being shot), demanded all civilians lock 
their doors to keep out strangers, threatened to execute everyone in buildings gunfire came from, 
and warned that 10 hostages taken from the “terrorist-communist movement” would be killed for 
each gunshot or wounded soldier.60  Near 5 pm, the Iaşi Prefect reported that he feared continued 
“grave disorders” in the city, blamed German patrols for being “stubborn” in rounding up Jews, 
and claimed Jewish snipers had not been found yet only because they were wily or well-hidden.61  
Stavrescu’s curfew was effective in clearing civilian mobs from the streets by 6 pm, but soldiers 
continued to search for snipers and murder Jews.  While Romanian and German patrols chased 
shadows, survivors at Police Headquarters, including a few women and children, were taken to 
the train station where they waited, until soldiers and CFR workers brutally crowded them into 
unventilated freight cars (120-150 in space for 40).  The first train was loaded with 2,500 Jews 
and left after midnight, the second was loaded with 1,900 Jews and left in the early hours of the 
morning, and both were directed south and west – towards Târgu Jiu.62  Near 11 pm, Stavrescu 
asked the German Army to withdraw their patrols from Iaşi, but reports indicate that not all of 
them left and disorders continued.  Third Army ordered that Colonel Lupu be replaced.63 
The Iaşi pogrom triggered a flurry of orders from General Headquarters that affected the 
fate of Jews in Moldavia.  Local officers tried to blame the Germans for breakdown in order, but 
General Ioaniţiu blamed panicked soldiers and incompetent officers.  On 30 June, he ordered that 
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patrols should not be led by reserve officers, soldiers should be kept close together, and soldiers 
only fire on clearly identified targets.64  His conclusion was not wrong, Romanian soldiers were 
badly trained and had terrible fire discipline, but it was incomplete.  Ioaniţiu ignored the effect 
that orders coming from General Headquarters had on troops, encouraging them to see “Jewish-
Communists” around every corner.  That same day, Ioaniţiu contributed to soldiers’ paranoia by 
announcing the Soviets were dropping spies and “terrorist agents” by parachute into Romania to 
provoke disorder, he claimed a Jewish baker from Moldavia who left for Bessarabia in 1940 had 
been parachuted into Iaşi and downed Soviet pilots had women’s clothes to disguise themselves. 
“All these enemy agents make contact with resident agents in the Country and with the Judeo-
Communist population and together organize acts of sabotage, terrorism, aggression, etc.”  To 
guard the rear, Ioaniţiu, citing Antonescu’s authority, ordered all cities in Moldavia to enforce a 
strict curfew between 6 pm and 7 am for Jews, each night all Jewish men would be gathered and 
placed under guard in a few large buildings in the Jewish neighborhood, and during the daytime 
hostages would be taken from among prominent Jews and communists to deter any attacks.65  An 
exception was in Constanţa.  On 26 June, a failed Soviet naval attack (probably to prepare for an 
amphibious landing) convinced officers to evacuate all Jewish men from the port city and seaside 
villages to camps in the countryside away from the coast.66  Fourth Army passed along Ioaniţiu’s 
order, warning that the “Jewish population is an accomplice in these actions [of enemy agents],” 
                                                 
64 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 481, f. 14.  
65 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 781, f. 17.   
66 A pair of destroyers were driven off, see, Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 331; RG-25.004M, Reel 14, dosar 
2986, vol. 5991, c. 716.  
 272 
 
and gave soldiers the authority to shoot suspects on the spot.67  Despite these orders, there were 
no further massacres of Jews in Moldavia because of an intervention by Antonescu. 
Antonescu never deviated from his conviction that Jews were a threat, but he signaled his 
displeasure with popular anti-Semitic violence – west of the Prut in Moldavia.  In a special order 
on 4 July, he began by attacking Jews for impoverishing Romania.  Next, he recalled the shame 
of 1940, but then reprimanded, “The shame is even greater when isolated soldiers on their own 
initiative, and many times only with the purpose to rob or maltreat, attack the Jewish population 
and randomly kill as was the case in Iaşi.”  Antonescu argued only the state could “legally” carry 
out anti-Semitic policies and bemoaned the chaos in Iaşi, saying it proved that Romanians were 
undisciplined and uncivilized.  He concluded by threatening soldiers with court martial if they 
continued to abuse Jews.68  The rhetoric of his order may appear surprising, but it was motivated 
by memories of 1907 mixed with the recent Legionary uprising.  Antonescu feared popular anti-
Semitic violence getting out of control, perhaps being used by Legionaries, and causing chaos in 
the rear in Moldavia that would impede military operations to liberate eastern Romania.     
Antonescu’s intervention came two days after order had been restored in Iaşi.  In the days 
after “that Sunday,” soldiers and civilians killed hundreds more Jews, especially on 30 June after 
an air raid alarm in the middle of the night again heightened tensions and rumors swirled that the 
Soviets had dropped parachutists into Iaşi.  Workers at the trolley car factory and power station 
killed dozens, if not hundreds, of their Jewish co-workers who showed up for work on Monday.69  
At 1:30 pm, a group of soldiers patrolling in the city who believed they had been fired at from an 
                                                 
67 RG-25.004M, Reel 35, dosar 40010, vol. 89, c. 305. 
68 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 325, f. 12.   
69 The workers stonewalled post-war investigators on details, see, Ancel, Prelude to Mass Murder, 141-142. 
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apartment above a Jewish-owned pharmacy, followed General Stravescu’s order, grabbed all the 
people inside, and used an armored car to machinegun 18 men, women, and children.70  Isolated 
shot continued to be heard in Iaşi for several more days.  Concurrently, hundreds of Jews in the 
two “death trains” died of hunger, thirst, and exhaustion as they both slowly meandered through 
the countryside, often sitting for hours while military trains were given priority, for day after day. 
Approximately 1,200 died on the first train before being unloaded a Podul Iloaei and 650 died on 
the second train before being unloaded at Târgu Frumos.71  Many more on the trains died before 
they reached their final destinations or shortly after being unloaded.  The total number killed in 
Iaşi during 26 June-2 July and on the two “death trains” was around 13,000 innocent Jews.72   
The Iaşi pogrom and “death trains” demonstrated what awaited Jews in the Old Kingdom 
had Germany won the war in 1941, but fortunately they remained an exception west of the Prut.  
The authorities took steps to prevent “rebellions by the Jewish population” by increasing patrols, 
assigning police to patrols to keep them in line, and ordering stricter fire discipline.73  Resulting 
from Antonescu’s demand for order, these orders ironically protected Jews west of the Prut from 
pogroms.  The Antonescu regime continued other anti-Semitic policies.  Gendarmes evacuated 
Jews from villages to cities and sent suspected Jewish men to internment camps.74  By the end of 
August, approximately 7,000 Jews from Moldavia, including 1,100 “death train” survivors, and 
Bukovina, mostly from in or around Dorohoi, were held in seven camps in western and southern 
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Wallachia.  Most of them were men, but hundreds of women and children who had survived the 
“death trains” or deported form Dorohoi were interned as well.  In the next few weeks, all of the 
Jews were transported back to cities in Moldavia and Bukovina – except for 1,000 actual leftist 
or communist Jews who remained interned in Târgu Jiu.75  The situation of Jews west of the Prut 
faced remained difficult and many had to perform forced labor under the direction of the General 
Staff, but east of the Prut soldiers carried out mass atrocities against Romanian and Soviet Jews.  
Antonescu not only tolerated them, but eventually escalated the violence east of the Prut.     
Operation München and Cleansing the Terrain: 2 July-26 July 
 As order broke down in Iaşi, Army Group Antonescu was preparing to launch Operation 
München.  On 20 June, Romanian-German command issued an order with two offensive options: 
Operation München, an attack against defenses on the Prut if the Red Army stood its ground; and 
Operation Nachstoss, a vigorous pursuit to harry the Red Army before it could cross the Dniester 
in case it retreated immediately due to pressure from Army Group South.76  The forces available, 
an estimated 326,000 Romanians and 135,000 Germans, were manifestly unsuited for a pursuit.  
German Eleventh Army had almost no panzers and few motorized units.  General von Schobert 
had to rely on Third Army’s three motorized cavalry regiments and single armored division for 
mobile operations, these were poor substitutes for panzer divisions, but performed well-enough 
during the liberation of eastern Romania.  Army Group Antonescu had mixed success, at best, in 
fulfilling its operational mission but succeeded in liberating northern Bukovina in two weeks and 
Bessarabia by the end of July.  The liberation of eastern Romania, however, was marred by anti-
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Semitic violence initiated by poorly-trained soldiers who saw Jews as threats or took revenge for 
1940.  Officers channeled soldiers’ intrinsic motivation to “cleanse the terrain” of Jews.    
Operation München was delayed due to unexpectedly strong resistance, but by 1 July the 
Soviet counterattack was spent allowing Axis forces to attack.  In the event, the offensive was a 
mixture of Nachstoss in Bukovina and München in Bessarabia.77  Third Army would carry out a 
short left hook through northern Bukovina with the Mountain Corps, cross the Prut around 
Cernăuţi, harry Soviet forces retreating to the Dniester aided by a cavalry brigade, and then link 
up with Army Group South.  German Eleventh Army would attack Soviet defenses in northern 
Bessarabia, break through, and drive east with the support of most of the Cavalry Corps and 1st 
Armored Division towards Moghilev (Mohyliv-Podilskyi) on the Dniester.  Fourth Army would 
mark time further south, carry out demonstration attacks on the Prut until 5 July, then attack east 
into central Bessarabia aiming for Tighina (Bender) on the Dniester, and liberate Chişinău on the 
way.  II Corps would only cross the Danube to clear southern Bessarabia and retake Cetatea Albă 
after Fourth Army’s offensive succeeded.  Operation München would liberate northern Bukovina 
and Bessarabia north to south much like the child’s toy Jacob’s ladder.   
 Third Army’s pursuit in northern Bukovina had difficulty keeping up with the Red Army 
retreat because the Mountain Corps was limited by the speed of man and horse and also because 
its soldiers stopped to pillage Jewish and Ukrainian villages.  After a tour of the front on 4 July, 
Antonescu complained that units were not taking security measures, allowed columns and wagon 
trains to bunch up, thus slowing the march and presenting easy targets for air attack, carried out 
costly frontal attacks, and were delayed by “Jewish or Ukrainian snipers (francs-tireurs).”  Since 
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29 June he had also accused Soviet soldiers of using “deception methods” such as: shooting from 
trees, waiting to fire until Romanian soldiers came very close, using agents allegedly dressed in 
German or Romanian uniforms in the rear, and receiving aid from civilians.  The very same day 
Antonescu condemned the Iaşi pogrom, he ordered summary execution of francs-tireurs.78   
The precipitous Soviet retreat from northern Bukovina, and after an Axis breakthrough 
from northern Bessarabia, meant that Romanian and German soldiers were greeted in villages by 
joyful peasants.  Local bucovineni and basarabeni were particularly relieved because the Soviets 
had begun deporting Romanians to the Soviet far east.  Ukrainians were also excited to see Axis 
troops, although Romanian soldiers treated them roughly and a few fights broke out with armed 
Ukrainian nationalists.  Jews stayed inside or fled east – Romanians saw either action as proof of 
guilt for 1940.79  The initial celebratory atmosphere in liberated villages or towns soon dissipated 
as troops began looting, raping, and murdering.  Lieutenant Nicolae Dan, a reserve officer in 3rd 
Mountain Artillery Regiment, recalled that upon entering Adâncata (Hlyboka), just 10 km across 
the border, gunfire was heard, and soldiers began yelling about Jewish snipers, scattering down 
side streets, and breaking into homes lookng for Jews.  “The troops were inflamed with a kind of 
madness and only very few soldiers remained calm.”  While some were shot immediately, many 
were seized to be interrogated, sorted, and then shot.  Dan took pity on a woman and her six-year 
child, ordering a corporal to let them go, and he was soon stuck with six more.  He tried to keep 
them out of view, but a group under a major arrived, ordered all eight turned over, and took the 
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Jews to a courtyard being used for executions after expedited interrogations.  Dan followed, but 
could not stand to watch, so another officer accused him of being a Jew and threatened him.80   
The reports of Jewish snipers were accepted by most commanders who then sanctioned 
reprisals.  After 1st Mountain Brigade entered Ciudei, General Lascăr ordered “the most energic 
measures” against Jewish snipers and 300-400 Jews in the town were murdered, finishing what 
Major Valeriu Carp began the year before.81  The traditional dress of Jews in shtetls, especially 
men, aided soldiers in identifying them, but help from local Ukrainians or Romanians to point 
out Jews and communist collaborators was even more important.  In places, soldiers arrived to 
discover that Romanian or Ukrainian villagers had already begun pogroms or gathered Jews to 
be murdered.  When the Red Army decided to defend a town, Romanian troops pushed forward 
recklessly, often without clearing nearby Soviet positions, and suffered casualties.  They blamed 
Jews (or Ukrainians) for allegedly directing Soviet artillery fire, and butchered Jews in revenge.  
2nd Lieutenant Ignat Timaru boasted of dodging “kike bullets” in the town of Storojineţ, picking 
his way along streets strewn with bodies of “francs-tireurs,” corpses Antonescu and Ioaniţiu must 
have seen when they inspected the newly captured town on 4 July.82  To speed up the advance, 
Antonescu ordered commanders to avoid towns filled with “malevolent foreigners.” 83     
Despite being slowed by Soviet rearguards and pogroms, the Mountain Corps reached the 
Prut on 5 July. General Avramescu spent the day “crossing all over” the Mountain Corps’ rear as 
he investigated an unending series of reports claiming that columns were coming under attack by 
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franc-tireurs.  In every case there were no snipers and all gunfire was “only from panic-stricken 
soldiers,” so he ordered that soldiers should not fire unless expressly ordered to by an officer.84  
Nevertheless, the first mountain troops entering Cernăuţi claimed they had been fired on from 
the Jewish cemetery and in following days the city was subject to successive waves of violence 
even as Avramescu’s forces pressed on towards the Dniester.85  The 8th Cavalry Brigade joined 
in the advance and arrived outside Hotin on 8 July. Third Army was still clearing the area when 
it received orders to prepare an assault across the river into Ukraine.86 
 The offensive into Bessarabia was not so easy because the Red Army put up a fight, but 
German Eleventh Army quickly penetrated Soviet defenses in northern Bessarabia and General 
von Schobert requested Fourth Army move up its attack to 4 July.  General Racoviţă’s Cavalry 
Corps prosecuted an especially violent advance as the three motorized regiments created ad-hoc 
“execution teams” to murder Jews.  Captain Leon Ostrovschi, who had attended Colonel Carp’s 
briefing with the officers of 7th Roşiori Regiment, gave a speech to his soldiers after crossing the 
Prut.  He declared it was time to take revenge, asking for “worthy, courageous, and determined 
men who will not give up for anything.  To kill without mercy from babes in swaddling clothes 
to [old men with] white beards.”  Only nine volunteered, annoying Ostrovschi, who chose seven 
more to join the team, but those who self-selected proved highly motivated and consistently left 
the column during the advance to murder Jews in groups of 5-50.87  Killing Jewish women and 
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children initially shocked many Romanian soldiers, but killing Jewish men was less traumatic as 
troops were convinced they were a threat.  The cavalrymen gathered Jews, village leaders, and 
anyone else locals pointed out as pro-Soviet traitors to be interrogated and executed.  Those who 
wanted could easily find ways to get out of the assignment.  During 4-6 July, successive cavalry 
units passed through Edineţ and each day the number of bodies in the streets multiplied.  Troops 
gathered 3,000 Jews into the courtyard of a school and another 400 into a small house.  Alcohol 
flowed freely, contributing to the crimes, as one soldier later laconically summarized, “in Ediniţ 
[sic] they drank a good wine, shot Jews, and raped women.”88  Racoviţa was pleased to report 
Ukrainian and Romanian civilians reacted “very violently” against Jewish neighbors, declared 
Jews were “a second and even more dangerous enemy” than the Red Army, advocated sending 
remaining Jews to concentration or labor camps “way in the interior of the country” in southwest 
Wallachia, and concluded that Jews were “frightened” by the brutality.  He argued, however, that 
brutality was needed to “annihilate” Soviet propaganda.89  Racoviţa’s sentiments were far from 
unique and the officer corps became convinced that such pitilessness was part of its duty. 
German Eleventh Army was soon battling for cities that had to be cleared street by street. 
When German XXX Corps entered the city of Bălţi on 7 July, Axis troops reported battles “with 
armed bands” as German and Romanian troops cleared the city, but a Soviet counterattack with 
tanks forced them to retreat temporarily until the Bălţi fell for good on 10 July.90  Cities were 
threatening places to peasant soldiers used to life in small villages: large, unfamiliar, and filled 
with smoke and fire.  Soldiers saw danger around every corner.  They also blamed Jews for all of 
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the destruction in cities because they allegedly started fires as part of the Soviets’ scorched-earth 
policy, but strangely Jewish neighborhoods usually suffered the worst from flames.  After Bălţi 
fell, Romanian soldiers gathered 400 Jews, both men and women, but after hours of sorting only 
15 men of military age were executed.91  Romanians did not murder Jews in the cities of eastern 
Romania alone, German soldiers participated and were soon joined by SS troops. 
 Einsatzgruppe D operated throughout eastern Romania in July and August, particularly in 
large towns and cities.  Heinrich Himmler ordered the creation of these special units, staffed with 
SS security forces, and tasked with pacifying the German Army’s rear by the selective murder of 
political enemies.  Each Einsatzgruppe (A, B, C, D) had about 900 men assigned to army groups 
North, Center, South, and Antonescu; Einsatzgruppe D was established later than the others.  
The German Army ceded authority over rear area security and promised to provide support to the 
SS.  Himmler ordered wherever they went Einsatzgruppen should encourage “without leaving a 
trace” local anti-communists and anti-Semites to carry out “self-cleansing efforts” of Jews and 
communists.92  Einsatzgruppe D arrived in Romania and set up its headquarters in Piatra Neamţ 
next to German Eleventh Army headquarters on 4-5 July.93  Antonescu’s General Headquarters 
moved to Roman, an hour or so away, to better coordinate with the Germans.  Einsatzgruppe D 
soon had a Vorkommando operating east of the Prut that reported, “Good cooperation with the 
Romanian Army.”94  The SS were a malevolent force, but Romanian officers and soldiers did not 
need to be pushed to murder Jews or communists.  Instead, they focused on teaching Romanians 
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on how to “properly” sort Jews and communists from suspects gathered by frontline troops and 
to create ghettos like in Poland.  This established a precedent for future collaboration in Ukraine.   
 Einsatzgruppe D received support from and influenced the policies of the SSI.  The secret 
police organized an Eşalon Operativ, or Operational Echelon, a small group of 100-160 men sent 
to the front to aid army intelligence, known as Section II, in gathering information on the enemy, 
reporting on the morale of soldiers and civilians, and securing the army’s rear from communists, 
saboteurs, and terrorists.95  These men were not fascists, indeed many had tracked, arrested, and 
even executed Legionaries for over a decade, but they did hate “Judeo-Bolshevism” and adopted 
SS policies, including “self-cleansing efforts.”  The SSI informed Fourth Army Section II on 11 
July that it was recruiting agents to send ahead of the army to create “an unfavorable atmosphere 
for Judaic elements” in villages by a whisper campaign, so when soldiers arrived locals would 
help point out Jews, communists, and other threats.96  Considering difficulties in recruiting and 
how quickly eastern Romania was overrun it seems unlikely these efforts made much difference.  
Moreover, they were superfluous because basarabeni did not need to be prompted to collaborate 
with the army; Diana Dumitru shows that Romanian and Ukrainian civilians often attacked Jews 
before the army even arrived, very much like the infamous case of Jedwabne in eastern Poland.97  
SSI agents acted as liaisons for Einsatzgruppe D to ease collaboration with army officers.  
 When a city fell one of the four Einsatzkommandos (10a, 10b, 11a, or 11b) rushed to try 
to direct repressive measures, but they usually arrived after Romanian soldiers and gendarmes 
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had already begun to “cleanse the terrain.”  This phrase was army jargon for clearing an area of 
enemy combatants, but it took on a more sinister meaning during the war.  While turning a blind 
eye to German looting, the SS complained they often arrived to find Romanian troops looting or 
randomly rounding up Jews and communists.  The SS depict themselves as bringing order to this 
choas, but these reports need to be treated with some skepticism.98  A number of frontline troops 
did create chaos by thieving as they murdered, raping Jewish or Ukrainian women, and accepting 
bribes.  Officers and gendarmes from the Praetoral Service soon arrived, however, who enforced 
order and repression became more uniform.  Praetor officers gathered suspects for interrogation, 
sorted women and children from men, and took hostages.  The main difference between SS and 
Praetoral Service treatment was applying different sets of subjective criteria – racial or cultural – 
when sorting Jews.  Yet, when SS Einsatzkommandos arrived in a city, often accompanied with 
an SSI liaison, Romanian officers and gendarmes generally deferred to their wishes. 
The officers of the Praetoral Service arrived with the second wave of rear echelon troops 
and were the first to restore a semblance of order.99  They took custody of Jews and communist 
suspects already arrested, searched out more, and executed hostages in reprisal for attacks.  They 
also tried to restore discipline and halt looting until gendarmes of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
arrived with the next wave of occupying forces, but the arrival of each new unit triggered another 
round of looting, rape, and murder.100  By mid-July General Headquarters was complaining that 
troops were treating liberated Romanian territory like occupied enemy territory: looting animals, 
equipment, and seed from kolkhozes (created by the Soviets with property requisitioned from 
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peasants that the regime wanted to return to the original owners); and furniture, materials, and 
valuables from towns and cities.  Antonescu complained after a tour of the front that wagons 
loaded down with stolen goods made advancing columns look like “true Gypsy caravans.”101  
The General Headquarters ordered officers to shoot troops caught in the act, but this threat was 
not carried out, especially as officers often participated in and directed the looting.102 
Each city taken by Axis forces was progressively because locals had fled, some just a 
short distance to nearby villages to escape artillery or air bombardment, while others evacuated 
with the Soviets.  Cernăuţi fell so quickly that most its population remained; elsewhere, such as 
Bălţi or Chişinău, it took longer to reach the cities and their populations were noticeably reduced; 
cities located on the Dniester, such as Hotin, Soroca, or Cetatea Albă, allowed escape across the 
river into Soviet Ukraine.  After a year of Soviet rule, most locals were thoroughly disillusioned 
with communism and stayed put, and it was the Red Army’s turn to experience mass desertion of 
local basarabeni and minority draftees from its ranks.  Nonetheless, many draftees retreated with 
the Red Army and hundreds of thousands fled with communist civil servants, including 124,000 
Jews.103  Towns and cities began to fill up again as those who sought shelter in villages or were 
overtaken by the Axis forces returned home.  Initially, Jewish refugees were escorted west across 
the Prut to be interned in Târgu Jiu, but on 16 July Third Army passed down a decision that the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs now had responsibility over all Jews in eastern Romania who would 
be concentrated locally.104  Gendarmes gathered Jewish refugees caught on highways into camps, 
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often next to POW camps, and survivors of massacres in towns or cities were kept in ghettos.  In 
a few places, probably due to SS influence, Jews were marked by yellow stars.105   
While soldiers, gendarmes, and SS troops instituted a reign of terror in the rear, German 
Eleventh Army continued it offensive to clear central Bessarabia.  After reaching the Dniester at 
Soroca, General von Schobert diverted the 1st Armored Division southwest, reaching Bălţi on 12 
July, to launch it against the Soviet flank in central Bessarabia to rescue Fourth Army, which was 
mired in a bloody stalemate.  III Corps had crossed the Prut south of Ungheni, initially benefiting 
from German Eleventh Army’s success, and advanced without much resistance.  The Red Army 
regrouped in the wooded hills of the Corneşti Massif located in central Bessarabia and Romanian 
units advanced as recklessly here as they did elsewhere.  A counterattack by a Soviet battalion on 
8 July caught the officers of the 35th Reserve Infantry Division off-guard, their soldiers panicked, 
and embarrassingly several artillery batteries were captured.106  III Corps ordered fruitless frontal 
assaults against Soviet positions for another week.   
Further south things were even worse.  V Corps had barely expanded its bridgehead at 
Falciu and any advance came at great cost against dug in Soviet infantry with artillery support.  
On 9 July, the 11th Dorobanţi Regiment lost half its officers and 40 percent of its soldiers killed 
or wounded advancing just a few kilometers to Ţigancă.  V Corps considered evacuating back 
across the Prut, but division commanders protested because they did not want to abandon terrain 
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seized at such a high cost.107  Private Ioan Popa wrote his parents from Ţigancă telling them not 
to believe the announcements that the army had reached the Dniester, “Papa there ain’t been 
nothing like this war being fought between Romania and Russia…know that we’ve barely gone 
seven kilometers, advancing without tanks, artillery, or planes, only with infantry fire, while the 
Russians got casements.”108  Fourth Army had old artillery easily outranged by Soviet guns since 
most of the Romanian Army’s modern heavy artillery was assigned to Third Army or German 
Eleventh Army.  Before the Soviets retreated the Guard and 21st Infantry divisions took 2,743 
and 6,222 casualties respectively, and a song was soon circling among the ranks, “Over in the 
valley at Ţigancă, the Russians sat in casements, and they hit us with grenades, with grenades 
and shrapnel, and with machineguns.”109  It’s a testament to the strength of their motivation that 
Romanian soldiers continued to attack in the face of such strong Soviet firepower.  
The 1st Armored Division’s attack, taking Călăraşi on 14 July, unhinged the whole Soviet 
line in central Bessarabia finally allowing Fourth Army to advance, but the Red Army carried out 
an organized withdrawal.  Romanian armor continued south, taking a weakly defended Chişinău 
off the march on 16 July before turning southeast, and concluded its romp on 19 July at Tighina, 
where it found the bridges across the Dniester already dynamited.  General Voiculescu arrived in 
Chişinău that day to find a devastated city, moved to restore utilities, began setting up a ghetto in 
the lower part of the city, and forced Jews to clean up the damage for which the Romanians held 
them responsible.110  Sergeant Ioan Lungu, a gendarme in the Praetoral Service, was shocked by 
the damage to the city’s Orthodox cathedral, but inside “on the wall of the burned iconostasis, 
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there is the icon of the pure Mary, untouched by the flames of fire!”111  How many Jews soldiers 
murdered in the following days is unknown, but numbered many hundreds.   
Fourth Army chased the Red Army out of central Bessarabia, allowing II Corps to finally 
cross the Danube to help clear southern Bessarabia.  The Soviets were in full retreat by 20 July, 
leaving villages and fields burning in their wake, but the Romanian pursuit was easily checked 
with powerful artillery fire.  In northern Bessarabia the same day, General Racoviţa, his forces 
already across the Dniester, declared that he “didn’t want to see a kike” in the rear of the Cavalry 
Corps west of the river because he considered them a threat to the logistics of his advance into 
Soviet Ukraine, so Jewish men were rounded up in towns, held in synagogues, and often shot.112  
Despite losing the bridge at Tighina, the Soviets still evacuated troops, civilians, and materials 
by boat down the Dniester to the Black Sea and Odessa; the railyards at Cetatea Albă were soon 
crowded with hundreds of train cars.113  Bessarabia was officially declared liberated after Fourth 
Army units reached the Dniester on 26 July, but the Red Army still held a small bridgehead on 
the lower Dniester “with very weak forces” and evacuated the last of its men.114  Advancing into 
southern Bessarabia, which was more sparely populated in general and now stripped bare by the 
Soviets, Romanian soldiers found less to loot and fewer Jews to murder.  The pattern of pogroms 
initiated by soldiers, and civilians, during the initial occupation and then concentration of Jewish 
survivors into improvised ghettos by the Praetoral Service, however, still repeated.  By 31 July, 
the Romanian Army had suffered 24,396 casualties (5,011 dead, 14,898 wounded, and 4,487 
                                                 
111 Lungu, De la Stalingrad la Gherla, 11. 
112 ACNSAS, Fond Personal, dosar 10617, vol. 3, f. 175. 
113 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 843, f. 311, 312; RG-25.003M, Reel 3, dosar 3823, c. 408-409.  
114 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 843, f. 858.  
 287 
 
missing) – more than a third of them at Ţigancă alone.  Romanian soldiers left tens of thousands 
of murdered Jews in their wake as they crossed into Soviet Ukraine. 
Advance into Ukraine and Battle for Odessa: 17 July to 16 October 
 When Romanian forces reached the Dniester, they had to halt to wait for their logistics to 
catch up and prepare combat crossings.  After the war this minor pause, required by operational 
realities, was turned into a crossing of the Rubicon moment when Antonescu allegedly overrode 
widespread opposition by politicians, senior officers, and the public against continuing the war 
into the USSR.  Therefore, the Conducător was solely to blame for the disaster that followed.115  
In reality, choices months earlier by senior officers and most of the political elite to support an 
alliance with Nazi Germany had already set them down this path.  Furthermore, it became almost 
impossible for the Romanian Army to turn back after crossing the Prut because its soldiers, from 
General Ioaniţiu down to the lowest private, had implicated themselves in Hitler’s criminal war.  
There was no debate at the time among Romanian senior officers about continuing the war into 
Ukraine.  As career soldiers they knew the Red Army had to be defeated to permanently secure 
eastern Romania and ideologically they believed in the necessity of the total defeat of the threat 
of “Judeo-Bolshevism” – expecting the Germans to crush the Soviets in a matter of weeks.  All 
claims that they had opposed continuing across the Dniester only appeared later.  
 General Headquarters had already accepted that Third Army would fight east of Dniester 
on 20 June when it was subordinated to German Eleventh Army.  Just over a week after the start 
of Operation München over 100,000 Romanian troops, the mountain and cavalry brigades under 
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General Dumitrescu, plus the five German-trained infantry divisions under General von Schobert 
(1st Armored Division had been sent south), representing the most-mobile and best-trained units 
of the Romanian Army, stood prepared to cross the Dniester.  On 13 July, von Schobert ordered 
Dumitrescu to prepare the Mountain and Cavalry corps to cross the river to support German XI 
Corps’ attack on Moghilev, help pierce the Stalin Line, advance to the Bug, and then turn south 
to protect German Eleventh Army’s left flank – using the Bug to guard his own flank.  The Stalin 
Line was a series of half-finished fortifications built on the old border in 1938, cannibalized of 
its weapons in 1939, but in 1941 its concrete casements still offered the Soviets a chance to slow 
the Axis.116  Third Army carried out its crossing during the night of 16/17.  General Avramescu’s 
men encountered many difficulties: a shortage of boats, a river swollen by flooding, insufficient 
bridging equipment, and light mountain artillery with limited range unable to support the attack.  
The Mountain Corps’ bridgehead was constantly counterattacked, yet it held on, and pioneers – 
lacking training, flamethrowers, or specialized equipment –cleared 182 concrete casements.117  
General Racoviţa’s Cavalry Corps had a much easier time with its crossing.  Third Army broke 
through the defenses by 19 July, joined General Gerd von Rundstedt’s Army Group South that 
had finally arrived, and marched in pursuit of Red Army troops trying to escape over the Bug.  
The Mountain Corps combat journal trumpeted, “The Victorious Crossing of Romanian troops 
across the Dniester and decisive battle for the destruction of Bolshevism.”118   
 Anti-Semitic violence by Romanian soldiers noticeably declined east of the Dniester for 
four major reasons.  First, Romanian soldiers simply had less time to loot or murder because the 
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pace of operations stepped up significantly and officers pushed troops in long, tiring marches to 
keep up with the motorized and panzer forces of Army Group South.  General Dumitrescu could 
no longer allow looting or pogroms to slow his men.  Second, since disorders continued officers 
feared a breakdown in discipline and reigned in soldiers’ “excesses.”  Dumitrescu complained on 
23 July that soldiers: broke into homes, pocketed valuables, devastated beehives, rustled animals, 
and profaned the few churches still intact under Soviet rule.  He ordered that soldiers should be 
instructed to act as liberators towards locals.  Three days later, exasperated, he castigated officers 
for tolerating crimes against Soviet Ukrainian peasants “not guilty of the communists’ outrages,” 
demanded stronger patrols by gendarmes, and threatened to execute soldiers caught in a criminal 
act.119  Officers also faced arrest and dishonor if they let their men get out of control.  Third, the 
ardor to take revenge for the alleged betrayal of Romanian Jews in 1940 had cooled a little and 
did not apply to Soviet Jews.  During long marches, tired soldiers overtook crowds of miserable-
looking Jewish refugees consisting primarily of women, children, and elderly and some took pity 
on them.  On 5 August, Major Scârneci ordered men from 3rd Mountain Battalion to give bread 
to a group of Jews from Bălţi and told the refugees to leave the road to hide from the Germans.120  
Such acts of kindness were few and far between.  Back in eastern Romania, hastily improvised 
camps were already overflowing with Jewish refugees, and on 17 July the Great Praetor of the 
Army General Ioan Topor reported, “We cannot guard them.  We cannot feed them.  I beg you to 
give an order concerning what to do with them.”121  Conditions in these camps were much worse 
compared ghettos.  General Headquarters did nothing to ease Jewish suffering after German 
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soldiers and SS troops moved further east out of northern Bukovina and Bessarabia.  Last, but 
not least, most Soviet citizens did not join in anti-Semitic violence.  Indeed, a few individuals 
collaborated, and many held anti-Semitic beliefs, but the arrival of Romanian or German soldiers 
did not trigger pogroms by civilians as it did in eastern Romania.  Soviet citizens were also more 
willing to offer Jews aid.122  Romanian soldiers did not completely stop looting, raping, or 
murdering Jews (or communists) in Soviet Ukraine, but they no longer did so in the frenzied 
manner as earlier in eastern Romania.   
Passing through villages many soldiers felt pity for Soviet peasants.  They remembered 
stories of cannibalism during collectivization, saw the misery they lived in, and were impressed 
by their Orthodox piety – especially among the older generation.  During a pause in operations 
while his unit carried out “moral education,” cleaned up, and held a ceremony to bury its dead, 
Major Scârneci noted on 30 July, that local Ukrainian women looked at the unit chaplain “with a 
kind of ecstasy.  Too bad they are old ladies!”123  Fourth Army Section II claimed soldiers were 
received with “greater warmth” by some villagers in Transnistria than in parts of Bessarabia due 
to their long oppression under the Soviets.  When troops entered villages, they were greeted not 
with pogroms but celebrations in which scores of couples were married and hundreds of children 
or youths were baptized with Romanian soldiers acting as godfathers.  Chaplains contributed to 
the evangelical atmosphere developing across the Dniester as they preached “holy war.”  Priest 
Sever I.D. Husariu later wrote a letter to Antonescu petitioning him for funds for a church youth 
program in Transnistria because “the first measure that we need to occupy ourselves with, is the 
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religious culture problem and the forming of the [Soviet] youth.”124  Although arrests, hostage 
taking, and executions remained common, Romanian soldiers could feel, and many began to act, 
like a liberating army as they tramped into villages full of Orthodox believers.   
 German LIV Corps, having liberated central Bessarabia, crossed the Dniester and Hitler 
asked Fourth Army to follow on 27 July.  The German crossing near Dubossary was supported 
by Romanian artillery. Antonescu responded four days later, promising that, “I will go to the end 
of the line” to destroy “the greatest enemy of civilization, of Europe, and of my country.”125  An 
SS Nachkommando soon turned Dubossary into a charnel house by murdering 10,000 Jews with 
help from German and Romanian troops.  Fourth Army began crossing at Tighina on 3 August.  
Antonescu and Hitler met at Berdychiv in Soviet Ukraine on 6 August, he was decorated with a 
Knight’s Cross and asked to send Fourth Army to neutralize Odessa to protect German Eleventh 
Army’s rear as it cleared the Dnieper bend.126  At the same time, General Topor began to push 
Jews (an a few Ukrainians and Russians) from overcrowded camps in eastern Romania across 
the Dniester with official approval from Antonescu who cited Hitler’s excited ramblings about 
pushing Soviet Jews across the Urals that the invasion seemed about to make a reality.127   
The sudden flood of Jews across the river worried Romanian and German officers alike.  
2nd Lieutenant Ioan Manu, commanding a platoon of 58th Police Company guarding a bridge at 
Kozliv near Moghilev, was alarmed when 10,200 Jews were driven across on 27-28 July.  He 
reported “imminent danger” because instead of seeing terrified, exhausted, and starving women, 
children, and elderly, he saw “10,000 provocateurs” who might seize weapons on the battlefield 
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to attack Axis columns.128  General von Schobert complained and ordered Einsatzgruppe D to 
force back the Jews back across the Dniester.  The SS pushed 3,000 back across the Dniester on 
6 August, in places Romanian gendarmes opposed the effort, so the SS often just shot the Jews.  
Romanian generals were as unhappy with General Topor’s orders.  General Ciupercă argued that 
starving and unguarded Jews were a threat to his logistics and suggested they be kept west of the 
Dniester as labor.129  Ciupercă also targeted non-Jews to secure supply lines from attacks.  Since 
isolated groups of Red Army stragglers were roaming the countryside of eastern Romania not all 
attacks on the army were imagined.  Fourth Army reported attacks on the highway from Chişinău 
to Tighina.  Ciupercă demanded five “proven” communists be executed in 17 villages along the 
highway and Fourth Army claimed the reprisals had the desired effect of halting attacks.130   
As General Topor’s gendarmes and the SS in northern Bessarabia competed to push Jews 
across the Dniester in opposing directions, Romanian and SS troops cooperated in “cleansing the 
terrain” of the few Jews left in southern Bessarabia.  The Red Army held off the Romanians long 
enough for many Jews to escape across the Dniester.  A forward scout unit entered Cetatea Albă 
on the morning of 27 July to adulation, but when the Grăniceri Division arrived its troops began 
looting mounds of goods abandoned by the Soviets, broke into a wine factory, and fired off shots 
all night as they looked for Jews and communists.  Locals told grăniceri that “communists” were 
hiding in basements waiting to attack and had mined buildings.  It’s certain scores of Jews still in 
the city were killed over the next few days.131  After these disorders ended, the Praetoral Service 
gathered surviving Jewish men into a synagogue and Jewish men gathered from the countryside 
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were imprisoned in another synagogue, with about 500 in each, between 30 July and 2 August.132  
The same thing occurred in cities across southern Bessarabia.  On the Danube in Ismail, Jewish 
men were put in a “camp” (a synagogue) while their families were kept in an improvised ghetto. 
Fourth Army Praetoral Service was applying the same policy being used in cities in Moldavia, 
separating Jewish men and placing them under guard in a few central locations. 
In southern Bessarabia, however, under pressure to secure the rear and encouraged by the 
SS teams still roaming the region, army praetors and gendarmes massacred Jewish men, and in a 
few places women and children.  The opposite bank was still in Soviet hands, so General Topor’s 
policy of just pushing the Jews across the Dniester was not viable.  In Cetatea Albă, the garrison 
commander, the police chief, and an SSI agent conferred with an SS team and decided to shoot 
all the Jewish men held in the two synagogues beginning 3 August.  Before dawn a truck brought 
the Jews to a quarry near the river bank to be executed by gendarmes under Captain Alexandru 
Ochişor.  Initially reticent, he reminded his superior they had orders to send all “communists” to 
Chişinău for military trial.  They decided to call on Colonel Marcela Petala, Third Army’s Chief 
Praetor who was touring the area with a German colonel, to verify they had authority to shoot the 
Jews.  Petala was upset to be woken up early in the morning and yelled “that in Chişinău all Jews 
are imprisoned in a ghetto and in every night they pull out hundreds of Jews f.[or] executions,” 
implying they could do whatever they wished.  The killings went ahead under the eye of Ochişor, 
finishing four days later, but Jews caught later were shot too.133  On 15 August, at the Tătăraşti 
camp in Chilia County, located between Cetatea Albă and Ismail counties, where around 1,200 
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Jews were being used as labor, guards shot hundreds because they had become “aggressive.”134  
The SS were later blamed for ordering the massacre, but the Jewish inmates may have revolted 
due to overcrowding and starvation.  In Ismail, sometime in August, “German police” took 105 
Jewish men held in the synagogue and shot them.  The surviving men, and women and children 
in the ghetto, were used for labor until they were deported to Transnistria.135 
Romanian leadership was divided on what to do with surviving Jews in eastern Romania.  
Senior officers believed they should remain in place and be used for forced labor, while civilian 
leaders favored removal by deportation, but the SS offered a third option, extermination.  Across 
the Eastern Front in the rear of the German Army, Einsatzgruppen A, B, C, and D began taking 
the initiative as they expanded their original orders to include not just communists, military age 
men, or hostages as reprisals, but all Soviet Jews.  This process of radicalization took weeks, but 
by mid-July Berlin began issuing orders to the SS that all Soviet Jews should be murdered.136  In 
northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, however, the Romanian Army was in control.  The SS had to 
cooperate with the Romanian authorities who continued to primarily target Jewish men and who, 
at times, resented German meddling. For this reason, many Jews in eastern Romania, particularly 
women and children, survived the initial bloodbath long enough to be deported to Transnistria.  
During July-August, the Romanian soldiers and gendarmes, aided by civilians or SS troops to 
varying degrees, murdered an estimated 43,500 Jews in northern Bukovina and Bessarabia.    
The Ministry of Internal Affairs’ gendarmes took over the occupation in eastern Romania 
in August, allowing General Headquarters to focus on coordinating operations in Soviet Ukraine.  
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Fourth Army advanced on Odessa as quickly as possible.  1st Armored Division supported the 
advance, taking the longer eastern route while slower infantry divisions marched directly south.  
Fourth Army reached Odessa’s outer defenses on 10 August.137  Concurrently, Third Army was 
preparing to cross the Bug near Voznesensk to follow German Eleventh Army.  At first General 
von Schobert believed Third Army was staying west of the Bug to carry out security operations 
and told General Dumitrescu as much.  The news leaked to soldiers, whose expectations of being 
demobilized increased after a few worn out units were sent home, so when they were ordered to 
cross the Bug instead they did so less enthusiastically than when they had crossed the Prut or the 
Dniester.  After being informed, General Headquarters reminded Third Army on 21 August that 
so long as the Red Army fought the USSR was a threat to Romania, “Every drop of blood shed 
across the Dniester is thus an absolutely necessary sacrifice, a sacrifice made only for our cause 
and not for any other.”138  Third Army began crossing the Bug on 9 August and encountered 
resistance, not from Soviets, but from the Hungarian Rapid Corps with German Twelfth Army.  
As mountain troops began crossing into their rear the Hungarians grew alarmed, demanded they 
stop, and even threatened to attack when they did not, so the Romanians halted for a day while 
German liaisons worked out the conflict.139  This incident has been blown out of proportion, but 
from then on the Germans were careful to keep Romanian and Hungarian forces separate.  Third 
Army soldiers then began trudging east, guarding German Eleventh Army’s left flank as it turned 
south to clear the eastern bank of the Bug to Nikolaev and then east to the Dnieper.    
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Fourth Army, on the other hand, was advancing into the teeth of heavy defenses as Soviet 
resistance outside Odessa stiffened on 10-14 August.  The attack on Odessa was thrown together 
last minute because German planning for Operation Barbarossa had been so overoptimistic and 
rushed that the port was forgotten until mid-July when German Eleventh Army was desperately 
needed further east.140  Odessa represented a major threat to its rear, so German High Command 
turned to the willing Romanian Army.  General Ciupercă’s advance lacked finesse, but as Odessa 
sat on the Black Sea protected from envelopment there was no other option than a frontal assault 
hoping the city’s defenses would collapse.  Unfortunately for Ciupercă, Stalin had decided that 
major cities be held at all costs.  Odessa proved an impossible nut for Fourth Army to crack.  It 
was the seventh-largest city in the USSR with factories quickly converted to war production that 
made 1,500 mortars (enough to export to Crimea), tens of thousands of grenades and incendiary 
bottles, and turned tractors into armored “Odessa tanks.”  The city had time to prepare defenses. 
Citizens were mobilized to dig trenches, pour concrete, and build barricades.  Initially, the Soviet 
Independent Coastal Army only had 34,000 soldiers and 247 field guns but could call on coastal 
artillery and naval guns of ships in the port, including the aging cruiser Komintern.  Crimea acted 
as an unsinkable aircraft carrier to provide air cover.  Since Axis naval forces consisted of just a 
few Romanian or Bulgarian destroyers and support ships, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet dominated 
the waters and allowed Stavka (Soviet High Command) to quickly reinforce Odessa whenever 
Fourth Army threatened a breakthrough, eventually boosting Soviet forces to 86,000.141   
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A thin Red Army line held back waves of attacking Romanian infantry with a wall of 
firepower for two months.  At first glance, Fourth Army seemed to have significant advantages. 
It had over 200,000 soldiers (eventually more than 340,000 took part in the battle), supported by 
1st Armored Division, and had three times as many field guns as the Soviets.  Appearances can 
be deceiving, however, and lack of training and professionalism in all arms impeded efficiency. 
Poorly trained and inexperienced artillerymen pounded away ineffectively, proving unable to 
time artillery bombardments to aid infantry attacks and definitely could not coordinate a creeping 
barrage that was a standard since the First World War.  Outdated guns from the First World War 
made the situation worse.  Most batteries were equipped with light 75 mm field pieces that had 
minimal effect against prepared defenses, by the end of the battle 1.3 million 75 mm shells had 
been fired compared to just 200,000 heavier 105 or 150 mm.142  Luftflotte 4 had moved on with 
German Eleventh Army, so only the inferior – in both numbers and quality – GAL remained for 
air support.  Poorly trained infantry contributed to the failure to take Odessa.  A captured Soviet 
captain reported Romanian infantry attacked in dense formations (resulting in heavy casualties), 
had poor fire discipline (making it easy to spot their positions), were timid in pursuit (due to lack 
of motorization), and attacked “by template” (making it easy to predict their moves).143  Fourth 
Army’s logistical system relied mostly on horse or ox carts and created shortages in ammunition, 
supplies, and rations.  Sudden downpours that flooded newly built bridges on the Dniester added 
to difficulties.  Its inability to modernize and neglect of training not cost the army dearly.   
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Fourth Army tried to take Odessa off the march on 18 August, but was halted after week, 
although it managed to bring the port under sporadic bombardment.  Following a pause to bring 
up units, a second assault began 28 August that made progress, took 7,000 POWs, and came near 
to breaking through, but then 10,000 Soviet troops arrived by sea.  After heavy losses, the attack 
stalled by 5 September.144  General Headquarters looked for scapegoats, blaming cowards and 
“Jewish-Communists.”  Fourth Army Section II claimed “a battalion of Jews, called the death 
battalion” was policing the Soviet rear, “Jewish” political commissars executed Soviet deserters 
in front of arriving troops to motivate by fear, and all Jewish men over 15 had been mobilized.  It 
also warned officers to expect street battles with diehard Jews when Odessa fell.145  Officers and 
soldiers were convinced that “Jewish-Communists” were responsible for the continued resistance 
of Odessa and anger built against them.  Romanians dealt with suspect locals brutally, especially 
after a costly attack; such as when after taking Bilyaivka, a village southwest of Odessa, soldiers 
shot 50 civilians for allegedly bearing arms on 2 September.146  On 20 August, General Ioaniţiu, 
reported that Antonescu believed recent attacks showed lack of élan, so he threatened that troops 
judged to be cowards would have financial aid to their families cut off, land grants promised to 
soldiers for winning medals revoked, and that units in the rear would fire on those who retreated 
without cause.  Ioaniţiu announced six days later that Antonescu thought that many wounds were 
self-inflicted and ordered confirmed cases be punished by execution.  Only a few likely cases of 
self-mutilation were uncovered, and most were not shot.  III Corps shot two soldiers in front of 
their units and XI Corps sentenced 23 suspected cowards to twelve years hard labor.147   
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General Ciupercă, shocked by 31,552 casualties in such a short time, wanted to wait for 
German reinforcements before a decisive attack in the Dalnik sector.  Dalnik was a long, thin 
town laying across the most direct path to Odessa that had been heavily fortified by the Soviets 
and all attacks against it were cut down.  A Soviet officer compared the Romanian attacks to the 
popular 1934 film Chapaev that had White forces being mowed down by Red Guards.148  
German High Command sent four engineer, two infantry, and a heavy artillery battalion, all it 
could spare, to help Fourth Army.  General Headquarters favored attacks in all sectors, however, 
and believed Fourth Army could break through before the Germans arrived.  Ciupercă was 
sacked for lack of offensive spirit, but publically because he was exhausted.  He was replaced 
with General Iacobici on 9 September.  Antonescu took over Iacobici’ position as Minister of 
Defense, spending more time in Bucharest.  In Ciupercă’s final message to Fourth Army, he told 
the troops that they were again masters of Bessarabia. He warned, however, that it could not be 
“true masters” until the USSR was defeated.  “At the gates of Odessa, we are now only a step 
away from this goal…[so make]…one last effort.”149   
During Fourth Army’s second assault, German and Romanian military leaders hammered 
out an agreement to end the tensions triggered by the expulsion of Jews across the Dniester.  On 
30 August, the Tătăranu-Hauffe decision, better known as the Tighina Agreement, was signed.  It 
granted the Romanians authority to administer and exploit the territory between the Dniester and 
Bug (soon christened Transnistria), required them to provide troops for security operations in the 
German rear all the way to the Dnieper, and clarified that Jews should not be pushed across the 
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Bug and instead would be kept in work camps in Transnistria until they could be deported further 
east once the USSR was defeated.150  General Topor immediately ordered his army gendarmes to 
prepare to deport Jews from Bessarabia on 7 September, beginning with the largest internment 
camp at Vertiujeni, which also held Soviet POWs, where about 23,000 starving Jewish refugees 
had been gathered on the Dniester near Soroca.  The Jews were to be deported across the river in 
groups of a thousand at a time – anyone who resisted would be shot.151  The Jews held in ghettos 
in northern Bukovina and Bessarabia would also be deported, but only once Odessa fell.    
During the first assault against Odessa, Third Army was exhausting itself in 15 km a day 
marches, as it crossed the parched steppe that quickly turned to sucking mud when it rained. It 
reached the Dnieper on 26 August.  During 1-16 September, General Dumitrescu defended the 
west bank of the river from Soviet attacks trying to cross over and flank German Eleventh Army.  
General von Schobert carried out a combat crossing of the Dnieper on 30 August and constructed 
a bridge at Beryslav with the help of Romanian pioneers who provided 30 percent of the bridging 
equipment.  Third Army remained another week on the river as it prepared to follow.152  General 
Avarmescu issued an order on 16 September read to the Mountain Corps in which he reminded 
troops of centuries of Russian oppression of Romania, celebrated the chance for revenge with the 
help of the Germans, and repeated that only after the Red Amy was defeated would Romania’s 
borders be restored, “Today, as we expand the field of battle against the Bolsheviks across the 
Dnieper, we win the right to enlarge the truncated borders of Transylvania [Ardeal].”153 
                                                 
150 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 481, f. 120-126.  
151 Ioanid, Holocaust in Romania, 143, 131.  
152 Axworhty, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 65; Duţu, Armata română în război, 114-117. 
153 Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 118, f. 253.  
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On 11 September, General Iacobici’s hurriedly prepared third assault on Odessa began, 
before German reinforcements arrived, and nearly broke through within four days.  The Soviets 
pulled back their left flank to prevent collapse, exposing the city, and Iacobici tried to rush troops 
into position for a final attack planned for 17 September against Dalnik spearheaded by some of 
General L’Honere de Coubière’s newly arrived German units.  Soviet aircraft heavily bombarded 
troop concentrations as units made little effort to camouflage movements and more Soviet troops 
from the Caucasus landed just in time to knock back the assault.154  Horses now sought cover at 
the sound of aircraft without any direction from their riders.  Despite their best efforts Romanian 
pilots of GAL were unable to dominate the air and lacked dive bombers like German Stukas to 
aid infantry attacks.  General Virgil M. Protopopescu, commanding an infantry brigade, noted in 
his diary that while his soldiers came under air attack whenever they moved, across the trenches 
he could see Soviet tanks, trucks, and soldiers moving with impunity.155  Sergeant Lungu wrote 
of the carnage left behind, “The field was dotted about with dead, Romanian and Russian.  Some 
had died with weapons in their hands, others with a telephone at their throat, others on houses, 
swollen like barrels and eaten by flies in the heat of summer.”156  The third assault culminated on 
21 September.  The next morning a Soviet counterattack, along with an amphibious landing and 
a team of 23 naval parachutists dropped by air in V Corps’ rear, panicked Romanian troops who 
retreated 9 km, lost 1,300 men, and abandoned artillery positions overlooking the port.157  The 
fate of Odessa would not be decided at Dalnik, but at the Perekop Isthmus in Crimea.   
                                                 
154 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 53; DiNardo, Germany and the Axis, 119; Armata 4-a, dosar 772, 251. 
155 Romanians constantly complained about a very active Soviet air force, see, Fond Manuscrise, MSS 656, f. 22, 24. 
156 Lungu, Dela Stalingrad la Gherla, 13.   
157 Krylov, Glory Eternal, 237, 241-249; Duţu, Armata română în război, 94-96. 
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As it continued on to Rostov, Army Group South ordered German Eleventh Army to take 
Crimea.  General von Schobert, however, was killed on 12 September when his plane accidently 
landed on a Soviet minefield at Nikolaev, so General Erich von Manstein took his place.  Five 
days later bad luck struck again as General Ioaniţiu, coming to inspect the front with Antonescu, 
was also killed accidentally when he stepped into the propeller of their aircraft on an airfield near 
Odessa.  His death threw the General Headquarters into disarray.  General Iacobici took over as 
Chief of the General Staff on 22 September while continuing to direct Fourth Army’s attacks at 
Odessa.  Ioaniţiu’s loss was keenly felt.  General Pantazi later wrote that not only was Ioaniţiu 
intelligent, hardworking, and calm, but he got along well with Antonescu, not the easiest thing to 
do, and acted as a mediator, “He was the best complement possible for the volcanic temperament 
of the Marshal.”158  King Mihai I had raised Antonescu to the rank of marshal on 22 August.   
General von Manstein ordered General Dumitrescu to take over parts of the German line 
on the Nogai steppe north of the Azov Sea to free up troops to break through the heavy Soviet 
defenses at Perekop.  He placed the Mountain Corps on the left, with its flank on the Dnieper, 
German troops in the middle, and the Cavalry Corps on the right, with its flank on the sea; von 
Manstein hoped these natural obstacles would prevent the Romanians from being outflanked.  He 
began his offensive to batter through Perekop by frontal assaults on 24 September, but two days 
later the Soviet Southern Front attacked the German-Romanian line stretching across the Nogai 
steppe to threaten the Axis rear.  The Mountain Corps, with light mountain artillery, few trucks, 
and no armor, faired more poorly than the Cavalry Corps; additionally, mountain infantry felt 
exposed on the steppe, lacking the mountains they trained to fight in, and were forced to keep 
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 303 
 
reserves far to the rear due to Soviet artillery.159  Pounded by artillery, aircraft, and tanks, the 
whole German-Romanian line began to bend, but a retreat by 4th Mountain Brigade opened up a 
seven-kilometer gap forcing von Manstein to turn his forces at Perekop around to meet the theat.  
They were joined by panzers from the newly arrived Panzer Group Kleist that broke through on 
1 October and encircled parts of two Soviet armies with the assistance of Romanian motorized 
Roşiori regiments.  General Racoviţă had kept them in reserve while his horsed regiments had 
borne the brunt of the initial Soviet attacks on Cavalry Corps.  By 7 October, 65,000 Red Army 
troops had been captured.160  This fresh disaster convinced Stavka to order the forces at Odessa 
to begin evacuating to Sevastopol on 1 October to participate in the defense of Crimea.   
Since 22 September Fourth Army had settled into trench warfare after the failure, even 
with German support, of the last assault.  It was now clear to all, from Antonescu on down, that 
Fourth Army could not take the city, and an artillery colonel reported he heard soldiers, and even 
officers, saying, “Why don’t the Germans come?  Why not bring one or two PANZER [sic] 
Divisions?  Why don’t the Stukas come?  Until the Sea is closed …nothing can be done.”161  The 
soldiers remained ready to fight, despite the grumblings, but were no longer willing to be thrown 
into doomed frontal assaults without proper support.  Romanian soldiers dug deep to shelter from 
the torrents of fire poured on them by the Soviets.  They dug “Tartar holes” just wide enough for 
a man and deep enough to stand in, effective against tanks and mortar blasts.  What had not been 
stripped by the Soviets in the surrounding countryside before they arrived had now largely been 
consumed, so food was in short supply.  Soldiers drank from whatever water source they could 
                                                 
159 Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 481, f. 2-5. 
160 Robert M. Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (Lawrence: University of Kansas 
Press, 2007), 57-58; Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 65-67. 
161 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 772, f. 451; dosar 773, f. 189.   
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find, causing diarrhea and afflicting horses – both blamed on poisoning by Soviet agents.  In the 
“dirty rat life” in the trenches, General Protopopescu noted, the only beauty was anti-aircraft fire 
over the city at night.162  Any movement brought down fire on the exhausted soldiers. 
Soviet Independent Coastal Army began a quiet, steady withdrawal after 2 October, but 
reacted violently to even minor Romanian attacks.  Romanian pilots and Soviet POWs provided 
Fourth Army news of the evacuation, but General Iacobici had to be content with occupying the 
positions vacated by Red Army forces because whenever he probed for weak points the Soviets 
brought down concentrated artillery fire on the Romanians.163  Chaplains ministered to wounded 
soldiers and Soviet peasants in the rear.  On 14 September, with patronage from the 15th Infantry 
Division, the village church in Bujalik outside Odessa was reopened, 42 children baptized, and a 
speech was given in Ukrainian and Romanian to hundreds of villagers and soldiers.  Chaplain V. 
Apostol, in the trenches with the 9th Dorobanţi Regiment, reported that morale was good because 
“the Christian soldier possess a true fighting spirit for our holy defense.”164  A few cracked under 
constant bombardment.  Major Gheorghe Răşcănescu recalled a lieutenant had to be held back 
by two soldiers from attacking in nothing but a shirt and underwear.  Răşcănescu slapped him 
hard, told him not to dishonor reserve officers, and sent him back from the frontline for a few 
days.165  A final assault was planned for 23 October, but the last Soviet ships loaded with troops 
slipped away during the night of 15/16 October.   
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Odessa Massacre 
Romanian units entered Odessa the next morning.  As they navigated barricaded streets, 
soldiers expected a final street battle against fanatical “Jewish-Communists” and rounded up all 
deemed suspicious, especially military aged men, but it soon became clear the fighting was over.  
Order broke down as troops, relieved to be alive, celebrated, drank, looted, searched for threats, 
and took revenge against Jews they believed had kept the Red Army fighting.  Fourth Army had 
suffered 90,020 casualties – 63,280 wounded, 17,891 killed, and 8,849 missing – in two months.  
On 17 October, General Iacobici told General Ionel Glogojanu, the commander of 10th Infantry 
Division had been tasked to organize the Odessa Military Command, that Odessa was “teeming” 
with Soviet soldiers and Jews in civilian clothes.  He ordered “radical searches” to find them.166  
Non-Jewish citizens later smirked when they recalled these “sugar patrols,” as they nicknamed 
soldiers who successively broke into homes looking for weapons and demanded food (especially 
sugar), but for Jews these patrols were deadly serious.  Hundreds of Jews and scores of non-Jews 
were murdered.  Over 7,000 non-Jews were arrested as partisans.  On 21 October 15 “communist 
terrorists” under a Jewish “ringleader” were shot.167  Fires were blamed on Jewish arsonists and 
the German Military Mission warned Iacobici that a few weeks previously the NKVD had mined 
buildings in Kiev that greatly damaged the city and killed German soldiers, so teams of German 
and Romanian pioneers inspected buildings.  Glogojanu was ordered to secure Odessa and bring 
order, but since his headquarters on the outskirts of the city he had difficulty doing so.168   
                                                 
166 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 860, f. 412.  
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After Odessa fell, the deportation of Jews from eastern Romania to Transnistria began in 
earnest.  On 11 and 22 October the civilian Government of Transnistria told Fourth Army that it 
would create ghettos and camps for 150,000-200,000 Soviet Jews caught in Transnistria.  They 
would be joined by 125,000-145,000 Romanian Jews deported from Bukovina and Bessarabia in 
deadly marches organized by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.169  General Glogojanu moved his 
10th Infantry/Odessa Military Command headquarters into downtown Odessa on 22 October, so 
he could better enforce order, sort Jews and communists, and set up a ghetto.  The former NKVD 
headquarters was chosen for this command.  The building had been verified by both German and 
Romanian pioneers, nevertheless, locals repeated warned that it had been mined.  The building 
was evacuated and re-checked several times after bomb threats but continued to be used.    
At 5:35 pm on 22 October, the headquarters exploded killing Glogojanu and 91 others, 
including a few German officers, and wounding 43.170  General Constantin Trestioreanu, second 
in command of 10th Infantry Division, and initially presumed dead somewhere under the rubble, 
appeared an hour later.  He ordered reprisals against Jews and communists.  Soon hundreds were 
swinging from street poles as a warning to partisans, and many more were simply shot that night.  
General Iacobici sent General Nicolae Macici, commander of II Corps now assigned to guard the 
coast from any landing, to assess the situation.  He arrived the next morning at the explosion site.  
Macici screamed that reprisals had been insufficient, “you are a bunch of cowards and scaredy-
cats, by now Odessa should’ve been turned inside-out!”171  The number of Jews still in Odessa is 
hard to determine, but probably 80,000-90,000.172  Antonescu personally added fuel to the fire by 
                                                 
169 Ibid., dosar 781, f. 175; dosar 860, f. 576; Ioanid, Holocuast in Romania, 177, 173-174.  
170 Duţu, Armata română în război, 110.   
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ordering that for each officer or soldier killed, respectively, 200 or 100 “communists” should be 
hanged, and hostages taken.  His order was exceeded.  Iacobici reported “severe reprisals” were 
taken on 23 October murdering approximately 5,000 Jews with 20,000 more held in the city jail.  
The next day 5,000 were marched to Dalnik, crammed into four warehouses (two with men and 
two with women and children), and lit on fire.  Soldiers shot or threw grenades at those who tried 
to escape.  On 25 October, the charred ruins were symbolically blown up, and reprisals continued 
for days.  An estimated 25,000 Jews were murdered and 16,258 remained in jail as hostages.173  
 General Headquarters expected German victory any moment and believed that the fall of 
Odessa signaled the end of major operations east of the Dniester.  It ordered Fourth Army on 15 
October to send as many divisions as possible back to Romania, beginning with those mobilized 
longest.174  This rewarded those who fought longest to avoid demoralization and returned troops 
home to help bring in the bumper harvest sown earlier, but over 100,000 stayed.  The Romanian 
Army remained committed to the war.  When General von Manstein asked Antonescu for more 
soldiers for Crimea he immediately agreed, but General Headquarters believed that Third Army 
would be used mostly in mop-up operations and naively asked on 21 October, “We ask if you 
could please communicate to us how long it will be necessary for III [sic] Army units to remain 
East of the Dnieper, both to secure the Azov Sea littoral and eventually in Crimea.”  The troops 
in Transnistria were placed under Third Army administration on 24 October.175 
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Conclusion 
 The myth of Jewish betrayal in 1940 permeated every level of the Romanian Army and in 
1941 manifested in executions of “Jewish-Communist” franc-tireurs, pogroms, and massacres.  
Anti-Semitic violence took many forms: panicky soldiers, ruthless officers, interrogations by the 
Praetoral Service, ad-hoc “execution squads,” SSI agents with lists, SS actions, civilian pogroms, 
and Legionaries in the ranks.  Not all were heartless killers: alcohol dulled guilt, some bourgeois 
reserve officers avoided direct involvement, and soldiers balked at shooting women and children 
– at least initially.  Officers grew concerned about discipline and a few skeptical of Jewish guilt.  
Few protested, like Major Gherman Pântea, a basarabean reserve officer made mayor of Odessa.  
In late October 1941, he sent a letter to Antonescu by Alexandrina Cantacuzino, boyar patron of 
the Red Cross then in the city, that blamed army incompetence and the NKVD for the explosion 
that killed General Golgojanu and appealed to his sense of law and order to end crimes against 
innocent Jews.  Antonescu ignored it and the General Staff issued more warnings of Jewish fifth 
columnists aiding Soviet parachutists, spies, and agents.  Pântea never resigned in protest.176    
 The Romanian Army did not begin 1941 with plans for an offensive war, nor genocide, 
but as this chapter shows it quickly embraced both Operation Barbarossa and the Holocaust.  The 
events of 1940 had created a powerful national consensus built on underlying intrinsic factors of 
nationalism, religion, anti-Semitism, and anti-communism that motivated Romanian soldiers in 
combat and committing atrocities.  West of the Prut, General Headquarters discourage popular 
anti-Semitic violence.  East of the Prut, anti-Semitic violence initiated by soldiers was quickly 
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endorsed by senior officers who believed that military necessity required brutal policies to secure 
the rear of the army.  In Bucharest, Mihai Antonescu and other ministers, with input and backing 
from the Conducător on the front, decided to use the situation to “cleanse the terrain” of northern 
Bukovina and Bessarabia.  Soldiers and gendarmes cooperated well with SS units.  The Tighina 
Agreement ended the brief period of tension between the SS and army gendarmes.  On the front 
and in the rear, Romanian soldiers were implicated in Hitler’s war of annihilation. 
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CHAPTER VII  
1941-1942: WINTER OF GENOCIDE, SPRING RECOVERY, SUMMER OFFENSIVE, AND 
FALL OF STALEMATE 
 
Golta County gendarmes were taking a break to celebrate the traditional three days of 
Christmas.  They were envious of Fourth Army soldiers already home, while they were stuck in 
godforsaken Transnistria, but counted themselves lucky they were not with Third Army forces 
on the front.  On 28 December, they went back into the cold, joining local Ukrainians and ethnic 
Germans, to continue shooting thousands of Jewish men, women, and children.  Only seventy 
Romanian gendarmes and Ukrainian police, plus sixty more ethnic German militiamen, under the 
command of Romanian and SS officers, shot nearly all of the estimated 52,000 Romanian and 
Soviet Jews in the Bogdanovka camp between 21 December 1941 and 15 January 1942.1  This 
massacre was the start of an incredibly murderous two months near Golta, the right bank part of 
the city of Pervomaisk (the rest of the city on the left bank was occupied by the Germans), and 
east of Odessa on the Bug during a period of military crisis on the front in the USSR.   
Romanian atrocities were not limited to Transnistria or only to times of crisis, however, 
and Jews not the only target.  Soviet civilians, partisans, and POWs faced similar treatment.  This 
chapter examines hard fought Axis victories between October 1941 and October 1942 in which 
Romanian troops played an important supporting role, and drew Third Army ever deeper into the 
USSR, to show that despite terrible conditions, heavy losses, and fleeting periods of poor morale, 
Romanian soldiers remained highly motivated in combat against the Red Army.  Furthermore, in 
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operations east of the Bug, Romanian troops also murdered many thousands of Soviet Jews, both 
on their own initiative and under German direction, demonstrating that they were still motivated 
to commit anti-Semitic atrocities.  Officers and soldiers hoped to destroy “Judeo-Bolshevism.” 
The participation of Romanian soldiers in battles with the Red Army or in the Holocaust 
east of the Bug is largely overlooked by historians.  The important contribution of the Romanian 
Army is dwarfed by the size and scale of the major belligerents of the Eastern Front and when it 
is remembered more often than not it is to blame the Romanians for German defeats or mistakes.  
In his account of the battle for Crimea General von Manstein used the Romanians as convenient 
scapegoats for German failures.  Since the publishing of von Manstein’s memoir Lost Victories, 
military historians have followed his lead in granting begrudging respect for Romanian infantry 
but castigating Romanian officers and accusing Romanian soldiers of lacking motivation to fight 
east of the Dniester.2  Romanian military historians are quick to take umbrage at accusations that 
officers were incompetent or soldiers cowardly, but they gladly accept the fallacy that Romanian 
soldiers were reluctant victims in war.  Unsurprisingly, they almost completely ignore atrocities.3  
Historians who specialize in the Holocaust in Romania neglect atrocities east of the Bug because 
they focus on eastern Romania and Transnistria to prove intentionalist arguments that condemn 
Antonescu.  Of course, this prioritization is legitimate because most of the Jews murdered on the 
direct order, or through implicit approval, of the Antonescu regime were in these provinces.  The 
                                                 
2 A few have begun to give Romanians their due, see, Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 68-69; Robert Forczyk, 
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 312 
 
continuation of crimes east of the Bug, proves that Romanian soldiers’ motivation was more than 
just revenge against Jews for alleged betrayal in 1940 and should be included in any narrative of 
the Holocaust in Romania.  Evidence for crimes east of the Bug is much sparser than for crimes 
west of the Bug.  Post-war efforts by Soviet and Romanian investigators to punish soldiers for 
crimes committed in Ukraine, southern Russia, and the Caucasus were limited because collecting 
evidence was difficult, witnesses hard to find, and often the term “fascists” subsumed Romanian 
crimes with German ones.  Recently uncovered Romanian Army documents and new research by 
historians specializing in the Holocaust in the USSR now allow a fuller picture of these crimes. 
The survival of the Red Army, followed by a Soviet winter counteroffensive, threw both 
German High Command and General Headquarters into crisis.  Romanian troops probably faced 
the worst conditions on the front of the war because they lacked winter gear, Axis logistics were 
overstretched, and units were almost totally isolated from home.  These soldiers proved resilient 
because of deep reserves of intrinsic motivation: nationalism, religion, anti-Semitism, and anti-
communism.  Third Army provided critical manpower to Army Group South, thus allowing it to 
contain Soviet winter counterattacks and then deal the Red Army crushing defeats in Crimea and 
at Kharkov in the spring.  Romanians divisions again advanced with the Germans in the summer, 
many Romanian soldiers believed that 1942 might result in a decisive victory, and wherever they 
went atrocities against Jews, civilians, and POWs followed.  Yet Romanian soldiers’ motivation 
could only make up for material shortages so much in an industrial war of attrition.  The German 
Army increasingly relied on Romanian (as well as Hungarian and Italian) divisions to fill gaps in 
the line, which at best had the same combat value as in 1941.  The Red Army was recovering and 
growing in strength, and thus the Axis courted disaster at Stalingrad.   
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Anti-Partisan Operations and Battle for Crimea: October to December 1941 
 After the fall of Odessa and subsequent rapid demobilization of most of Fourth Army, all 
troops east of the Dniester fell under General Dumitrescu who set up Third Army headquarters in 
Nikolaev (Mykolaiv) next to the headquarters of German Eleventh Army and Einsatzgruppe D.  
By November 1941, Dumitrescu’s troops were divided into three areas: 104,000 in Transnistria, 
106,000 occupying southern Ukraine to the Dnieper, and roughly 70,000 operating further east 
with the Mountain Corps in Crimea or the Cavalry Corps on the Azov Sea coast.4  General von 
Mansetin had total operational control of all Romanian combat divisions with German Eleventh 
Army, so Dumitrescu was relegated to coordinating the administration, supply, and discipline of 
Romanian formations spread across over 800 km of Soviet Ukraine from Tiraspol to Taganrog.   
Third Army, following German orders, began to carry out a brutal anti-partisan campaign 
in German-occupied Ukraine.  Anti-partisan warfare resulted from the German Army’s inability 
to capture all the Soviet troops overtaken in its headlong rush into the USSR and Stavka orders 
for Red Army stragglers to form partisan groups to fight a guerilla war in the rear as early as July 
1941.  The partisan movement was initially small and disorganized.  Katherine Merridale argues 
that its role was more about maintaining Soviet power in occupied areas and had limited military 
impact, but David Stahel demonstrates that the sheer number of wandering Soviet stragglers and 
organized partisan bands became a real threat to Axis logistics.  By September 1941, the NKVD 
in Soviet Ukraine reported 21,530 partisans operating or prepared to operate in the German rear.5  
Romanians quickly adopted German tactics of sweeps, hostage taking, and mass reprisals since 
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they had already used them against “Jewish-Communist” franc-tireurs.  The primary difference 
was partisans were an actual threat, not just an imaginary one, although many of the “partisans” 
were just Jews or unlucky civilians caught in the wrong place at the wrong time. 
 In October 1941, the Antonescu regime still believed German propaganda and anticipated 
imminent victory.  The General Staff ordered lists of soldiers who had received medals be drawn 
up so they could be given land grants in eastern Romania, officers began compiling materials on 
the advance from the Prut to the Dnieper to write unit histories, and rumors swirled among Third 
Army troops on the front that once Crimea fell they too would be demobilized like Fourth Army.  
Antonescu was also optimistic.  He organized a victory parade for the fall of Odessa in Bucharest 
on 8 November and held another plebiscite on 9-12 November.  It resulted in another 99 percent 
vote in favor of his regime with 3,446,889 for and 68 against.6  All soldiers (except for regular 
officers and NCOs) were expected to vote, including those east of the Dniester, even in Crimea 
or on the Azov Sea coast.  When soldiers voted yes they were then ordered to sign a “covenant” 
declaring, “I…covenant [ma leg] to support our Marshal by thought and deed to the fulfillment 
of his program to reorganize the State and Nation and I stand ready [in any] place and time for 
[whatever] duty that I will receive.”7  Antonescu, expecting the end of the war, made the soldiers 
to swear this oath specifically to him and his vision of a military welfare state in a new European 
order under Nazi Germany.  If the war had ended in 1941, the Conducător would have enjoyed 
near universal support, but the USSR did not collapse and Antonescu did deliver on his domestic 
promises, so this semi-coerced “covenant” was conveniently forgotten after 23 August 1944.  
                                                 
6 Giurescu, Romania in the Second World War, 94.  
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As Antonescu tried to bind soldiers and civilians to his vision of a militarized Romania, 
General von Manstein was trying to take Crimea.  After defeating the Red Army threat to his rear 
north of the Azov Sea, he ordered German infantry, backed by heavy artillery and air support, to 
begin battering their way forward at Perekop on 18 October.  He kept the Ziegler Brigade, an ad-
hoc motorized unit he scrounged up that included the Korne Detachment (6th Motorized Roşiori 
Regiment reinforced with a mechanized squadron and horse artillery) from the Cavalry Corps, in 
reserve.  It was committed after the Soviet collapse at Perekop on 28 October to sweep down to 
Sevastopol.  The Korne Detachment guarded the German flank and cut the roads on the western 
coast between Simferopol and Eupatoria.8  Then von Manstein ordered the 1st Mountain and 8th 
Cavalry brigades to cross the Sivash Sea on 29 October.  1st Mountain Brigade marched south 
passing through Karasubazar (Bilohirsk) to the Yaila Mountains along the southern coast of 
Crimea to clear them of Red Army stragglers and partisans to secure the key roads through the 
mountains between Simferopol and coastal cities like Yalta, Alushta, Sudak, and Feodoisa, while 
the 8th Cavalry Brigade turned east to clear the Kerch peninsula.   
The Mountain Corps finally got to use its specialized training in the difficult terrain.  By 
November, the Romanians noticed that the Germans kept assigning them to the most remote and 
benighted areas, and when operations required the Germans to use Romanian soldiers to capture 
cities they were diverted away at the last moment.9  General Avramescu believed von Manstein 
was trying to horde all the glory, which is possible, but it is just as likely that the Germans, who 
saw the Romanians as undisciplined soldiers at best and thieving Gypsies at worse, were trying 
                                                 
8 Citino, Death of the Wehrmatch, 59-61; Duţu, Armata română în război, 129-130, 132.  
9 Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 108, f. 368.  
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to prevent them from looting Crimean cities.  German Eleventh Army had constantly complained 
of Romanian soldiers’ poor fire discipline, abuses, and looting in southern Ukraine.  This was in 
part due to racist stereotypes, but primarily because the Germans wanted to requisition the goods 
the Romanians were looting – although to Soviet civilians there was little real difference between 
Romanian “looting” and German “requisitioning.”  General Dumitrescu order more gendarme 
patrols by the Third Army Praetoral Service, enforced a curfew, and restricted his soldiers from 
entering warehouses, factories, or other buildings in Ukrainian cities, like Melitopol.10  German 
Eleventh Army’s attempt to take Sevastopol off the march ground to a halt on 8 November, just 
as 1st Mountain Brigade began a brutal sweep through the Yaila Mountains.  It captured several 
thousand Soviet stragglers, suffering 800 casualties in the process, but when Romanian officers 
encountered Red Army soldiers who chose to resist they labeled them partisans and shot them in 
groups of 20, 50, and even 200.11  Reports comment on the presence of a few female partisans 
who were viewed as fanatical communist beasts.  Major Scârneci described one captured in a 
group of seven partisans as “a woman with a mop of coal black, curly, tangled hair.  She seems 
completely wild, articulating a single word, nicevo.”12  They were often shot along with the men.  
Civilians were also targeted in the anti-partisan sweep, not surreptitiously, but by mid-ranking 
officers following orders.  General Lascăr ordered 1st Mountain Brigade on 10 November that for 
each soldier wounded in partisan attacks that 30 civilians would be killed in the nearest village. 
Avramescu warned villagers to turn over arms and partisans because if they did not they “will be 
                                                 
10 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 283, f. 93-95.   
11 On 16 December 1941, 4th Mountain Brigade shot over 200 captured “partisans,” including two political officers 
and a woman, see, Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 118, f. 413.  
12 Russian for “I don’t know,” see, Scârneci, Viaţa şi moarte din linia întai, 194.  
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treated according to the laws of war.”13  The Mountain Corps swept across the mountains to the 
southern shore, then turned west, and marched to Sevastopol to take part in a second assault.   
The failure to take Sevastopol in the first assault meant General von Manstein required 
more troops and asked Third Army to provide them, General Dumitrescu obliged, sending units 
from the Azov Sea.  Sergeant Ionescu, serving with artillery battery in 4th Mountain Brigade on 
the coast, initially thought they were going home when his unit was ordered to begin marching to 
the west.  The colonel commanding his regiment gathered all three battalions on 15 November – 
five days after they swore their “covenant” to Antonescu and two days after news of their true 
destination leaked – to read out an order from Third Army.  He then began a speech, saying that 
the Romanian Army needed to destroy the Red Army because “if Germany is defeated we are 
also defeated,” and promised that in Crimea there “will be many decorations.”  In that moment a 
chant, “Home, home, home, home,” swept across the gathering and drowned out the rest of his 
words.  The colonel demanded those who had chanted step forward, but only seven or eight did, 
who were sent to court martial, while the rest continued to Crimea.14  This outburst resulted from 
a feeling of being lied to since officers had constantly told them that the next battle would be the 
last, such short-sighted rhetoric continued to be used during the siege of Sevastopol and advance 
on Stalingrad, and soldiers wanted to go home after doing what they considered their bit.15  The 
                                                 
13 Duţu, Armata română în război, 131; Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 118, f. 378.   
14 Ionescu, Însemnări din război, 39.   
15 It is likely that rather than being deceitful, Romanian officers actually believed their promises that the war would 
end soon, especially as the propaganda they read promised victory, which was reinforced by intelligence reports on 
the success of the German Army and the Romanians’ own dismay at the destroyed remains of the Red Army they 
saw and pace of the advance.  General Avramescu issued orders as early as August 1941 asking for “Just one more 
week of fresh efforts,” and “A few [more] days of effort and victory will be ours,” see, Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 
244, f. 16; dosar 467, f. 52; in October 1941 General Gheorghe Potopeanu, commanding the Grăniceri Division 
with Fourth Army, told his men, “Odessa awaits you and the possibility of returning victorious to your homes,” see, 
Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 629, f. 284-285; in July 1942 General Ştefla issued a General Staff order complaining that 
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fact that most of Fourth Army had been demobilized added to the soldiers’ sense of being treated 
unfairly.  There were other isolated cases, such as a labor unit at Tighina collectively demanding 
Christmas leave, that worried General Headquarters.  In response, Antonescu issued a daily order 
specifically recognizing that the Mountain and Cavalry corps had been called on to keep fighting 
and reminded troops that “the precious fruit” of victory won by “difficult sacrifices” of comrades 
“could easily be lost.”16  These arguments, and shocking news of the German defeat at Moscow 
later in December 1941, convinced soldiers that they were still needed on the front. 
When Sergeant Ionescu arrived with 4th Mountain Brigade in Crimea, the peninsula was 
about to be wracked by the mass murder of Jews because the SS were intent on implementing the 
“Final Solution.”  The SS saw Romanian soldiers in Ukraine and Crimea as a liability to Nazi 
plans for an “orderly” extermination of all Soviet Jews.  Since July 1941, Einsatzgruppe D had 
reported that Romanian soldiers were “very corrupt,” “very incompetent,” “take bribes from all 
sides,” “plundered,” and “[do] not regard this war as ideological.”17  Romanian troops murdered 
Jews seemingly at random and ignored SS efforts to sort out “dangerous” Jews.  Now the SS did 
not trust them to kill all Jews without exception – and especially not to turn over all looted goods 
to the SS.  In German-occupied Ukraine Romanian troops felt free to beat, rob, arrest, and shoot 
Jews, much to the chagrin of the SS.  General Karl Kitzinger, commander of Reichskommissariat 
Ukraine, held a conference on 11 November in Nikolaev with General Corneliu Dragalina, who 
was commanding VI Corps (1st, 2nd, and 18th Infantry divisions) helping to occupy the territory 
between the Bug and Dnieper, to improve cooperation.  He emphasized that Romanian soldiers 
                                                 
“the combatants at Sevastopol have been promised that after the fall of the citadel they will be sent home,” he then 
warned that the temporary morale boost was not worth the subsequent disillusion, see, dosar, 1246, f. 1. 
16 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 624, f. 95; dosar 369, f. 351.  
17 Arad, The Einsatzgruppen Reports, 63, 73, 111, 166 
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did not have the right to interfere in the “Jewish Question” because it was “exclusively reserved 
to the ‘S.S.’ troops.”  During an inspection a few weeks later Dragalina ordered a Romanian unit 
in Kirovograd to turn over a group of Jews, survivors of an earlier massacre in the city who were 
being held as hostages, to the SS.  The SS assumed Jews bribed the Romanian soldiers to protect 
them.18  Therefore, Romanian soldiers largely played a supporting role in the “Final Solution” in 
German-occupied Ukraine and the Gross Aktion implemented by Einsatzgruppe D in Crimea.   
Before 500-600 men from Einsatzgruppe D arrived, German and Romanian troops were 
too occupied in combat to kill many Jews and an estimated 30,000-40,000 Jews remained in the 
peninsula, including 14,000 concentrated in Simferopol.19  There had been the usual crimes when 
cities fell, and the Germans quickly set up ghettos.  When Major Scârneci passed through Yalta 
in late-November, he visited Livadia Palace, but also saw Jews in the city marked with yellow 
stars.20  A Romanian unit set up the only rural ghetto in Crimea in a village called Voikovstat 
near Kerch, apparently the 100 Jews were not used as labor and survived through the new year.21  
In Crimea, the SS had the additional requirement of sorting out Karaites, ethnic Turks practicing 
a form of Judaism to be spared, from Krimchacks, Turkic-speaking Jews to be killed, because SS 
leaders in Berlin had recently decided their racial position on the two groups.  Romanian soldiers 
did not differentiate between them because a Jew was a Jew regardless of alleged racial reasons; 
the Germans later tried to educate Romanians on difference in articles in Ecoul Crimeei printed 
                                                 
18 Fond P.C.M.: CM, dosar 31/1941, f. 22-92; Arad, The Einsatzgrupeen Reports, 159. 
19 Yitzhak Arad, The Holocaust in the Soviet Union (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 202; 25,000-
30,000 Jews were probably successfully evacuated from Crimea to the Caucasus, see, Kiril Feferman, The 
Holocaust in The Crimea and The North Caucasus (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2016), 80, 120, 128.  
20 Scârneci, Viaţa şi moarte din linia întai, 199.   
21 The Jews had to wear yellow stars and lived in houses covered in barbed wire.  All but 20 were liberated by the 
Soviets after 26 December 1942, see, Feferman, The Holocaust in The Crimea and The North Caucasus, 157-158.   
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in December 1942 to explain the continued presence of Karaite Jews in Crimea.22  The first wave 
of murders by the SS began on 23 November, peaked during 9-13 December as 11,000-17,000 
Jews in Eupatoria, Kerch, Feodosia, Bakhchysarai, Simferopol (10,000 there alone) were shot by 
20-man execution teams, and ended on 18 December.23  The Gross Aktion was perpetrated nearly 
exclusively by the SS since Axis soldiers were occupied and few Romanians were in cities.       
General von Manstein began a second assault against Sevastopol on 17 December.  His 
men faced one of the most fortified ports in the world with three concentric lines of defense that 
had been thrown up in the previous months and manned by the Soviet Independent Coastal Army 
(recently arrived from Odessa) reinforced with Soviet soldiers from Crimea.  He had two corps, 
German LIV and XXX, placed in the northern and southern sectors respectively, reinforced with 
Romanian units on each wing, with the sea protecting the flanks of the Korne Detachment in the 
north and the 1st Mountain Brigade in the south – just as he had north of the Azov Sea.  Despite a 
determined Soviet defense, the Germans made remarkable progress in the center, while the 1st 
Mountain Brigade helped clear the southern coast, and on 20 December elements of German LIV 
Corps almost reached Severnaya Bay.24  These attacks pushed Germans and Romanians to their 
limits.  Major Scârneci noted soldiers in 3rd Mountain Battalion were utterly exhausted after 
repeated frontal attacks.  He worried, “if I will not be killed by the Russians, I will surely go 
insane.”25  The morale of Romanian soldiers was further depressed due to isolation from home 
because mail delivery had broken down, all leave had been canceled, Christmas packages sent by 
Antonescu arrived opened and partially pilfered, and few newspapers (army or civilian) arrived 
                                                 
22 Arad, The Holocaust in the Soviet Union, 203-204; Pontinus, “Evrei in Crimea,” Soldatul 10 Decembrie 1942, 1. 
23 Feferman, The Holocaust in Crimea and the North Caucasus, 123, 133, 146.  
24 Citinio, Death of the Wehrmacht, 63-64; Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 67. 
25 He blamed a callous Lascăr who yelled at him to advance, see, Scârneci, Viaţa şi moarte din linia întai, 229-239.   
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in Crimea.26  The Soviet Independent Coastal Army just managed to fend off a breakthrough by 
sheer tactical grit.  Stavka’s Soviet winter counteroffensive including an attack across the Kerch 
straits into his rear that forced von Manstein to call off any more plans.     
Winter Crisis: December 1941 to April 1942 
The defeat of the German Army in the Battle of Moscow and the Soviet counteroffensive 
launched on 5 December against Army Group Center not only threw Berlin into a crisis, but all 
the Axis capitals, including Bucharest.  The Soviet counteroffensive affected not only operations 
on the front, but decisions far to the rear in Transnistria.  On the front, the false hope that the war 
would be over by Christmas quickly disappeared and Third Army soldiers in Crimea were soon 
being pushed to their limits.  In Bucharest, delusions that the Romanian and Soviet Jews held in 
camps and ghettos in Transnistria would soon be pushed across the Bug into German-occupied 
territory to be deported east of the Urals evaporated.  The alarm bells in Bucharest really began 
to ring after the Soviets began amphibious assaults on the Crimean coast during Christmas 1941 
that then triggered a new wave of deportations and murders of Jews in Transnistria. 
Crisis on the Front and Genocide in the Rear 
The Antonescu regime’s attempt to use Transnistria as a dumping ground for Jews from 
eastern Romania before deporting them further east after German victory resulted in predictably 
nightmarish conditions by December 1941.  Antonescu decided that surviving Jews in Bukovina 
Bessarabia would be deported to Transnistria in early October.  Soon, the General Staff issued 
deceptively detailed orders to the gendarmes in eastern Romania on how the deportation should 
                                                 
26 No mail meant pay also could not be sent home, see, Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 947, f. 197; all soldiers got a 
Christmas package.  Officers and NCOs got extra coffee, rum, cigarettes, and a bar of soap.  Officers and NCOs in 
Transnistria only received (half the amount of) coffee and cigarettes, see, Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 369, f. 412. 
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be implemented that specified the size of each column of Jews, number of carts per column, 
rations, itineraries, preparation of mass graves to prevent disease, and authorized gendarmes to 
shoot anyone who fell out of line.27  These plans were fundamentally flawed, however, because 
the army did not provide enough gendarmes, maps, carts, rations, or even shovels to dig graves.  
Furthermore, columns were comprised mostly of women with children, and the elderly (most of 
whom were already weak, sick, or starving) who were forced to march up to 30 km a day.  Some 
were transported by train to the Dniester before continuing on foot towards the Bug.  One of the 
last groups to be deported were 12,000 Jews from southern Bukovina, which was not occupied 
by the Soviets in 1940, concentrated in Dorohoi.  A large ghetto remained in Cernăuţi to provide 
labor, but General Staff had largely realized its goal of ridding Bukovina of Jews.28   
The deportation plans soon broke down and the envisioned orderly transport turned into a 
series of death marches.  Gendarmes hoarded limited rations, got lost, found villages unable (or 
unwilling) to provide food, beat Jews, raped women, shot those who fell behind, left unburied 
bodies along the roads, robbed the deportees, and even sold off groups of Jews to peasants to be 
killed and stripped of their possessions.  Despite the horrors, most arrived in Transnistria where 
they joined Soviet Jews, but both groups were soon freezing in camps without food, medicine, or 
shelter.  The camps were usually set up in kolkhozes that had been stripped of anything of value 
by Soviets, locals, or Romanians and quickly became overcrowded.  Romanian Jews displaced 
Soviet Jews who were sent to camps further east on the Bug to make room for the new arrivals 
and then the arrival of more Jews from eastern Romania would displace them.  Most Romanian 
                                                 
27 Ioanid, The Holocuast in Romania, 143-144.   
28 Only half of Jews from the Dorohoi region survived to return in 1944, see, RG-25.004M Reel 14, dosar 2986, vol. 
4094, c. 584-586.  
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Jews crossed the Dniester at Moghilev, Iampol, and Râbiţa and ended up spread across northern 
Transnistria.  Jewish refugees caught by the advancing Axis forces were concentrated in camps 
near the Bug in the center of the province.  In southern Transnistria, approximately 45,000 Jews 
survived the October massacre in Odessa.29  The conditions in the ghettos in towns and cities set 
up by the Government of Transnistria were better than the isolated camps.  By December 1941, 
the Transnistrian Gendarme Inspectorate only had 179 officers, 372 NCOs, and 5,432 gendarmes 
(1,566 in Odessa), too few to effectively guard at least 300,000 Jews, even with help from local 
Ukrainian policemen.30  Romanian officers and civil servants still feared a Jewish uprising. 
The conditions in the camps and ghettos resulted in epidemics, typhus was very common 
and particularly feared by both Romanians and Germans who used it to justify mass murder in 
Golta County.  In mid-August 1941, the 200 men of the newly created Sonderkommando R (for 
Romania) left Germany for Transnistria with a mission to turn Soviet ethnic Germans into a Nazi 
vanguard for a future racial empire.  The Tighina Agreement gave the SS nearly unlimited power 
over ethnic Germans in Transnistria, even letting them to create Selbstschutz, or “self-protection” 
militia, in ethnic German towns.  The SS-directed militia fended off Romanian troops who looted 
German towns as readily as any other.31  During the fall, Sonderkommando R worriedly observed 
the establishment of Jewish camps near ethnic German towns and soon the SS believed that Jews 
spreading disease from camps poorly administered and guarded by Romanian troops presented a 
threat.  Third Army expressed concern about typhus outbreaks too and blamed Jews, although 
shortages of soap, hot water, and changes of clothes for soldiers were more likely causes.32  Most 
                                                 
29 Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania, 201.   
30 Jean Ancel, Transnistria, vol. I (Bucharest: Editura Atlas, 1998), 52-53.   
31 Steinhart, The Holocaust and the Germanization of Ukraine, 40-41, 75-77, 80. 
32 Peasant hygiene was never very good in general either, see, Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 731, f. 7, 17, 32-33, 44, 69.  
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of the ethnic German towns were in southern Transnistria, but Sonderkommando R did not want 
to take any chances and was its men were anxious to play a role in realizing the “Final Solution.”  
Therefore, it decided to convince Romanian officers to liquidate Jews in central Transnistria.       
Lt. Colonel Modest Isopescu, the recently appointed Prefect of Golta, proved amenable to 
SS overtures to help rid him of Jews.  Born in Austrian Bukovina, he served as a reserve officer 
in the Habsburg army during the First World War, so he knew some German.  He had served in 
Fourth Army Praetoral Service, directing gendarmes to “cleanse the terrain” in Chişinău, but 
after Fourth Army was demobilized he was ordered to stay to become a prefect in the 
Government of Transnistria.  Since the Legionary rebellion in January 1941, Antonescu had 
replaced Legionary prefects with officers and now extended this practice to eastern Romania and 
Transnistria.33  The Antonescu regime had to rely on officers, in part, because few civil servants 
wanted to relocate to the region.  Most prefects were reserve officers, but the fact that they were 
in uniform and under military discipline belied the “civilian” nature of the state in Transnistria.  
Dr. Gheorghe Alexianu was appointed governor but took his orders from the General Staff.   
Golta County became the destination for tens of thousands of Soviet Jews during the fall.  
Each day hundreds more arrived, despite Lt. Colonel Isopescu’s protests that he only had a few 
hundred gendarmes and Ukrainian police to guard them, almost no medicine, and little food.  By 
December 1941 the situation in the Golta camps were appalling, so when SS officers approached 
Isopescu to urge him to shoot the Jews because of the threat of typhus, promising ethnic German 
militiamen to help, he quickly accepted – his Habsburg origins may have smoothed negotiations 
                                                 
33 Legionaries took most prefect positions after September 1940, see, Heinen, Legiunea “Arhanghelul Mihail,” 422.  
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and his German language ability certainly did. 34  On 12 or 13 December, he visited Bogdanovka, 
the most overcrowded camp with over 50,000 people and had Ukrainians in the nearby village to 
bake bread to lure starving Jews to turn over the last of their valuables.  The next week teams of 
Romanian, German, and Ukrainian shooters began killing groups of several thousand a day.  The 
small number of men and sheer number of victims meant that the executions took several weeks.  
Soon after, officers at two other smaller camps at Dumanovka and Acmecetka in Golta County 
ordered the Jews they were responsible for shot.  They had even fewer gendarmes or Ukrainian 
guards, however, so while Romanian and SS guards finished killing a massive number of Jews 
relatively quickly at Bogdanovka in mid-January 1942, the murder at these much smaller camps 
dragged into early-February 1942.  Romanian gendarmes and Ukrainian police at Dumanovka 
and Acmecetka lacked aid from SS Selbschutz, so they often took a two-three day pause between 
each day of killing due to the physical and psychological strain exacerbated by the severe cold.   
After a few days of rest and warmth, they went back outside to finish their grisly task.35   
 As Lt. Colonel Isopescu’s men took a break from murdering Jews to celebrate Christmas, 
Stavka launched a counteroffensive to relieve Sevastopol and reconquer Crimea.  The Red Army 
landed at multiple points along the Kerch peninsula during the night of 25/26 December, and two 
nights later made a major landing at Feodosia.  The landings had immediate effect in Bucharest.  
Antonescu ordered Third Army on 28 December that “all kikes in Odessa” must be immediately 
deported due to the “resistance of SEVASTOPOL [sic] and the insufficient forces found there [in 
Odessa], we could expect a disagreeable surprise” from Jews that he expected to rebel if the Red 
                                                 
34 It is unclear if mid-level SS officers had orders from the leadership of Sonderkommando R or acted on their own 
initiative, hindered by paucity of wartime documents, see Steinhart, The Germanization of Ukraine, 120-126. 
35 Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania, 183-186. 
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Army landed.  He argued that “to keep [Jews] there is a crime.  I do not want to stain my activity 
with this lack of foresight.”36  The Conducător’s fears were overblown.  Robert Citino describes 
the Soviet landings as poorly organized, lacking specialized amphibious craft, and “more like the 
Gallipoli landing of 1915, [than Normandy in 1944,] with the main difference being the horrible 
weather.”37  Moreover, most military aged Jewish men in Odessa had evacuated with the Soviets 
or been killed by Romanian soldiers after the city fell.  The Red Army had great difficulties just 
landing troops in Crimea, much less sending a force all the way to Odessa, but only an estimated 
112,000 troops remained in Transnistria.  Half were poorly equipped third-rate units, such as the 
1st, 2nd, 3rd Security, and 1st Fortification divisions.  Third Army’s best troops occupied Ukraine 
or fought in Crimea, so the General Staff considered 45,000 Jews in Odessa a major threat. 
 While Governor Alexianu, prepared to deport the Jews of Odessa the military situation in 
Crimea remained precarious.  General Hans von Sponeck, commanding German XXXXII Corps 
in the Kerch peninsular, panicked and reterated after the Soviet Forty-Fourth Army landed, but 
General von Manstein took things in hand and transferred German XXX Corps from Sevastopol. 
Its mobile units, including the Korne Detachment, went ahead.  The 8th Cavalry and 4th Mountain 
brigades had battalions in Kerch that were thrown piecemeal against Soviet threats while other 
German units forced march west to east.  The 4th Mountain Brigade was soon knocked back by 
Soviet troops and tanks, but it had managed to slow down the enemy and win vital time for Axis 
reinforcements to arrive.  General Avramescu blamed “cowards” for panicking other soldiers and 
threatened to have them shot.  A few Romanian troops were “stupefied” [îndobitociţi] by Soviet 
                                                 
36 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 452, f. 2.  
37 Citino, The Death of the Wehrmacth, 65.  
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artillery fire, since the beginning of Operation Barbarossa infantry often endured bombardment 
without support form Romanian counterbattery fire, and heavy (if short) bombardments caused 
them to flee shallow foxholes.38  Despite the temporary reversal and some shell-shocked soldiers, 
most Romanians fought well and played an important role in delaying the Soviets long enough to 
allow von Manstein to set up a line across the Kerch peninsula and counterattack.   
 In the desperate situation, the Germans no longer had the luxury of diverting Romanian 
units to rear security and found them to be both effective partners in fighting to retake key cities 
and close collaborators in rooting out “Jewish-Communists” after successful counterattacks.  By 
15 January 1942 enough German reinforcements had arrived that von Manstein ordered XXX 
Corps to counterattack and retake Feodosia.  The city fell a second time to German-Romanian 
forces on 19 January.39  During this time, the Soviets landed troops in the rear to try to outflank 
the Axis line, on 4/5 January at Eupatoria north of Sevastopol and 12/13 January at Sudak west 
of Feodoisa, German troops supported by Romanian artillery defeated the landing at Eupatoria, 
but the Soviet established a beachhead at Sudak that took until 27-28 January to eliminate.  After 
retaking Sudak, Romanian soldiers massacred Jews left behind by the Red Army on the beach.40  
Further north, the Cavalry Corps, guarding the Azov Sea coast with two brigades, held off strong 
Soviet attacks.  Romanian soldiers now began to realize that the war was going to continue much 
longer.  When Sergeant Ionescu went to buy chicken and bread for Christmas, another NCO said 
the Germans had asked for a million Romanian soldiers for 1942 and after New Year’s he heard 
that after the Soviet landings were defeated the Mountain Corps may be rotated home, but a vast 
                                                 
38 Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 499, f. 162, 165-166.  
39 Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 65-66; Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 68; Duţu, Armata română în război, 
137-139.  
40 Report from the Soviet Krasny flot newspaper, see, Berkhoff, Motherland in Danger, 194. 
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mobilization was prepared for spring.41  In Crimea, the opposing forces settled into a stalemate, 
but on 18 January 1942 Soviet armies attacked in Ukraine and broke through south of Kharkov at 
Izyum.  Answering German pleas, the General Staff sent the 1st and 2nd Infantry divisions, then 
operating between the Bug and Dnieper, and diverted a mountain ski unit near Crimea to Izyum.   
 The Soviet breakthrough at Izyum made the deportation of Jews from Odessa that much 
more urgent.  Governor Alexianu issued Order No. 35 on 2 January 1942, announcing his plans 
to deport all Jews from Odessa to Berezovka and Oceakov counties to camps on the Bug.  Jews 
could only take 25 kg of personal possessions, had to sell off the rest of their property, and were 
expected to live off their own funds.  Municipal police would transport them to the train station 
and gendarmes would march them from railheads to camps in the countryside near the Bug to be 
used as labor.42  Alexianu knew that these deportations would result in many deaths.  During an 
earlier Council of Ministers meeting on 16 December 1941, he told Antonescu that he wanted to 
put 10,000 Jews to work at a Soviet naval barracks outside of Odessa, but he lacked food to feed 
them and did not know what to do with the rest of the Jews.  Antonescu told Alexianu to get rid 
of the Jews any way he could, immediately, he did not care how.  He even suggested packing the 
Jews into the catacombs under Odessa or throwing them into the Black Sea, “but get them out of 
Odessa.  I don’t want to know.  A hundred can die, a thousand can die, all of them can die, but I 
don’t want a single Romanian official or officer to die.”43  Alexianu quickly agreed. 
The deportations from the Slobotka ghetto in Odessa ghetto began on 8 January 1942.  
Once one of seven police commissions inspected Jews for hidden valuables – unsanctioned theft 
                                                 
41 Ionescu, Însemnări din război, 47, 49.   
42 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 452, f. 8-11.  
43 Full translated quote found in Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 176.   
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began in the ghetto out of sight of these official commissions as the news spread among civilians 
and soldiers that the Jews were being deported – groups of a thousand were marched under guard 
to the train station.  Each day dozens froze to death along the route as Jews were left out in the 
cold while they waited for their train.  They were packed into freight cars, sent east, and dozens 
more died before being unloaded.44  Then Romanian gendarmes or Ukrainian police marched 
groups of 50-100 Jews through the countryside, directly through the heart of Sonderkommando R 
in southern Transnistria, towards isolated camps on the Bug.  The sudden arrival of Jews passing 
through ethnic German villages surprised the SS, who feared the Jews would spread typhus, and 
so they decided to intercept, gather, and murder them.  Eric Steinhart believes that Alexianu sent 
the Jews through the area knowing that the SS would kill them, but this was just the most direct 
route to the Bug.45  Romanian gendarmes and Ukrainian police, usually turned over the Jews to 
the SS, no questions asked, in large part just to get rid of the burden and get indoors.   
 At the same time, the Soviet winter counteroffensive precipitated a crisis in the General 
Staff.  In late November, after Fourth Army demobilized, General Headquarters reverted to the 
General Staff, with General Iacobici still its chief, and Antonescu continued acting as Minister of 
Defense.  Then on 29 December 1941 Hitler wrote Antonescu announcing the need for a spring 
offensive and asking for a large Romanian contribution.  Antonescu offered 10 divisions with the 
possibility of more if German High Command agreed to provide arms and equipment and require 
the Hungarian Army to contribute large forces too.46  This triggered a clash between Antonescu 
and Iacobici.  Iacobici opposed such a large commitment, so he and his two deputy chiefs of the 
                                                 
44 RG-25.003M, Reel 18, dosar 452, c. 709-710, 713.   
45 Steinhard, The Holocaust and the Germanization of the Ukraine, 133-134, 140.   
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General Staff, generals Nicolae Tătăranu and Nicolae Mazarini, wrote a report on the danger of 
continuing to field Romanian units on the Eastern Front because they had proved ill-equipped in 
comparison to Red Army units with more firepower and mobility.  When the Conducător signed 
a formal agreement with the German Military Mission on 17 January, Iacobici wrote a letter of 
resignation stating that the war was unpopular, the Hungarian Army grew more threating as the 
Romanian Army was ground down on the Eastern Front, and no more than eight divisions should 
be provided to the Germans.  Antonescu cited the November 1941 plebiscite as proof support for 
the war, called Iacobici a defeatist, and accepted his resignation on 20 January – his two deputy 
chiefs of staff were demoted to command divisions.  Apologists argue Iacobici’ protest was the 
view of most officers, but Antonescu’s rebuttal truly reflected the feelings of the officer corps.47  
Iacobici was an outsider and unpopular.  He was an ardelean, had fought against Romania as an 
Austro-Hungarian officer, and spoke with a heavy German accent.  Antonescu had chosen him as 
Minister of Defense in 1940 because of his assumed pro-German sentiments, and his elevation at 
the expense Old Kingdom generals angered many officers.48  Iacobici’s resignation remained an 
isolated protest.  Antonescu easily replaced him with the compliant General Ilie Şteflea, who had 
commanded 3rd Infantry Division at Odessa and was a former Deputy Chief of the General Staff, 
and elevated General Pantazi, Subsecretary to the Minister of War since September 1940, to head 
the ministry on 23 January 1941.49  The triumvirate of Antonescu, Pantazi, and Şteflea proved a 
stable and enduring team, running the war until the royal coup of 23 August 1944.  
                                                 
47 Giurescu, Romania in the Second World War, 149-150; Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 73.   
48 Pantazi, Cu mareşalul până la moarte, 122, 160. 
49 After the war Şteflea claimed that he tried to refuse the assignment, but Antonescu threaten to kick him out of the 
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1942 and April 1944), but both times due to Antonescu’s insulting language about the quality of the General Staff’s 
work (“robotic,” “rigidity of Old Man Scabbard,” “stupid”) and failure to rebuild the army after Stalingrad, not a 
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 Fears of a Soviet amphibious landing at Odessa continued.  General Dăscălescu, now in 
command of II Corps, was given control of all the military and civilian institutions in the city on 
22 January 1942.  Troops on the coast were kept on high alert due to reports alleging parachutists 
had been dropped to free Soviet POWs in Transnistria and in Crimea civilians in Eupatoria had 
supported the failed Soviet landing there – Romanian and German troops shot an estimated 1,200 
civilian “partisans” in response.50  On 28 January, Romanian Royal Navy reported to the General 
Staff that a Soviet landing at Odessa was not likely, but Third Army Section II continued to warn 
of the danger of a parachutist assault on Transnistria.51  Therefore, deportations from Odessa did 
not halt and by early February an estimated 33,000 Jews, most of the surviving Jews were being 
marched east.  Selbstschutz militiamen continued to stop and massacre columns of Jews if they 
entered ethnic German towns, so most Jews did not reach camps on the Bug – especially once 
the SS began to seek out and intercept columns before they arrived in ethnic German towns.  
By the end of February most killing had ended.  At least 75,000 Jews were murdered in 
Golta (50,000 at Bogdanovka, 15,000 at Dumanovka, and 10,000 at Acmecetka) with another 
25,000 from Odessa murdered in Berezovka.52  In northern Transnistria the Romanians did not 
carry out mass executions, but the death rates from illness, starvation, and exposure in camps in 
Balta, Tulcin, and Moghilău counties were appallingly high.  In mid-February, reports began to 
reach Third Army of the scale of death during the winter.  An inspection at Dumanovka found 
                                                 
firm stand against continuing the war in the east like Iacobici.  Antonescu ignored his pouting and did not accept his 
resignations.  Şteflea employed his skills in service of the Antonescu regime to the end.  Later claims that he tried to 
limit Romanian commitment to the Eastern Front are belied by the facts, see, Fond Personal, dosar 7245, f. 153-183. 
50 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 511, f. 3, 6, 8-9, 12. 
51 Ibid., dosar 511, f. 23; now-Colonel Grosu ran Third Army Section II, see, dosar 307, f. 81. 
52 Ioanid estimates 70,000-75,000 killed in Golta, see, Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania, 186, 193; Steinhart 
estimates 25,000 by Germans along in Berezovka, not counting those Jews deported from Odessa killed by the 
Romanian and Ukrainian guards, see, Steinhart, The Holocaust and the Germanization of the Ukraine, 156, 131. 
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unburied bodies being eaten by dogs and Ukrainian guards shooting Jews on a whim.  Farther 
north in the Obodovka and Berşad ghettos, where there had not been mass executions, at least 
5,000 Jews had died from disease.53  The shortage of guards meant that some Jews were able slip 
in and out of the ghettos to trade valuables for food or sneak into the Moghilev ghetto to the west 
on the Dniester where the conditions were better.  Third Army ordered all executions to halt.   
 In Crimea, with the Red Army successfully bottled up at Kerch, Einsatzgruppe D rushed 
to finish the terrible work that the Soviet landings had interrupted.  During this second wave of 
genocidal murder beginning in January there were few German troops available to help with the 
rounding up of Jews and Romanian soldiers were now on the spot in cities with large surviving 
populations of Jews, so they played a much greater role in searching for and shooting Jews.  The 
SS used locally raised Tatar police to help seek out Jews too.  The 10th Infantry Division reported 
in late February that it had carried out “a cleansing action” in Eupatoria under German direction, 
taking seven partisans prisoner and shooting 26 Jews.54  By then, the SS had murdered the Jews 
in Karasubazar, Dzhankoi, and those still in Simferopol.  In the months to come, whenever called 
upon, Romanian soldiers reliably assisted Einsatzgruppe D in its hunt for Jews and partisans. 
Stalemate in Crimea  
 In February 1942, Romanian troops helped hold the line across the Kerch peninsula and 
carried out anti-partisan sweeps in the rear, while General von Manstein prepared an offensive to 
break the stalemate.  On 4 February, General Avramescu reminded his troops why they were still 
fighting.  “By defending Crimea, we defend the borders of the country, we defend the fields that 
                                                 
53 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 452, f. 25-26. 
54 Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 947, f. 503. 
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must be worked and that give our families food, we defend our children and protect the country 
from disaster and fire.  For as long as the enemy will be held far away from the borders of the 
country, our families will be able to work, to give us the necessities of war.”55  His soldiers knew 
the horrors they had inflicted on Jews and Soviet citizens during their advance, so the specter of 
Red Army troops in Romania among their families was a powerful motivator to fight.  
After eight months of combat on the front, the situation of the Mountain and Cavalry 
corps was serious.  General Lascăr reported on 2 February that the 1st Mountain Brigade only 
had 60 percent of its original strength and morale had been “sufficient” until 10 January, when 
they were thrown into battle for another 40 days, but now his men were “totally demoralized.”56  
General von Manstein awarded Lascăr the Knight’s Cross in January 1942 for his units suffering, 
he already got the Order of Michael the Brave in October 1941, but the General Staff transferred 
him to 6th Infantry Division in Romania after this pessimistic report.  This humiliating demotion 
might explain Lascăr’s steadfastness on the Don later in November 1942 as an attempt to restore 
his personal honor; the General Staff used this same tactic with other generals who showed lack 
of grit or sufficient faith in victory. 57  Chaplains worked as propagandists to shore up morale by 
giving sermons, passing out the few copies of Sentinela or Soldatul, and organizing conferences.  
Their work made more difficult because there were not enough priests, many of were older, and 
it was hard to reach soldiers who were spread across the peninsula in cities, remote mountains, or 
distant coasts.  Priest Ioan H. Popescu held a conference on 29 January with a company from 20th 
                                                 
55 Ibid., dosar 118, f. 506-507.   
56 For General Lascăr’s report, see, Ibid., dosar 947, f. 655-656.  
57 Some called him a coward, jumping at the chance to go home after getting a medal, see, Scârneci, Viaţa şi moarte 
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Mountain Battalion, the rest were in the mountains, with topics on “Patience in Suffering,” “The 
Holy Cause,” “Espionage-Holy Silence-Consequences,” and “Spiritual and Bodily Cleaniless.”58  
The General Staff took more concrete steps.  Since regular officers treated reserve officers like 
inferiors, denying them the same material benefits of career soldiers, Antonescu ordered that the 
families of reserve officers serving in the expeditionary corps in Crimea be eligible to take food 
and supplies from army warehouses, the same as families of regular officers.  Reserve officers’ 
families were struggling to make ends meet with the breadwinner gone.59   
The Red Army won the race to build up forces and attacked from the Kerch bridgehead 
on 27 February 1942 with three armies.  The Soviet offensive, however, made almost no impact 
against the outnumbered Axis forces stretched thinly across the Kerch peninsula, except for a 11 
km bulge in the north.  General von Manstein put the 4th Mountain Brigade at the very southern 
end of the line, with its right flank protected by the sea – as per his usual practice – whose troops 
had recovered from its earlier defeat at Feodosia and fought tenaciously.  Soldiers who had just a 
month before had been described as cowardly or shell-shocked shows what Romanian units were 
capable of when they were properly supported by artillery and aircraft to make up for their lack 
of firepower.  The sheer number of Red Army formations squeezed into such a small peninsula 
actually worked against them, especially due to the large Luftwaffe forces assigned to German 
Eleventh Army.  German pilots found it difficult to miss vehicles and armor packed on narrow 
roads.  Further Soviet attacks on 13 March, 26 March, and 9 April all failed.60   
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The battle at Kerch stripped every possible German unit from Sevastopol, leaving behind 
the Mountain Corps to help hold the line.  The 1st Mountain Brigade settled into trench warfare 
outside of the city, playing a vital part in keeping the Soviet Independent Coastal Army penned 
in on the other side of Crimea.  Major Scârneci noted that increased Luftwaffe patrols in the sky 
overhead improved morale, “I feel so good in my den, among sincere, devoted men.”61  Soldiers 
sung old First World War songs in the trenches to remind themselves of why they were fighting.  
General Vasiliu Răşcanu, who took over the 1st Mountain Brigade, reported his companies took 
15-20 casualties each day, reducing some to just 60-70 men instead of 200, so companies were 
stretched so thinly they had no reserves and could not rotate men off the line to rest.  His men 
were covered in lice too.  Răşcanu claimed, however, that morale was “pretty good, even at its 
best, [considering] the situation we find ourselves in.”62  Romanian units made the difference in 
Crimea and let General von Manstein snatch victory from the jaws of defeat at Kerch.   
Spring Army Reorganization  
German High Command, usually through Hitler making personal requests to Antonescu, 
asked for more from the General Staff.  The German Army planned spring counteroffensives in 
Crimea and at Kharkov to be followed by a major summer offensive into southern Russia and the 
Caucasus.  As battles raged on the front, in Bucharest the General Staff began preparing for the 
German summer offensive by mobilizing and reorganizing divisions collectively labeled Echelon 
II – the divisions east of the Dniester were labeled Echelon I.  Due to manpower shortages each 
infantry division had to reduce its number of battalions from nine to six, but increased Romanian 
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industrial production (including Soviet factories in Transnistria), captured stocks of Soviet small 
arms, mortars, and anti-tank guns, and a few German deliveries of Czech-made anti-aircraft guns 
or captured stocks of French weapons meant each division’s firepower did not suffer.63  Since the 
start of the war, however, Soviet divisions had superior firepower compared to Romanian ones, it 
only increased with time, so simply maintaining was not enough.  Losses in motor vehicles were 
partially replaced by captured Soviet ones or German deliveries.  On 15 March 1942, Romanian 
cavalry and mountain brigades were re-designated divisions.  This was purely a political decision 
because only two Echelon II mountain brigades (as both Echelon I brigades were understrength) 
were the same size as Hungarian and Italian divisions.  Antonescu wanted to be sure Romania’s 
contribution to the Eastern Front was not underrated by Hitler and thought he could convince the 
Führer to reward the Conducător by rectifying the loss of northern Transylvania.64   
 As the General Staff carried out this reorganization west of the Dniester, Third Army 
rounded up stragglers and deserters roaming the rear east of the Dniester, including some that 
had coalesced into bandit groups.65  By spring 1942 military prisons in Romania and on the front 
were filled with thousands of deserters, or soldiers guilty of other crimes, primarily for theft or 
smuggling, but also murder and rape.  A constant flow of orders by senior officers to threatened 
to shoot deserters, looters, alarmists, and rapists; pretty any soldiers guilty of an infraction.  Few 
were ever shot because there were too many, the General Staff needed men, and the Antonescu 
regime was unwilling to alienate public opinion by shooting soldiers – although small groups of 
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deserters were periodically shot so the threat still carried weight.  In March 1942 the army issued 
General Order No. 240; instead of being shot deserters would be released and sent to the front for 
rehabilitation and their record would be wiped clean if cited for bravery.66  Third Army’s courts 
martial had the responsibility of processing deserters and other miscreant soldiers arrested east of 
the Dniester as replacements to infantry or cavalry units – and signed off by General Dumitrescu.  
The process took time: courts martial were few and far between, accused troops required guards, 
and transport was in short supply.  General Avramescu complained these issues made the process 
onerous for the Mountain Corps, as he needed every soldier for combat, and received authority to 
oversee rehabilitation in Crimea.67  Their families were to be deprived of state aid until they were 
rehabilitated.  The General Staff even applied the policy of rehabilitation to troops thought guilty 
of self-mutilation, only those found “in the flagrant act of self-mutilation,” should be executed in 
front of their unit within 48 hours.68  In mid-March, Major Scârneci recorded a rash such cases in 
3rd Mountain Battalion outside Sevastopol that he blamed on new replacements “not raised in the 
spirit of the mountain troops.”  They used various methods: injection of urine or fuel, knife cuts, 
burns from boiling water, and cutting off fingers.69  In April 1942, the Sărata Training Center 
was set up in Bessarabia where inmates from prisons west of the Dniester, including political 
prisoners and common criminals, were sent to be re-trained before being formed into four 
“independent” infantry battalions that were later sent with Echelon II units to the Don. 
 The Romanian Army put men to work in fields from Romania to Crimea with the coming 
of spring.  On 24 March, the General Staff ordered units in Romania to create Agricultural Work 
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Labor Detachments, which were units of 500 recruited from minorities (Hungarians, Bulgarians, 
Ukrainians, or Russians) or raw Romanian draftees.70  The same day General Avramescu ordered 
his troops to help the Crimean populace with the spring planting to aid in alleviating shortages of 
food that he blamed on the Red Army’s scorched earth policy during its retreat.71  Additionally, 
General von Manstein had told him the previous November that the Axis forces required the help 
of locals, especially the “Mohamadans,” in anti-partisan warfare, so the Mountain Corps should 
give the Tatar minority favorable treatment.  Avramescu ordered the creation of a small canteen 
in Simferopol to feed orphans (a symbolic gesture as only 20-50 were fed each day with leftovers 
from soldiers’ meals) and took part in Islamic ceremonies.  The General Staff sent Captain Sebat 
Husein, an imam from near Constanţa, to carry out missionary work among Crimean Tatars.72  A 
veritable Romanian orientalism developed among officers and nurses in Crimea.  
 In March 1942, a spat broke out between generals Dumitrescu and Avramescu over who 
was to blame for material shortages facing the Mountain Corps in Crimea.  Avramescu was not 
shy about complaining to the General Staff, or even to General von Manstein, about shortages 
faced by his troops.  He requested that the battle-worn 1st Mountain Division be replaced by a 
fresh Echelon II division and accused Dumitrescu of being distant – his headquarters was still in 
Nikolaev – and unresponsive to his appeals to provide relief to the Mountain Corps.  Avramescu 
argued this forced him to approach the General Staff and Ministry of Defense directly to address 
his problems.  When the General Staff reproached him, Dumitrescu defended himself by arguing 
that he was well-aware of the situation on the front and blamed distance, bad roads, and shortage 
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of rolling stock for logistical issues.  He reminded the General Staff that German Eleventh Army 
had previously agreed to supply the Mountain and Cavalry corps, so Third Army was now only 
responsible for any issues of discipline.73  These recriminations rapidly passed.  Dumitrescu was 
correct and the Germans Army began supplying Romanian combat units on the front in Crimea, 
on the Azov Sea, or at Izyum.  In Crimea, however, Avramescu accrued more authority.  Since 
Romanian forces in the peninsula now consisted of a mixture of mountain, cavalry, and infantry 
divisions the General Staff created the Command of the Mountain Corps and Romanian Troops 
in Crimea under Avramescu.  He was responsible for discipline, coordinating supply issues with 
German Eleventh Army, and carrying out von Manstein’s operational orders.  Avramescu ran it 
as his personal fiefdom until October 1943.  He oversaw local propaganda efforts as well: setting 
up a radio station, printing Ecoul Crimeei, building churches, and increased “moral education.”  
Soon victories, improved logistics, and better rations greatly improved morale.  
 At the same time, the General Staff decided to sort out the chaotic mess of ghettos and 
camps in Transnistria to harness the labor of surviving Jews for the war effort.  The deportations 
during the fall and winter had scattered Jews across the province, many were given nothing to do 
(like the Jews in the Voikovstat ghetto in Crimea), no logistical system existed to feed them had 
they been given work, and due to a mixture of incompetence and indifference no one was quite 
sure just how many Jews had been deported or interned.  Probably 150,000 Jews survived the 
massacres and terrible conditions of the winter.  Senior officers now agreed that the survivors 
needed to be concentrated, watched closely, fed enough to keep them healthy, and put to work.74  
                                                 
73 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 314, f. 577-578; dosar 1044, f. 33-34, 139-141. 
74 An SSI report from late February declared, “Aside from the fact that it is inhuman to leave them in the current 
living conditions, it also constitutes a permanent danger, both for security and the health of the population and 
soldiers, as it defeats the purpose for which these camps were created,” see, Ibid., dosar 452, f. 24.   
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Third Army’s primary concern was the Moghilev ghetto, where a large group of Romanian Jews 
managed to find refugee, rather than be sent to the Bug – largely by ingratiating themselves to 
local Romanian authorities by putting their skills to work bringing local factories back to life.75  
While the General Staff approved, Third Army did not like having so many Jews at one of the 
main rail crossings on the Dniester.  General Traian Cocorăscu, commander of the 9th Cavalry 
Division, claimed in early April that the number of Jews in Moghilev had grown from 8,000 to 
15,000 and (less believably) that 30,000 more lurked hidden in the countryside.  He considered it 
a scandal that Jews could walk freely in the city.  He warned that Jews represented a security and 
a health risk to civilians and soldiers alike, and demanded they be evacuated farther east.76  The 
labor provided by Jews in Moghilev’s factories was too valuable to deport them, however, those 
deemed unnecessary or caught living from illicit trading were deported farther east.   
 Governor Alexianu had to balance the Antonescu regime’s demands to increase industrial 
and agricultural production in Transnistria and the Romanian Army’s complaints about security.  
Officers blamed gendarmes and Ukrainian police for lax security and endemic smuggling.  Many 
enterprising officers, NCOs, and soldiers traveling through Transnistria brought goods to sell on 
the black market “at speculation prices,” which was not only illegal but embarrassing, since the 
officer corps considered all commercial activity to be crass.77  Third Army complained soldiers 
were wandering Transnistria, overstaying leave or on forged papers, to smuggle goods, letters, or 
currency.  Illicit trade helped many Jews to survive to liberation.  Officers believed civil servants 
were corrupted by bribes from Jews and often accused them of sleeping, in the literal sense, with 
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the “Jewish-Communist” enemy.  Third Army put pressure on local prefects to organize periodic 
roundups of Jews not considered unproductive and send them to labor camps in the countryside.  
Soldiers arriving on leave from the front had to go through customs at the Dniester or the Prut, 
officers were not checked, and gendarmes confiscated items considered contraband.  Gendarmes 
were supposed to turn confiscated goods over to the state, but often did not and confiscated many 
things that were not contraband.78  Troops were deloused and turned in weapons, reclaimed later, 
to prevent abuse at home.  Those lucky enough to get leave came to hate the customs process. 
 As always Odessa was Third Army’s primary concern.  II Corps confronted the threat of 
Soviet partisans operating out of catacombs beneath the city.  They consisted of NKVD officers, 
Red Army soldiers, and desperate Jews seeking refuge.  Periodically, they organized attacks, but 
mainly just tried to survive on fetid water and whatever food they stole.  Since October 1941, II 
Corps had tried to identify and block openings to the caves.  In February 1942, the General Staff 
sent a smoke company, trained to conceal ground attacks or obscure targets from the air, to try to 
smoke out the estimated 700-800 partisans remaining in the caves.  The Germans vetoed any use 
of poison gas.79  In May, after smoking proved ineffective, II Corps returned to identifying and 
sealing openings, with help from informants, to keep the partisans bottled up.80  It was successful 
in halting attacks.  Starving partisans and Jews died, gave up, or got caught scrounging for food.  
Nonetheless, II Corps remained convinced that more partisans and Jews hid in the city, so Third 
Army order a new round of deportations in April to secure Odessa once and for all.  First on the 
list, Jews, a few hundred remained in the local jail.  Second, former members of the Communist 
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Party, all factories with 1,000-5,000 workers were kept closely surveilled.  Third, any deemed to 
be “suspicious” in seaside towns.  The Odessa Military Command was resurrected under General 
Trestioreanu with authority over all police, gendarmes, and soldiers in the city.  His task was to 
root all Jews, communists, and partisans, so II Corps could concentrate on guarding the coast.81   
VI Corps at Izyum 
 While the fighting raged in Crimea, Romanian units crossed the Dnieper to help German 
Seventeenth Army stop a Soviet breakthrough at Izyum.  The 1st Infantry Division, commanded 
by General Emanoil Bârzotescu, was closest in Kirovograd, and on the front on 21 January.  The 
Rotta Ski Detachment, with two mountain ski battalions, arrived in Krasnograd five days later.  
General Nicolae Ghineranu’s 2nd Infantry Division had to take over rear security from Nikolaev, 
in southern Ukraine, to Kirovograd, in central Ukraine.  The 1st Infantry Division and Rotta Ski 
Detachment marched 150-450 km in extreme winter conditions with 40 percent of horses dying 
and 30 percent of men suffering frostbite.  As Romanian regiments arrived in drips and drabs the 
Germans threw them onto the line near Dnepropetrovsk.82  Once all 1st Infantry Division arrived 
it counterattack on 13 February and won Bârzotescu an Iron Cross.  Soviet attacks on 20-21 
February against thinly spread soldiers lacking artillery support, since 1st Infantry Division had 
been spread out for rear security its artillery was slow in arriving from Mariupol, broke the line 
on 22 February and dazed troops fled 8-10 km.  The next day he personally led a counterattack 
that inspired panicked soldiers and restored the situation.  Regardless, General Dragalina sent 
exaggerated reports of a rout due to poor leadership to the General Staff, so Antonescu ordered 
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an inquiry into Bârzotescu’s actions during the retreat on 15 March.83  The mercurial Conducător 
did not countenance any “cowardice” or “incompetence” that came to his attention.  
 The battle seethed back and forth as the Soviet pushed slowly forward from Izyum and 
chewed up more Axis forces.  The General Staff sent the 2nd Infantry Division in response to new 
German requests that reinforced the German line on 9 March, again after a long march, and then 
immediately joined in a local counterattack near Lozovaya.  Romanian soldiers took heavy losses 
from combat and the cold.  General Ghineraru reported that in just ten days 2nd Infantry Division 
suffered 2,000 causalities, around half from frostbite.84  Apparently shocked and demoralized by 
the losses, he wrote four alarming reports during April directly to General Şteflea at the General 
Staff, bypassing his immediate superiors General Dragalina and General Dumitrescu, reporting 
that Soviet tanks were too strong, blaming the Germans for not giving support, and claiming his 
men were utterly spent.85  Foreshadowing Stalingrad, he did not exaggerate the weather, Soviet 
superiority in mobility and firepower, or German inability to make up the difference.  However, 
while he was ready to quit, he repeatedly asked for leave, his soldiers were not.  They doggedly 
held on and turned back a strong local Soviet offensive at the end of March.   
Commanders who showed such lack of resolve were not tolerated by others in the officer 
corps.  General Dumitrescu’s response to General Ghineraru’s letters, which were forwarded to 
                                                 
83 He and three of his staff officers, see, Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 888, f. 204; Bârzotescu was convinced Dragalina 
had a personal grudge against him and denied any panic, see, f. 223-226, 236-256; the German decision to award 
him the Iron Cross caused confusion, see, f. 198, 199; General von Kortzfleisch later attested to Bârzotescu’s ability 
and bravery and said he had no reason to regret giving the award for 13 February because after 22 February he 
restored the situation.  He was confused since he discussed the award with Dragalina who did not oppose it or tell 
him of the investigation.  Kortzfleisch blamed mid-ranking officers for the panicked retreat, see, f. 297-298. 
84 Ibid., dosar 1229, f. 15-18. 
85 Ibid., dosar 888, f. 167-168, 170-171, 175-177; it was not the first time he went over the head of his superior.  
Ghinereanu took over 10th Infantry Division after the explosion in Odessa and complained when he was replaced on 
8 November 1941.  Dumitrescu said he was not a good fit with Alexianu, see, dosar 309, f. 120-126.   
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him by the General Staff, provides insight into the mindset of most senior officers in 1942.  He 
dismissed even Ghineraru’s legitimate concerns, exhorted he that as an officer rather than being 
the first to complain and doubt he should embolden and encourage, and reprimanded him for his 
anti-German sentiments.  “The vital interest of our country is to give as much support as possible 
to the German Army to crush the common foe.  It is your duty to cooperate most sincerely and in 
the best manner [condiţiuni] with the German Army.”86  In a letter to “Beloved Şteflea,” written 
soon after, Dumitrescu told the Chief of the General Staff that Ghineraru’s attitude “leaves much 
to be desired…The general interest forces us to make sacrifices [in senior officers who lack grit], 
but we don’t really have anyone to replace the sacrificed.”87  As a consequence, the General Staff 
waited until after the crisis passed to fire Bârzotescu on 9 May, forcing him to retire soon after, 
and replace Ghineraru on 27 June, rotating him to an administrative post in Romania.     
German High Command and Stavka spent April planning offensives to take advantage of 
the Soviet salient at Izyum.  This required more soldiers, so the General Staff sent the 4th Infantry 
Division from occupation duties in Transnistria, and shortly afterwards the 20th Infantry Division 
from Romania, both arriving in early May.  General Dragalina’s VI Corps was sent to command 
all four divisions, now consolidated his forces had over 64,000 soldiers, and he was given part of 
the salient to defend.88  After a winter of crisis and uncertainty, the German High Command had 
big plans, not only to improve the situation, but to utterly crush the Soviet foe.  Stuck for months 
in terrible winter combat conditions a hairsbreadth’s away from disaster, Romanian troops would 
                                                 
86 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 1206, f. 85-95.  
87 Ibid., dosar 1206, f. 106.  
88 Axworthy, Third Ally, Fourth Ally, 70-71.  
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now participate in two of the most incredible counterstrokes in military history that restored their 
faith in the invincibility of the Wehrmacht and in final victory over “Judeo-Bolshevism.” 
Spring Recovery: May 1942 
 The German recovery began with Operation Bustard Hunt to clear the Kerch peninsula.  
Despite facing the same obstacles and cramped terrain, plus a defending Soviet force twice the 
size of the attacking Axis forces, General von Manstein managed the seemingly impossible, to 
break through, encircle, and destroy most of three Soviet armies.  He had two major advantages. 
First, the whole of Luftflotte 4 was assigned to Crimea, so his army had enough aircraft for a 
whole army group.  Second, the bulge in the northern sector, won at great cost in previous weeks 
by the Red Army and where most Soviet troops were concentrated, offered him the chance for an 
encirclement.  At Kharkov Marshal Fedor von Bock planned Operation Fridericus, which aimed 
to encircle and destroy the Soviet forces in the Izyum salient, but local Soviet attacks, shortages 
and spring flooding repeatedly forced the start date to be pushed back until mid-May.89 
Operation Bustard Hunt and Battle for Kharkov  
German Eleventh Army performed a veritable military miracle.  General von Manstein’s 
attack began on 9 May.  In the northern sector, newly arrived VII Corps (19th Infantry Division 
and 7th Heavy Artillery Regiment) and German XXXXII Corps attacked to pin down the bulk of 
the Soviet forces, but it was in the southern sector that German XXX Corps, with the support of 
22nd Panzer Division, made the main attack to break through Soviet Forty-Fourth Army.  It then 
wheeled to the north to bag the prize: Soviet Fifty-First and Soviet Fourth-Seventh armies.  The 
Grodeck Brigade, a hodgepodge of light motorized units including the Korne Detachment, drove 
                                                 
89 For German plans of operations Bustard Hunt and Frederick, see, Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 70-72, 92-94 
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straight on the city of Kerch as quickly as possible to disrupt any Soviet attempt to reform on two 
pre-prepared defenses, the Nasyr and Sultanovka lines.  Operation Bustard Hunt went almost like 
clockwork, despite initial difficulties crossing a massive anti-tank ditch, within days panzers had 
encircled Soviet forces in the bulge and with Luftflotte 4 turned it into a cauldron of death.   
The Grodeck Brigade carried out an epic attack.  Its lightly armored units were constantly 
engaged, soon it lucked into arriving at an unoccupied part of the Nasyr line that let it continue to 
the Sultanovka line, which it crossed on 10 May.  Now low on fuel and ammunition, the Grodeck 
Brigade’s luck ran out the next day when a Soviet counterattack stopped it dead and encircled it.  
The German-Romanian force used a “hedgehog” defense, drawing itself into a circle, as it came 
under attack from every side.  Colonel Korne was lightly wounded and had to temporarily turn 
over command to a subordinate.  The situation was so dire that supplies had to be dropped by air 
to the encircled forces on 11 May.  Colonel Grodeck took part of force to find a way forward, but 
on the morning of 14 May Luftwaffe aircraft accidently bombed it, mortally wounding Grodeck.  
He was evacuated, dying days later, so Korne took over and directed the brigade’s final advance 
on Kerch with his arm in a sling.90  The Axis forces now overlooking Kerch and were treated to a 
spectacle as the disorganized survivors of three Soviet armies tried to escape across the straits by 
any means possible.  Since Luftflotte 4 had to be sent north to stop a Soviet offensive at Kharkov 
the air above was suddenly empty of Luftwaffe aircraft, but General von Manstein brought up his 
artillery on the heights around the port and began a slaughter that lasted until 16 May.  The battle 
ended with German-Romanian forces capturing 170,000 troops, 1,100 guns, and 250 tanks; at a 
                                                 
90 Duţu, Armata română în război, 146-149; Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 72-75.   
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cost of just 7,588 Axis casualties, including 988 Romanians.91  German Eleventh Army did not 
have a long time to bask in the glory because von Manstein had to turn back to Sevastopol.   
General Dragalina’s VI Corps had arrived just in time to help German Seventeenth Army 
hold the southwest part of the Izyum salient after the Soviets beat the Germans to launch a major 
offensive.  Marshal T. S. Timoschenko’s forces attacked on 12 May from the northern part of the 
salient lunging forwards trying to encircle Kharkov, but another pincer further north encountered 
more resistance causing the Soviets to pause after three days and gave the Germans a chance to 
take the initiative.92  With Luftwaffe forces transferred from Kerch, a nervous Marshal von Bock 
finally initiated Operation Frederick on 17 May.  General Ludwig von Kleist’s 1st Panzer Army 
attacked the southern base of salient, farther west German Seventeenth Army with Dragalina’s 
VI Corps continued to hold the line to keep the Soviets in the bag, and German LI Corps drove 
down from the north to meet up with the panzers.  The salient was pinched off on 22 May, but 
intense fighting followed as the Soviets tried to break out eastwards, so VI Corps’ sector to the 
southwest became relatively quiet.  By 28 May the battle was over.  VI Corps had withstood all 
attacks and then harried the fleeing Soviets.  Both th 85th and 93rd Infanterie regiments had their 
flags, the symbol of regimental honor that had been confiscated by Antonescu in April because 
of alleged cowardice on 22 February during 1st Infantry Division’s retreat, restored due to their 
recent bravery.93  In June, VI Corps helped with mop up operations after the end of the battle for 
Kharkov and 240,000 Soviet soldiers, 1,200 tanks, and 2,600 guns were netted in the cauldron.94  
                                                 
91 Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 77; Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 68-69.  
92 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 71; Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 94-99. 
93 Fond Third Army, dosar 888, f. 236, 270-274, 354; dosar 1119, f. 153.    
94 Duţu, Armata română în război, 167; Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 103-109. 
 348 
 
The news was trumpeted on the radio by Axis propaganda.  Sergeant Ionescu excitedly recorded, 
“here [in Crimea, Romanian soldiers] hope in a decisive victory [for] Christianity.”95 
General von Manstein turned his attention to preparing for a final assault on Sevastopol.  
The Mountain Corps would play a major supporting role.  After VII Corps arrived at Kerch, the 
4th Mountain Division had been transferred to Sevastopol to reinforce the 1st Mountain Division 
and was soon joined by the 18th Infantry Division.  Together with German formations, they kept 
watch on the Soviet Independent Coastal Army as the blow was delivered at Kerch.  The trench 
warfare, backed by German artillery and aircraft, suited the Romanians.  In May the Ministry of 
Defense issued a new medal called Crusade against Communism, which troops proudly wore on 
the front.96  Morale revived as German Eleventh Army units from Kerch, Luftflotte 4 forces from 
Kharkov, and super-heavy artillery from the Reich took up positions outside Sevastopol. 
End of the “Final Solution” in Crimea and Deportation of Gypsies from Romania 
After Operation Bustard Hunt, General Avramescu focused on bringing order to Crimea. 
The Mountain Corps swept up stragglers and deserters (processed for rehabilitation), began anti-
partisan sweeps in the Yaila mountains, and carried out raids in cities in cooperation with the SS.  
Any partisans or Jews they discovered were turned over to the Germans.  Partisans were hanged 
as a warning to locals.  Jews were killed by the SS, who increasingly employed mobile gas vans 
to asphyxiate them, which spared the murders the psychological trauma of shooting Jews.97  The 
General Staff warned troops not to let down their guard.  It circulated stories like a Soviet POW 
being used by 1st Mountain Battalion to care for horses being revealed to be a Jew, the discovery 
                                                 
95 He miss-wrote “o victorie decisive asupra creştinismului,” see, Ionescu, Însemnări din război, 94.  
96 This medal was also issued to civilians for helping the war effort, see, Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 813, f. 335. 
97 Ibid., dosar 852, f. 168; Feferman, The Holocaust in Crimea and North Caucasus, 123, 132. 
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of two Jewish women from Chişinău posing as Romanians employed as translators by Section II 
officers who freed them from POW camps on the Bug, and female partisans being left behind by 
the Soviets at Kerch to carry out sabotage.98  Romanian officers and soldiers remained convinced 
Jews and partisans were everywhere and helped German troops round up the last Jews in Crimea.  
By June only a few hundred Jews survived in hiding, several thousand protected Karaite Jews in 
Simferopol or Karasubazar were left alone, and 4,000-5,000 Jews remained in Sevastopol.99 
 On 1 June, as General von Manstein readied his assault at Sevastopol for the next day, the 
Antonescu regime began deporting nomadic and “criminal” Gypsies to Transnistria.  Anti-Gypsy 
racism was rife in interwar Romania, but in February 1942 Antonescu began increasingly talking 
about deporting Gypsies, particularly from in Bucharest or other large cities.  He argued that they 
were cowards, lazy, and dirty.  During May 1942 the Ministry of Internal Affairs began a census 
to discover just how many nomadic and “criminal” Gypsies existed.  Before a proper census was 
finished, however, the Antonescu regime organized two waves of deportations, the first in June-
July and second in September, that interned 25,000 Gypsies in camps in Transnistria.100  At the 
same time, Gustav Ritcher, an SS representative at the German Embassy, and Radu Lecca, head 
of the Central Jewish Office, began negotiating in Bucharest to deport all remaining Jews west of 
the Prut to Nazi death camps in Poland.  Despite the fact that tens of thousands of Gypsy soldiers 
were in the ranks, the deportation of nomadic and “criminal” Gypsies did not trigger protest from 
officers, instead they requested clarification on what to do with Gypsy soldiers whose families 
                                                 
98 Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 923, f. 89-90; Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 1498, f. 3; the Ministry of Defense claimed 
ships arrived in Kerch with 570 specially trained young women, see, Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 916, f. 63-64.  
99 Some Karaites joined Tatar police to prove their loyalty, see, Arad, The Holocaust in the Soviet Union, 204, 211. 
100 The few Romanian eugenicists among the intellectual elite, who believed that Gypsies were “the great racial 
problem of Romania” also played a major role in this decision, see, Solonari, Purifying the Nation, 268-269, 271. 
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had been deported.  Most Romanians supported the two deportations, first nomadic and second 
“criminal” Gypsies, but the threat of a third round of deportations targeting assimilated sedentary 
Gypsies triggered appeals to sympathetic authorities.  A few influential liberal elites opposed the 
deportations as well.  Constantin Brătianu, head of the outlawed Liberal Party, sent a protest to 
Antonescu, the SSI reported disquiet among the shadow National Peasant Party, and liberal elites 
in Bucharest privately bemoaned the policy.101  The Antonescu regime was sensitive to such elite 
criticism, Gypsy manpower was needed by the army, and unencouraging news from the front led 
to a temporary halt order in mid-September of further deportations of Gypsies or Jews. 
Fall of Sevastopol 
 When a massive bombardment on Sevastopol began on 2 June, the situation on the front 
seemed much brighter.  While the Mountain Corps had help keep the 106,000 men of the Soviet 
Independent Coastal Army bottled up, they had not prevented the Soviets from using five months 
of trench war to reinforce the already formidable defenses, so General von Manstein now faced a 
maze of bristling warrens, reinforced by natural obstacles, and back by coastal and naval guns.  
There was no choice but to attack the defenses head on, but von Manstein again had Luftflotte 4, 
recently returned from defeating the Soviet offensive at Kharkov, plus heavy siege howitzers of 
305 mm, 350 mm, and 420 mm, and three super-heavy guns – two 600 mm and an 800 mm gun, 
the world’s largest with a crew of 2,000 it fired just 48 rounds over 13 days.  In total, over 600 
aircraft and 611 artillery guns were concentrated on a mere 34 km.  He had one more advantage, 
                                                 
101 Solonari, Purifying the Nation, 289-290; Brătianu pleaded, “They are Orthodox…and play an important 
economic role in our country…Why all this cruelty?  What crime have thy committed, [unlike the Jews of eastern 
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and Diaries, vol. II, 317; on 20 September, she noted in her journal, “Now start the horrors with Gypsies too.  Where 
will we arrive?  When will be stop?  More and more I feel that we are myopic!” see Voinescu, Jurnal, vol I, 500. 
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German-Romanian troops sensed victory.  An increasing number of Soviets deserted to the Axis, 
Romanian units used many POWs for menial work or to assist officer’s orderlies.102   
General von Manstein departed from his usual practice and placed Romanian units in the 
center of the German line.  He knew Sevastopol could only be seized by taking the hills over the 
bay across from the city from the north and passing over the old 1854-1855 battlefields from the 
south, so assigned 1st Mountain and 18th Infantry divisions, with three heavy artillery battalions, 
to the center.  German LIV Corps, including 4th Mountain Division, took the north and German 
XXX Corps, including a Romanian heavy artillery regiment, took the south.103  The assault made 
steady progress.  Romanian troops used “firecrackers,” improvised bombs using tires filled with 
explosives and grenades, which they rolled down onto Red Army positions.  They compensated 
for lack of firepower by infiltrating forward before attacking to limit exposure to fire as much as 
possible.  Infantry-artillery coordination continued to be difficult, due to a shortage of radios and 
training, and at times infantry attacked without artillery support.104  The massive bombardments 
by German guns and aircraft threw so much dust into the air that it darkened the sun, so Sergeant 
Ionescu wrote that the battle was, “Something like in the Apocalypse.”105   
At midnight on 28/29 June, after his troops seized the northern shore of Severnaya Bay, 
General von Manstein surprised the Soviets with a landing by a hundred assault boats taking the 
port.  The defenses crumbled on the landward side after news of the German penetration into the 
rear reached the trenches.  Stavka ordered evacuation on 30 June.  Soviet soldiers tried to escape 
west down the Chersonese Peninsula, but ships never came for them.  Now, with the road open 
                                                 
102 Orderlies had 1-2 POWs and each combat group had 2-3, see, Scârneci, Viaţa şi moarte din linia întai, 369.   
103 Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 78-79; Duţu, Armata română în război, 152. 
104 Scârneci, Viaţa şi moarte din linia întai, 341, 345, 355-356, 367 
105 Ionescu, Însemnări din război, 101. 
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to Sevastopol, von Manstein tried to divert the Romanians: sending 1st Mountain Division to 
clear the southern shore of the peninsula, 18th Infantry Division to fill its place to prevent Soviets 
from escaping into the mountains to the east, and 4th Mountain Division simply to halt in place.  
When his German superior offered General Gheorghe Manoliu, commander of 4th Mountain 
Division, champagne to toast the Soviet collapse he refused.  Manoliu declared he had not come 
to drink champagne outside Sevastopol but inside the city, so von Manstein quickly let his troops 
join in the final attack on 1 July and they helped clear the city until it was declared secured on 4 
July.  The final assault captured 60,000 soldiers in Sevastopol, plus 30,000 POWs in the 
Chersonese peninsula, in exchange for 35,500 Axis casualties, including 9,500 Romanian 
soldiers.106 
 The fall of Sevastopol was a bloody affair.  Romanian soldiers wanted revenge for slain 
comrades during the assault and were convinced that Jews, commissars, and fanatical communist 
women were responsible for its continued resistance.  Sergeant Ionescu noted rumors of a Jewish 
female soldier firing a mortar after the rest of the crew fled, Soviets shooting Romanian POWs, 
and the Red Army forcing women and children to fight.  Major Scârneci, leading efforts to clear 
catacombs on in Chersonese peninsula, believed political commissars, fanatics, and “mad, wild 
women” were shooting Soviet soldiers who wanted to surrender.107  Romanian soldiers joining 
the Germans in rounding up Soviet POWs in the city on the peninsula often shot Red Army Jews 
on the spot108  The SS began its butchery of remaining Jews in the city soon afterwards.  A large 
number of female soldiers were taken as POWs.  1st Mountain Division separated them from the 
                                                 
106 Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 80-81; Duţu, Armata română în război, 154-159.   
107 Ionescu, Însemnări din război, 100; Scârneci, Viaţa şi moarte din linia întai, 371-373.  
108 The Romanians claimed that they were “trying to escape”, see, Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 916, f. 96.  
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male prisoners in a collective farm turned POW camp where the women seem to have received 
better treatment, although some may have been raped.109  After Sevastopol fell, rumors swirled 
among Romanian soldiers in Crimea that they would finally be rotated home. 
Lull before Case Blue  
 The start of Case Blue, the German summer offensive, meant that more Romanian troops 
were needed for the front and soldiers were disappointed to learn that they would either stay in 
Crimea or join in Case Blue.  While the Antonescu regime could not send troops home, it still 
promised that it would care for soldiers’ families if they were killed in combat.  Antonscu issued 
an order on 8 July celebrating Lieutenant Ioan Drăgănescu, who was killed outside Sevastopol in 
December 1941, in which he declared Drăgănescu’s nine children would all be cared for by the 
state.  The Conducător was trying to motivate troops with the promise of a military welfare state.  
This promise was not just rhetoric.  Antonescu established special military schools for orphans of 
men killed in combat, who were to become a new military elite after the war, and increased state 
financial aid to soldiers’ families to keep up with inflation.110  Patriotism, anti-communism, hope 
for a better post-war Romania, and fear of “Judeo-Bolshevism” kept soldiers motivated.   
General Avramescu reported a strange phenomenon in June.  Beginning in February 1942 
a trickle of soldiers arrived in Crimea asking to be assigned to the front, with 45 in March alone, 
and by August an estimated total of 200-300 soldiers.111  A few were stragglers from the battles 
around Kharkov rounded up by gendarmes, but most came from the 1st Fortification Division and 
turned themselves in willingly.  This division used to build defenses, first in Bessarabia in 1939, 
                                                 
109 He claimed that they soon became friends, see, Scârneci, Viaţa şi moarte din linia întai, 374. 
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then in Moldavia in 1940, and now in Transnistria near Odessa.  The conditions in this glorified 
construction unit were particularly bad.  General Dăscălescu took officers in the 1st Fortification 
Division to task because they were neglecting soldiers, leaving them unsupervised day and night, 
while they found more comfortable quarters.112  When they turned up in Crimea, the troops cited 
violent officers and NCOs, verbal abuse, and squalid conditions to explain deserting to the front.  
A few had tried to patriotically volunteer for the front, instead of sitting out final victory digging 
trenches, but many were probably attracted by news of better rations in Crimea.113  Avramescu 
decided to not to question his luck and assigned them to units in Crimea.  He needed every man 
to clear catacombs, patrol mountain roads, and guard the coasts from Soviet landings. 
 During the final assault on Sevastopol, Third Army obsessed over securing the rear in 
Transnistria.  Third Army Section II reported on 12 June that it was convinced 20,000 young 
Jewish men were still hiding in Odessa and questioned the reliability of 10,000 Soviet workers.   
It accused municipal police of being “[effectively] inexistent, thieves, and Judaized” who helped 
“camouflage” Jews in exchange for bribes.  Odessa Military Command reported on 20 June that 
only 1,950 former Communist Party members turned up when required to register, 30 percent of 
whom were working for the Government of Transnistria.  A few Jewish women, children, and 
elderly presented themselves too.  Third Army Section II argued the low numbers were proof of 
civil servants’ corruption and efforts to hid “Jewish-Communists.”114  These attacks had some 
                                                 
112 He threated to court martial officers and NCOs, see, Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 369, f. 399; dosar 511, f. 59.  
113 The Mountain Corps began receiving rations from the Germans in February that included higher quality, greater 
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validity as black-market activities increased in 1942, especially with bumper crops in Romania.  
The Chişinău Gendarme Inspectorate blamed the Cernăuţi Gendarme Inspectorate for contraband 
flowing across the Dniester, arguing it came from the Cernăuţi ghetto where an estimated 21,000 
Jews worked in factories.  Soldiers of the 4th Bridge Company were caught smuggling goods and 
medicine, possibly with help from officers who got a cut of profits.115  Black-market activity was 
too profitable for soldiers, gendarmes, or civil servants to resist, but it fed officers’ paranoia that 
Jews and partisans were a major threat.  Raids, deportations, and executions continued.    
Summer Offensive: June-August 1942 
Case Blue planned for a large Romanian contribution to Army Group South.  Third Army 
initially had operational command of I (2nd Mountain and German 298th Infantry divisions) and 
Cavalry corps.  Additional Echelon II units were to arrive later.  Lieutenant Dumitru Teodorescu 
recalled a celebratory atmosphere in mid-July when 2nd Mountain Division, the first Echelon II 
unit mobilized, left for the front.  The train station in Deva was crowded with people to see off 
the men with flowers and well-wishes, "All are faithful troops [with a] single desire: to vanquish 
[the enemy]!"  But on one occasion such a farewell was marred when soldiers fired off rifles and 
panicked civilians.116  They were transported by train most of the way but had to march the last 
several hundred kilometers to Rostov to join in Case Blue.  This was only the first of many long 
marches, German officers praised the marching ability of Romanian troops, and Teodorescu was 
proud of “our pedestrian engines.”117  Already on the front, VI Corps followed 1st Panzer Army’s 
attack across the Donets River on 22 June to seize better jumping off positions before Case Blue 
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officially started six days later.  VI Corps stayed on the defensive until 7 July when it followed 
4th Panzer Army, marching 25-30 km a day, rounding a measly 3,100 POWs along the way, until 
it reached the Don River on 27 July, where it defended the Tsimlyansk bridgehead.118  All its 
effort was in vain because Case Blue failed to encircle and destroy large Soviet forces.119 
German High Command split Army Group South and relaunched Case Blue in late-July.  
Army Group A had the primary goal of attacking into the Caucasus to seize its oil fields.  Third 
Army would support this attack, but lost operational control of I Corps, leaving only the Cavalry 
Corps, although it was reinforced with two extra heavy artillery regiments, a scout group, and a 
pioneer battalion.  Army Group B had a secondary mission to protect the flank by attacking east 
to seize Stalingrad on the Volga River.  VI Corps would support this attack.120  Army Group A, 
supplied with almost all available fuel and aircraft, began Operation Edelweiss on July 26 and its 
attack south from Rostov broke through quickly.  Army Group B, which had launched Operation 
Heron several days before, was now robbed of fuel and stalled.  After Army Group B fought off 
Soviet counterattacks and received fuel it advanced.  VI Corps marched east in the wake of the 
14th Panzer and 29th Motorized divisions, advancing 130 km, to guard bridgeheads and flanks.  
In the Caucasus, General Dumitrescu pushed the Cavalry Corps hard in pursuit.  The 5th 
Cavalry Division snaked its way down to clear the Azov Sea coast, taking Yeysk and Primorsko-
Akhtarsk on 9 and 11 August, each port was skillfully defended by Soviet marines before being 
evacuated by sea.  The 6th and 9th Cavalry divisions, now joined by the Korne Detachment from 
Crimea, advanced with the Franc Mechanized Detachment driving straight on the Kuban River to 
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cut off the Taman Peninsula.  The Soviets made a stand on the Kuban at Slavianskaia.  A mixed 
German-Romanian force took the city on 11 August.  The Romanians took 600 POWs, but after 
two soldiers were shot by snipers in the town the cavalrymen executed 50 civilians.121  General 
Racoviţa ordered 5th Cavalry Division, tired from its port hopping, to guard bank of the Kuban, 
while he regrouped his two other divisions to attack the port of Temryuk.  Dumitrescu thought 
Racoviţa was taking too long, so on 19 August he sent his chief of staff General Ioan Arbore to 
organize an immediate attack to take the port and let Axis troops cross from Crimea.  The two 
generals butted heads.  The Soviet marines made a stand, inflicted heavy losses, and it took five 
days to take the port – Arbore and Racoviţa pointed blame at the other.122 
Only a week into the offensive, the German High Command decided that the Caucasus 
was an operational dead end and switched the main effort to seizing Stalingrad.  On 7 August, a 
refueled Army Group B attacked east and quickly encircled and destroyed parts of two Soviet 
armies on 8-10 August at Kalach.  Now with the path clear it raced east and reached the Volga 
on 23 August.  VI Corps trudged forward another 400 km.  In the Caucasus, the Cavalry Corps 
crossed the Kuban on 27 August attacking southwest to clear the coast to protect the flank of the 
German lunge for the oil fields at Maikop farther east begun 4 August.  The Korne Detachment 
reached the Black Sea at Anapa on 31 August, taking the port off the march, after turning Soviet 
heavy artillery on the port.  German High Command could not support Army Group B’s attack 
                                                 
121 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 81-82; Fond Documentar, dosar 8178, f. 48, 258.  
122 Racoviţa wrote to Pantazi and blamed Dumitrescu for being out of touch, giving unrealistic orders, and sending 
Arbore who made a mess of the attack.  He wanted any investigation to blame the losses on Dumitrescu, see, Fond 
Corpul de Cavalerie, dosar 639, f. 169-178; Dumitrescu defended himself and blame Racoviţa for making the same 
old mistakes as in previous battles.  His accusations against Cavalry Corps are contradictory saying it both attacked 
off the march too quickly and gave the Soviets too much time to regroup to set up defenses.  As an artilleryman, he 
also blamed the infantry for lack of skill and not giving the artillery accurate information, see, f. 209-215. 
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towards Stalingrad and Army Group A’s advance in the Caucasus, so the farther it went the less 
fuel, ammunition, supplies, and aircraft it had.123  It also began to lose Romanian units. 
Fall of Stalemate: September to November 1942 
 Case Blue initially electrified Romanians.  Antonescu and the General Staff were slightly 
less credulous of German propaganda than the year before, but not by much.  Regardless of what 
they believed, they had little choice but to provide German High Command as many soldiers as 
possible.  The survival of the Antonescu regime, holding onto eastern Romania and Transnistria, 
and the return of northern Transylvania were tied to a Soviet defeat.  The deceptively successful 
offensives by Army Group A and Army Group B kept the faith of most Romanian officers and 
soldiers in German invincibility.  One last effort before final victory seemed possible.  General 
Şteflea reactivated the General Headquarters on 8 August and traveled to Rostov to coordinate a 
massive deployment of Echelon II units.  On 20 August, Hitler dangled the prize of resurrecting 
Army Group Antonescu after the fall of Stalingrad before the Conducător.124 
 The Romanian forces at Stalingrad began with Echelon I units.  General Hermann Hoth, 
commander of Fourth Panzer Army, placed VI Corps to cover his front at Tinguta, south of the 
city, to free up his panzers to swing north and link up with German Sixth Army to create a front 
just west of Stalingrad.  A Soviet attack on 5 September momentarily knocked the Germans off 
balance, allowing Soviet forces to organize a defense of Stalingrad despite intense bombing by 
the Luftwaffe, but General Friedrich Paulus soon organized an assault.  Within a week German 
Sixth Army cut off General Vasily Chuikov’s Sixty-Second Army in the city.  On 13 September 
                                                 
123 Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 246-247, 233-237. 
124 An obvious ploy, but Hitler also wanted his steadying influence, see, Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 84.   
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launched a new assault to overrun Stalingrad, but it soon degenerated into a multitude of nasty 
battles on bombed-out streets that provided perfect cover for Red Army troops.125  As Stalingrad 
sucked in German Sixth Army, Army Group B required more Romanian soldiers for its flanks.   
During September, the General Headquarters deployed another army from Romania and 
transferred soldiers from other fronts.  At Rostov, it funneled Echelon II units from Romania to 
the Don, and ordered a few available Echelon I units, the 5th Cavalry and 18th Infantry divisions 
from the Caucasus and Crimea, to reinforce VI Corps, although it took until October before they 
arrived.  On 16 September, General Şteflea ordered General Dumitrescu to transfer Third Army 
headquarters to the Don, leaving behind the Cavalry Corps which was subordinated to German 
operational control.  Before these forces arrived, VI Corps had to stretch itself over 60 km of the 
Kalmuk steppe south of Stalingrad.  VI Corps’ line was east of a series of lakes oriented north-
south, but a Soviet attack on 29 September inflicted heavy losses on VI Corps and pushed it back 
to the lakes.  Subsequently, Fourth Panzer Army sent the German 14th Infantry Division to take 
over part of the VI Corps line allowing it to hold the line through October.126  On October 10, 
after enough Echelon II units arrived, Third Army took over a section of front west of Stalingrad 
on the bank of the Don from German Sixth Army and Italian Eighth Army.  Dumitrescu’s forces 
included I, II, IV, and V corps, comprising eight infantry and two cavalry divisions, and totaled 
171,000 men.127  General Headquarters could not supply these troops, so Army Group B under 
General Maximilian von Weichs was to provide ammunition, supplies, and other materials.128 
                                                 
125 Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 248-251.  
126 Duţu, Armata română în război, 212; Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 85.  
127 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 86; Duţu, Armata română în război, 188. 
128 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 1416, f. 169.   
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Soldiers arrived on the front after a long train ride, officers in third class passenger cars 
and soldiers often in cattle cars with just hay or benches, and a long march from the railhead at 
Mariupol.129  During the march to the front, whenever Romanian soldiers stopped for a break or 
to rest for the night local villagers would bring babes, children, and even youths up to 15 years 
old to be baptized by the chaplain or even by lay soldiers.  Romanian soldiers saw this as proof 
of local piety and their crusade against “godless communism,” but Soviet peasants had a material 
motive too.  Soviet civilians knew Romanian officers and soldiers, like good godfathers, would 
provide some sort of baptismal gift, even if it was just a small amount of food or soap.  Captain 
Dumitru Păsat, a company commander in the 991st Independent Infantry Battalion that was the 
first of three battalions sent to the Don from Sărata Training Camp, baptized at least ten on his 
way to the front and christened them with the names of his loved ones at home.130  After a long 
march, periodically harassed by Soviet aircraft, soldiers were thrown into battle on the Don.  
October was a grueling month of positional warfare between Romanian and Soviet troops 
battling over small hills on German Sixth Army’s flanks.  The details of the fighting on the Don 
can be summed up as an attritional battle akin to the First World War, but with Soviet tanks and 
aircraft opening the way for infantry to seize key positions.  Third Army’s Echelon II forces on 
the Don were fresh and rearmed, but in mid-October the Red Army began strong probing attacks 
from the Serafimovich and Kletskaya bridgeheads over the Don that mauled divisions.  Captain 
Păsat records that in his sector there was a military cemetery 200 m long and 50 m wide where 
                                                 
129 Păsat, Memoriile Căpitanului Dumitru Păsat, 65; being treated as second class travelers on trains was a constant 
complaint by Romanian soldiers, in July 1942 a soldier said, “We Romanian soldiers are only good enough for 
Sevastopol, Kerch, Kharkov, but [not for] rapid trains that we don’t have permission to use, even while for German 
soldiers special wagons are attached [to the train],” see Fond Armata 4-a, 1243, f. 68. 
130 Păsat, Memoriile Căpitanului Dumitru Păsat, 77-78. 
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German and Italian dead from earlier battles lay buried in either end.  Over the next month the 
empty area in the middle, which troops nicknamed “Cernăianu’s neighborhood” after the colonel 
that ordered them to retake hills lost to the Soviets, began to fill up with the crosses of Romanian 
dead.131  Romanian soldiers, veterans of Odessa, resented these casualties because they knew 
attacks were doomed to fail because they could not overcome firepower by sheer force of will, 
but determined to defend they dug in to neutralize Soviet firepower.    
VI Corps position on the Kalmuk steppe was worse and despite being engaged longer its 
veteran troops showed no signs of cracking.  It desperately needed reinforcement, however, since 
1st and 2nd Infantry divisions had been fighting the longest, some battalions were down to 39-45 
percent strength, and 4th and 20th Infantry divisions, which had been engaged slightly less, were 
marginally better with battalions down to 57-63.132  On 22 October, Antonescu complained to 
Hitler that Army Group B did not consider that Romanian divisions on the Don, and especially 
the Kalmuk steppe, were short of manpower, firepower, and material – he highlighted that the 4th 
Infantry Division was required to hold 60 km of front.133  German High Command offered only 
vague assurances.  On 31 October, the 5th and 8th Cavalry divisions arrived battle worn from the 
Caucasus and Crimea and formed VII Corps, which took over the southern part of VI Corps’ line 
during 1-12 November.  This shortened VI Corps’ front, it was reinforced with the 18th Infantry 
Division, but meant it had 82,000 soldiers to feed and supply with ammunition.134   
Third Army faced a constant threat from the Kletskaya and Serafimovich bridgeheads on 
the Don.  General Dumitrescu asked Army Group B to help him destroy the bridgeheads once he 
                                                 
131 Ibid., 103-104.  
132 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 1332, f. 70-72. 
133 Arimiae, Antonescu-Hitler, Vol. I, 189-190. 
134 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 85. 
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took over the position, but the General von Weichs did not have soldiers to spare and knew that 
the Red Army had held the bridgeheads against previous German or Italian attacks – so doubted 
the Romanians could succeed.  The Germans assigned the Romanians part of the rear to exploit 
to feed their troops.  2nd Lieutenant Alexandru Teodorescu-Schei was sent to a village south of 
the Don for requisitioning.  After being attacked by partisans on the way, he took an enlightened 
approach to try to keep his throat from being cut in the night and sat down with the local Cossack 
mayor who told him there nothing was left to take.  Teodorescu-Schei worried seizing anything 
would drive the Cossacks to the partisans.  He asked General Nicolae Mazarini, commander of 
5th Infantry Division, not to order reprisals before first consulting him, “Because of a murdered 
officer in Rostov, a whole street of men, women, and children were executed [weeks earlier].  An 
action of this type produces a reaction of hatred, creating in the rear a permanent festering source 
[focar] of revenge, not useful to an army of occupation.”135  There was little on the barren steppe 
around Stalingrad as everything of value had either been evacuated by the Soviets or taken by the 
Germans before the arrival of Third Army.  Priest Octavian Friciu reported that on the Kalmuk 
steppe there were even fewer villages, and that many locals were Buddhists uninterested in his 
spiritual ministering.  He acted as a propagandist, “standing to speak with soldiers giving them 
nerve [îmbărbătându-i] and encouraging them” against “pagan fanaticism.”136  Dumitrescu’s rear 
was chaotic.  Partisans attacked, hungry Soviet villagers simply tried to survive, and Romanian 
deserters or stragglers lived like vagabonds.  A soldier from the 991st Independent Battalion was 
                                                 
135 Alexandru Teodorescu-Schei, Învins şi învingător: 1941-1949, Campania din est şi prizonieratul (Bucharest: 
Editura Allfa s.r.l., 1998), 50-52.   
136 Fond Inspectoratul Clerului Militar, F.II.4.1578, dosar 300, c. 203-213.   
 363 
 
shot by a Cossack, a policeman previously armed by the Germans, while breaking into a house to 
rape or steal.137  While things in the rear were confused the situation on the front was hellish.   
Soviet pressure on the Don continued into November.  The trenches left by Italian and 
German soldiers were shallow and incomplete.  Third Army had few materials to improve them, 
ground grew increasingly more difficult to dig as the days got colder, and what supplies it did 
receive were used to construct command posts.  All of this was made harder because Romanian 
units were constantly bombarded by artillery.  Romanian troops grew adept at destroying tanks 
without anti-tank guns during Soviet probing attacks that occurred a several times each week.  
Captain Păsat records that tank hunting became a hobby for soldiers motivated by the promise of 
promotion and a month of leave for each tank destroyed.138  Third Army faced shortages of all 
kinds.  V Corps complained the bread ration had been cut, some soldiers were reduced to eating 
boiled wheat or rye, mail arrived infrequently, soldiers again lacked winter gear, few newspapers 
were delivered, radios were in short supply (V Corps suggested that radios in Romania should be 
requisitioned not just from Jews but Christians as well), and financial aid to soldiers’ families too 
little.139  Ammunition was in increasingly short supply.  As the weather grew colder, Romanian 
commanders squabbled over who got towns to use for headquarters and the materials in them.140  
At the end of October, Gerneral Dumitrescu wrote several detailed reports on the Third Army on 
the Don.  He recognized the Soviets had only carried out local attacks that should have favored 
the defenders and resulted in heavy Soviet casualties, but instead it was the Romanians who were 
                                                 
137 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 1046, f. 10, 74, 399.   
138 Magnetic mines were disliked by Romanian tank hunters since they exploded too quickly and burst eardrums or 
blinded eyes of those who wielded them, see, Păsat, Memoriile Căpitanului Dumitru Păsat, 93-94.   
139 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 1138, f. 13. 
140 General Headquarters had to step in and act as Solomon at times, see, Ibid., dosar 1299, f. 136. 
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taking heavy losses.  Dumitrescu blamed a shortage of shelters and trenches, poorly prepared fire 
plans – exacerbated by a shortage of radios and reliance on telephone communication –failing to 
concentrate artillery fire in support of the infantry, poorly trained infantry who attacked without 
properly using the terrain, and insufficient “patriotic education.”  He believed (mistakenly) many 
soldiers were throwing away weapons or deserting, so he threatened to punish officers who took 
losses over 25 percent.  Dumitrescu’s reports show that these Echelon II units had not improved 
on their performance much since Odessa, training and professionalism remained limited, and the 
shortages of modern weapons and equipment meant Third Army was fighting a First World War 
defense against a Second World War offense.141 
By the end of October, General Headquarters began losing faith that Stalingrad would fall 
soon and prepared for a Soviet winter counteroffensive.  In Crimea, General Avramescu already 
had ordered his soldiers guarding coasts to be extra vigilant at the beginning of the month, so that 
they would not be taken by surprise as they had been in 1941.142  The Black Sea Fleet, despite its 
decrepit condition and exile to distant ports in the Caucasus, was still a great concern at General 
Headquarters.  Mountain Corps assured it that the partisan movement in Crimea was now “non-
existent” due to previous “radical measures,” the local Tatars and Russians seemed happy, and 
the destruction of the Jewish population meant that there was little concern about a fifth column 
uprising.143  General Constantin Constantinescu-Claps, whose Fourth Army headquarters was 
preparing to take operational control of VI and VII corps on the Kalmuk steppe, warned to his 
commanders in mid-October to be on guard against partisans, parachutists, and infiltrators.144  
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The longer Stalingrad stood against German Sixth Army’s onslaught, the greater doubts grew 
among Romanian (and German) soldiers about a final victory against the USSR. 
While their comrades stood on the defensive outside Stalingrad, Romanian soldiers with 
Army Group A advanced deeper into the Caucasus.  In early hours of 2 September, Axis forces 
crossed the Kerch straits, a Romanian infantry company with German pioneers landed on Kossa-
Tusla island halfway across the narrow body of water, allowing German and Romanian troops to 
take the Taman peninsula and link up with Axis forces in Kuban.145  Soon German V Corps, with 
General Racoviţa’s Cavalry Corps, attacked Novorossiysk.  Before transferred to Stalingrad, the 
5th Cavalry Division helped storm the port at Novorossiysk.  Outside the city, an ambush killed 
Colonel Carp, commander of 7th Roşori Regiment blamed for ordering the creation of “execution 
squads” in June 1941.  His cavalrymen shot 15-20 Soviet POWs in revenge.146  Soviet defenses 
stiffened Novorossiysk never completely fell.  1st and 4th Mountain divisions remained in Crimea 
carrying out occupation duties, but 2nd and 3rd Mountain divisions were brought from Romania to 
fight in the Caucasus.  3rd Mountain Division continued down the coast trying to take the port of 
Gelendzhik as part of a German effort to force the forested mountains protecting the coast before 
being halted at the end of September.  2nd Mountain Division advanced eastwards, playing a part 
in taking Nalchik on the way towards Grozny, one of the last successes of Army Group B.  The 
German advance slowed to a crawl and a Soviet counterattack on 6 November ended the dream 
of seizing the rich oil fields of the Caucasus.147  Corporal Cârlan, a radio operator in 38th Infantry 
Regiment with the 19th Infantry Division under the Cavalry Corps on the front in the Caucasus, 
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noted the richness of the land in his diary on 8 November, but complained that “the women here 
– as in all of the USSR – are very depraved and lazy.”  He threatened the woman he was staying 
with for not cleaning well enough, and the soldiers had to spend on night off and one night on 
guard because “we must keep our eyes peeled, since there are partisans here too.”148   
In early November, General Headquarters worried about morale of soldiers outside of 
Stalingrad.  General Dumitrescu fretted that outer signs of discipline, such as dress, salutes, and 
soldierly comportment, were slipping.  Section II reports of soldiers’ conversations with defeatist 
sentiments were more concerning with comments like Germany will lose the war because of its 
losses and Soviet growing strength, Romania will not receive northern Transylvania and lose the 
rest of it, and reports of severe shortages at home.  Romanian generals blamed demoralization on 
“kikes, Polish refugees, and [their] henchmen.”149  General Headquarters ordered commanders to 
increase propaganda efforts.  Dumitrescu reiterated orders that officers stay with their men in the 
trenches, commanders should visit the front often, and soldiers be reminded of consequences if 
they deserted (execution, financial aid cut off to families, and confiscation of soldier’s property).  
He believed Echelon I soldiers who had been on the front longer “appear[ed] much better” than 
newly arrived Echelon II soldiers who showed “apathy” and “lack of motivation” [tragere de 
inima].  Dumitrescu complained they attacked without élan and halted at the first enemy fire.150  
The veterans were proud of being on the front for so long and due to experience fought better 
than soldiers who had been demobilized after Odessa and spent their time farming.  A IV Corps 
report complained that poorly trained infantry expected the artillery to do most of the work and a 
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few mortar units held their fire during attacks to avoid revealing their positions to the Soviets and 
being bombarded themselves.151  Soviet firepower dominated Third Army.  Dumitrescu worried 
a spike in the number of missing reported after battles signaled demoralization, however, many 
“missing” soldiers were later reported killed, evacuated wounded, or mixed in with other units.152  
Poor training, lack of modern equipment, and supply shortages combined with lessons learned at 
Odessa about Soviet firepower did affect morale.   
Soviet resistance at Stalingrad probably convinced the Antonescu regime to halt plans to 
collaborate with the SS in deporting Jews to death camps in Poland.  In a meeting of the Council 
of Ministers on 13 October, Mihai Antonescu announced that his temporary halt order from mid-
September was now a permanent halt order of all deportations to Transnistria.  This was a drastic 
reversal of the policy up until that point.  Yet with the German offensive clearly stalled it seemed 
that the best-case scenario was another winter of trench warfare on the Eastern Front.  If the Nazi 
and Soviet giants became locked in a stalemate, a negotiated end to the war seemed possible, so 
the Antonescu regime wanted to keep its options open and international opinion would matter in 
peace talks.  In September diplomats from the United States and Switzerland both protested the 
treatment of Jews in Transnistria.  The General Staff was not involved in negotiations between 
Ritcher and Lecca about deporting Jews west of the Prut but reports from the front significantly 
influenced the decision of the Antonescu regime to not commit to sending Jews to Poland.153   
                                                 
151 It also blamed distance from Romania for poor morale, see, Duţu, Armata română în război, 191.   
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Romanian soldiers had to put their trust in another German military miracle because the 
situation on the front was dire.  On 9 November, after inspecting VI Corps, a Romanian colonel 
reported there were almost no anti-tank ditches, only a few thousand mines, barely 30 percent of 
the trench system was finished, only command posts and artillery positions had concrete shelters 
and emplacements, and particularly worryingly the lakes that had acted as an obstacle were now 
freezing and would support soldiers or tanks.”154  Luftwaffe reconnaissance reported a build-up 
of Soviet forces on the Don.  German Sixth Army expected local attacks against Third Army but 
ignored General Hoth’s warnings about a growing Soviet threat to VI and VII corps.155  On 14 
November, General Pantazi issued an order communicated only to officers that called attention 
to “defeatist currents in the interior that have no other purpose but the conscious disintegration of 
national solidarity and army discipline.”  He ordered officers to provide energetic leadership and 
unwavering support to soldiers to maintain discipline.156  Two days later, the first snow fell at 
Stalingrad, and Third Army reported German supply trains were failing to arrive.  This growing 
supply crisis affected VI and VII Corps worst and no trains arrived during 7-17 November.157  
Conclusion 
 Romanian commanders could be forgiven for feeling a bit of déjà vu by November 1942.  
They had advanced, endured scorching heat and choking dust, suffered heavy losses, combated 
partisans, and executed “Jewish-Communists,” but they were again stuck in trenches facing an 
implacable enemy as winter approached.  The General Staff had weeded out senior officers who 
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doubted in victory or were unwilling to push their men to the limit, however, even dedicated men 
like General Dumitrescu realized Third Army’s situation was desperate.  A sense of foreboding 
grew among the Romanian commanders on the Don and on the Kalmuk steppe.  German liaisons 
passed along increasingly alarmist reports from Third Army.  Third Army Section II was sure the 
Soviet counteroffensive would come on 8 November, anniversary of the October Revolution, but 
the date came and went without incident.158  Just maybe the Soviets had no strategic reserves for 
another winter counter offensive and the Germans were on the cusp of taking Stalingrad. 
 The Romanian Army had continued to carry out atrocities throughout 1942.  Wherever it 
in the USSR Jews, civilians, and POWs were massacred.  The winter crisis of 1941-42 resulted 
in a period of genocidal murder in collaboration with the SS in certain areas of Transnistria, and 
mass death from starvation, cold, and disease elsewhere, which was the peak of the Holocaust in 
Romania.  Soldiers’ motivation did not stop at the Dniester.  The continued to fight committedly, 
even in terrible conditions, and provided the SS support for the “Final Solution” whenever asked.  
Third Army pressured the Government of Transnistria to continue harsh treatment of Jews.  The 
stalemate in the fall of 1942 acted as a break on plans by the Antonescu regime to deport Jews to 
Poland.  In November 1942, the Romanian Army still believed that the war might be won, and 
that Stalingrad might fall, although on 20 October the General Headquarters quietly dissolved the 
Army Group Antonescu headquarters it had set up because Stalingrad did not fall and the at the 
time the Conducător was too ill to command.  A Soviet winter counteroffensive shattered Army 
Group B, including Third and Fourth armies, but did not break Romanian soldiers’ motivation.
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CHAPTER VIII  
PROPAGANDA, EXTRINSIC MOTIVATION, AND MORALE 
 
During the Second World War, the Antonescu regime – like every belligerent state – did 
not trust in intrinsic motivation alone to keep officers and soldiers fighting, so the General Staff 
actively worked to reinforce the motivation of Romanian officers and soldiers through various 
extrinsic means.  This chapter will show that extrinsic motivation (propaganda, coercion, and 
remuneration) played a supporting role in sustaining combat motivation of soldiers on the front.  
Propaganda was used extensively, and the General Staff believed that it also could improve the 
morale of soldiers, thus motivation.  Morale is not motivation, however, while morale fluctuated, 
motivation remained sound.  The threat of coercion was used much more than actual coercion, 
and remuneration was indirect.  Extrinsic motivation played a minor role in sustaining atrocity 
motivation, and the influence it exerted was indirect.  Propaganda was the most important factor 
helping to sustain atrocity motivation, but only pointed out previously accepted threats.  Officers 
and soldiers decided to make the leap from alleged threats to murder of Jews, partisans, POWs, 
or civilians.  Coercion played essentially no role in atrocity motivation, and any form of personal 
remuneration from the murder of Jews was illicit.  Intrinsic motivation is the primary explanation 
as to why Romanian soldiers continued to fight, but extrinsic motivation helped.    
 Propaganda had several main themes: “holy war,” the defense of European civilization, 
anti-communism, and German-Romanian “brotherhood of arms.”1  The army’s military justice 
system was old-fashioned, still based on corporal punishment to enforce discipline, and in times 
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of crisis threatened capital punishment, but executions were relatively rare.  The General Staff 
initiated a policy of rehabilitation to give deserters and criminals a chance to redeem themselves 
in battle.  Lastly, material rewards were used to motivate.  Remuneration took on many forms: 
promise of land grants, discounted sale of expropriated Jewish property, and even cash prizes.  
Illicit looting of Jewish and Soviet property was another material motivation, but the Antonescu 
regime wanted such spoils for the state.  The General Staff attempted to shore up motivation, and 
morale, of Romanian soldiers through these means between June 1941 and August 1944.   
 The importance of these extrinsic motivators should not be overemphasized.  The use of 
propaganda and its prioritization by the Antonescu regime does not mean that Romanian officers 
and soldiers lacked motivation or did not understand why they were fighting.  For the most part, 
official propaganda simply confirmed pre-existing beliefs and biases of troops.  Coercion played 
a minor role in combat motivation and no role in atrocity motivation.  Aside from self-serving 
testimony of officers and soldiers, claiming they were following orders or were threatened if they 
did not cooperate, there is no proof that anyone was ever punished for refusing to murder Jews.2  
Officers did use the threat of punishment to deter soldiers from aiding Jews to avoid or escape 
persecution.3  Coercion was primarily used to enforce discipline in the rear.  While discipline in 
the Romanian Army was strict, it was far less murderous than in the Wehrmacht or Red Army. 
The policy of rehabilitation had mixed success in motivating soldiers in combat.  Remuneration 
was an ancillary motivator, although the Antonescu regime threatened denying financial aid to 
soldiers’ families to motivate may have had some effect.   
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Propaganda 
 In the Second World War, all governments (democratic, fascist, communist, or otherwise 
authoritarian) fashioned various systems to control and direct the production of propaganda.  The 
Romanian state first practiced disseminating propaganda on a mass scale during the First World 
War, but after the war it focused limited resources on propaganda abroad to aid its diplomats in 
legitimizing România Mare.  Romania became embroiled in propaganda battles in capitals across 
Europe over territorial claims, primarily with the Soviets in the 1920s, then with the Hungarians 
in the 1930s.4  Despite calls by the SSI to create a separate ministry to coordinate these efforts, 
propaganda remained a sub-secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 3 October 1939 
when King Carol II ordered the creation of a centralized ministry for propaganda, but it was 
disbanded less than a year later on 20 September 1940 by Antonescu after the king’s exile.  The 
National Legionary government made Alexandru Constant, editor of the Legionary newspaper 
Buna Vestire, or The Good News, the Sub-Secretary of Propaganda until January 1941.   
On 30 April 1941, Mihai Antonescu re-established the Ministry of National Propaganda.  
The Antonescu regime modeled it on Joseph Goebbels’ Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and 
Propaganda in Nazi Germany.  Alexandru Marcu, an intellectual chosen for his Italian contacts, 
was officially Minister of Propaganda, but as Vice-President of the Council of Ministers Mihai 
Antonescu constantly involved himself in matters of propaganda.  In September 1940, Mihai 
Antonescu stated that his goal was to centrally control the press so that “all journals attack at the 
same time the same problem.  This is how it works in Germany.”5  His success in realizing this 
                                                 
4 Nicolae Ureche, Propaganda Externă a României Mari, 1918-1940 (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 2015), 215. 
5 Ciucă, Stenogramele şedinţelor consiliului de miniştri guvernarea Ion Antonescu, Vol. I, 57.   
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goal is debatable.  The Ministry of National Propaganda had serious problems: disorganization, 
confused institutional structure, poorly trained staff, and departments replicating efforts.  Mihai 
Antonescu tried to raise standards, increase funding, and improve coordination of propaganda.6  
The Ministry of National Propaganda trumpeted Mihai Antonescu’s speeches on “holy war,” but 
it would be mistaken to depict his rhetoric as merely cynical propaganda that was foisted upon a 
skeptical public to justify an unpopular war.  While Mihai Antonescu may not have believed the 
“holy war” rhetoric he pushed, as some assert, it reflected the existing consensus of society.  
 Mihai Antonescu had little difficulty in directing the Romanian press because he found 
many willing propagandists among Romanian journalists, authors, and academics who had long 
espoused nationalist, pro-Orthodox, anti-Semitic, and anti-communist views.  There were a great 
number of right-wing and anti-Semitic mouthpieces dating back to before the First World War.  
In the 1930s as the populist right wing emerged a whole host of new nationalist and anti-Semitic 
publications began to be published, with titles like: Pământul strămoşesc, or The Ancestral Land; 
Garda Moldovei, or The Guard of Moldova; Calendarul, or The Calendar.7  Beginning under the 
two-month Goga government, the state increased censorship and shut down left-wing papers, 
especially those that were Jewish-owned or had Jewish editors, such as Adevărul, or The Truth; 
Lupta, or The Struggle; and Dimineaţa, or The Morning.   The Goga government believed that 
Jews had an unwarranted influence over the national press and official reports in 1938 claimed 
that a quarter of all journalists were Jews.8  After Carol II declared his royal dictatorship he also 
shut down Liberal and National Peasant presses, so the only press still functioning in Romania 
                                                 
6 Anton, Propaganda şi război, 72, 10.   
7 Eaton, The Origins and Onset of the Romanian Holocaust, 22; Clark, Holy Legionary Youth, 121-126. 
8 Filderman, Memoirs and Diaries, Vol. 1, 494; Bolitho, Roumania under King Carol, 42. 
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was center- or far-right.  After the Soviet ultimatum in 1940, however, center-right newspapers, 
including the two most popular Universul, or The Universe, and Curentul, or The Daily, carried 
inflammatory anti-Semitic stories.9  The Antonescu regime maintained the bans initiated by King 
Carol II, so those who tried to criticize Antonescu, his pro-German foreign policy, or the conduct 
of the war after 1941 could do so only by surreptitiously circulating letters by hand to trusted 
friends and other like-minded elites.10  After 1941, with few exceptions, the Romanian press 
followed the lead of the German press in its reportage of events on the front.11  
 The General Staff created and distributed its own propaganda.  Section II-Intelligence 
initially had an office called the Propaganda Service that busied itself with collecting, producing, 
and distributing propaganda materials to soldiers.  On 1 December 1941, the Propaganda Service 
was elevated to an independent, co-equal part of the General Staff and renamed the Propaganda 
Section.  The permanent staff of the Propaganda Section numbered 45 officers and NCOs who 
worked in Bucharest, except for one representative respectively in Cernăuţi and Chişinău, and 
three in Odessa.  In addition to its office staff, the Propaganda Section had at least 17 various 
types of propaganda groups carrying out activity on the front and in occupied territories.12  These 
included two- or three-man photo/journalist teams, film crews, mobile cinemas, theatre groups, 
loudspeakers, and the Army Choir.  The resources of the Propaganda Section were limited, but as 
the Romanian Army advanced into the USSR the Germany Army provided it additional material, 
                                                 
9 Solonari, Purifying the Nation, 161-162; these papers were so anti-Semitic that Ancel has claimed that its editors 
were paid by the Nazi Party, which seems unlikely, see, Ancel, The History of the Holocaust in Romania, 63.  
10 Hollingworth, There’s A German Just Behind Me, 188.  
11 David Stahel, Kiev 1941: Hitler’s Battle for Supremacy in the East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 270.   
12 AMR, Fond Secţia Propaganda, dosar 51, f. 21-22; Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 1173, f. 16. 
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personnel, and funds – especially in Crimea where the two forces shared occupation duties and 
worked closely for over two years.  The Propaganda Section did all it could to reach the troops. 
 Radio theoretically offered the Romanian Army the chance to influence every soldier, the 
General Staff had advocated more robust radio propaganda to combat Soviet efforts since 1927, 
but radio receivers were in short supply on the Eastern Front.13  On 1 May 1941, there were only 
116 radio receivers in the whole army, far from sufficient for propaganda needs, so on 7 June the 
General Staff requested units to be equipped down to the battalion level with 900 radios recently 
confiscated from Jews.14  The majority of these radios, however, were plug rather than battery 
powered, so required a building with functioning electricity.  Therefore, while regimental offices, 
army headquarters, and hospitals soon had radios, frontline regiments often went withotu.  After 
June 1941, Third Army repeatedly asked for battery-powered radios, so in December 1942 the 
Propaganda Section began to purchasing radios wherever it could because they were “necessary 
to maintain the morale of the soldiers, who have been observed manifesting longing for family 
and home.”15  Soldiers greatly valued radio programs like: “The Soldier’s Hour” (beginning as a 
weekly program in December 1940 it increased to three times a week after March 1942), “The 
German-Romanian Hour,” “The Italian-Romanian Hour,” “The Casualties’ Hour,” and “Radio 
Mail.”  Eventually music only stations were added for soldiers’ enjoyment.16  Those units with 
radio receivers had difficulty picking up radio signals from Romania the deeper they advanced 
into the Soviet Union.  In consequence, German Eleventh Army began broadcasting Romanian 
language programs from Simferopol in Crimea, with daily news and twice weekly variety shows 
                                                 
13 Ureche, Propaganda Externă a României Mari, 131.   
14 Fond Secţia Propaganda, dosar 33, f. 153-154, 270-271.  
15 Fond Secţia Propaganda, dosar 33, f. 54. 
16 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 40; Anton, Propaganda şi război, 94.   
 376 
 
with live and recorded music, on 7 February 1942.  These broadcasts continued for two years.17  
There were never enough radios in Romanian formations, but when officers and soldiers could 
tune in there was usually something for them to listen to. 
 Film was a powerful propaganda tool, but Romania had few cinemas.  Moreover, during 
the intewar period soldiers were usually assigned to the frontier or other remote locations, so the 
General Staff created mobile cinemas transported by trucks to project films outdoors to soldiers.  
They were used after the retreat from eastern Romania in 1940 to help raise morale.18  After the 
invasion of the USSR in June 1941 the mobile cinemas were constantly on the road in Romania.  
During 22 June-3 August 1941, they set up scores of screenings in villages for 10,830 soldiers 
and 9,300 civilians, plus for 13,422 wounded soldiers in hospitals in Bucharest and the Prahova 
Valley.  They moved east after the liberation of eastern Romania.  During 20 September-12 
October 1941 they showed films to 52,000 soldiers and 22,600 civilians in Transnistria.19  The 
films shown included: newsreels, often with footage provided by the German Military Mission in 
Romania; documentaries on various subjects, such as, “Our Holy War,” “Petrol,” “The Fall of 
Odessa,” “Transylvania,” “Bukovina,” and “Bessarabia;” and entertainment consisting of both 
Romanian films like “The Merry Women” or “The Bears’ Paradise” and German cinema imports 
like “Pat and Pataschon” or “Truxa.”20  These mobile cinemas did not travel east of the Bug.  In 
German-occupied regions of the USSR the Axis forces used Soviet cinemas and screened films 
                                                 
17 Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 921, f. 1.  
18 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 277, f. 343-344. 
19 Fond Secţia Propaganda, dosar 32, f. 13, 37-38.   
20 Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 914, f. 15; Anton, Propaganda şi război, 96; Fond Secţia Propaganda, dosar 170, f. 
34-35. 
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to German or Romanian soldiers in shifts.  Soldiers preferred comedies and dramas but received 
a steady diet of nationalist and anti-communist propaganda.  
 Music and spectacle were used to entertain and propagandize.  In July 1941, peacetime 
performance groups were used to entertain the troops, for example, the six-member “Struggle 
and Light” theater troupe was exempted from mobilization until November 1941 (suggesting that 
the Propaganda Section expected the war to be over by then) and ordered instead to provide 
entertainment “for workers in militarized factories as well as wounded soldiers in hospitals.”21  
When the war did not end, the army created theater teams to entertain troops on the front, first in 
Transnistria and Crimea during the summer of 1942.  These theater teams were so successful that 
the Propaganda Section organized “mixed” theater groups, comprising 22 men and 11 women, to 
carry out 45-day tours to entertain the troops all across Ukraine and southern Russia, beginning 
in October 1942.22  The 60-member Army Choir joined them too.  By the end of January 1943, 
the four groups had put on 145 shows, again in Transnistria and Crimea, but also so far afield as 
southern Russia and northern Caucasus.23  The shows put on by these theater groups consisted of 
patriotic songs, folk songs, dances, poems, recitations, and plays.  These spectacles brought a bit 
of Romania to soldiers far from home to remind them why they were fighting. 
 The printed word was the most common form of propaganda and four newspapers were 
the most important means of delivering it.  Sentinela, or The Sentry, was a weekly distributed for 
free to soldiers (and then passed on to civilians) that ran from December 1939 to September 1944 
under King Carol II, the National-Legionary State, the Antonescu regime, and King Mihai I post-
                                                 
21 Fond Secţia Propaganda, dosar 14, f. 86-88 
22 Ibid., dosar 82, f. 25-27, 70-71. 
23 Fond PCM: CM, dosar 124/1943, f. 166. 
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23 August 1944, so it provides an important window into how the Romanian Army navigated the 
changing politics.  Soldatul, or The Soldier, was a single page (front and back) given to soldiers 
for free that appeared thrice weekly from June 1941 to August 1944.  Armata, or The Army, was 
a bi-monthly magazine published by and for officers that had to be purchased and ran from May 
1942 to April 1944.  Lastly, Ecoul Crimeei, or The Echo of Crimea, was a weekly given for free 
to soldiers in Crimea that ran from March 1942 to March 1944.  As a report from March 1943 
shows, the print run of each was never near enough to provide a copy to every soldier: 117,500 
copies of Sentinela, with over half sent to the front; 10,000-39,600 copies of Soldatul, with over 
half sent to the front; 12,000 copies of Armata, with a third sent to the front; and 4,000 copies of 
Ecoul Crimeei, all in Crimea.24  Soldiers were supposed to pass around each paper or read them 
aloud other soldiers, but the Propaganda Section struggled to distribute newspapers on the front.  
The supply of newspapers to the front was chronically low throughout the war, but in late 
1941 it temporarily broke down completely.  In 1940, in a few places, indifferent or overworked 
officers did not prioritize propaganda, so initially stacks of copies of Sentinela sat in regimental 
offices undistributed.  The General Staff upbraided officers and the newspaper was distributed.  
During 1941, the farther troops advanced the more difficult it was to distribute newspapers from 
Bucharest to the front due to distance, bad roads, and shortages in transport.  In mid-July 1941, 
after crossing the Dniester, Third Army complained it only received 800 copies for 100,000 men.  
Further advances made thing worse, especially when roads turned to mud in the fall or froze in 
the winter.  The few available aircraft carried a limited number of copies, but weather completely 
                                                 
24 RG-25.003M, Fond Ministerul de Război: Cabinet, dosar 273, f. 59A-60A; Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 921, f. 
24. 
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grounded flights.  When Axis logistics nearly broke down in the winter of 1941-1942, practically 
no newspapers were delivered to the front.  The situation was so bad that in February 1942 one 
general offered to personally pay for 500 copies of Sentinela and their transport to his division.25  
The improvement of logistics in the spring of 1942 and the joint initiative of Mountain Corps and 
German Eleventh Army to print Ecoul Crimeei in Simferopol, the Germans provided the printing 
press (captured from the Soviets) and the Romanians provided paper and editors, meant that soon 
soldiers had access to a reasonable amount of printed materials on the front through 1944.26 
Pre-war Propaganda 
 Sentinela first appeared on Christmas Day 1939 to provide entertainment and propaganda 
to 800,000 soldiers guarding the borders of România Mare during the winter.  The initial tone of 
the newspaper was defensive, even its name emphasized standing guard; a postcard at the same 
time shows a soldier with his back to the viewer watching over a map of România Mare.27  The 
editors selected letters between soldiers and their families that showed the support of the nation 
and the determination of soldiers to fight if called upon to defend Romania.28  They also printed 
patriotic poetry and songs written by readers.  Sentinela soon incorporated “The Cheerful Page” 
with cartoons and jokes for the soldiers, later copied in the other army newspapers.  For the next 
six months Sentinela carried patriotic articles and speeches promising that if Romania were 
attacked the army would fulfill its duty and defend every last furrow of Romanian soil. 
                                                 
25 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 222, f. 238; dosar 438, f. 25; dosar 410, f. 13; Fond Corpul de Munte, fond 947, f. 502.   
26 Fond PCM: CM, dosar 137/1942, f. 109-158; the type was a legacy of Soviet interwar “Latinization” policy, see, 
Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 182-207; Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 921, f. 1-2, 9.   
27 Case, Between States, 82.  
28 Ion Măghiran, “Scrisori dela oaşte,” Sentinela, 25 Decemvrie 1939, 4. 
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 After Soviet ultimatum and occupation of northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, the tone of 
Sentinela changed.  While the editors supported Antonescu’s call for soldiers to be patient and to 
accept further territorial losses in Transylvania and Dobrogea, they still included a message of 
future revenge.  In September 1940, Sentinela published an old First World War song with new 
lyrics altered by Sergeant Valceanu.  “Land, you still seek neighbor, Land!  You want us to give 
you our land.  Because we have enough…and [by] Lord!  If we don’t have enough to make you a 
grave!”29  In the following months, under the National Legionary State, Sentinela celebrated 
Mihai I, who had succeeded his father, and the return of Queen-Mother Helen from exile abroad 
as a purification of the monarchy from the corruption of Carol II.  It also extolled the supposed 
virtues of the Legion, particularly its spirit and discipline, dedication to duty, self-sacrifice, and 
order.30  This infatuation with the Legion soon passed.  By November 1940, Sentinela began to 
focus more on Antonescu and his efforts to reform and re-train the Romanian Army with the help 
of the German Military Mission to prepare to fight to restore România Mare.  In December 1940, 
the editors declared, “The German soldier knows he fights for a new order of honesty and work, 
not just for [his] nation, but for many more.  The victory that he achieved over those corrupted 
[nations in Western Europe – who are] also caught in the nets of Judaism – is a victory for honor 
and happiness in the world.”31  After New Year’s 1941 the message of the coming “resurrection” 
of România Mare increasingly crowded the pages of Sentinela.32    
                                                 
29 Plt. Mj. Adm. C. Valceanu, “Pământ cere duşmanul,” Sentinela, 8 Septembrie 1940, 5.   
30 Sentinela, “Pe prima pagina,” Sentinela, 15 Septembrie 1940, 1; Nelu Constantinescu, “Duhul şi disciplina 
legionară,” Sentinela, 29 Septemvrie 1940, 5.   
31 Sentinela, “Soldatul German,” Sentinela, 1 Decembrie 1940, 3.   
32 The New Year’s front page had Decebal, king of ancient Dacia, presenting soldiers with a map of România Mare 
restored to its previous borders, see, Sentinela, “Darul de Crăciun pentru ostaşi,” Sentinela, 5 Ianuarie 1941, 1.   
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 The Legionary uprising of 21-23 January 1941 and its aftermath had to be addressed by 
the editors.  The front page of Sentinela on 26 January declared, “the Romanian soldier ensures 
the union and tranquility of the country,” with an illustration of a soldier holding hands with a 
worker and a peasant flanking him to each side.33  Inside, a declaration by General Gheorghe 
Băgulescu, a prominent Legionary sympathizer, defended the anti-Judeo-Masonic credentials of 
the officer corps, accused Horia Sima and the Legionaries of being communists intent on causing 
anarchy, and warned Romania might share the fate of partitioned Poland if Legionary disorders 
continued.34  This was followed by a message from Antonescu who congratulated the soldiers for 
their loyalty and saving Romania.  After having reiterated the need for order and reasserted the 
anti-Semitic credentials of the Antonescu regime, Sentinela focused on preparing the army for 
war.  In the months leading up to the invasion of the Soviet Union, articles focused on the harsh 
conditions facing bucovineni and basarabeni in the “lost territories” under Soviet occupation.   
Wartime Propaganda 
 On Sunday, 22 June 1941, even as the first groups of soldiers crossed the Prut River to 
carry out local raids and seize bridgeheads, Sentinela trumpeted the decision to invade the USSR.  
“Comrades in battle, the German soldier elbow to elbow with the Romanian 
soldier, both handsome and brave hawks, have thrown themselves upon the 
greatest enemy of the world: Bolshevism…[and fight in the cause of] freeing the 
earth of Bessarabia and the mountains of Bukovina from the communist yoke.  
Forward, brave comrades!  The God of righteousness is with you!”35   
 
The image of a Romanian soldier paired with a German soldier, both with fixed bayonets, was 
repeatedly featured on the front page of the newspaper over the next month: advancing together, 
                                                 
33 Pe prima pagina, “Soldatul asigura unirea şi lineştea ţării,” Sentinela, 26 Ianurarie 1941, 1.   
34 Gheorghe Băgulescu, “Chemarea bravilor veterani,” Sentinela, 26 Ianurarie 1941, 3.   
35 Sentinela, “Camarzi in lupta,” Sentinela, 22 Iunie 1941, 1.   
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breaking the chains of Bolshevism, and attacking a hydra-headed dragon with a tail tipped with a 
Star of David.  Articles declared that the dream of restoring România Mare was coming to pass.  
The Cheerful Page had cartoons of Stalin booted out of Europe by a kick to his hindquarters, and 
a rotting skeleton of a Red Army soldier with the caption, “Land he wanted, land he got!”36  On 
28 June 1941, the first issue of Soldatul carried a speech given by Mihai Antonescu six days 
earlier, in which he declared the beginning of Romania’s “crusade against communism.”  
The war, this war, is a great battle of Christian civilization against the new 
barbarians.  Today European states do not face off against each other but races 
and worlds…Family, property, church, all are to be burned in the demiurgic 
flames of the insane communist religion…I believe that since the sacred war of 
the Crusaders, no other battle has been holier, greater, and more epic than that 
which Adolf Hitler, the apostle of our new civilization, began today.37 
 
For the rest of 1941 this apocalyptic anti-communist rhetoric was splashed across the pages of 
Sentinela and Soldatul with headlines like: “Christian Armies penetrate deep into the Land of 
Hell,” “Kikes: The Tools of Bolshevism,” and “The European Crusade against Bolshevism.”38  
 Revenge and atrocity propaganda reinforced the anti-communist bombast.  Immediately 
after the Soviet occupation of eastern Romania in 1940, the General Staff avoided focusing on 
the humiliation of the Romanian Army because it wanted to cool emotions and convince soldiers 
to support the state’s decision to cede territory, but now in 1941, its propaganda was designed to 
inflame the pent-up anger of officers and soldiers.  Its articles focused not only on the events of 
1940, but also the subsequent Soviet occupation.  In an article entitled “A Year Ago,” Private I. 
Dumitru called 28 June 1940 the “black page in the calendar of the Romanian nation,” but then 
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37 Mihai Antonescu, “Războiul sfânt a inceput,” Soldatul, 28 Iunie 1941, 1.   
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rejoiced at the thought that the blood of Romanian soldiers spilt on the battlefield that Bessarabia 
would be “reborn in all its ancient virtues, under the correct leadership of a great soldier and 
Romanian, General Ion Antonescu.”39  Both officers and soldiers believed in this war of “heroic 
revenge” that they thought would be over by Christmas.40  Images were published of supposed 
“Judeo-Bolshevik” crimes: persecution, torture, murder, destruction, and profaned churches.  
Propaganda further accused the Red Army of torturing or murdering Romanian POWs; these 
reports may have made soldiers more fearful than angry, but also justified mass reprisals against 
“Jewish-Communists” blamed for the alleged atrocities.41  Atrocity propaganda contributed to 
the effectiveness of nationalist arguments about the need to liberate so-called transnistrieni in the 
USSR from the oppression of “the Bolshevik yoke.”  There were articles of soldiers discovering 
transnistrieni (Moldovan) communities as far east as in the Caucasus through 1943. 
 The Romanian press, following the lead of German propaganda and greatly enthused by 
the apparent success of the Wehrmacht, was extremely optimistic in its reportage of the war in 
the summer and fall of 1941.  Furthermore, in the first weeks the Axis advances seemed to match 
the propaganda that depicted Operation Barbarossa as an ever-victorious march against an enemy 
in complete disarray.  Romanian-German forces quickly overran both northern Bukovina and 
Bessarabia while the Red Army retreated to avoid being flanked by German successes elsewhere.  
A series of propaganda films were made to celebrate this rapid advance with titles like: “Soldiers 
cross the Prut,” “The Liberation of Bukovina,” “The Liberation of Bessarabia,” and “Romanian 
                                                 
39 Soldat I. Dumitru, “Acum un an,” Soldatul, 28 Iunie 1941, 1.  
40 Anton, Propaganda şi război, 188. 
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Troops across the Dniester: Penetrating the Stalin Line.”42  While Third Army continued to romp 
eastwards with the Germans, Fourth Army became embroiled in the bloody siege at Odessa.   
Propaganda claimed that the Red Army was on its last legs, but soldiers’ experience in 
combat belied this.  Fourth Army casualties mounted at Odessa, even as Sentinela and Soldatul 
claimed it was about to fall week after week, and Third Army crossed river after river, Dniester, 
Bug, then Dnieper, deeper into Soviet Ukraine, so the General Staff felt it had to explain why 
Soviet resistance seemed only to increase the farther German-Romanian forces pushed into the 
USSR.  A week after the combined land-sea-air Soviet counterattack against V Corps halted the 
third major assault on Odessa, an article in the 30 September 1941 issue of Soldatul, written by a 
German war correspondent, asked in it title “Why are the Bolsheviks resisting?”  His answer was 
simple, “Jewish-Communists.”  He wrote that “kikes” made up 90 percent of Red Army political 
commissars who carried out “animalistic” propaganda and prosecuted a “sub-human” war based 
on the use of terror to motivate Soviet soldiers by shooting any who retreated or tried to desert.43  
He described Odessa as a “nest of Bolsheviks” that was filled with fanatical communists willing 
to fight to the last man.  On 5 October 1941 Sentinela published an article written by Professor S. 
Mehendinţi called, “Why are we fighting?”  He responded with his own question, “What would 
happen if we do not keep fighting?”  He argued that if the Red Army was not utterly destroyed it 
would return “ten times stronger” and in a monster version of 1940 would “break all the borders, 
from Finland to the shores of the Dniester” except that this time the Red Army would continue to 
advance across Europe all the way to Spain.  In its wake, communism would bring “permanent 
                                                 
42 Anton, Propaganda şi război, 202.   
43 Wilfried E. Ott, “De ce rezista bolşevicii?,” Soldatul, 30 Septemvrie 1941, 2.  
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war” between the classes including abolishing the family (no more marriage, baptism, or parent-
child relationship), destroying churches but not synagogues, and seizing peasants’ land thereby 
making them serfs on “the state’s estate.”44  Odessa finally fell to great fanfare and Fourth Army 
had a victory parade in Bucharest – the massacre of the city’s Jews was unreported. 
 Third Army remained on the front in Ukraine and Crimea, but as fall turned to winter, the 
“decisive” battle remained elusive.  The defeat of the German Army outside Moscow and Soviet 
winter counteroffensive against Crimea in December 1941 stunned Romanians and alerted them 
that the war would continue for much longer than anyone had anticipated.  Yet, contrary to the 
conventional wisdom that portrays Romanian soldier as increasingly unmotivated and confused 
about why they were still fighting, Third Army soldiers were kept acutely aware of what they 
were fighting for, even if they wished they could return home like their Fourth Army comrades.  
In fact, Antonescu proactively ordered that the General Staff intensify propaganda efforts after 
crossing the Dniester River.45  The Propaganda Section relentlessly appealed to soldiers’ intrinsic 
motivations (nationalism, religion, anti-Semitism, anti-communism) through printed word, film, 
and radio to remind soldiers – if they had ever forgotten – why they were fighting.   
 In March 1942, as part of the nationwide re-mobilization for what was expected to be a 
decisive summer campaign, Mihai Antonescu initiated a major propaganda campaign to reassure 
Romanians of the need to continue the war alongside Germany.46  Already on 2 February 1942, 
at the Ministry of Defense, General Pantazi ordered that greater efforts be made to “educate the 
army through images – photographs, cinema.”47  It was no mere coincidence that Ecoul Crimeei 
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46 Case, Between States, 81.   
47 Anton, Propaganda şi război, 210.   
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and Armata first began publishing in the spring of 1942.  The General Staff stressed that soldiers 
had to continue fighting, not only to restore România Mare, but to make sure that the sacrifices 
of soldiers already fallen in combat to liberate basarabeni, bucovineni, and transnistrieni would 
not be in vain.  Propaganda depicted Romanian troops as liberators of oppressed Soviet peoples, 
especially their “brothers in faith” the Russian Orthodox belivers.48  In spring 1942, the military 
press encouraged renewed optimism that the coming summer offensive would deal the Soviets a 
death blow.  The German defeat at Moscow in winter 1941 was depicted as a near victory that 
the Soviets only survived because of the Russian winter.  Now with snow melting optimism had 
returned.  A cartoon from the Easter issue of Soldatul, captioned “General-Winter has retreated,” 
showed a melting Soviet snowman revealing a pile of bones of slain Red Army soldiers, and the 
snow melt was drowning living Soviet soldiers who shouted, “Our last hope has gone to hell!”49  
Romanian soldiers leaving with Echelon II units for the front could still believe in the promise of 
the new summer offensive and that 1942 might be the decisive year.   
 While it fostered hope in the future, army propaganda reminded soldiers of past victories 
and celebrated new successes.  As the year progressed, the anniversaries of the beginning of the 
war, the liberation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, and the fall of Odessa were prominently 
commemorated.  The recent German successes, Operation Bustard Hunt in Crimea in May 1942, 
the Second Battle of Kharkov in May 1942, and the fall of Sevastopol in July 1942, including the 
important role played by Romanian formations in these battles, were widely reported.  When the 
German Army finally began Case Blue, the army press encouraged hopes with articles like: “The 
                                                 
48 Natalia Nabokova-Vasilkova, “Odesenii recunoscător fraţilor români liberatori,” Soldatul, 3 Februarie 1941, 1.  
49 V. Stamati, “General-Iarna a trecut în retragere,” Soldatul, 5 Aprilie 1942, 2; for another example, see, Capitan N. 
Trandafir, “Victoria Germaniei,” Ecoul Crimeei (Simferopol), 8 Mai 1942, 1. 
 387 
 
Situation of the Soviets is desperate,” “In Pursuit of the Enemy from the East,” and “The Fatal 
Blow.”50  As summer turned to autumn and German forces became embroiled at Stalingrad, the 
tone of propaganda remained optimistic.  An article in Armata compared the battle for Stalingrad 
with the battle for Odessa, predicting the city on the Volga would also eventually fall.51  Finally, 
during 1942 articles continued to harp on themes developed in 1941: why Romanians fought, the 
plight of transnistrieni, Bolshevik atrocities, and German-Romanian comradeship.   
Post-Stalingrad Propaganda   
After Stalingrad, fearing a slump in morale and negative effects on combat motivation, 
the General Staff ordered preventative measures to be try to control what information reached 
Romania from the front and neutralize Soviet propaganda.52  Between March 1943 and August 
1944, Romanian propaganda doubled down on all the themes that it had been using since June 
1941, especially atrocity propaganda, with an added sense of foreboding because every Soviet 
victory brought a vengeful Red Army closer to Romania.  The February 1943 issue of Armata 
was dedicated to the “fight against communism.”  The cover showed a death’s head wearing a 
Bolshevik cap with a red star grinning over a cityscape in flames, decaying bodies of murdered 
civilians, and names of cities Chişinău, Cernăuţi, Odessa, Kharkov, Sevastopol, Smolensk, and 
Riga.53  Ecoul Crimeei carried a story the same month describing the “bestial revenge” taken by 
the Soviets on the people of the Caucasus after the Axis retreat from the region, implying that 
Romanian soldiers’ families would expereince the same treatment if the Red Army entered their 
                                                 
50 “Situaţia bolşevicilor e disperată,” Ecoul Crimeei, 27 Iulie 1942, 2; Sentinela, “În urmăriea duşmanului dela 
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homeland.54  A March 1943 article from Soldatul was even more blunt.  Its title declared in big 
bold letters, “The Bolsheviks will never forgive any people.”55  The discovery of the mass grave 
of thousands of Polish officers at Katyn in April 1943 gave the Germans a valuable propaganda 
tool and the fate of the Polish officers was soon splashed across the pages of military and civilian 
newspapers.  Clearly the reasons Romanian troops went to war for in the first place (nationalism, 
religion, anti-Semitism, and anti-communism) remained powerful motivators after Stalingrad.   
Officers and soldiers feared a terrible Soviet vengeance for the crimes they committed in 
the USSR if the Red Army reached Romania.  Army propaganda warned Soviet victory would be 
a disaster for Europe and openly spoke of the threat of Soviet revenge, but never actually directly 
addressed the crimes committed by soldiers after 1941.  The Propaganda Section counted troops 
knowing about atrocities because the pogroms, deportations, and mass executions of 1941-1942 
were an open secret.  Army propaganda continued to play on soldiers’ intrinsic motivation: fears 
of an existential threat to nation and religion, loss of property or land, and “Jewish-Communist” 
retribution that was sure to follow in the wake of the Red Army.  Propaganda messages became 
increasingly shrill and repetitive as the General Staff tried to keep faith in final victory.  Articles 
had titles like: “On Guard between Two Worlds,” “Victory or Death,” “Only Germany can save 
Humanity from Bolshevism,” and “What Soviet Liberation Means.”56  Despite these efforts, by 
fall 1943 it was clear that the war was being lost and, as Mioara Anton put it in her recent history 
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of the Ministry of Propaganda, Romanian soldiers were “not fighting from conviction [in final 
victory], but from duty.”57  Yet the strength of duty as a motivator should not be discounted.   
The Misadventures of Private Neaţa 
 Before concluding this examination of Romanian army propaganda, it is worth looking at 
the most iconic and beloved figure of the war, Private Neată.  Neaţa was an invention of Neagu 
Rădulescu, an interwar writer, playwright, and caricaturist hired by the General Staff to produce 
material for Sentinela’s cheerful page.  He created a four-panel comic strip “The Misadventures 
of Private Neaţa” that ran from January 1940 to September 1944.  The hijinks of the irrepressible 
peasant soldiers became immensely popular with troops and civilians alike.  It was such a hit that 
two volumes of Neaţa’s misadventures were published, in 1942 and then in 1943, totaling 20,000 
copies.  Neaţa inspired a host of copycats that included a children’s book and a short-lived comic 
strip called “The Life of Private Stan” in Soldatul.58  Neaţa was someone peasant soldiers could 
identify with and laugh at as he navigated army life – and later life on the front.   
 “The Misadventures of Private Neaţa” was initially supposed to provide entertainment to 
bored soldiers.  Sentinela did not focus on propaganda under Carol II as much as it did under the 
Antonescu regime and Neaţă was still in a peacetime army, correspondingly the comic strip was 
primarily just humor.  Most of the jokes were made at Neaţa’s expense, mocking his clumsiness, 
bad luck, and stupidity.  Rădulescu’s comic on the cheerful page, before Neaţa fully took shape, 
showed vignettes of army life; regimental doctors inspecting the poor specimen of recruits from 
rural areas with bent backs and flat feet, regular officers trying to find a role for reserve officers, 
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a soldier caught in the kitchen with female cook by an officer, and a Gypsy recruit, colored black 
as coal, being asked by a sergeant, “Who stole my bread, hey [there] Gypsy?”  “Respectfully 
mister sergeant, what serial number did it have?”59  During the Carlist period, Rădulescu’s comic 
strip focused on the humorous trivialities of peacetime army life to the chuckles of his readers.   
After the Soviet occupation of eastern Romania in 1940, propaganda became prominent 
in “The Misadventures of Private Neaţa.”  On 30 June, Neaţă learned about communism.  Neaţă 
asks his friend Private Stan, “What is this thing communism?”  Stan then asks Neaţa give him his 
cap, coat, puttees, and even his pants, causing him to exclaim “Why are you making me do this 
Stan, you are not a doctor”!?  Finally, with Neaţa stripped down to an undershirt, Stan proclaims 
“Look, this is communism Neaţă, you get it?  What is mine is mine and what is yours is also 
mine.  So now we are comrades.”  “Now I understand friend Stan, so if my wife [muierea] would 
be here, you would take her too!”60  Rădulescu pushed the theme of restoring România Mare.  In 
the New Year issue, Neaţa’s wife Mariţica bides him farewell, “Dear Neaţă because your holiday 
leave has ended and you are returning to the barracks, look, here is a sprig of basil.  Put it under 
your pillow for Epiphany and you will dream of what you desire for the New Year.”  Arriving at 
his barracks, he dreams a map of “România Mare!  From the Dniester [in the east] to the Tisza 
[in the west]!”61  In another strip, Rădulescu used an object lesson, an officer finds Neaţă crying 
over a wagon wheel with several broken spokes and asks, “What is with you Neaţă, why are you 
crying, is a tooth hurting you, or have you got too many chores?”  Neaţă responds he was crying 
because his “heart hurts” after “standing and looking at this wheel and seems I saw our Romania.  
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Like her, it is missing a few spokes…Bukovina, Transylvania, and Bessarabia.”  He keeps the it 
as a reminder of what he was fighting for, “to put the spokes of the country back in place.”62  
Rădulescu turned his pen to explain politics after the repression of the Legionary uprising 
in January 1941.  Neaţă is shocked to see his wife at the front of a crowd of Legionary rebels and 
says, “what the devil does she think she’s up to, harrumph, because she isn’t good at anything 
except cooking and cleaning?”  He singlehandedly halts the mob by shouting, “Stop!  I am the 
country and no one gets by me!”  Then he yells at Mariţica, “Get over here monkey!  Today you 
leave mămăliga [polenta] unmixed and join a demonstration!”  Neaţă puts Mariţica over his leg 
and spanks her with his rifle promising, “I will teach you to behave!  You won’t be able to sit on 
a chair for six months!”63  Rădulescu thereby gendered the Legionary rebellion, associating it 
with women, believed to be inferior and lacking the intelligence to participate in politics, and 
depicted Romanians who participated in the uprising as being misguided, thus requiring minimal 
punishment.  Rădulescu succinctly summed up a complex issue, provide a clear message to the 
troops, and supported the Conducător – all while also getting a laugh.   
After June 1941, Private Neaţă underwent a subtle transformation.  His character, which 
in peacetime had been buffoonish, became cunning on the front.  Rădulescu depicted the Soviet 
soldier as a “simpleton” [ciolovec]: cowardly, dirty, unprofessional, demoralized, and drunk.  He 
also racialized them, giving some Asian features – notably Rădulescu never depicted a Jew or 
incorporated anti-Semitism.  Neaţă outsmarts the Red Army “simpletons” through a mixture of 
peasant cleverness and bravery.  In one case, Neaţă neutralizes a Soviet machinegun nest outside 
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of Odessa in 1941 by spraying vodka on it, which the Red Army soldiers lap up, causing them to 
fall into a drunken stupor and allowing Neaţă and his buddies to take the trench.64  A couple of 
the troops were repeated in the comic strip.  Neaţă being surprised unarmed by Soviet troops and 
having to find his way out of the situation or Neaţa finding a way to surprise Red Army soldiers 
to capture them on his own.  At Stalingrad in 1942, Neaţă masquerades as a woman to lure sex-
starved Soviets back to Romanian lines to be captured.65  Rădulescu never depicted Neaţă killing 
the enemy, mutilation or death is always out of sight, but since soldiers saw plenty of both in real 
life they enjoyed the escape of reading Neaţa’s bloodless antics.   
Romanian soldiers on the front were concerned about the situation facing families on the 
home front.  Inflation, shortages, and wives or daughters left to work family plots were all major 
concerns for Romanian soldiers.66  Rădulescu tried to allay these fears.  Therefore, unlike most 
soldiers, Private Neaţă got regular leave to visit home and each time the opportunity was used to 
reassure readers of the conditions in Romania.  In one strip, after arriving home, Mariţica has a 
massive meal prepared for him and Neaţă gorges so much that his belly is distended.  In another, 
when it is time for him to leave, Mariţica humorously gathers food for him to take with him back 
to the front, sweet breads, meats, and alcohol, all piled into a sack two or three times bigger than 
Neaţă!67  This reassuring sequence of events occurred each time Neaţa got leave. 
Additionally, Rădulescu presented an idealized vision of German-Romanian relations in 
the comic strip.  When Private Neaţă meets the German soldier “Fritz” they are equals, brothers-
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in-arms, sharing food and cigarettes before going off to fight Bolsheviks together.68  In another 
strip, Neaţă and Fritz take turns firing a sub-machinegun, passing the weapon back and worth as 
they tired.  Neaţă always remembers to bring a present from home to Fritz when he comes back 
from leave.  He interacts with “Giovanii,” an Italian soldier, on several occasions.  Neaţa teaches 
both Fritz and Giovanii a Romanian hora, a folk circle dance.69  Hungarians, unsurprisingly, are 
not depicted as allies.  Rădulescu did his best to reinforce German-Romanian comradeship.   
Finally, “The Misadventures of Private Neaţa” commented on the progress of the war and 
it was always shown as going well.  The closest Rădulescu came to addressing Stalingrad and the 
disaster on the Don and Kalmuk steppe was in a comic strip from April 1943, when Neaţă is told 
his recent promotion to corporal was a mistake.  The news is so disappointing, that he attempts to 
hang himself, but after he kicks out the stool the rope breaks.   Neaţa survives and exclaims, “A 
good sign!  The one above doesn’t want me to upset Mariţica or let the simpletons escape.”70  It 
seems the noose was a metaphor for the encirclement at Stalingrad and suggested to Romanian 
survivors of Third and Fourth armies they had escaped from Stalingrad due to divine providence.  
They needed to fight on against the communist menace just like Neaţă.  On 22 June 1943, second 
anniversary of Operation Barbarossa, Rădulescu drew Neaţă standing atop the body of the Soviet 
giant, not yet defeated, but breathing his last.71  For soldiers this message must have rung hollow.  
At that time, the Cavalry Corps was the only formation left fighting on the front after Stalingrad, 
in a tough defense of the Kuban bridgehead, and soon after the Germans were defeated at Kursk.  
When Rădulescu first introduced Neaţă his character was funny and relevant, but once the war 
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turned against the Axis he became divorced from reality and the comic strip became boring and 
pedantic, simply conveying the same tired message of fighting to the last for final victory. 
Propaganda and Motivation 
In evaluating the efficacy of propaganda, one must be careful not to give it inflated value 
because soldiers can only be convinced to believe so much by such efforts.  Most historians have 
been dismissive of the intrinsic motivation of Romanian soldiers and argue that they were easily 
swayed, and thus demoralized, by Soviet propaganda after 1941.72  On the contrary, the Soviets 
were unsuccessful in convincing soldiers the “holy war” was unjust, to lay down their arms, or 
desert in large numbers.  The only success it had was informing Soviet soldiers of its victories in 
1943-1944.  Romanian propaganda was effective in reinforcing soldiers’ intrinsic motivation and 
remind them why they needed to keep fighting.  By fall 1943, the Propaganda Section could not 
convince soldiers that the Axis was winning the war or that German-Romanian comradeship was 
stronger than ever after, but it did contribute to a continued fear of communism that motivated 
Romanian soldiers to keep fighting in a lost cause.  Romanians remained committed to the war 
against the USSR to the very end.73  They hoped for a miracle or some sort of negotiated peace 
to deliver them from the impossible position they found themselves in.  What is true for combat 
motivation is valid for atrocity motivation.  Army propaganda may have reinforced pre-existing 
anti-Semitism in the ranks and legitimized anti-Semitic violence, but it was primarily intrinsic 
motivation that compelled soldiers to carry out atrocities against Jews during the war.  Fear of 
Soviet retribution probably contributed to a slacking in anti-Semitic violence in 1943-1944.   
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Coercion as a Motivating Tool 
 All military institutions, even democratic ones, are inherently coercive.  Coercion relies 
on a soldier’s own self-interest to function; as John Lynn put it, a “soldier’s concern for his own 
well-being makes the punishments associated with military discipline necessary and effective.”74  
Modern armies have developed military law and courts to punish soldiers for disobeying orders, 
criminal behavior, or dereliction of duty.  Punishment can vary substantially, depending on the 
severity of the infraction and accepted disciplinary practices, from deprivation of privileges to 
imprisonment, or in the worst cases execution.  The Romanian Army had a traditional system of 
military discipline that still used corporal punishment, including flogging.  This was not unusual 
as other armies in the region still maintained the practice.  Nonetheless, the Romanian Army has 
been unfairly stereotyped as being particularly brutal towards its men. 
Corporal Punishment 
By the First World War many European armies no longer used corporal punishment.  The 
German Army outlawed flogging in the late-nineteenth century, but corporal punishment did not 
completely disappear (NCOs still unofficially used it during training) and other practices, such as 
binding, tying an offender to a wheel or tree, were still in official use until 1917.75  A temporary 
breakdown of discipline on the Western Front in the last days of the war prompted a rethinking 
of discipline in the German Army during the interwar years.  It decided to try to break down the 
social class barriers between officers and soldiers using the myth of a Frontgemeinschaft, or a 
egalitarian “front community,” which meshed with later Nazi ideology of Volksgemeinschaft, to 
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break down class divisions and cement bonds between officers and enlisted men.76  If German 
soldiers no longer endured corporal punishment, under the Nazi regime military justice became, 
in the words of Omer Bartov, “positively murderous.”  Approximately 13,000-15,000 German 
soldiers were officially executed during 1939-1945 because martial law under the Nazi regime 
was politicized and classified desertion or self-inflicted wounds as treason, not demoralization.  
This was a huge increase compared the few hundred executed during 1914-1918.77   
The Red Army also rid its military justice system of corporal punishment.  The Russian 
Army had outlawed flogging in the late-nineteenth century but reintroduced it in 1915 in an 
attempt to coerce troops to fight, contributing to discontent in the ranks.  In 1917 one of the first 
demands of soldier soviets was an abolition to flogging and all forms of corporal punishment.78  
The new Red Army lambasted the old tsarist army and assured its soldiers that they would not be 
exploited.  The abolition of flogging was symbolic of this promise.  Other punishments were also 
strictly limited, but the Red Army began to progressively strengthen its code of military justice in 
the 1930s and soon included stronger punishments: prolonged imprisonment, a term in a labor 
camp, or execution with confiscation of property.79  After 1941, the Red Army liberally used 
execution as a punishment for the crimes of cowardice, self-mutilation, desertion, and even just 
failure in combat.  It began employing “blocking detachments” and penal battalions to try to 
force soldiers to fight.  The Stalinist regime decided to target the families of soldiers accused of 
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treason, including simply being captured.80  It should be noted none of these brutal measures, 
German or Soviet, were ever completely successful in deterring the behavior they punished.   
 The Romanian Army had to deal with these same problems of cowardice, self-mutilation, 
and desertion, but used flogging or imprisonment – not executions – to punish.  Before the First 
World War, regular officers were notorious for severely beating their men when they felt like it, 
but during the interwar period the General Staff made a concerted effort to end this tradition of 
informal beatings that too often resulted in injured or incapacitated soldiers in favor of regulated 
flogging that resulted in manageable welts, bruises, or lacerations.  Under the Carlist regime the 
General Staff tried to further minimize abuse of corporal punishment.  In March 1939, an article 
in România militară instructed that while officers had the right to punish soldiers they needed to 
be aware that punishments “instead of being a means of education, many times degenerate into 
abuse, on a whim [bun plac] and arbitrary.”81  Some in the officer corps resisted these efforts and 
in times of crisis their first impulse to restore discipline was to recourse to corporal punishment.  
General Ţenescu, then Chief of the General Staff, reported on 1 August 1940 that commanders 
had asked for permission to use flogging to restore discipline after the evacuation from eastern 
Romania, but Ţenescu did not agree because he believed the state of discipline had not reached a 
point where flogging were needed, moreover, “ten days of effectively executed incarceration 
constitutes for he who carries it out a physical punishment much greater than 25 lashes.”82   
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After Antonescu took power, forcin General Ţenescu and other Carlists into retirement, 
flogging became more common, especially after June 1941 once soldiers began pillaging.  Senior 
officers worried about physical abuse.  At the Ministry of Defense, General Iacobici complained 
on 21 July 1941 that even though unregulated beatings had been “totally banned” some officers 
were still using them and cited the case of a captain who beat a subordinate so badly that soldier 
had to be hospitalized with a broken jaw.  Consequently, Iacobici warned that all officers guilty 
of physical abuse would be punished and a few weeks later reiterated that even flogging required 
a “long procedure” following army regulations.  Flogging should use a belt, applied to the back 
or buttocks, under supervision of a doctor, and only for “lack of respect and grave mistakes.”83  
Numerous cases of officers beating soldiers can be found in army records showing that abusive 
officers were indeed punished, at least when it resulted in serious bodily injury, officers who left 
only minor cuts and bruises probably never faced investigation.  The General Staff periodically 
repeated warnings since physical abuse did not end.  This was in part due to the fact that military 
justice never severely punished officers.  Officers were never flogged; they were subject only to 
“arrest” or “severe arrest.”  This meant confinement to quarters or imprisonment with reduced 
rations, depending on the offense, for several days – soldiers could be similarly punished.   
 Despite General Staff efforts to limit flogging, it continued to be used to punish relatively 
minor offenses, such as brawling, theft, and drunkenness, but also serious ones like rape.84  Often 
being absent without leave or desertion was punished by flogging.  On 15 April 1942, General 
Dumitrescu, frustrated with the backlog of cases due to what he considered the glacial pace of 
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Third Army courts martial, ordered that deserters should simply be flogged immediately after 
their detention and then escorted back to the nearest frontline combat unit.85  Dumitrescu had a 
record of favoring swift and harsh punishment, but in this instance, he did not get his way and 
soon had to countermand the order.  On 24 May 1942, he reminded commanders that while the 
floggings had ended, the recent changes in the military justice code still required desertion cases 
to be decided within three days, “They will follow the path of justice – with rapid procedure.”86  
Flogging remained common until it was finally outlawed in September 1944 under the influence 
of the Romanian Army’s new (coerced) alliance with the Red Army. 
The Romanian military justice system functioned relatively effectively during the war.  
Small infractions, such as drunkenness, brawling, or inattention in an assignment, were punished 
with a few days or a week imprisonment or flogging, if the officer wanted to make an example of 
the soldier.  In December 1943, two corporals at the Tiraspol prison camp hospital received 15 
lashes “for inappropriate dress and failure to supervise the prisoners that they were escorting.”87  
Soldiers caught smuggling or profiteering faced long prison sentences.  In early 1943, following 
Stalingrad, Private Mihai Lubescu, who had deserted a year earlier, pretended to be a sergeant 
gathering stragglers and deserters (sometimes enlisting actual Romanian stragglers and deserters 
to help him deceive the Germans).  After entering a village, he would ask local German officers 
to issue rations for the men he was supposedly shepherding to collection points.  They provided 
vouchers to German commissaries and Lubescu then sold the supplies on the black market.  A 
suspicious Cossack auxiliary (HiWi) soon uncovered the subterfuge and Lubescu was taken to 
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Mariupol for count martial, but the investigators found nothing when they looked for evidence 
except for a pretty Ukrainian girlfriend.  He was charged with impersonating an NCO.88   
Those who broke the law in efforts to help or protect Jews faced especially harsh prison 
sentences.  After the fall of Odessa, Sergeant Nicolae Tănase began a relationship with a local 
Jewish woman Vera Sepel in hiding, bringing her food, clothing, and fuel.  In January 1942, after 
gendarmes began to deport Jews to camps on the Bug, he tried to help her escape on a night train 
to Buzău to the relatively safety of Moldavia, since west of the Prut Jews faced less persecution, 
but they were discovered by a suspicious ticket collector.  Tănase was sentenced to three years 
imprisonment for “falsifying the documents of a Jew” and another five years for “attempting to 
remove a Jew from internment in the ghetto.”89  Sepel received five years and was probably sent 
to a camp in Transnistria.  Thereby, courts martial punished such cases harshly to discourage any 
other soldiers (few were so inclined) from aiding Jews.   
 Flogging was generally accepted as a legitimate punishment by soldiers, but if an officer 
was considered abusive he faced resistance from soldiers.  Soldiers could and did denounce any 
officers deemed abusive, citing the General Staff’s official stance against unregulated beatings.  
There are many examples of investigations into officers accused of abuse – often simultaneously 
accused of corruption – in army records.  Such denunciations were usually anonymous because 
soldiers feared further beatings from the abusive officer, especially in cases when investigators 
vindicated the accused because they trusted the word of an officer over that of an enlisted man.  
                                                 
88 Giorgio Geddes, Nichivó: Life, Love and Death on the Russian Front, trans. Natalie Lowe (London: Cassell & Co, 
2001), 128-130.   
89 King, Odessa, 215-216.   
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All “false” denunciations were punished.90  A few soldiers on the front took retribution into their 
own hands.  A report from Crimea in June 1943 recorded that after a lieutenant slapped a soldier 
some nearby soldiers muttered, “Why does Mr. Lieutenant not come to fight on the front, rather 
than hit innocent people here.  [Because] many officers who were used to hitting [their men], 
were shot by their own troops [at the front].”91  While corporal punishment may have deterred 
petty infractions or even motivated some soldiers to keep fighting rather than risk being punished 
for desertion, it had its limits and officers who employed it too liberally put themselves at risk.   
Capital Punishment 
In times of crisis officers used the threat of capital punishment.  From Antonescu down to 
commanders of divisions, officers threaten soldiers with execution “on the spot” for indiscipline 
or cowardice appears.  The threat appeared in orders so often that it became a cliché almost from 
the start of the war.  On 12 July 1941, General Dumitrescu reported his soldiers were treating 
liberated northern Bukovina like enemy territory pillaging as they advanced, even misusing army 
trucks to transport looted items back to Romania.  He warned that these were “especially grave” 
crimes against the “population liberated from the Bolshevik yoke” and threatened soldiers with 
severe punishment.  The General Headquarters agreed.  A week later General Ioaniţiu reported 
continued complaints of soldiers “and even officers” looting occupied areas.  He ordered, “Those 
guilty of such an act that debases a civilized army will be executed on the spot.”  On 20 August, 
Antonescu ordered that Romanian soldiers should be seen “as liberators from the bolshevik yoke, 
                                                 
90 In July 1941, General Iacobici complained that soldiers had denounced officers “falsely” and did not defend their 
honor energetic enough and threatened to punish officers who did not defend “their personal honor,” see, Fond 
Armata 4-a, dosar 766, f. 91; in March 1942, the 10th Infantry punished some troops, “influenced by bad elements,” 
who denounced their officers by writing to the Council of Ministers, see, Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 1119, f. 7.  
91 Moraru, Armata lui Stalin văzută de români, 126. 
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and not as barbarians” and declared any soldier caught pillaging east of the Dniester should “be 
executed on the spot without mercy.”92  These harsh orders, however, were not carried out 
While the General Headquarters favored swift and brutal justice, frontline officers needed 
fiving soldiers, not executed ones.  Officer magistrates serving on courts martial, many of whom 
were reservists who worked as legal professionals in peacetime, resisted all efforts to ignore the 
Code of Military Justice, whether orders to expedite punishment or order summary execution.  In 
September and October 1941, Fourth Army headquarters complained that its courts martial were 
too “indulgent” in sentencing soldiers.  Between July and September 1941, Fourth Army courts 
martial carried out 336 trials with only 11 resulting in death sentences (most were commuted), 
prompting Fourth Army headquarters to upbraid them for not following Antonescu’s orders to 
“apply the maximum penalty.”  General Ciupercă’s staff pushed for more death sentences, but 
officer magistrates stood firm against this pressure, saying they were well within their authority 
and following army law.93  Only in the case of self-mutilation did courts martial regularly order 
executions.  The officer corps saw acts of cowardice as the same as treason and kept an eye on 
possible cases.  After a spike of minor wounds hands or feet among soldiers during the battle for 
Odessa, Antonescu ordered doctors to verify that the wounds were not self-inflicted.  He wanted 
any confirmed cases to be executed in front of their unit as an example.  Fourth Army ordered 
nine soldiers from three different units executed on 27 September 1941.94 
The threat of capital punishment was invoked in times of crisis and periodically soldiers 
were executed to show that the threat was real.  In January and February 1943, during the retreat 
                                                 
92 Traşcă, “Chestiunea evreiască” în documente militare române, 161; Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 325, f. 42; Fond 
Corpul de Munte, dosar 639, f. 33.   
93 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 784, f. 162, 81, 120. 
94 Ibid., dosar 629, f. 274, dosar 658, f. 145, dosar 860, f. 128.   
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from Stalingrad, General Dumitrescu authorized commanders of divisions or ad-hoc groups that 
were isolated on the front to carry out executions until regular court martial proceedings could be 
restored because it was impossible to send soldiers to the nearest court martial in Mariupol.95  On 
8 February 1943, the General Staff announced that 12 deserters arrested near Kiev in December 
1942 had been sent to Bucharest for a court martial and all but one were sentenced to death – it 
ordered this news be publicized to soldiers.96  At the same time, General Pantazi visited units in 
the Caucasus because alarming reports from German High Command claimed Romanian troops’ 
morale was collapsing.  During the inspection, he granted division commanders the authority to 
carry out summary executions to maintain discipline because Romanian divisions were scattered 
across the region and cut off from Third Army courts martial.  This period of crisis passed and an 
investigation by a joint Romanian-German commission reported that Romanian soldier’s morale 
in the Caucasus was shaken after the disaster on the Don but was not collapsing as reported.  On 
10 March 1943, having successfully finished shepherding the remnants of both Romanian armies 
outside Stalingrad to Transnistria, Dumitrescu’s Third Army headquarters again took charge of 
administration and discipline of all Romanian troops east of the Dniester.97   
As the situation deteriorated in 1943, the General Staff increasingly used the threat of 
capital punishment and authorized even mid-ranking officers to carry out executions.  After the 
Red Army occupied northeastern Romania, in April 1944 Antonescu issued Order No. 10.523 
that authorized execution without court martial for desertion, cowardice, looting, self-mutilation, 
rebellion, insubordination, or striking an officer.  Again, officer magistrates pushed back against 
                                                 
95 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 992, f. 96, 183-184.  
96 Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 933, f. 374. 
97 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 126-127.   
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such a radical order.  Fourth Army Court Martial clarified that only commanders of regiments or 
detachments “operating isolated” could order executions – and even then, they had to obtain final 
approval from the division commander first.98  Therefore, Romanian military justice did become 
more brutal as the war continued, but the death penalty was still not used extensiely.   
The Antonescu regime, unlike the Nazis or the Soviets, was not particularly bloodthirsty 
towards its people – aside from Jews and Gypsies.  The SSI was relatively small and did not use 
terror on the scale of the Gestapo or NKVD.  During 1940-1944, only 10,617 people were tried 
and imprisoned for political crimes: 4,830 sentenced to less than 15 years; 5,185 sentenced to 15-
25 years; 277 sentenced to life of hard labor; 313 sentenced to death (all but 72 commuted to life 
in prison); and 22 killed during interrogation – another 5,463 were interned.99  A precise number 
of soldiers executed during the war is difficult to determine as there is no centralized record, but 
taking into account the nature of the Antonescu regime and a random sampling from the archives 
the total was probably in the hundreds, probably a maximum of around a thousand.  The officer 
corps executed just enough soldiers to maintain capital punishment as a realistic threat. 
Rehabilitation  
The General Staff developed the policy of rehabilitation to provide the Romanian Army 
with desperately needed manpower.  Like the German Army, the Romanian Army was already 
having serious shortages in manpower in early 1942 due to heavy losses on the Eastern Front, so 
it decided to expand the policy of rehabilitation that it had initiated in 1941.100  Articles 415-418 
of the Code of Military Justice allowed officers judged guilty of cowardice or crimes in time of 
                                                 
98 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 1533, f. 31, 59. 
99 10,617 “anti-fascists” (maximum 2,300 communists), see, Giurescu, Romania in the Second World War, 98. 
100 Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 153; Romania was a small country with limited manpower, but post-war Şteflea 
claimed he tried to purposely limit the contribution to the Axis, a lie, see, Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 75.   
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war to have their sentences suspended, be stripped of rank, and be given a chance to rehabilitate 
themselves through bravery in combat.  On 26 June 1941, the Ministry of Defense first applied 
this section of the Code of Military Justice to reserve officers arrested in January for supporting 
the Legionary rebellion, releasing them from prison to fight on the front.  Since they had shown 
“moral incapacity” by they were restricted from ever commanding soldiers and were supposed to 
remain privates for at least five years, even after being rehabilitated.101  In 1941 rehabilitation 
was voluntary and authorized on an individual basis by the General Staff.  Officers accused of 
cowardice or incompetence, usually after their unit had retreated in panic and disorder, petitioned 
for a chance to restore their honor – and their pensions.  For example, on 1 September 1941 two 
second lieutenants from 5th Grăniceri Regiment awaiting court martial in Chişinău on charges of 
cowardice asked to be sent to the front for a chance to redeem themselves.  Antonescu personally 
approved their request, even letting them to keep their rank, but warned that if the officers again 
proved to be cowards they would “be shot in front of their companies.”102  As the war continued 
into 1942 the rehabilitation policy was expanded to include NCOs and even privates. 
The Ministry of Defense issued General Order No. 240 on 2 March 1942 to clarify and 
expand the policy of rehabilitation.  Based on Articles 415-418, commanders at army and corps 
level were empowered to suspend court martial sentences imprisoning soldiers for a period of a 
month to 12 years.  They would then be assigned to a frontline infantry or cavalry unit.  If they 
distinguished themselves in combat, by being praised in a daily order at the army or corps level, 
                                                 
101 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 1236, f. 902; the army’s need for officers (plus a combination of poor communication 
and misunderstanding of policy) meant that many of these Legionary reserve officers not only were not degraded, 
but were placed in command or staff positions against orders, which triggered complaints from the General Staff in 
October and December 1941 to reaffirm the orders, see, Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 306, f. 277; dosar 1351, f. 74.  
102 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 773, f. 85.   
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they would be rehabilitated by a decree.  If a soldier was killed before the process was complete, 
families could request post-mortem rehabilitation and benefit from the soldiers’ pension.103  All 
soldiers arrested east of the Dniester were sent to the nearest Third Army court martial, after the 
court martial General Dumitrescu approved the suspension of the sentence and the reassignment. 
Rehabilitation soldiers were sent as individuals or small groups to infantry or cavalry regiments.  
While there was little volunteerism in the process, most rehabilitation soldiers were willing.   
The General Staff decided on a different variant of rehabilitation for soldiers or criminals 
being held in prisons east of the Dniester.  During 1940-1941, military and civilian prisons filled 
up with political prisoners, beginning with several thousand socialists and communists, joined by 
hundreds of liberals and Carlists, and finally thousands of Legionaries.104   After the war started 
in June 1941, groups of imprisoned Legionaries sent petitions to Antonescu that declared their 
patriotism, hatred of bolshevism, and asked to be sent to the front.105  Although they were not all 
immediately sent to the front, the Legionary requests planted the idea of expanding the policy of 
rehabilitation to political prisoners, also soldiers sentenced for desertion, theft, and other cases of 
indiscipline west of the Dniester, and even common criminals in state penitentiaries.  In February 
1942, General Şteflea decided that the army needed these men for replacements, especially with 
plans for spring counteroffensives and later the Case Blue summer offensive.  Some that asked to 
                                                 
103 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 358, f. 132. 
104 While over 9,000 Legionaries were initially arrested, not all were found guilty, and many had their sentences 
suspended later, especially after June 1941, except for those deemed too dangerous to release, see, Heinen, Legiunea 
“Arhanghelul Mihail,” 491, 426; in August 1942 a group of 500 actual Jewish communists were deported to 
Vapniarka camp in Transnistria, 407 from Târgu Jiu and 87 from Caransebeş camps, joining hundreds of “Jewish-
Communists” from Transnistria, see, Paul A. Shapiro, “Vapniarka: The archive of the International Tracing Service 
and the Holocaust in the East,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 27, no. 1 (Spring 2013), 120.   
105 For example: in June 196 Legionaries in Lugoj Prison asked to be sent to the front to fight for the fatherland, see 
Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 748, f. 105; in September 27 Legionaries in Suceava Prison and 81 Legionaries in Târgu Jiu 
internment camp also declared the loyalty to the regime and asked to be sent to the front, see, dosar 793, f. 972, 981;  
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be rehabilitated came to regret their decision.  Sergeant Ionescu recorded a rumor on 29 May 
1942 that a deserter sentenced to 10-12 years who had volunteered for rehabilitation on the front 
had “returned to prison to carry out the punishment, [because] he is unwilling to fight.”106   
 In April 1942, the General Staff ordered the creation of a special infantry training center 
for rehabilitation in southern Bessarabia.  Initially, the center was going to be located in Arciz, a 
large town located on a railway line that had been emptied of its German and Jewish populations 
in 1940 and 1941, but worries about having recently released convicts too close to a railway that 
might be used as a possible means of escape – and the Antonescu regime’s plans to colonize 
refugees from northern Transylvania or southern Dobrogea in Bessarabia – meant that it was 
moved 20 km further east to the smaller, more isolated, town of Sărata.107  On 8 May 1942, the 
General Staff established Training Center No. 5 in Sărata.  It had also been emptied of ethnic 
Germans and Jews, leaving infrastructure for the center, although many buildings had been 
damaged in fighting and had to be repaired.  Soon officers, NCOs, and materials were on their 
way to the town to prepare for the first wave of rehabilitation soldiers released from prison. 
General Alexandru Poenaru was placed in command of the Sărata Training Center and 
oversaw the training, organization, and departure of four battalions between June and December 
1942.  Each independent infantry battalion (991st, 992nd, 993rd, and 994th) eventually numbered 
roughly a thousand men gathered from military prisons, the majority were soldiers condemned 
for desertion, theft, or other crimes.  For example, from a total of 1009 men in 992nd Independent 
Infantry Battalion almost half or 486 were deserters, followed by 123 condemned for theft, only 
                                                 
106 Ionescu, Însemnări din război, 93.   
107 AMR, Fond CI Nr. 5 Sărata, dosar 108, f. 1-2. 
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88 imprisoned for rebellion (Legionaries), and the rest were guilty of striking officers, beating 
troops, falsifying papers, rape, and manslaughter.108  After being released from prison on their 
own recognizance and received ten days of leave before they had to report to Sărata.  Poenaru 
defended the practice to the General Staff, arguing that seeing their families would improve the 
morale of rehabilitation soldiers and weed out the untrustworthy because they could desert from 
or commit crimes at Sărata just as easily as they could on leave.109  Desertion or going absent 
without leave was a constant problem at Training Center No. 5.  Captain Păsat, newly transferred 
to take over a company in the 991st Independent Infantry Division, recalled that, “Weekly 2-3 of 
those who had deserted were brought back to me, again weekly, another 2-3 left, almost as if 
they were on a rotation.”110  By December 1942, an estimated 300 soldiers had deserted from 
Sărata or from one of the battalions at the front.111  Poenaru described a glum atmosphere in 
Sărata.  The officer and NCO instructors were unhappy with their assignment, political prisoners 
were uncomfortable being lumped together common criminals, and the criminals “do not seem 
dedicated to renouncing [their] bad habits.”112  Each battalion was formed successively in June, 
July, August, and September; after about three months of training each left one after the other in 
September, October, and November for the Don front – except for the 994th Independent Infantry 
Battalion in December that was sent to the Caucasus.113  After departing Sărata every battalion 
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109 Ibid., dosar 69, f. 40.   
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became “independent” of the training center, hence their designation, and came under command 
of a frontline division.  The performance of these battalions in combat was surprisingly steady. 
 While the soldiers of these independent battalions were unruly and had higher desertion 
rates, when buttressed by regular units on either flank and put in the situation of kill or be killed, 
they fought fiercely.  General Poenaru believed around 20 percent of the soldiers who came to 
Sărata could not be counted on, but most were weeded out by the time the battalions left for the 
front; Captain Păsat thought 70 percent of the soldiers were just “brutes, without law, without 
God,” but he believed he earned their trust and they fought well on the Don.114  The most reliable 
rehabilitation soldiers were Legionaries who were the most motivated and least likely to desert.  
The 991st and 992nd Independent Infantry battalions were completely destroyed on the Don in 
November 1942, the 993rd Independent Infantry Battalion was severely mauled too but managed 
to withdraw with the remains of Third Army before being assigned to the 24th Infantry Division 
guarding the Azov Sea coast. The 994th Independent Infantry Battalion fought determinedly in 
the Caucasus.115  Over 100 soldiers in the 994th Independent Infantry Battalion were award Iron 
Crosses for bravery while fighting for the German 97th Mountain Division during the winter of 
1942-1943, however, in the rear these soldiers were undisciplined and if the officers and NCOs 
who trained them at Sărata were killed desertions increased.116  Despite these issues the General 
Staff’s need for manpower was so dire that imprisoned soldiers continued to be rehabilitated.   
                                                 
114 Fond CI Nr. 5 Sărata, dosar 72, f. 107; Păsat, Memoriile Căpitanului Dumitru Păsat, 55.  
115 991st was encircled with the 5th Infantry Division in November and 992nd suffered heavy losses with 7th Infantry 
Division during its epic anabasis with Italian survivors in December, both battalions were later disbanded, the Sărata 
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December, retreated a shorter distance, and most survived, see, Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 100.  
116 Fond CI Nr. 5 Sărata, dosar 40, f. 102; dosar 230, f. 192. 
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 The General Staff expanded rehabilitation in 1943.  Third Army set up Training Center 
No. 3 in Tiraspol where deserters, stragglers, or other criminals arrested east of the Dniester were 
collected and retrained before being reassigned to frontline infantry or cavalry regiments – some 
regiments created separate rehabilitation companies or platoons.  Back in Sărata, Training Center 
No. 5, now under a new commandant General Simion Coman, expanded its efforts.  It retrained 
replacements for the 993rd and 994th Independent battalions respectively guarding the Azov Sea 
coast or fighting in the Kuban bridgehead, formed the 995th Independent Battalion that was sent 
to reinforce the 24th Infantry Division on the Azov Sea, and began organizing labor battalions for 
construction projects west of the Bug.  As Romanian prisons emptied, the Sărata Training Center 
began to have difficulties finding manpower.  In April 1943, the Târgu Jiu internment camp sent 
164 Legionaries (112 were designated “notorious Legionaries”) from its dwindling population of 
political prisoners.  The Sărata Training Center also began be sent mistrusted minorities culled 
from prisons.  By October 1943, it had organized the 1001st-1017th Labor battalions.  Each of the 
16 battalions had approximately 500 men, totaling 8,189.  Nearly half were minorities: 1,338 
Hungarians, 1,634 Russians, and 961 Jews (placed in the segregated 1016th-1017th Jewish Labor 
battalions).117  The General Staff ultimately used 7,053 in Transnistria and 1,812 in Romania 
(see Table 4) but did not trust minorities to fight – or with valuable weapons and equipment. 
The large number of stragglers and deserters after Stalingrad meant that Third Army had 
plenty of men to assign for rehabilitation as replacements to the Mountain and Cavalry corps still 
fighting on the front.  Many officers in these elite units were not unhappy with this.  In August 
1943, Major Scârneci bemoaned the further dilution of 3rd Mountain Battalion.  He had already 
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received cavalrymen, gendarmes, grăniceri, even sailors, as replacements, and now rehabilitation 
soldiers.  “If it is said that the frontline is the ‘Altar of the Fatherland,’” Scârneci quipped, “What 
kind of altar, with such angels as these?”118  When they reached the front, they were presented to 
the regiment’s colonel and then its chaplain may have made a speech like the one given by Priest 
Nicolae Petrache with 1st Mountain Division in August 1942 on the “sublime gesture of parental 
indulgence of the Marshal Conducător, who wants their reformation [îndreptarea], and the duty 
they have to distinguish themselves through acts of arms, which will wash away [their] mistaken 
deeds.”119  Then assigned to a platoon, the other soldiers greeted them coolly.   This hostility was 
not just due to rehabilitation soldiers’ background as political prisoners, deserters, and criminals.  
Lt. Colonel Victor Isăceanu, commander of 13th Călăraşi Regiment in Crimea in 1943, pointed 
out that mountain and cavalry units not only had a strong esprit de corps, but had been together 
for two years and during that time formed strong bonds.  Therefore, tight-knit veterans looked on 
all replacements “like some foreigners,” a common reaction in any army.120  The value of these 
troops as replacements was mixed.  For example, Private Sârghie, an officer demoted since he 
was a Legionary and sent to Scârneci’s unit, and two others sacrificed themselves using 
grenades, bayonets, fists, and even their teeth to cover 3rd Mountain Battalion’s retreat after a 
Soviet counterattack at Sevastopol in June 1942.  On the other hand, two rehabilitation NCOs 
sent to Scârneci in August 1943 deserted the same night after they arrived.121  At the end of 
October 1943, the 993rd and 995th Independent Infantry battalions under 24th Infantry Division 
were blasted apart by a Soviet attack at Mariupol, so many had fled that, after gendarmes 
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gathered the survivors up, both the independent infantry battalions were disbanded and their 
rehabilitation soldiers spread out several regiments.122  This left only the 994th Independent 
Infantry Battalion, still fighting with the 19th Infantry Division in Crimea, but it was disbanded 
after the losses suffered during the evacuation in April 1944. 
 In March 1944, as the Red Army approached, both Training Center No. 3 in Tiraspol and 
Training Center No. 5 in Sărata were dismantled, evacuated in barges up the Danube, and set up 
near the Yugoslav border in the town of Tirol.  Now the Tirol Training Center it formed the 996th 
and 997th Independent Infantry battalions in June 1944, but short of weapons and equipment they 
did not see combat before 23 August 1944.  Between May 1942 and June 1944, a total of 23,082 
men passed through Sărata (see Table 4), with 7,770 sent to the front (see Table 5). 
 
Table 4.  Soldiers sent for rehabilitation to Sărata, May 1942-June 1944.  
 
Returned to prison or judged unfit for rehabilitation      2,356  
Sent to the front for rehabilitation        7,770 
Sent to Labor Battalions east of the Dniester in the operational zone  7,053 
Sent to Labor Battalions west of the Dniester in Romania    1,812 
Organized and prepared to immediately leave for the front    1,956 
Remaining at the Training Center       2,135 
 
Total                     23,082  
 
 
 
Table 5.  Soldiers sent to the front from Sărata, May 1942-June 1944.   
 
Proposed for rehabilitation and returned to their original units   1,544 
Special rehabilitation based on the Code of Military Justice         38  
Renounced rehabilitation and completed sentences after returning from the front      87  
Remaining on the front        1,822 
Killed on the front            775 
                                                 
122 In the ad-hoc 111th and 112th Infantry regiments, see, Fond CI Nr. 5 Sărata, dosar 30, f. 66. 
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Table 5 Continued.  Soldiers sent to the front from Sărata, May 1942-June 1944.   
 
Missing on the front         3,269 
Recovered at the Training Center and situation being clarified      235 
 
Total            7,700 
 
Source: AMR Fond CI Nr. 5 Sărata, dosar 40, f. 100.   
 
 
 
To the 7,770 from Sărata Training Center must be added soldiers sent for rehabilitation by Third 
Army courts martial east of the Dniester, in April 1944 another 2,292 rehabilitation soldiers were 
serving individually or in small groups in Third Army, so the real total was closer to 10,000.123  
While almost half those sent to the front for rehabilitation from Sărata were eventually declared 
missing, most were casualties at Stalingrad, not deserters.  The rehabilitation policy let officers 
and NCOs restore their reputations, Legionaries to escape prison, spared many deserters worse 
punishment, and provided the General Staff with desperately needed manpower. 
Blocking Detachments 
 There is evidence the Romanian Army sporadically used ad-hoc blocking detachments in 
times of crisis.  On 20 July 1941, Third Army reported that some cowardly soldiers panicked and 
fled at the first contact with the enemy, so General Dumitrescu authorized commanders to shoot 
troops who panicked other soldiers and to place machinegun units behind units that hesitated to 
attack and “to fire without mercy on all fleeing soldiers.”124  A month later, on 20 August 1941, 
the General Headquarters issued a similar order.  General Ioaniţiu claimed that at Odessa some 
units “hesitated to attack or attacked without élan” and retreated after counterattacks by a smaller 
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number of Soviets.  He ordered that machineguns squads make blocking detachments and fire on 
fleeing troops.125  This order did not create permanent blocking detachments, but such orders 
were repeated during crises.  2nd Lieutenant Ion Lăzărescu remembered that on 20 August 1944, 
at the start of the Second Iaşi-Chişinău offensive, a major told him over the phone to machinegun 
retreating soldiers, but he refused.  The major yelled, “You want to give me advice?  I fought at 
the Don!  …Take the measures!”  Lăzărescu could not bring himself to fire on the troops and let 
them pass.126  This illustrates how hard it was to try to enforce these orders.  On 22 August 1944, 
citing orders from Antonescu, General Şteflea ordered Fourth Army, who took over because the 
front was collapsing and General Racoviţa was one leave, to shoot troops fleeing from the front.  
Lt. Colonel Nicolae Dragomir, Fourth Army’s chief of staff, refused to countersign Şteflea’s 
order.127  Such orders were desperate threats, infrequently invoked, and not usually carried out.    
Remuneration as a Motivation Tool 
 If coercion was the stick, then remuneration was the carrot.  Despite popular stereotypes 
regarding the venality of Romanians, personal enrichment was at most an ancillary motivator for 
Romanian soldiers, however, those who could often enriched themselves through unsanctioned 
pillaging of Jewish and Soviet property.128  Additionally, some soldiers turned to smuggling or 
black marketeering to earn quick cash.  Yet neither of these activities was officially sanctioned 
and in fact troops could be punished for both.  Instead, the General Staff promised decorations 
with material benefits, land grants, and in a few cases cash prizes or leave for bravery.  
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 Many military decorations came with a material reward, so there was as double attraction 
to winning a medal.  The most prestigious (and valuable) was the Order of Michael the Brave – 
only for officers – that came with a knighthood and 25 acres of land.  The General Staff awarded 
troops land too.  Military Virtue – the highest medal for NCOs or soldiers – came with 10-15 
acres of land in eastern Romania.  Officers were intent on not missing out on a supposed bonanza 
of Jewish property expropriated in cities, especially Bucharest.  Reports on army morale during 
the first year of war are filled with complaints from officers about civil servants, who were not 
risking their lives, unfairly benefiting from Romanianization.  The Antonescu regime eventually 
retained Jewish property to be made available to officers to purchase under “more advantageous 
conditions” than average Romanians.129  At the end of the war, the General Staff adopted a more 
direct form of reward.  In May 1944, responding to reports that German troops were requesting a 
cash prize for every aircraft that they shot down, Antonescu authorized 10,000 lei for every tank 
or aircraft destroyed by Aix soldiers.130  Coming so late in the war this incentive had negligible 
influence.  Furthermore, as Roger Reese notes in the case of the Red Army that extensively used 
cash prizes to try to motivate, given the already poor odds of survival on the Eastern Front “it is 
hard to imagine men taking undue risks simply for a wad of [cash].”131  It is easier to imagine, 
however, men taking risks for the continued financial well-being of their families.     
Pensions or financial aid for their families was an important motivation for some soldiers.  
Both regular officers and reangajat NCOs looked forward to a pension as a benefit of choosing a 
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career in the Romanian Army, the money would support them and their family in retirement, and 
the General Staff used the threat of losing it to motivate.  Soldiers sentenced by court martial for 
cowardice, incompetence, abuse, or other crimes lost their pension, but rehabilitation offered a 
way to win it back.  Sergeant Major Ioan Meiţa was thrown out of the army for “incapacity” after 
17 years of service and later sentenced to two months in prison for “calumnious denunciation” of 
his captain in 1941.  He volunteered for rehabilitation and was assigned to the 54th Transmission 
Battalion.  After joining his unit joined Case Blue, he wrote a letter in August 1942 to beg that 
his telephone or telegraph repairs under fire might count as combat, so he could be rehabilitated 
and “not remain expelled from the Army and without a pension…as well as to be able to care for 
my family.”132  Privates could also be so motivated.  In 1940, the state began providing financial 
aid to the families of soldiers concentrated for long periods of time.  This policy was expanded 
after the start of the war and many families depended on it – especially due to wartime inflation.  
The General Staff threatened to cut off such aid to their families if soldiers were judged guilty of 
crimes, especially desertion, and even to confiscate their property.133  Private Ioan Bortică was 
sentenced to a year in prison in August 1942 for beating a civilian, subsequently he volunteered 
for rehabilitation, but he was assigned to a non-combat unit.  In June 1943, he wrote a petition 
saying his wife had been living with her parents in Cernăuţi with no means to provide for herself 
and asked if he might be transferred to a frontline unit “to have the possibility, even [with] the 
sacrifice of [my] life, to pull [her] out of squalor.”134  Since soldiers could be rehabilitated post-
mortem, soldiers knew that even in death they could help their family if they died bravely.  
                                                 
132 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 840, f. 6-8.   
133 Ibid., dosar 1299, f. 211,  
134 Ibid., dosar 2152, f. 89.  
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Looting was another way that soldiers materially benefited from the war, but they faced 
stiff competition from the state.  Under the Antonescu regime Romanianization was supposed to 
use “legal” means, without resorting to random violence and terror like the Legionaries, and the 
state expected to benefit from the ethnic cleansing of Jews from Bukovina and Bessarabia.135  
Romanian soldiers (and civilians) on the ground in eastern Romania and Transnistria, however, 
had other ideas.  The Romanian Army faced a similar problem as the German Army, in that the 
economic exploitation and devastation of Jews was officially sanctioned and was supposed to be 
carried out by the organs of the state, but soldiers took the initiative to pillage Jewish property.136  
Materially benefiting from murdering Jews was more of an afterthought than a primary goal, but 
if they could benefit materially during the process soldiers did not shy away from thieving from 
their Jewish victims.137  Romanian soldiers, however, stole from Jews in eastern Romania and 
Soviet civilians after crossing the Dniester as much from logistical shortages as greed.   
As the war continued, opportunities to personally profit diminished.  Romanian soldiers 
fought campaigns in increasingly harsh geography, from the semi-barren peninsula of Crimea to 
the dry, empty steppe of Ukraine and southern Russia, and the unforgiving mountainous terrain 
of the Caucasus.  Due to poor Axis logistics and German prioritization of their troops, Romanian 
soldiers had to live off the land and the impoverished populations of these regions just to survive.  
Additionally, few soldiers received regular leave home, particularly those with the Mountain or 
Cavalry corps who were in almost constant combat during 1941-1943, so they lacked the chance 
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to personally transport goods home that German soldiers had.138  Moreover, the General Staff put 
restrictions on how much soldiers could mail home to their families.  These mail restrictions, due 
in large part simply to limited Romanian logistics, were also the result of class divisions and the 
lack of Volksgemeinschaft ideology that Nazi leadership used to justify the practice of German 
soldiers’ looting.  The soldiers’ ability to send looted goods home was simply not a priority of 
the Antonescu regime, which still officially denounced looting of “liberated” Soviet peoples. 
Soldiers and officers who tasked with occupation duties in Transnistria and later Crimea 
– for roughly 16 months during 1942-1943 it was not on the front line – had the chance to enrich 
themselves through black-market activities.  Odessa enjoyed an economic resurgence under the 
permissive conditions of Romanian occupation that resulted in the growth of private businesses, 
which relied to a large degree on corruption and bribes, thereby becoming a center of smuggling 
and the black market.139  Unlike the German Army that stripped Ukraine bare of food and goods, 
Transnistria remained relatively well-stocked, but only partly due to Romanian Army policies.  
Romanian civilians, soldiers, and civil servants smuggled foodstuffs produced in Romania into 
Transnistria in exchange for goods including clothing, footwear, blank travel documents, rope, 
cigarettes, chocolate, vitamin candy, cameras, and all manner of things to trade in Romania.140  
Smuggling was not unique to the Romanian Army; neither was the hostility it fostered between 
frontline and rear area soldiers.  One report from 1943 recorded a soldier suggesting that “all 
officers and the rest of the personnel staffing field hospitals, guide centers, and ‘Red Cross’ 
canteens ought to be shot, because they busy themselves only with [black-market] business and 
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dirty things on the backs of soldiers and wounded.”141  Some even blamed their poor rations, not 
on shortages or bad logistics, but on corrupt officers selling them on the black market.   
Clearly, many soldiers were motivated by material gain, especially when committing 
atrocities, but it played a much smaller role in combat.  The Romanian Army offered some 
official material rewards for bravery on the front decorations that came with land grants and 
simple cash prizes.  The state indirectly allowed soldiers to benefit from the persecution and 
murder of Jews, however, it claimed all the profits from Romanianization for the state.  Soldiers 
participated in black market activities on the front but were punished by superiors when caught 
and despised by frontline soldiers.  Therefore, while greed was widely evident in the actions of 
many Romanian soldiers, it was not the primary reason that they murdered or fought.      
Morale and Motivation 
  Morale is notoriously hard to define and even more difficult to try to measure or evaluate.  
John Lynn accepts S. L. A. Marshall’s definition of morale as “the whole complex of an army’s 
thought.”142  This definition can encompass thoughts and emotions about almost anything: losses 
in combat, material situation of soldiers, relationship between soldiers and home, rest, quality of 
leaders, understanding of the cause or goals of the war, primary group cohesion, and so forth.  
Clearly, morale is a difficult (probably impossible) phenomenon to measure with accuracy, yet 
historians have been remarkably cavalier in concluding that the morale of Romanian soldiers was 
weak, and rapidly collapsed after liberating northern Bukovina and Bessarabia in July 1941.  The 
Antonescu regime was acutely concerned about the morale of the army, making great efforts to 
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gauge it and try to reinforce it, but despite the General Staff’s concerns, Romanian soldiers’ 
morale actually appears to have been quite resilient through late-1943, primarily due to their 
intrinsic motivation, but reinforced by propaganda, coercion, and remuneration. 
 The relationship between morale and motivation is complex.  They overlap, but are not 
equivalent, as troops with poor morale can still be motivated to fight.  Motivation is more stable 
than morale.  John Lynn has identified three forms of motivation: initial, sustaining, and combat.  
Atrocity motivation can be linked to these too.  Motivation is dependent on strong underlying 
intrinsic factors that convince a soldier to agree to become a soldier, endure military life, and 
fight in combat.143  Motivation also influences if a soldier carries out atrocities.  Morale is the 
day to day variation in soldier’s mood on the surface of deeper motivation, which can fluctuate 
wildly due to a multitude of reasons.  One only needs to peruse his diary to see how a soldier’s 
morale can change from moment to moment and learn that even soldiers with strong intrinsic 
motivation can experience bouts of low morale.  Major Scârneci is a good example.  As career 
officer in an elite arm, literate with access to army propaganda, he was highly motivated, but at 
times he feared for his sanity during the battle for Sevastopol and became demoralized, but he 
never stopped fighting.  In addition, he ordered reprisals against innocents, but in a different 
mood he took pity on Jews.  Morale exists not only on an individual level, but on a group level.  
A unit can have good or bad morale at different times depending on its situation and experience.  
Poor morale can influence soldiers’ motivation whether initial, sustaining, combat, or atrocity.   
 Any examination of morale in the Romanian Army must begin the army’s own attempts 
to measure it.  Indeed, the army generated a lot of documents while trying to gauge the morale of 
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soldiers (and civilians); unfortunately, its reports are inherently problematic.  First, reports used 
the material situation of officers, NCOs, and soldiers as the primary criterion to evaluate morale. 
Evaluating morale this way was a common practice, it followed the Napoleonic maxim that an 
army marches on its stomach, and it is relatively easy to obtain figures on rations, clothing, mail, 
etc.144  Yet soldiers having a good material situation does not necessarily mean that they have 
good morale, or vice versa.  Second, reports focus on the complaints of officers, those of NCOs 
or troops are perfunctory, some reports simply record a single word, “good.”145  Clearly, these 
reports do not actually tell much about the morale of the average enlisted man and are more a 
bureaucratic exercise.  Some reports deviate from this pattern.  In the summer of 1944, reports 
began describing morale as “satisfactory” or “mediocre” rather than “good;” such bureaucratic 
understatement should be interpreted as widespread demoralization of soldiers in those units.146  
Other reports include specific anecdotes or examples, but it is difficult to determine just how 
representative they are.  Nonetheless, official army reports indicate that morale remained fairly 
high in the army until mid-1943, when it became clear that the German Army was not going to 
recover from the Stalingrad defeat after its defeat at Kursk and Soviet counteroffensive.   
 The conventional wisdom that morale in the Romanian Army was poor is primarily based 
on the work of Mark Axworthy who accepts apologist nationalist accounts.  He argues the battle 
for Odessa in 1941 was a pyrrhic victory that destroyed the morale of the army for the rest of the 
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war.147  He describes Romanian soldiers as “peasant scapegoats” with no idea of why they were 
fighting because “no effort had been made to explain to the troops precisely why Romania had to 
cross the [Dniester] and confront Bolshevism in its own home.”148  This is wholly inaccurate and 
ignores both the strong intrinsic motivation of Romanian soldiers and army propaganda efforts.  
Furthermore, Axworthy exaggerates the long-term effects of the battle on the Romanian Army, 
which was conducted by Fourth Army and not Third Army.  Odessa’s capture was a propaganda 
coup for Antonescu and was followed by the demobilization of most of Fourth Army that gave 
formations a chance to rest, refit, and recover.   In early 1942, Romanian propaganda promises of 
victory seemed realistic, Third Army endured its winter battles well, and Fourth Army was well-
rested.  During July-August 1942 when formations left for the front, they left with good morale 
in a celebratory atmosphere and expecting to defeat the USSR and be rewarded with the return of 
northern Transylvania for their sacrifices to the Nazi war effort.  It was only after Stalingrad that 
Romanian propaganda rang increasingly hollow and soldiers began to doubt that “final victory” 
was possible.  Officers and soldiers’ morale began to erode during 1943-1944.   
Nonetheless, despite falling morale after September 1943, soldiers were motivated by an 
increasingly fatalistic attitude because it was their duty to defend Romania.  The threat of Soviet 
occupation strengthened the resolve of Romanian soldiers to fight on in defense of their families, 
faith, and nation.  In mid-July 1943, the German defeat at Kursk and Anglo-American landings 
in Sicily undermined propaganda messages about “final victory,” but reinforced fears of Soviet 
revenge for Romanian crimes in the USSR.  While true that in 1943, soldiers in Crimea became 
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fearful of making “useless sacrifices” in a “second Stalingrad,” this does not mean they lacked 
motivation to fight, only that they doubted the wisdom in bottling up the Mountain and Cavalry 
corps in such an obvious trap.149  The “encirclement” of Crimea in late-Ocober 1943 hurt morale, 
but propaganda justified the continued defense of the peninsula by claiming that the goal of the 
Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad had been to seize Crimea to use it as a base for air attacks 
and naval landings against Romania.150  Soldiers held on in their trenches to April 1944. 
Flogging sometimes had negative effects on morale in frontline formations, but its effect 
should not be exaggerated.  Axworthy has argued that physical and verbal abuse by officers 
somehow prepared Romanian soldiers psychologically to be defeated in battle by the Soviets. 
Yet considering how recently Western armies had employed corporal punishment and the long 
(not to mention the still healthy) tradition of verbal abuse by officers and NCOs, this argument is 
unpersuasive.151  It was not a shortage of encouragement, but of modern weapons that mattered.  
Flogging was an accepted practice by soldiers who reserved their ire for officers who used their 
power to physically abuse soldiers against regulations.  Rehabilitation recalled comparisons of 
military service to a form of punishment.  A June 1943 intelligence report recorded a soldier 
complaining that sending Legionaries for rehabilitation had turned “the field of honor” into “the 
field of exile.”152  Due to manpower shortages the General Staff could do little to assuage the 
negative effect on morale from the policy of rehabilitation, except to omit mentioning it in 
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propaganda, try to isolate rehabilitation soldiers in battalions or companies, and reassure the rest 
of the soldiers that all those fighting on the front were heroes sanctified by combat.  
The different opportunities for remuneration based on class could also hurt morale.  Some 
mid-ranking field officers resented the winners of the Order of Michael the Brave because they 
believed that it usually went to senior officers (often boyars) in the rear who did not merit it and 
quickly found a way to be reassigned away from the front once they won the coveted award.153  
The fact that the opportunity to profit from looting was based on class and rank also angered 
troops.  In a diary entry on 28 May 1942, Sergeant Ionescu complained that privates and NCOs 
were limited to sending home three postcards a month, but officers were sending “trainloads” of 
goods, including sheep and cows, “for personal ends.”154  The soldiers were helped to send their 
pay home to help their families, if mail delivere was functioning.  Antonescu himself publicly 
abhorred corruption and those caught red-handed were punished, so soldiers could take comfort 
in the hope that officers or NCOs guilty of corruption would eventually be punished.  
Conclusion 
 The Romanian Army used many tactics to try to prop up the combat motivation and buoy 
the morale of Romanian soldiers.  The Propaganda Section did its best to reach as many soldiers 
as possible and flooded the front with printed materials, radio programs, films, and even patriotic 
entertainment stressing the righteousness of the “holy war,” the threat of the enemy, and need to 
continue fighting.  The military justice system tried to enforce strict discipline through corporal 
punishment and to discourage soldiers from deserting by the threat of capital punishment.  On a 
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few occasions commanders resorted to using blocking detachments, but few subordinates carried 
out the orders to shoot other soldiers.  The General Staff expanded the policy of rehabilitation 
and organized the Sărata Training Center that formed political prisoners, deserters, and common 
criminals into combat battalions.  The General Staff promised to reward soldiers with land that 
came with medals, but much more importantly provided financial aid to families that could be 
taken away.  Soldiers looting was not officially sanctioned, but widespread. 
All extrinsic motivators (propaganda, coercion, and remuneration) had limitations and a 
modern army lacking a firm foundation of intrinsic motivation cannot keep fighting in the field 
for long.  Propaganda can only convince soldiers of so much and is useless against firepower. 
Flogging or threats can only intimidate soldiers to risk their lives for so long and soldiers did not 
want to machinegun their comrades if they broke under Soviet attacks.  The promise of cash can 
only purchase so many mercenaries.  Romanian officers and soldiers believed in the virtue of 
their cause and threat of “Judeo-Bolshevism,” which bound them together, and duty to the nation 
motivated them to make sacrifices that words, whips, or cash could not.
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CHAPTER IX  
MOTIVATION OF ROMANIAN WOMEN AND MINORITIES 
 
The traditional Romanian narrative of the war is male-centric and nationalist.  It ignores 
the contribution of tens of thousands of women, most of whom served as Red Cross volunteers, 
who offered medical treatment and succor to wounded or dying soldiers on the front.  An history 
of the Romanian Red Cross exists but does not focus on the motivation of female volunteers.1  
The service of tens of thousands of religious, ethnic, and racial minorities in the ranks of the 
Romanian Army is also almost completely overlooked – with the exception of ethnic Germans, 
but in this case, historians focus on those who volunteered to fight for the Waffen-SS.2  The 
service of women and minorities deserves to be recognized.  The reality that some women and 
minorities participated in the Holocaust must be acknowledged as well.  The perspectives of 
women and minorities offer more evidence for the strength of intrinsic motivation and extent of 
support for the “holy war” throughout the whole of Romanian society.  
 Women provide an interesting case of motivation because, unlike men that were drafted, 
all women who served were volunteers.  Female volunteerism illustrates all the facets of intrinsic 
motivation previously illustrated to have motivated Romanian soldiers in the ranks.  Romania’s 
traditional society, however, greatly circumscribed the extent and ways in which women could 
provide service to the military.  Class was the decisive factor in determining who volunteered, 
mostly wealthy middle-class or boyar women, although a few peasant women volunteered too.  
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Contemporary gender roles meant that almost all these volunteers would only serve as nurses.  
Romanian women who volunteered provided the General Staff with womanpower used to fill 
rear service roles because manpower reserves were limited, and every man needed for combat.   
During the war minority men served both in the ranks of combat units at the front and in 
labor battalions in Romania.  The rhetoric of “holy war” was somewhat less effective with these 
men and the General Staff so distrusted certain minorities that it restricted them from combat, but 
these fears were largely overblown because most minorities shared similar intrinsic motivation – 
a fact unappreciated by most officers.  Obviously, Romanian nationalism was not a major factor, 
but religion, anti-Semitism, and anti-communism were still powerful motivators.  The threat of 
“godless communism” worried all Christians – and Muslims – not just Orthodox believers.  Anti-
Semitism was as common among minorities as it was among Romanians; the same was true with 
the fear of “Judeo-Bolshevism.”  Most minorities, regardless of class, feared communism for the 
same reasons as Romanians.  The SSI and Section II greatly exaggerated minorities’ connections 
to communism before and during the war.  Only a small number, mostly from the small working 
class, were sympathetic to the ideology emanating from Moscow, particularly promises of social 
justice and national self-determination – including the revision of the borders of România Mare.  
Therefore, most minority soldiers dutifully reported for service in the Romanian Army.   
 This chapter will also examine the Gypsy racial minority and Gypsy soldiers’ service in 
the Romanian Army.  România Mare had a large Gypsy minority that despite being assimilated 
into the national culture – most spoke Romanian and were Romanian Orthodox Christians – were 
reviled because of the color of their skin.  However, unlike Jews, or other ethnic minorities, the 
General Staff never considered Gypsies a serious threat to national security, so did not keep them 
under close surveillance.  Romanian Army reports never listed Gypsies as a separate category of 
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minority or gathered intelligence on them like suspected minorities, so Gypsy soldiers are nearly 
invisible in army records.  They were conscripted no differently than Romanians, assigned to 
combat units, and most were motivated by the same basic intrinsic factors as their Romanian 
comrades.  Nevertheless, the Antonescu regime decided to target “unproductive” members of the 
Gypsy minority in mid-1942 for persecution unequaled by any other minority – except Jews.   
Romanian Feminism, the First World War, and Female Volunteerism 
 Romanian women, particularly those from the upper classes who made up the bulk of the 
volunteers during the war, were penetrated with the same intrinsic motivation as Romanian men.  
Boyar women led the feminist movement in Romania, wielding their social influence to develop 
a conservative brand of feminism to advance the rights of elite women.3  Romanian conservative 
feminism promised to uphold the social status quo if allowed to participate in building a healthy, 
modern nation.  Princess Alexandrina Cantacuzino embodied Romanian feminism.  She was an 
ultranationalist, xenophobic, and authoritarian.  Originally born into a minor boyar family from 
Moldavia in 1876, she was educated in France, and then married into the princely Cantacuzino 
family.  In 1910 she helped create Societatea Ortodoxă Naţională a Femeilor Române, or The 
Romanian Women’s National Orthodox Society, which she dominated until she died in 1944.4  
Middle-class Romanian women shared conservative politics and joined the feminist movement 
to improve the position of socially elite women in Romanian society.  When the Romanian Army 
invaded the USSR in 1941 many of women enthusiastically volunteered their time and service.   
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 The First World War established the precedent of using female volunteers as nurses on 
the front.  The Romanian Red Cross was established in 1876, just in time to support the Russo-
Turkish War of 1877, it and another female organization in Bucharest provided funds and a few 
female personnel for three ambulance companies – a fourth was financed by Jews in Bucharest.5  
Female volunteerism reached new heights in 1913, during Romanian Army’s brief campaign in 
Bulgaria during the Second Balkan War, and in 1916-1919 during the First World War.  The 
demands of total war mobilized more female volunteers than ever before.  They served as nurses 
working in hospitals, running network of canteens for the starving poor, and fighting the spread 
of disease in unoccupied Moldavia.  Princess Cantacuzino volunteered for the Red Cross, and 
controversially remained in Bucharest under German occupation.6  Queen Marie set the example 
by donning the uniform of a nurse and visiting wounded soldiers in hospitals; she was venerated 
as the “mother of the wounded.”  The memory of Queen Marie set the stage for a competition in 
the Second World War that developed between Queen-Mother Helen and Maria Antonescu, the 
wife of the Conducător, over who would take her place as the female saint to the nation.  
In interwar Romania class still determined women’s roles, rights, and opportunities more 
than did gender.  Elizabeth Wood argues that the cult of domesticity was much weaker in Eastern 
Europe due to the absence of a large middle class.  The cult of domesticity claimed there were 
separate spheres for men and women; one of female passivity, leisure, and domestic life; another 
of male activity, career, and public life.  Society in Eastern Europe was largely divided between 
nobles (men and women) who did not work and peasants (men and women) who worked – by 
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the fin de siècle a small bourgeoise and even smaller working class had developed.7  Feminists 
used the cult of domesticity to argue for increased rights as vitreous mothers of the nation and 
pointed to their service during the First World War to strengthen their claim.  Feminists’ efforts 
bore fruit during the interwar period: women with education or training, members of important 
societies, members of the civil service, or war widows 21 or older could vote and even stand for 
office in municipal elections after 1929.  An independent and short-lived political party, Grupul 
Femeilor Române, or the Romanian Women’s Group, was set up, and in 1938 King Carol II gave 
elite women a chance to stand in elections that resulted in the first female ministers in Romanian 
history.  Peasant women did not benefit much from Romanian feminism and remained subject to 
the traditional peasant patriarchy of the village.  The number of female workers was minuscule 
and considered suspect by elite women.8  During the war both peasant and working-class women 
were needed to work in fields or factories and not encouraged to volunteer. 
The fall of Carol II did not change the situation of women because the Antonescu regime 
largely maintained the gender status quo.  On 28 September 1940, shortly after the creation of 
the National Legionary State, Antonescu proclaimed to Romanian women at a Legionary rally 
that “the men who are building Romania will be warriors.  Warriors in every moment.  At home 
they must find goodwill, warmth, and order.  You must make this happen…Then shall we ask 
you to fulfill three great tasks: raising children, social welfare, and defending our borders.”9  In 
the 1930s, the Legionary movement attracted women as well as men.  Legionary women formed 
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groups that were supposed to promote female self-improvement, support Legionaries, improve 
female morality, maintain an active life based in Christian tradition, and form a “new woman” to 
fight for a purified Romania.10  Princess Cantacuzino became a firm devotee of Codreanu in the 
1930s, but after the Legionary uprising in 1941 she took a leadership position in the Red Cross 
again and worked for the Antonescu regime until her death in 1944. 
Antonescu needed women to support his vision of a military welfare state.  In April 1941 
a law created Consiliul de Patronaj al Operelor Sociale, or the Council of Patronage for Social 
Works, headed by Maria Antonescu, which was tasked with providing financial aid to the nation 
by bringing all social welfare organizations, public and private, under unified leadership.  It was 
set up in competition with the Red Cross and adopted a Blue Cross as its symbol, but it remained 
the junior organization.  The Blue Cross focused on providing care to the families of soldiers as 
well as invalids, orphans, and widows.  On 15 May 1941, the Decree-Law for the Organization 
of National Labor gave the state the right to conscript citizens for labor service, including women 
who did not have regular employment.11  Nevertheless, there was never a female counterpart to 
Munca Tineretului Român, or Romanian Youth Work, a paramilitary labor group comprised of 
pre-military aged young men that was modeled on the Reichsarbeitsdienst, or the Reich Labor 
Service, because Romanian society would not tolerate it – peasants wanted daughters close to 
home and social elites did not want daughters forced to work.  Antonescu feared the political 
consequences of alienating the middle class or peasantry.  Jewish women, on the other hand, had 
little political clout, so on 27 June 1942 the General Instructions on Jewish Forced Labor issued 
                                                 
10 Legionary “fortresses” for women, compared to male “nests,” see, Clark, Holy Romanian Youth, 115-116.  
11 Bărbulescu, Munca obligatorie a evreilor din România, 73-77. 
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by the General Staff allowed the territorial corps to mobilize Jewish women between 18-40 as 
seamstresses or washerwoman if they needed them.12  Yet while thousands were mobilized at 
different times, most Jewish women west of the Prut were not used as labor. 
During the Second World War, female volunteers again responded to the call to provide 
service for the war effort.  Most women carried out their labors west of the Dniester near home 
with the Red Cross, often aided by the Blue Cross, and played an important role in Antonescu’s 
efforts to motivate soldiers in combat by delivering on promises of a military welfare state that 
would care for their families while they fought or if they died in battle.  In April 1943, a pair of 
officers took the initiative to set up a canteen for poor or orphan high school students (serving 60 
a day) in a village in Prahova County.  General Pantazi ordered all garrison commanders to copy 
them, request support from the Blue Cross, and have local boyar women or officers’ wives help 
prepare and distribute the food.   A few months later, Pantazi upbraided officers’ wives and 
daughters for being too preoccupied with their own amusements and not setting an example by 
volunteering for the Red Cross or the Blue Cross.  “Officers’ wives must work on the internal 
front to be equal to the sacrifice of the country’s soldiers that are fighting on the front.”13   
The Red Cross was the primary institution that Romanian women served in to support the 
war effort.  Queen-Mother Helen was its honorary patron and a few women sat on its board, but 
its leadership consisted mostly of men.  In anticipation of the need for nurses if war broke out, 
the Red Cross offered free courses that taught basic nursing skills to young women in Bucharest 
and other major cities during the year after the Soviet occupation of eastern Romania to create a 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 255, 376, 498. 
13 Fond Corpul Granicerilor, dosar 3513, f. 26; RG-25.003M, Reel 15, dosar 1480, c. 205. 
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pool of trained nurses.  Unfortunately, few women chose to attend classes before June 1941.14  
Nevertheless, 2,754 volunteer nurses and 2,430 female medical auxiliaries served with the Red 
Cross in hospitals or canteens on the front in the operational zone east of the Dniester.15   
Women on the Front 
Red Cross Volunteers  
The declaration of war on 22 June 1941 triggered a wave of patriotic volunteerism among 
middle-class and boyar women.  The heavy casualties in the first weeks of the war overwhelmed 
the existing medical infrastructure and compelled the General Staff to rush to establish up more 
hospitals and train new staff.  Emil Dorian, a Jewish doctor from Bucharest, was sent to the town 
of Găieşti at the outbreak of the war where he supervised soldiers converting a local agricultural 
school into a hospital with the assistance of the older ladies (including a baroness) and the young 
women of the town elite who set up beds, collected supplies, and scrubbed windows and floors.  
He remembered wryly, “They made their appearance dressed in the proper Red Cross uniform, 
expressing their regret that there were no wounded.”16  There was no shortage of wounded men 
in Bucharest.  For the first months of the war the front was so close that most wounded were sent 
to the capital where the largest, best-equipped, and best-staffed hospitals were concentrated.  It 
also had many Red Cross female volunteers, including the theater critic Alice Voinescu.  As she 
changed bandages of the wounded or tended the sick she conversed with the peasant soldiers and 
found herself attached to “these simple, but very intelligent and good people,” however she was 
                                                 
14 AMR Fond Asociaţia Surorilor de Caritate de Război, dosar 27, f. 38.    
15 Crucea Roşie Română, “Istoria Crucii Rosii Romane 1940 – 1945,” Crucearosie.ro, accessed 2 February 2018, 
https://crucearosie.ro/cine-suntem/istoria-crucii-rosii-romane/istoria-crucii-rosii-romane-1940-1945/.  
16 Dorian, The Quality of Witness, 163, 165. 
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horrified by their frequent use of the word kike “that encapsulates the worst in them.”17  Veteran 
nurses of the First World War volunteered too.  Asociaţie Surorile de Caritate de Război, or The 
Association of War Nurses, with around 800 aging members, offered their services for the front, 
the General Staff demurred.  They were undeterred, raising funds and collecting materials for the 
war effort.18  Women made up for military unpreparedness in these important areas. 
 The Red Cross followed the Romanian Army as it liberated eastern Romania.  In early 
August 1941, Maria Moruzi-Brăescu, a Red Cross representative, toured newly freed Bessarabia, 
inspected the medical facilities there, and suggested the establishment of canteens and hospitals 
to the General Headquarters.19  The General Staff preferred older, married nurses whose morality 
was unquestioned, but the Red Cross needed young, unattached women who could deal with the 
great physical demands and mental stress required of them.  On 23 August 1941, Elise G., a Red 
Cross nurse recently arrived in a hospital in Bălţi, crowded with wounded from Odessa, reported,  
We each have a pavilion where we try to do all that is humanely possible to 
comfort so much misery that it is terrible.  For the moment, we are holding up 
well, but I do not believe that [nurse] Dina will be able to support much more of 
this hell…No one should be sent here who doesn’t have an iron will and a strong 
work ethic and [an] exceptional physique.20   
 
The General Staff continued to demand morally irreproachable women, so application forms for 
nurses included income, ethnicity, and moral conduct sections to select married middle-class and 
boyar women.  These strict standards, however, left patriotic Romanian nurses who followed the 
Third Army across the Dniester into Soviet Ukraine understaffed and overworked.     
                                                 
17 Voinescu, Jurnal, vol. 1, 318, 322, 326. 
18 Fond Asociaţia Surorile de Caritate de Război, dosar 27, f. 2; dosar 29, f. 8. 
19 ASNCRR Fond Organizare, dosar 14/1941, f. 22-23, 38.   
20 Ibid., dosar 14/1941, f. 66.  
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 Since the General Headquarters believed the war would be over by Christmas 1941 it did 
not prioritize the shortage of womanpower on the front.  Therefore, the Red Cross doctors and 
nurses took the initiative and began recruiting Moldovan, Ukrainian, or Russian women to assist 
them in the hospitals and canteens set up east of the Dniester.  Every field hospital had a chief 
nurse, a section supervisor, and one nurse for every 20 sick or wounded men (usually a capacity 
for 300 soldiers); the chief nurse had authority to make personnel changes.21  The chief nurses 
hired Soviet women to help in tending the wounded, cleaning, and cooking.  Middle-class or 
boyar Red Cross nurses treated these Soviet female laborers much as they did peasant women at 
home.  After the Soviet winter counteroffensive proved that he war would not soon end, Third 
Army began sorting out its rear in Ukraine, including Red Cross hospitals and canteens.  General 
Dumitrescu ordered in April and June 1942 that the Red Cross could not keep hiring more non-
Romanian women and asked for lists of those Soviet women already hired – they could stay but 
only under close supervision by Section II.22  These women were seen by paranoid officers as 
potential Soviet agents who could spread defeatism, spy, or even poison soldiers.  Nevertheless, 
Red Cross nurses had to rely on these women as the need for nursing staff only increased as the 
war continue. The General Staff never relaxed its high standards for female volunteers.   
By June 1942, the Red Cross had established canteens east of the Dniester in Nicolaev, 
Lemberg (L’vov), Birzula, Radelania, Njecajanoje, and Odessa with 5 more teams in reserve for 
locations further east.23  Each canteen was marked in Romanian and German (Cantina Crucea 
Roşie Română – Rumanische “Rote-Kreuz Kantine”) and usually located in a train station.  They 
                                                 
21 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 1236, f. 11. 
22 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 1126, f. 132, 134-135, 136.   
23 Ibid., dosar 1732, f. 73-74.  
 436 
 
provided soldiers with a hot meal (usually just tea or coffee in the morning, but a full meal for 
lunch and dinner), a kind word, and a bit of home deep in Ukraine.  A canteen set up in January 
1942 in Odessa under a Mrs. Golescu, with help from Mrs. Carp – who had followed her officer 
husband to occupied Transnistria – began serving 600-1,000 cups of tea or coffee, found enough 
supplies for 200 portions of soup, and later 100 loaves of bread a day.  They were proud to help 
“our frozen soldiers” who “had not tasted anything hot in 5-6 days.”24  Without such canteens, 
troops would have gone without because Axis logistics were overstretched.  
 Women working at Red Cross canteens had to find ways to augment the paltry supplies 
provided by Third Army.  Funds and supplies donated in Romania were sent to the front, but not 
all of it made its way to the troops.  Some soldiers thought that the canteen staff pocketed much 
of the money and sold off goods for their own profit, but this happened less often than soldiers 
believed.  There are examples of false Red Cross collections, in one case a lieutenant asked for 
donations from passengers on trains that then he pocketed.25  Third Army charged fees – more 
for officers, less for NCOs, and very little for enlisted men – for special events or entertainment 
to raise funds for the Red Cross.  For example, proceeds from admission to a soccer match on 12 
July 1942 in Simferopol was donated to the Red Cross in Crimea.26  By April 1943, additional 
canteens had been set up in Kherson, Dzhankoy, Simferopol, Kerch, and Taman. 
 Often the only Romanian women for hundreds of kilometers, nurses became the object of 
amorous attention of soldiers.  While the army preferred mature married women as nurses in the 
operational zone east of the Dniester, there were plenty of single young women as well, and of 
                                                 
24 Mrs. Carp’s husband provided the basement space, see, Fond Organizare, dosar 14/1941, f. 285. 
25 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 3447, f. 662.  
26 Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 914, f. 382.   
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course the bounds of matrimony did not always remain sacred under the dual strains of time and 
distance.  Nurses usually associated with officers because they were from the same social milieu, 
and officers had the freedom to visit Red Cross stations.  Many of the relationships were merely 
plutonic friendships between married officers far from their wives and married nurses far from 
their husbands.  February 1943, as 3rd Mountain Battalion occupied Crimea, Major Scâneci soon 
developed a friendship with Red Cross staff in nearby Feodosia, particularly nurses Mrs. Şendrea 
(“a trueborn Moldavian, from Iaşi”) and Ms. Milcoveanu (“one hundred percent Oltenian”), and 
not only did he and officers visit Feodosia, but the nurses frequently visited his headquarters.  In 
fact, officers and nurses participated in Islamic ceremonies to win local goodwill, “Together with 
them, we marry pair after pair of Tatars.  We are Kum (godfather) and Kuma (godmother).  It 
will be more difficult at the baptism of the newborns, as we have to assist in the circumcision 
and that we do not like.”27  Not all officer-nurse relationships were so innocent.   
Despite official discouragement, sexual relationships did develop between officers and 
nurses.  In April 1943, the General Staff reiterated the need for “exemplary” discipline, decency, 
and morality from nurses.28  Soldiers’ comportment at Red Cross canteens was often far from 
gallant.  Third Army reported in August 1943 that officers and NCOs did not exhibit “a proper 
attitude” to nurses: using disrespectful language, spreading of salacious rumors about them, and 
if nurses sat with soldiers the officers calling them whores.  The nurses had “made the sacrifice 
of leaving their families to serve the army far from home…day and night, without taking notice 
of fatigue…For this reason the female personnel of the R.[ed] C.[ross] not only should not be 
                                                 
27 Oltenia is a name for the western part of Wallachia, see, Scarnesci, Viaţa şi moarte în linia întăi, 396 
28 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 2158, f. 18.   
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subjected to offences and insults, but they will be given all due respect required by decorum.”29  
Nurses were supposed to be pure vessels of patriotic service and not sexual objects. 
 The Antonescu regime’s re-mobilization of Romanian society in the spring of 1942 again 
called for female volunteers.  Fewer answered the call this time around because most willing to 
volunteer for service east of the Dniester had done so in 1941, but the General Staff successfully 
attracted a steady trickle of volunteers that met its high standards for nurses to provide Red Cross 
personnel for the expanded number of canteens and hospitals east of the Dniester.  It was much 
easier for the Red Cross to recruit volunteers in Romania.  Even if enthusiasm among women to 
volunteer to serve with the Red Cross on the front had waned when the front again approached 
Romania at the end of 1943, the Antonescu regime was able to count on female volunteers ready 
to do their part to defend the homeland.  During 1943-1944, leading up to Romania’s exit from 
the Axis alliance, army newspapers began printing lists of soldiers who volunteered for the front, 
including nurses.  Soldatul recorded 14 female volunteers in March 1944.30   
Entertainers  
 A small number of Romanian women, a few dozen, experienced the front as entertainers.  
These women were singers, dancers, and actresses hired by the Propaganda Section to entertain 
troops by traveling the expanses of Ukraine, Crimea, and southern Russia as members of several 
theater groups.  After an initial trial run of two all-male theater groups sent to Transnistria and 
Crimea in the summer of 1942, the Propaganda Section decided to send two “mixed” theater 
                                                 
29 Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 1414, f. 26 
30 “Alti Voluntari cer sa lupte pentru patrie,” Soldatul, 21 Martie 1944, 5. 
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groups with 11 women entertainers each to the front beginning in September 1942 and ending in 
January 1943.  These women crisscrossed the occupied territories performing hundreds of shows.  
 While these female entertainers were paid, their motivation went beyond mere lucre, as 
traveling through occupied territory was both difficult and exhausting, especially with a packed 
schedule of performances at each stop.  Moreover, while they originally signed on for 45 days, 
most stayed twice as long, some took no leave for holidays, and returned home only after falling 
ill; like Any Lupaşcu on the front for 101 days.31  They normally performed for groups of 1,000, 
but sometimes up to 3,000 soldiers.  Soviet civilians, excited for entertainment, swelled groups 
further.  These young women had professional training as entertainers; sung traditional folk 
tunes, contemporary songs, and classic opera; performed folk dances, waltzes, foxtrots, and even 
acrobatics.  A sample program from fall 1942 illustrates the kinds of entertainment.  
1. entrance of the group, 2. The Royal Hymn (played by an orchestra), 3. Prayer 
for Romania (recited by an NCO), 4. At the well with a bucket (female singer), 5. 
[Private] Neaţa at Concentration (comic sketch), 6. Donia and Ciocârlia (pan 
flute solo), 7. Who will take me? (couplet by a female singer), 8. The Japanese 
[Duo] (juggling and acrobatics by a husband-wife team), 9. Hey pal who stands 
watch? (duet), 10. Tyrol Ballet (male and female dancers), 11. peasant joke 
sketches, 12. magic tricks, 13. imitations, 14. It was Fatel to me (comedy 
couplet), 15. comedic acrobatics, 16. You cannot hit us (comedic couplet), 17. 
Badea told me, 18. Tri-conference (comic sketch), 19. Romanian dances, 20. 
[Major] Agrici left to hunt, 21. Am I right? I am!, 22. parade of the whole theater 
group, 23. patriotic recitation, 24. closing words, and 25. final choir.32   
 
The White Squadron  
A group of a dozen women actually served in uniform as pilots in the Royal Romanian 
Air Force transporting wounded soldiers in Escadrila albă (the White Squadron).  The exploits 
                                                 
31 Fond Secţia Propaganda, dosar 115, f. 13, 20.   
32 Ibid., dosar 82, f. 6-7.   
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of the squadron’s female pilots were celebrated by the Romanian military press and repeatedly 
interviewed by German and Italian war correspondents.  The White Squadron ferried over ten 
thousand wounded Romanian, plus a thousand German, soldiers by air from field hospitals in 
Bessarabia, Odessa, Crimea, and even Stalingrad to hospitals in Romania.  
This squadron was established in 1940 due to the efforts of Princess Marina Ştirbey as 
part of Romanian Civil Aviation.  Princess Ştibey was inspired by the Finnish female volunteer 
paramilitary organization called Lotta Svärd that supported the Finnish Army during the Winter 
War.33  The Romanian Royal Air Force desperately needed trained pilots in 1940.  The squadron 
had eight pilots: Mariana Drăgescu, Virginia Duţescu, Virginia Thomas, Nadia Russo, Victoria 
Comşa, Jeana Iliescu, Maria Adam, and Maria Voitec.  Half of them were noblewomen (Russo 
was a Russian exile) who had the wealth and leisure to earn their pilot’s license.  Unfortunately, 
on 21 July 1940, four of them (Comşa, Iliescu, Adam, Voitec) were killed in a training accident 
at the Băneasa airfield just outside Bucharest.34  As volunteers they could quit the unit whenever 
they decided that they had done enough.  The other four survived the war, leaving the squadron 
at different points between 1941 and 1943, except for Drăgescu who remained for the whole war, 
even after 23 August 1944.  They were joined in 1942 by the newly trained group of Smaranda 
Brăescu (a peasant turned famed interwar parachutist), Victoria Polkol, Maria Nicolae, and Stela 
Huţan.  They held the rank of Pilot 2nd Lieutenant, received an air force salary, and wore grey-
blue air force uniforms – except for Russo who usually wore civil aviation white.  They trained 
on transport aircraft and were initially named Escadrila Sanitară, or the Sanitary Squadron.   
                                                 
33 Daniel Focşa, Escadrila albă: o istorie subiectivă (Bucharest: Editura Vremea, 2008), 22.   
34 Sorin Turturică, Aviatoarele României: Din înaltul cerului în beciurile Securităţii (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 
2013), 94-95.   
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Italian journalist Curzio Malaparte made the squadron famous after seeing it during his 
visit to the front in July 1941.  He was the first to coin the nickname the White Squadron because 
their aircraft were painted white with a Red Cross.35  Italian media fawned over the squadron and 
a joint Italo-Romanian production made a film based on it in 1943.  The Romanian military press 
followed suit and depicted their “flying ambulances” as a continuation of the traditional auxiliary 
medical role fulfilled by socially elite women since they first financed ambulance companies in 
1877, but these women were first and foremost pilots, not nurses, and lacked even basic medical 
training until early 1943.36  Parts of Russo’s journal were published in Armata in 1942 and her 
description of prepping and flying the plane while her medical assistant Ernest loaded and cared 
for wounded presented readers with a case of role reversal that many found shocking.  Drăgescu 
remembered a one wounded soldier in 1943 expressing “maximum disbelief” when he realized 
she was the pilot and even resisted being loaded into the aircraft.37   
Romanians saw women in combat as unnatural and except for the female pilots of the 
White Squadron, the Propaganda Section depicted women as caring mothers or nurses.  The only 
women shown in combat were Soviet.  From the beginning of the war, Romanian propaganda 
used the fact that the Soviets were sending women into combat as proof of the moral bankruptcy 
of the Soviet regime and evidence the Red Army was near collapse.  Rădulescu depicted Soviet 
female soldiers in his comic strip as fat, ugly creatures who did not belong on the front and easily 
captured by Private Neaţa.38  The female pilots of the White Squadron pushed the boundaries of 
gender norms in Romanian society, but within limitations set by the military. 
                                                 
35 Turturică, Aviatoarele României, 97; Sentinela, 6 Iulie 1941, 6. 
36 Turturică, Aviatoarele României, 99. 
37 Armata, Anul I, Nr. 7-8, 4 Octombrie 1942, 14-15; Focşa, Escadrila albă, 30. 
38 Rădulescu, “Paţaniile soldatului Neaţă,” Sentinela, 27 July 1941, 7. 
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Corporal Constanţa Moisescu 
 During a visit to a mountain battalion in Crimea in May 1943 Ion Postolache, a spotted a 
strange looking soldier wearing the crisp uniform and when he came closer, “I saw how feminine 
tresses flowed from underneath the mountain beret almost down to the shoulders.  The delicate 
soldier in front of me was a woman.”39  Postolache was in truth not surprised to find a female 
soldier in Crimea because he had come specifically to interview her.  His dramatic license was 
meant to squeeze every bit of shock from the revelation and hook his readers, who would have 
been dismayed to read of such an abnormality, the only woman serving in the ranks of the 
Romanian Army during the Second World War, Corporal Constanţa Moisescu.   
 A female soldier in the Romanian Army was not unprecedented.  Ecaterina Teodoroiu 
was a heroine of the First World War, in 1916 she volunteered as a nurse, but when the German 
Army overran most of Romania, including her hometown of Târgu Jiu where she organized a 
failed defense, she volunteered to fight as a soldier to avenger her slain brother.  She overcame a 
reluctant military establishment with the backing of the king and queen, fought in several battles, 
after being wounded was made an honorary 2nd lieutenant, and ultimately was killed in battle in 
1917.  She was celebrated after the war as the supreme example of Romanian female sacrifice.  
In February 1943, an article in Soldatul entitled “Women in Combat” argued that women should 
support the war effort by taking their men’s place at the plow and providing succor as nurses.  It 
compared Corporal Moisescu with 2nd Lieutenant Teodoroiu, “Her soul sought to defeat the 
weakness of body and bending the law of nature took up arms together with men.”  Romanians, 
it argued, should not be surprised that the new war against the greater enemy of Bolshevism 
                                                 
39 Ion Postolache, “O voluntara a cruciadei din rasarit: Caporal Moisescu Constanţa,” Gazeta Odesei, 9 Mai 1943, 3. 
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finally “has its heroine.”40  The use of the singular was no accident and the implied message was 
clear.  Romania had had a heroine, Teodoroiu, in the First World War and now had a heroine, 
Moisescu, in the Second World War.  In consequence, there was no need for any other Romanian 
women to get any ideas about serving in combat.   
 In her interview in May 1943 Corporal Moisescu related her story of how she became a 
soldier in the Mountain Corps fighting partisans in Crimea.  She was from a small town in the 
Carpathian Mountains on the way to Braşov called Buşteni.  In the summer of 1942, she sent a 
petition to Marshal Antonescu asking to be sent to the front to fight as a simple soldier, after 
which she was called for a personal audience with the Conducător in Predeal where, “I explained 
to him that I had no other reason except for love of country.  Neither sentimental delusion, nor 
desire for fame [were motivations].  I wanted to follow the same life as our soldiers, to live with 
them the same heights, and to face death together with them.”  After she convinced Antonescu of 
her pure intentions he approved her petition, the only one of 86, and he sent her to the infantry 
training center in Făgăraş.  After basic training Private Moisescu asked to join the “green devils” 
(a Red Army nickname for Romania’s mountain troops).  She trained with the Mountain Corps 
rear element during 1 August-15 November 1942 before going to Crimea.  Since then, “Here I 
served just like a soldier: sentry duty, marches, shooting, fears of combat.  I get no special 
treatment any different from my comrades.  This winter I remained on the frontline for 23 days 
without being relieved.”41  She was promoted to corporal after her stalwart winter service. 
                                                 
40 Ion Munteanu, “Femei in lupta,” Soldatul, 25 Februarie 1943, 1. 
41 Ion Postolache, “O voluntara a cruciadei din rasarit: Caporal Moisescu Constanţa,” Gazeta Odesei, 9 Mai 1943, 3. 
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 Unfortunately, the record falls silent and Corporal Moisescu’s fate is unknown.  If she 
remained in Crimea until the Soviet broke through and retook the peninsula in May 1944, it is 
likely she escaped by ship or became a casualty during the retreat.  This assumes that she was not 
killed in one of the many anti-partisan operations carried out in the year following her interview 
– sweeps resulting in burned villages and reprisals.  One thing is sure, she was never celebrated 
like Teodoroiu, and if she survived the war she faded into obscurity in a country that did not 
want to remember why she had volunteered to fight against the Soviet Union.   
Women and the Holocaust  
The contribution of Romanian women was not without a darker side as their efforts were 
ultimately in the service of an army fighting for a reprehensible cause.  In addition to donations, 
both the Red Cross and Blue Cross benefited from funds extorted from Jews.  Maria Antonescu’s 
Council of Patronage for Social Works received 400 million lei in 1942 alone.42  Nurses who 
worked alongside Jewish doctors in Romania treated them as pariahs, even as they relied on their 
medical expertise to save the lives of soldiers who may have participated in massacres of Jews.  
The women who served on the front were confronted with the criminal aspects of the war being 
fought by the Romanian Army.  Pilot 2nd Lieutenant Drăgescu recalled visiting Odessa after it 
fell and saw Soviets executed as partisans by the “Germans,” but considering that the city was 
under Third Army occupation they were executed by the Romanians.43  The extent to which 
Romanian nurses may have participated in atrocities east of the Dniester is unclear. 
 
                                                 
42 Much of it through Radu Lecca’s Central Jewish Office, see, Deletent, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 123. 
43 It is also certainly possible that the “Russians” were in fact Jews, see, Focşa, Escadrila albă, 22.  
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Sex, Prostitution, and Rape on the Front  
 While Romanians imagined that the front was a masculine space, the territory east of the 
Dniester occupied by the Axis was filled with women left behind by the Red Army.  This put the 
Romanian Army in position of power over Soviet women.  Since Red Cross nurses were largely 
off limits to the rank and file, only officers could pursue them, NCOs or privates courted local 
girlfriends, purchased sex, and some used force to satisfy carnal desires.  Sexual violence by 
troops against Soviet women is a subject that Romanian military historians avoid even more 
studiously than the murder of Jews or partisans in their sanitized accounts of the Eastern Front.  
In comparison, Holocaust historians emphasize the rape of Jewish women by Romanian soldiers.  
Therefore, sexual practices by Romanian soldiers on the front deserves some attention.     
Third Army discouraged its soldiers from fraternization, but many officers and soldiers 
disregarded its wishes.  Soldiers who stayed in a location for any length of time, particularly in 
occupation duties in Transnistria or Crimea, often found local girlfriends and some got married.44  
Those just passing through sought temporary companionship. The Romanian Army did not have 
a tradition of army brothels and, unlike the German Army, did not establish any to try to limit the 
spread of venereal disease.45  At times gendarmes arrested prostitutes, but often on accident, like 
in May 1942 when police searching for communists or legionaries in Tiraspol stumbled upon 22 
prostitutes plying their trade.46  Romanian officers could frequent German army brothels, but the 
rank and file made due with illegal brothels.  In November 1942, the SSI reported there were six 
                                                 
44 Fond Corpul de Cavalerie, dosar 568, f. 61; some argue the unequal relationship between occupier and occupied 
means that even consensual relationships have at least a tinge of coercion, see, Bucur, Heroes and Victims, 207.   
45 In fact, during the First World War it was not until after the arrival of the soldiers of the French Military Mission 
that such establishments were created, and even then, only for French officers’ use, see, Ciupală, Bătălia lor, 66. 
46 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 1130, f. 401.   
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“houses of tolerance” in Simferopol and venereal disease was common.47  Due to a shortage of 
medicine (and officer indifference) soldiers with venereal disease were often left untreated, so 
army records are peppered with reports of soldiers with cases of untreated syphilis.   
Some soldiers decided they would not pay for sex and used force.  The Romanian Army 
did not tolerate rape to the extent of the Red Army, but it was relatively commonplace, especially 
against Jewish women in eastern Romania in the opening phase of Operation Barbarossa.  Since 
Jews were believed to have humiliated Romania by impoverishing it over decades and betraying 
it in 1940 soldiers raped Jewish women to assert dominance.  They often gang raped women or 
girls in front of their families to humiliate them.48  Michael Stivelman, a Jew from Secureni in 
northern Bukovina, emerged from hiding in early July soon after the Romanian Army arrived, 
and found Molia Roitman, a 16-year-old neighbor, who had been gang raped by soldiers while 
her parents were forced to watch, but he could do nothing and she bled to death.49  There are 
stories of alcohol fueled rape orgies followed by the rape victims’ murder by gendarmes during 
the deportation of Jews from eastern Romania to Transnistria.50   
Romanian soldiers raped Soviet women once they crossed into the Soviet Union, but on a 
smaller scale.  Officers punished rape, albeit sporadically, by flogging soldiers.  Officers caught 
in the act were court martialed, such as in October 1941 when a lieutenant billeted in a Ukrainian 
home raped one of the daughters of the owner.51  In September 1942, Third Army reported that 
                                                 
47 Soldiers usually paid for sex with food.  A few of the prostitutes in Simferopol also had positions as cooks in army 
canteens and were soon successful black marketers, see, Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 933, f. 91.   
48 Regina Mühlhăuser, “Between ‘Racial Awareness’ and Fantasies of Potency: Nazi Sexual politics in the Occupied 
Territories of the Soviet Union, 1942-1945,” in Brutality and Desire: War and Sexuality in Europe’s Twentieth 
Cenutry, ed. Dagmar Herzog (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 200-201.   
49 Stivelman, The Death March, 108.  
50 For a section on “Degradation of Jewish Women,” see, Ancel, The History of the Holocaust in Romania, 438-444. 
51 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 287, f. 73.  
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soldiers passing through Rostov on the way to the Don front “stop women on the street and try to 
convince them to accompany them either with food or money, and even by force.” 52  The report 
declared these actions were unworthy of soldiers, more embarrassed about indiscipline than true 
concern about protecting women.  General Dumitrescu, as with all discipline problems, ordered 
rapists to be shot, but there is little evidence this occurred.   
Minorities in the Ranks 
 The General Staff was deeply suspicious of minorities, but it needed the manpower.  The 
most suspect minorities were labeled Category III: Hungarians, Russians/Lipovans, Ukrainians, 
Bulgarians, and Jews.  These were the largest minority groups, who were associated with hostile 
states on the borders of România Mare, and who, if they defected on a mass scale, could damage 
the war effort.  Interwar Romania had smaller ethnic groups associated with friendly states that 
were labeled Category II: Poles, Czechoslovaks, and Yugoslavs.  Leading up to 1940, the ethnic 
German minority in Romania worried the Romanian Army, especially with the rise of Hitler, and 
who were initially in Category III, but after the Antonescu regime allied with Nazi Germany 
these ethnic Germans received privileged treatment.  The least suspect were ethnic Romanian 
members of religious sects labeled Category I: Baptists, Pentecostals, Evangelists, Adventists, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, and several heretical Orthodox sects.  Men from all these groups were 
conscripted, some served on the front, but most in labor detachments in Romania. 
Jews  
The Minority Treaty forced on Romania at the Paris Peace Conference meant that the 
situation for Jews in the Romanian Army improved during 1921-1940.  They could now become 
                                                 
52 Ibid., dosar 877, f. 7.  
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reserve officers or NCOs and several regiments with Jewish majorities had rabbis as chaplains.  
Sadly, this progress was only superficial and was rapidly undone after June 1940.  On 8 August 
1940, one of the last acts of the Carlist regime was to issue a decree clarifying the status of Jews 
that included restricting Jews who received citizenship after 1918 from becoming regular officers 
and alluded that Jews would be required to provide labor service rather than army service.  The 
Antonescu regime codified this idea on 5 December 1940 in the Law on the Military Status of 
the Jews that excluded all Jews from military service, obligated the payment of “military taxes,” 
and required Jewish men to provide communal labor [muncă de folos obtesc] “according to the 
needs of the state.”53  During 1941-1944, the General Staff organized Jews into segregated labor 
detachments working in tough conditions in construction projects west of the Dniester and used 
Jewish professionals or craftsmen to make up for skilled labor shortages in Romania.    
The General Staff organized segregated labor detachments to work on military and state 
projects beginning in May 1941.54  Previously, during the brief reign of the National Legionary 
State, Legionaries forced Jews at random to do degrading communal labor like as clearing snow, 
mud, or trash from streets to humiliate.  Since the suppression of the Legionaries, the Antonescu 
regime rationalized Jewish labor, but the war made regulating Jewish labor a greater priority.  On 
14 July 1941, Decree Nr. 2030 clarified labor obligations for Jews.  Jewish men 18-50 could be 
mobilized as individuals, small groups, or large detachments, whatever dictated by the needs of 
the General Staff or other state institutions.  Officially, they would only serve for a limited fixed 
period of days each year corresponding to age: 60 days of service for men 18-21, 180 days for 
                                                 
53 For both decree-laws, see, Bărbulescu, Munca obligatorie a evreilor din România, 57-64. 
54 Ibid., 14.   
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men 21-24, 120 days for men 24-26, 90 days for men 26-41, and 60 days for men 41-50.55  A 
few Jewish professionals were exempted from physical labor but were still required to lend their 
skills when called upon.  Any exempted for being sick, infirm, or otherwise unfit had to pay the 
“military tax.”  Labor service was either “interior,” served locally with the individual providing 
his own meals and returning home each night, or “exterior,” assigned to a labor detachment in 
the countryside with food and shelter provided by the army.  Some improved their assignment or 
escaped communal labor completely by a well-placed bribe.  In mid-1941, 84,042 of the roughly 
300,000 Jews remaining in the Old Kingdom and southern Transylvania were men between 18 
and 50: 47,345 were eligible for communal labor, 11,933 were intellectuals available for white 
collar work, 9,365 were exempted, and the status of 15,399 was unclear.56  
 Communal labor was a national program that encompassed not just Jews.  Other ethnic 
minorities and even Romanians made up the majority of soldiers who required to provide labor 
service for the General Staff.  Ultimately, 49 segregated labor detachments with 24,197 Jews and 
176 labor detachments with 165,930 Romanians and minorities were formed (see Table 6).  
 
  
Table 6.  Situation of Labor Detachments, 1943. 
 
Category Units Effectives   Date Created  Location   Minorities  
 
Agriculture    30 15,930        Apr.-Jul. ‘43*    Territorial Corps Mixed    
Forestry    58 43,502        Oct. ‘41   Forest Districts Mixed 
Factory     5   1,950        Apr.-Jul. ‘42  Transylvania 
Petroleum      4      810        Aug. ‘43   Prahova Valley  
Road    13 25,412        Apr. ‘42   Transn., Romania      Mixed  
Railroad   28 57,337        Apr. ‘42   Transyl., Mold. 42,320 Minorities 
Train Station     6   1,200        Apr. ‘42   Transnistria 
                                                 
55 Traşcă, “Chestiunea evreiască” în documente militare române, 42.   
56 Bărbulescu, Munca obligatorie a evreilor din România, 28.   
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Table 6 Continued.  Situation of Labor Detachments, 1943. 
 
Category Units Effectives   Date Created  Location   Minorities  
 
Special      5   1,500        May ‘43   Military Schools 700 Hungarians 
Sărata    17 14,516        May/Sept. ‘43  Transn., Romania Mixed 
Fortification    10   3,722        Aug./Dec. ’43  Dobrogea, Transyl.  
 
Total:              176    165,930 
 
Railroad      4   1,056       Apr. ’42   Territorial Corps Jews 
Roads      8   6,000       Apr. ’42   Bessarabia  Jews 
Engineer     5   6,709       Apr. ’43   Moldavia   Jews  
Civilian    32   8,414       Sept. ’42   Various Cities  Jews  
Sărata       2   1,994       ----------  FNB Line   Jews  
 
Total:    49  24,197 
 
General Total: 225    190,127 
 
*These agricultural labor detachments were demobilized each winter until the following spring.  
 
Source: ANIC, Fond PCM: CM, dosar 35/1944, f. 7. 
 
   
These units did all kinds of labor: road construction, railway repair, woodcutting, mining, and 
factory work.  Jews did not receive uniforms, although it was not uncommon for Christian labor 
detachments to lack uniforms as well, other than a yellow armband with the letters C.R. or C.T. 
(for Recruitment Center or Territorial Corps), county name, and sometimes the unit designation 
printed or simply handwritten on them.  The primary differences between normal and segregated 
labor detachments were Jewish laborers were supposed to provide their own equipment, received 
little to no pay, and fewer rations.  Jewish families sent money, food, and clothing to help their 
sons, brothers, and husbands survive their labor service.  If they worked locally families brought 
these things, but visits were curtailed, plus Jews’ ability to travel was restricted, so many were 
unable to reach exterior labor detachments.  The mail system was unreliable and mistrusted by 
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Jews and Christians alike, so they found other ways to deliver goods.  Jewish families used 
Christian friends, sympathetic officers, or paid couriers to smuggle packages to forced laborers.  
For example, in July 1942, 2nd Lieutenant Vasile Tănăsacle, a reservist, was caught transporting 
a suitcase with 30-35 kg of clothing, food, medicine, and letters from Botoşani, where he had 
been billeted with the Grünberg family, a middle-class Jewish couple, to their son assigned to the 
Podolia Camp near Hotin.  At his court martial, Tănăsacle did not deny transporting the suitcase, 
but “being touched by the sufferings of a mother, however, he declares that he should not be 
accused of un-patriotism.”57  Most couriers lacked such a tender motivation.  The profits from a 
brisk smuggling trade augmented the pay of soldiers, railway personnel, and civil servants 
traveling around Romanian and Transnistria.  Romanian officers and NCOs oversaw these labor 
detachments.  Some were corrupt or abusive, beating Jews, stealing packages sent from home, 
extorting money, and selling supplies designated for the Jewish laborers.  Most, however, were 
no worse than an average Romanian officer or NCO.  Jews in these segregated labor detachments 
were not worked to death or murdered, although a few died in work-related accidents.   
After June 1941, the exemption of Jews from combat caused some consternation among 
Romanians.  The General Staff reported on 19 February 1942 that soldiers became demoralized 
when they had leave and saw “insolent” and “defiant” Jews safe from the horrors on the front.58  
In November 1941, the Antonescu regime signaled a change in the status of Jews in segregated 
labor detachments when it began calling labor by Jews forced labor [muncă obligatorie].59  The 
General Staff ordered a review to weed out Jews who bribed or faked their way into exemption 
                                                 
57 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 779, f. 24-25 
58 Traşcă, “Chestiunea evreiască” în documente militare române, 459. 
59 Bărbulescu, Munca obligatorie a evreilor din România, 15.   
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from forced labor, but the most important change was a new policy of deportation to Transnistria 
as a punishment for Jews who did not report for forced labor or otherwise caused problems.  The 
General Staff not only threatened to deport those judged guilty of infractions, but families too. 
The threat of deportation to Transnistria terrified Jews in the Old Kingdom who were 
well-informed of the fate of the Jews of Bukovina and Bessarabia.  Most Jews in Transnistria 
were crowded into ghettos where they survived by smuggling, black marketeering, and working 
in factories.  The rest were held in camps in the countryside.  There were two types of camps: 
concentration camps set up in old Soviet kolkhozes where Jews deported from Bessarabia and 
Bukovina in 1941 worked in agriculture or construction, and small labor camps created for Jews 
deported from the Old Kingdom after 1942 for infractions related to forced labor.60  This threat 
suddenly disappeared on 14 October 1942 when Mihai Antonescu suspended all deportations to 
Transnistria, including of Jewish “delinquents” from forced labor.  Only 554 (306 delinquents 
with 249 family members) of 12,086 “disobedient” Jews were deported to Transnistria.61  After 
the deportation halt order Jewish absenteeism grew and by February 1943 the army thought there 
were 17,000 delinquent Jews.  The General Staff considered punishing delinquents as deserters: 
permanent forced labor, seizure of property, or execution, but it never followed through on the 
threat to execute delinquents.62  Jews in Transnistria, however, could be executed for any number 
of reasons and the conditions facing them in ghettos and camps remained difficult. 
 The Romanian Army needed craftsmen and professionals, especially doctors, and Jewish 
medical officers continued to serve in uniform for almost the entire war.  In August 1940, under 
                                                 
60 Dennis Deletant, “Ghetto Experience in Golta, Transnistria, 1942-1944,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 18, nr. 
1 (Spring 2004), 6.   
61 Bărbulescu, Munca obligatorie a evreilor din România, 303-304.   
62 Ibid., 323-333. 
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Carol II, the General Staff ordered all Jewish officers and NCOs, except for those with medical 
expertise, and all Jewish soldiers, except for those already in labor detachments, be demobilized 
and sent home.63  The mobilization rolls began to be purged of Jews in December 1940, but there 
were no replacements for Jewish professionals.  So, on 27 January 1941 Antonescu approved the 
continued use of Jewish doctors, pharmacists, veterinarians, engineers, and architects who would 
be allowed to continue wear uniforms with special Star of David insignia and receive a normal 
salary.64  Meanwhile, senior officers raced to replace these Jews with Christian professionals, but 
the process was haphazard.  Some senior officers simply sent all Jews home immediately, while 
others tried to hold onto them until replacements arrived.  The General Staff announced in March 
1941 that all Jewish doctors had been sent home and Christian replacements were on their way, 
but many doctors failed to report.  In consequence, under pressure from concerned commanders, 
the General Staff reaffirmed the continued use of Jewish doctors – as strictly necessary.65   
When they donned their uniforms, Jewish doctors looked like any other officer, but when 
people realized that they were Jews they were repulsed.  Emil Dorian recorded that his superior 
avoided telling the local elite that the officer physical helping set up a hospital in June 1941 as a 
Jew, but the fact got out.  “The high society of Găieşti learned that it had harbored ‘a beast, a 
traitor, a commando, etc., etc.,’” and demanded he be removed.  Dorian boarded a train back to 
Bucharest, where he saw other Jewish doctors returning home after being left because their unit 
would not take them east of the Prut.66  Officers needed Jewish doctors to help treat wounded 
soldiers, but often troops would not tolerate being treated by a Jew and officers believed that 
                                                 
63 Fond CMC, dosar 84, f. 119.   
64 Bărbulescu, Munca obligatorie a evreilor din România, 70-71. 
65 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 177, f. 17, 22, 678; Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 377, f. 52.  
66 Dorian, The Quality of Witness, 165-166.  
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Jewish doctors would spread defeatism or rumors to demoralize the soldiers.  The General Staff 
ordered that Jewish medical staff wear Star of David rather than rank insignia on their collars and 
not be called by their former rank but instead “doctor” or “assistant doctor,” so soldiers knew 
who was treating them.  Soldiers were reminded to be on their guard against Jewish subversion, 
and to not show Jews in uniform the same respect as Romanian officers.    
The General Staff refused to allow Jewish doctors or laborers accompany combat units to 
the front, but increasingly relied on them in the rear.  In August 1942, the General Staff sent 93 
Jewish doctors to Transnistria to carry out duties there, but their presence immediately triggered 
complaints.  The Transnistria Gendarme Inspectorate claimed their presence upset civilians and 
soldiers.  Soldiers saluted the uniformed Jews until they found out who they were and stopped. 
The report suggested the General Staff should strip them of uniforms and make them serve in 
civilian clothes with a Red Cross armband.67  These doctors presented the strange sight of Jews 
moving around freely in Transnistria.  The 3rd Security Division reported that Jewish doctors 
“enter[ed] unhindered and alone” into ghettos and camps where they observed conditions, shared 
information, and took messages back to Romania –seen as possibly subversive activity.68  The 
General Staff did not strip Jews of their uniforms, probably to afford the doctors the protection 
that an officer’s uniform offered them in Transnistria where soldiers were habituated to beating 
or executing Jews out of hand.  It would do the General Staff no good to have Jewish doctors 
injured or murdered while preforming the duties required of them.  The Sărata Training Center 
assigned Jewish doctors to each of the labor battalions during 1943.   
                                                 
67 The officer writing the report may also have been outraged at the thought that he might be mistaken for a Jew and 
not properly saluted by soldiers, see, Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 1236, f. 999.  
68 Ibid., dosar 779, f. 28.  
 455 
 
In addition to professionals, territorial corps and rear echelon garrisons also used Jewish 
craftsmen as forced labor to work as unit tailors, cobblers, carpenters, painters, mechanics, and 
electricians.  In peacetime, each garrison had workshops with craftsmen normally selected from 
draftees who already had the skills, but with regiments sent to the front, and demand growing for 
craftsmen, Jewish forced laborers filled the gap.  Soon every army workshop had a few Jewish 
craftsmen and even dozens by 1944.  In Transnistria, with tens of thousands of Jews still alive 
even after the harsh winter and massacres, the General Staff ordered in May 1942 that teams of 
20 Jewish craftsmen, under an NCO, could be employed to produce goods for the army, and 
thousands were soon laboring in army workshops.69  Jewish craftsmen were so ubiquitous in 
garrisons that in late-July 1944 reports reached the General Staff that some officers and NCOs 
had created conditions to compel Jews to offer them “incentives.”  General Şteflea ordered 
inquires and reminded soldiers who had to deal with Jews to take “into account the spirit of 
corruption of this race – to avoid any kind of ties with the Jews.”70  
Ethnic Germans  
The rise of Hitler and the growing influence of Nazi ideology among ethnic Germans in 
Transylvania made the General Staff look askance at them.  During 1938-1940, many officers 
saw ethnic Germans as potential supporters of an invading German-Hungarian army.  Feelings 
towards ethnic Germans, however, were far from uniform.  A report from October 1939 shows 
that some officers loudly denounced the Saxon and Swabian soldiers as Nazis while declaring 
support for the Anglo-French alliance, but at the same time other officers acted “irreproachably” 
                                                 
69 RG-25.003M, Reel 20, dosar 1127, c. 91-92. 
70 Some officers were caught inflating the cost of furniture bought from Jewish merchants with whom they were 
allegedly conspiring to defraud the army and pocket the profit, see, Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 1814, f. 392.  
 456 
 
towards ethnic German subordinates. 71  During 1940-1944, the General Staff tamped down any 
surviving anti-ethnic German sentiments and addressed complaints from ethnic German soldiers 
to please its new ally Nazi Germany.  Nevertheless, many ethnic Germans preferred to serve in 
the German Army where material conditions (food, uniforms, and pay) and officers (well-trained 
and no flogging) were better, and soon hundreds began evading the draft by crossing the border 
into German-occupied Yugoslavia.  Over time, the Nazis steadily consolidated their control over 
Romania’s ethnic Germans and eventually enrolled tens of thousands in the Waffen-SS. 
 Romania’s territorial losses in 1940 reduced its ethnic German population to 542,000 that 
were concentrated in southern Transylvania.  The Romanian Army needed every man after these 
losses, however, it soon faced competition in recruiting ethnic Germans from the SS because as 
part of Romania’s new alliance Nazi Germany had extracted a key concession, the creation of the 
German Ethnic Group in Romania on 20 November 1940.  This organization granted local ethnic 
Germans greater autonomy and increased Nazi influence over them.  The SS quickly organized 
the 1,000 Mann Aktion to recruit a thousand volunteers for the SS Das Reich Division.  The SS 
were particularly successful in attracting young and disaffected ethnic Germans, like Sigmund 
Landau who bristled at his status as a “tolerated foreigner” in his own home land with people 
shouting, “Speak Romanian!” at Germans, scuffles with Romanian student activists, and what he 
considered incompetent “Gypsy” rule from Bucharest.72  Soon hundreds volunteered for the SS, 
obtained a position in the German Ethnic Group, or found work with Wehrmacht units arriving 
in Romania with the German Military Mission to avoid serving in the Romanian Army.   
                                                 
71 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 16, f. 10. 
72 His memoir still bristles with anger at Romanians, see, Landau, Goodbye, Transylvania, vii, 5, 7.  
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 Not all ethnic Germans were Nazi sympathizers and most reported when drafted, so an 
estimated 40,000 ethnic Germans served in the Romanian Army during the war.73  The General 
Staff relaxed restrictions on ethnic Germans that they enforced for other minorities – they could 
read German newspapers, write letters home in German, and speak German – but they faced the 
same strict discipline as Romanian soldiers.74  Some Saxons or Swabians decided to evade the 
draft while others deserted to the German Army later.  In early 1941, Sigmund Landau illegally 
joined a Luftwaffe anti-aircraft unit in Ploieşti.  He left for the front and advanced with German 
Eleventh Army to Tighina, Kherson, and even Simferopol before being sent back to Romania in 
December 1941 after Antonescu protested the Wehrmacht aiding draft-dodgers like him.75   
In early 1942, the Antonescu regime began revoking the citizenship of ethnic Germans 
who remained in the German Army or deserted across the border.  Landau, after a quick visit to 
his family, decided he would rather lose his citizenship than serve under the Romanians that he 
despised, and signed up with a group of 2,500 volunteers for the SS in January 1942.  He served 
for the rest of the war in a Waffen-SS unit.  Yet the possibility of never being able to return home 
convinced many ethnic Germans not to volunteer for the SS.  Nonetheless, Antonescu’s efforts 
had minimal effect on the drain of ethnic Germans.  The SS used the German Ethnic Group to set 
up paramilitary youth group and an adult group, which enrolled 31,000 and 36,640 respectively, 
to prepare them to fight in the Waffen-SS.  Ethnic Germans in the Romanian Army resented the 
situation, a June 1942 report from a garrison unit watching the Hungarian border recorded Saxon 
soldiers complaining, “We are militiamen with families and we serve with pleasure on the front, 
                                                 
73 Scafeş, Armata română, 207.  
74 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 225, f. 108; Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 246, f. 124; Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 639, f. 165. 
75 Landau, Goodbye, Transylvania, 19-23.  
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but why do Saxon youths drive automobiles on the streets of Braşov and receive large salaries 
from the Saxon Ethnic Group?  Eligible Saxon youths should come to the front and show their 
patriotism and love for Germany here!”76  There were 5,000 ethnic German soldiers serving east 
of the Dniester in May 1942 (see Table 7), but the number probably doubled during Case Blue. 
 
 
Table 7.  Minorities in Third Army, May 1942.  
 
Minority Group Officers NCOs/Soldiers 
 
Ethnic Germans    679         4,080 
Hungarians         8            386 
Yugoslavs       35   99 
Slovaks        14                         58 
Bulgarians           3              27 
Russians         0                6 
Ruthenians (Ukrainians)    0                           2  
Other        16                           87 
 
Source: AMR, Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 1118, f. 1.  
 
 
    
Romanian troops nicknamed Saxons “the Germans’ Gypsies.”  They were invaluable to officers 
on the front as translators and to soldiers as sources of the latest gossip from the German Army.77  
There were many ethnic German mid-ranking officers, mostly former Habsburg officers, leading 
on the front and General Hugo Schwab and General Carol Schmidt commanded divisions.   
 A steady trickle of ethnic German soldiers deserted while on the front to nearby German 
units, but the greatest loss of ethnic German manpower resulted from SS recruitment efforts in 
Transylvania.  With German High Command increasingly desperate for manpower, it forced the 
                                                 
76 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 1044, f. 355. 
77 Their dialect was sometimes hard for Germans to understand, see, Harward, “Purifying the Ranks,” 168-169.  
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Antonescu regime to sign an agreement on 13 April 1943 that allowed the SS to recruit heavily 
from Transylvania.  A month later Antonescu was also compelled to end the policy of stripping 
ethnic Germans of their Romanian citizenship when they left to fight for the Wehrmacht.  All he 
managed to obtain in return was a face-saving agreement that all ethnic German officers, NCOs, 
or specialists (artillerymen, mortarmen, telephone or telegraph operators, aircraft gunners and 
bombardiers, or sailors) already in the armed forces would be forbidden from volunteering for 
the Wehrmacht.78  Officially, ethnic Germans were supposed to volunteer of their own free will, 
but Romanian reports indicate that Saxons came under pressure from the SS and their cronies in 
the German Ethnic Group.  Soon after the announcement of the agreement, a few Saxon families 
approached the commander of the 2nd Mountain Division rear echelon to ask for their sons to be 
called up by the Romanian Army, so that they could avoid having to “volunteer” for the SS.  The 
Braşov police reported that during the SS directed enrollment on 17-18 April “only a relatively 
small number of Saxons received the recruitment operations with enthusiasm.  The rest [reacted] 
with indifference, and a good portion among them are anxious.”79  Romanians in Braşov watched 
with obvious satisfaction as the recently privileged Saxons now faced the specter of the Eastern 
Front.  Approximately 60,000 ethnic Germans had volunteered to join the SS by the end of 1943.  
Most served with the Waffen-SS, but hundreds ended up as concentration camp guards, including 
at Auschwitz.  Another 15,000 served in the German Army or worked for the Todt Organization.  
 
  
                                                 
78 Scafeş, Armata română, 207. 
79 Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 1393, f. 170, 177.  
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Hungarians 
 Hungarians were the largest ethnic minority in România Mare, numbering 1,425,507 or 
7.9 percent of the population in 1930, and were the most mistrusted by the Romanian state after 
the Jewish minority because of Magyar irredentism supported from Budapest. The General Staff 
did not trust in the reliability of Hungarian draftees and increasingly relegated them to support or 
rear service positions.  The Second Vienna Award greatly reduced the number of Hungarians, so 
the General Staff had the luxury of not sending them to the front.  Hungarian soldiers’ rates of 
draft evasion were low and most dutifully reported for service in the Romanian Army. 
The General Staff was surprised in 1939 by the number of Hungarians that reported when 
full mobilization was declared because it expected high rates of draft evasion.  Only a few dozen 
fled across the border, the majority obeyed orders and hoped war would be avoided.  The Carlist 
regime knew it needed the support of minorities if it was going to successfully deter any invasion 
and made efforts to accommodate minorities in the ranks.  Until June 1940, Hungarians, as well 
as all the other ethnic minorities, could write letters in their native tongues, Hungarian, Yiddish, 
German, Russian, and Ukrainian.  They could read Hungarian or whatever respective minority 
language newspapers.  A few Reform (Calvinist) priests in Transylvania, most of whom were 
Hungarians, favored neutrality and were openly anti-war and pro-Romanian.80   
Regardless of attempts by the General Staff to woo minorities in the ranks, Section II was 
convinced that ethnic Hungarian reserve officers were spying on behalf of the Hungarian Army 
and that anti-Romanian propaganda was being spread in letters, newspapers, and plays.  All the 
                                                 
80 Transylvania had long been a bastion of Calvinism and nearly all the members of the Reform Church were 
Hungarians, but those Hungarians closer to the border were more likely to be members of the Catholic Church, see, 
Paul A. Hanebrink, In Defense of Christin Hungary: Religion, Nationalism, and Antisemitism, 1890-1944 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2006), 11; Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 93, f. 41. 
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entertainment for Hungarian troops had to be pre-approved and SSI or Section II agents attended 
performances to make sure no unapproved messages were sneaked in.81  Nervous officers had 
little trust in the loyalty of Hungarian soldiers.  The duty officer in charge of security at Fourth 
Army headquarters in Tecuci raised the threat of betrayal on 20 June 1940, citing a Hungarian 
sentry posted outside the headquarters, “If you take into account that the [headquarters] drivers 
are of the same [ethnic] origin, we can expect a surprise in a time of need.”82  The General Staff 
assigned newly mobilized Hungarian, Ukrainian, Russian, and Bulgarian minority troops to labor 
battalions to construct defenses in Transylvania or Bessarabia.  However, those minority soldiers 
already serving in mobilized combat units remained with them. 
The situation for Hungarian soldiers worsened after the territorial losses of 1940.  After 
the loss of northern Transylvania only 363,206 Hungarians remained in southern Transylvania, 
but the General Staff still viewed them as a threat.  It banned Hungarian language newspapers 
and ordered that letters had to be written in Romanian.  Section II put Hungarian soldiers under 
surveillance.  When the Romanian Army invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, hundreds of 
Hungarians advanced with Third and Fourth armies, but most were not used in frontline combat.   
Hungarian soldiers were usually assigned to menial jobs like carriage drivers or assistant cooks 
in support formations.83   In this way, the Romanian Army benefited from Hungarian soldiers’ 
service who freed Romanian soldiers for frontline combat, but they were still not trusted. 
 The re-mobilization of 1942 triggered new concerns that Hungarian troops were being 
told by Magyar irredentists to desert once they had received uniforms and weapons to deprive 
                                                 
81 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 225, f. 17; dosar 39, 310-311. 
82 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 201, f. 319.  
83 Harward, “Purifying the Ranks,” 163.  
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the Romanian Army of men and equipment, both in short supply.  In May 1942, there were 400 
Hungarians east of the Dniester with Third Army (see Table 7), but hundreds more were riding 
trains eastwards with Echelon II units heading to the Don that fall.  The General Staff attempted 
to keep ethnic Hungarian soldiers from interacting with the Hungarian Army while in the Soviet 
Union.  In September 1942, it ordered officers to “take severe measures that all soldiers of ethnic 
Hungarian origin be closely supervised for the whole period of transport and not be allowed to 
make contact with Hungarian soldiers and railway personal, under any circumstances.”84  A few 
dozen still managed to desert.85  On 22 September, an angry Antonescu ordered that Hungarians 
soldiers would no longer be given leave because of desertions.  In December 1942, the Artillery 
Officer School requested that the ban be lifted as a quarter of its staff were Hungarians.  While 
admitting that a few had deserted while on leave, it argued that most had “proved to be good 
soldiers,” and added that ban was ineffective because Hungarian soldiers could still easily desert 
while traveling within Romania between the Artillery Officer School’s two halves, in Bucharest 
and Timişoara.  Therefore, the ban uselessly alienated loyal Hungarian soldiers.86  The General 
Staff subsequently recommended that the ban be lifted. 
It was easier to evade the draft in southern Transylvania than to try to desert in the USSR 
under the watch of suspicious Romanian officers.  When Hungarians received their draft notice, 
a few decided that they would rather risk crossing the border into Hungarian-occupied northern 
Transylvania to avoid conscription.  Holly Case argues that the decision was primarily motivated 
by the desire to avoid conditions in the army that the Romanians had purposefully made poor for 
                                                 
84 Fond MR: CM, dosar 243, f. 17; Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 1486, f. 6.  
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Hungarians to encourage them to flee across the border rather than report for service, an indirect 
form of forced population exchange, but the conditions in the Hungarian Army were not much 
better since Hungarian officers were as brutal as Romanian officers.  Moreover, in June 1941, 
General Ioaniţiu ordered that all minorities caught committing infractions must be treated with 
“much tact” in a “civilized” way and it was “absolutely forbidden that these [minorities] be 
beaten or badly treated” because more Romanians were outside Romania than minorities inside 
Romania, so “the consequences will all be in our disfavor.”87  Clearly, the General Staff tried to 
make sure Hungarians were not treated worse than Romanians in the army.  Hungarian soldiers 
were still consistently maltreated due to the prejudice of individual officers or NCOs, but not as 
official policy.  Ironically, Hungarians who dodged the draft may have had a greater chance of 
seeing combat than those who remained because the Hungarian Second Army mobilized soldiers 
equally from all over Hungary, including occupied northern Transylvania, and participated in 
Case Blue.  It was destroyed defending part of the Don northwest of Stalingrad.88   
Most Hungarians did not evade the draft.  In addition to hundreds on the front or at army 
schools, roughly 20,000 served in labor detachments.  The heavy losses on the front meant that 
the Romanian Army needed Hungarians, especially those with training or experience.  In mid-
September 1942, the Ministry of Defense ordered the creation of lists of remaining Hungarian 
NCOs who had been trained under the Austro-Hungarians or the Romanians, so they could be 
best employed on the front, at army schools, or overseeing labor detachments.89   
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Slavic Minorities 
The Ukrainian, Russian, and Bulgarian Slavic minorities were the other major groups that 
served in the Romanian Army.  They were all considered suspect because Romanians assumed 
that they sympathized with the USSR and communism – although the General Staff recognized 
that many Ukrainians were nationalists with anti-Soviet sentiments, it found their aspirations for 
an independent Ukrainian state that would include Bukovina equally worrisome.  These Slavic 
minorities were concentrated in eastern Romania: 595,000 Ukrainians dominated Bukovina and 
northern Bessarabia, 409,000 Russians were concentrated in the cities and towns of central and 
southern Bessarabia, also included in this number were Lipovans (Russian Old Believers) who 
lived in scattered villages across eastern Romanian with most concentrated in the wetlands of the 
Danube Delta, and 366,000 Bulgarians predominated in southern Bessarabia and Dobrogea.90  
The territorial losses in 1940, operations in 1941, and new wartime borders greatly reduced the 
numbers of Slavic minorities in Romania who were conscripted into the army after 1941.  Most 
were assigned to labor detachments and did not fight on the front. 
The loss of northern Bukovina and Bessarabia in July 1940 removed most Ukrainians and 
nearly all Russians in a matter of days, but the Romanian-Bulgarian population exchange carried 
out during the turnover of southern Dobrogea dragged on until April 1941.  In September 1940, 
the General Staff ordered all Bulgarian officers from northern Dobrogea (Tulcea and Constanţa 
counties) and all Romanian officers from southern Dobrogea (Durostor and Caliacra counties) to 
turn in their uniforms and return home to be resettled.  In October 1940, the Ministry of Defense 
issued an order clarifying that officers descended from Bulgarian families that settled in northern 
                                                 
90 Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Interwar Romania, 10. 
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Dobrogea before 1877 “will be considered Romanians, because they were raised in Romanian 
schools,” and would remain in the Romanian Army.91  After the exchange only a tiny Bulgarian 
minority was left in northern Dobrogea.  Romania had few Slavic minorities for a year.    
The reoccupation of eastern Romania in July 1941 returned most of the Slavic minorities 
who were again seen as probable Soviet agents.  Lipovans especially were targeted in a manner 
similar to Jews west of the Prut: accused of insulting the Romanian Army in 1940, blamed for 
signaling Soviet aircraft in 1941, and even evacuated from the frontier.  The absurdity of the idea 
that these religious non-conformists would support the Soviets just because they were ethnically 
Russian was lost on Romanian officers. The General Headquarters ordered the evacuation of the 
Lipovan population from the Danube Delta, citing their threat in case of Soviet attack, but some 
Lipovan men were interned in camps on the Danube as well – 165 Lipovans arrived from Tulcea 
in Călăraşi on 6 July, the same day as one of the two “death trains” from Iaşi.92  On 14 July, after 
advocating evacuating all Jewish men 16-57 from Moldavia and interning them at Târgu Jiu, XI 
Corps reported that the lakes in southern Bessarabia were crowded with Lipovan fishermen who 
might be Soviet agents left to signal aircraft or report troop movements.  General Ghineraru, then 
commanding the 1st Fortification Brigade, proposed that they be restricted from fishing.93  Third 
Army rapidly overran northern Bukovina and since Ukrainian nationalists had little motivation to 
flee with the Soviets most remained.  There was some conflict between Romanian soldiers and 
Ukrainian militiamen.  Mihai Antonescu advocated deporting Ukrainians along with Jews east of 
the Dniester, but these plans came to naught.94  Instead, the Antonescu regime had gendarmes 
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and grăniceri advance to the Dniester and set up pickets to block the return of non-Romanians 
who had fled east across the river, especially Jews, but also Slavic minorities.  On 24 July, the 
General Headquarters ordered all foreigners, including 8,000 Poles and 6,000 Ukrainians the 
Soviets settled in Bessarabia during the occupation, to be deported east of the Dniester.95   
Most Ukrainians and Bulgarians avoided deportation, some deserted from the Red Army, 
but many Russians, basarabeni collaborators, and Jews – all with ample reason to fear the arrival 
of Romanian troops – joined in the Soviet exodus.  Those who remained endeavored to provide 
their loyalty to Romania.  In August 1941, a Bulgarian officer named Gheorghe Dancov, showed 
up at a Romanian unit claiming that while he had served as a captain in the Red Army in Ismail 
during the Soviet retreat he had done as little as possible before deserting.96  The Government of 
Transnistria had control over the population caught between the Dniester and Bug: local Soviet 
civilians, deported Romanian Jews, and minorities from eastern Romania who had fled with the 
Red Army that were not allowed to return home.  Soviet POWs from Transnistria were released 
from camps in Romania during 1941-1942 and allowed to return home.  During 1942-1944, the 
Government of Transnistria, ostensibly a “civilian” government effectively ran the province for 
the General Staff and mobilized the population to labor in agriculture or manufacturing to for the 
war effort.  Therefore, the General Staff did not recruit for labor detachments from Transnistria.  
Nearly all Ukrainians, Russians, and Bulgarians west of the Dniester who were drafted into the 
Romanian Army were assigned to labor battalions.  In May 1942, there were just two Ukrainians, 
six Russians, and 30 Bulgarians with Third Army (see Table 7), compared to approximately 
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30,000 in labor detachments west of the Prut (see Table 6).  The General Staff wrote a study in 
September 1941 proposing to create segregated Ukrainian units, but it was not never approved, 
so Ukrainians, Russians, and Bulgarians continued to serve alongside Romanians.97   
These Slavic minorities deserted when they grew tired of conditions, abusive officers, or 
for nationalist reasons.  Bulgarians had a refuge in Bulgaria across the new border in Dobrogea.  
Russians, however, lacked a similar safe harbor because Transnistria was a dangerous place to be 
without proper papers.  Ukrainians could desert to Nazi-occupied Poland, a particularly attractive 
option to hundreds of ardent nationalists who were encouraged by the Germans to join the SS to 
fight the Soviets for the dream of an independent Ukraine.  While hundreds of Slavic soldiers did 
desert, most remained with labor detachments because conditions were not too bad and probably 
seemed much better than fighting against the Red Army on the Eastern Front. 
Christian Sects and Muslims 
Religion in România Mare was synonymous to ethnicity (Orthodox/Uniate Romanians, 
Calvinist/Catholic Hungarians, Lutheran/Catholic Germans, Orthodox/Uniate Slavs), but there 
were a number of small, but growing, neo-Protestant and heretical Orthodox sects.  There were 
only about 100,000 of these believers, who were concentrated in Transylvania and Bessarabia, 
with various ethnic backgrounds.  The General Staff was suspicious of Christian religious sects 
because many did not recognize the legitimacy of the state and preached pacifism.98  In contrast, 
the General Staff saw Romania’s 150,000 Muslims, Turks concentrated in southern Dobrogea, as 
reliable because they were a historical religion willing to serve the state in uniform.   
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The Romanian Army’s mobilization of soldiers after 1938 meant that neo-Protestants, 
heretical Orthodox believers, and Muslims entered the ranks in greater numbers than ever before 
and triggered different responses from the General Staff.  It was concerned that neo-Protestants 
would use the opportunity presented by mobilization to proselytize.  In a 20 June 1940 order the 
Military Bishopric called “Adventist” proselytizing “unspeakably dangerous.”99  “Adventist” did 
not only refer to the religious group but was often used as a catch-all term for all neo-Protestant 
groups.  The General Staff ordered Orthodox chaplains to address the “Adventist” threat and to 
“show them the error of their ways.”100  Baptists, Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and others in 
uniform were followed by Section II agents who also observed their worship services.  In March 
1940, while neo-Protestants were targeted, the General Staff approved Bishop Ciopron’s request 
to allow four Muslim imams to become chaplains to minister to Muslim soldiers.101   
The territorial losses of 1940 altered the situation of both neo-Protestants and Muslims, if 
in different ways.  Along with losing southern Dobrogea, Romania lost most its Muslims, so few 
served in the ranks after 1940.  The loss of eastern Romania and northern Transylvania reduced 
the number of neo-Protestants and heretical Orthodox believers, but an estimated 25,000 Baptists 
and 15,000 Adventists remained.102  On 9 September 1940, just three days after seizing power, 
Antonescu outlawed all neo-Protestant and heretical Orthodox groups: Adventists, Baptists, 
Evangelists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Pentecostals, Incohentists, Stilists, and a few others.  These 
religious minorities did not give up their beliefs and continued to practice their religion best they 
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could, so Antonescu re-issued the band on 28 December 1942.  Many religious minorities found 
ways to accommodate themselves with the Antonescu regime, especially neo-Protestants.  
Neo-Protestant Romanians may have changed their religion, but they did not change their 
nationalist sympathies.  George Crisan, a Baptist officer from Transylvania, defended Romanian 
claims to Bessarabia after the war, and admitted, “I, like any other Rumanian, was apprehensive 
of any foreign-language-speaking fellow.”103  Additionally, many continued to believe in anti-
Semitism that was deeply rooted in Romanian culture.  The heretical Orthodox sects were less 
accommodating towards the Antonescu regime, especially Incohentists.  This charismatic and 
millennialist Orthodox sect refused to recognize the authority of the state, bear arms, or report 
when drafted.  Antonescu had 2,000 Incohentists deported to Transnistria in August 1942 at the 
same time as “unproductive” Gypsies.104  Many neo-Protestants accepted the rhetoric of “holy 
war” war against communist atheism and believed in defending Christian civilization.   
When neo-Protestants received a draft notice most reported for duty.  Adventists reported 
to recruitment stations to avoid persecution by the state and tried to maintain their conscientious 
objector beliefs.  Most Adventists donned uniforms without protest, but difficulties began when 
they were asked to hold a rifle or swear the oath to Nation, King, State, or Conducător.  Officers 
were unsympathetic to claims of conscientious objection.  The General Staff went out of its way 
to order that all soldiers without exception had to attend the mass oath taking, which was being 
broadcast by radio, on 5 April 1941 when the new contingent of draftees swore the army oath to 
Antonescu for the first time.105  Adventist soldiers tried to avoid the ceremony or only pretended 
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to say the words if they could not.  They tried to obtain assignments to non-combat positions like 
drivers, cooks, or orderlies, so that they could fulfill the military service required of them without 
compromising their faith.  On 18 July 1941 Third Army warned that, “In the cases when they do 
not succeed in getting a position that shields them from having to shoot [a rifle], they desert.”106   
Those who continued to refuse to serve or were caught deserting faced court martial and 
a long prison sentence.  Some Adventists ended up at the Sărata Training Center, released from 
prison for the chance to rehabilitate themselves on the front, Captain Păsat kept an Adventist in 
his command staff because he trusted him more than the rest of the soldiers in his company, who 
he considered a band of cut-throats and thieves, and assigned him to a special night shift.  “We 
only keep this soldier around to watch and eavesdrop on discussions and, eventually, on plans [of 
rehabilitation soldiers] to rob the population [in or near Sărata].”107  The harsh sentences acted to 
convince some to renounce their faith, at least officially.  On 18 November 1943, from Cernăuţi, 
Priest Pantelimon Birău crowed that 44 “religious sectarians,” all condemned to 1-25 years hard 
labor, had reconverted to Romanian Orthodoxy in exchange for pardons.108  Adventist soldiers 
lucky enough to be assigned to a unit in Romania had to make a hard decision if it was ordered to 
the front.  Private Corneliu Florescu, part of the groundcrew of 3rd Bomber Fleet, despite lengthy 
discussions with a captain and an Orthodox chaplain, signed a declaration on 2 June 1943 saying, 
“I am penetrated by my Adventist teachings, I do not accept any of the other religions that are 
legal in the Romanian State…This is my final decision; I remain Adventist, I do not accept the 
[Orthodox] cross, I do not bow [to Orthodoxy], and I do not accept giving the oath on the flag 
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because I do not accept these forms as valid.”109  Adventists, and Incohentists, continued to be a 
thorn in the side of the General Staff for the rest of the war. 
Gypsies and Race 
 The situation of Gypsies in the Romania Army was the most complex and ambiguous of 
all the minorities.  The Gypsy population in Romania was officially 208,700 in 1941 – although 
the true number was probably higher because the 1930 census let people chose their background 
and Gypsies many likely identified as Romanians because they were so assimilated or else feared 
stigmatization as Gypsies.  Like most Romanians, 85 percent of Gypsies lived in the countryside. 
They were spread across România Mare, those in Transylvania spoke Hungarian or in Bessarabia 
spoke Russian, but most lived in Wallachia and spoke Romanian.110  They also spoke their own 
language, called Romani, and were bilingual.  Gypsies were the most assimilated minority group, 
speaking Romanian and Romanian Orthodox believers, but suffered from widespread unofficial 
racial discrimination that was as pernicious as it was legally invisible.   
 There was never an official policy of Gypsy segregation in modern Romania, but there 
was an unofficial practice of racial discrimination in the nineteenth century rooted in medieval 
Gypsy slavery.  Romanian peasants knew little about theories of eugenics or racial hygiene, but 
most nurtured racist beliefs rooted in nearly five centuries of Gypsy slavery.  The first recorded 
Gypsy slaves were gifted to Orthodox monasteries by Romanian princes in 1385.  Gypsy slavery 
quickly became widespread and endured until 1856.  The reprehensible legacy of slavery meant 
that after emancipation Gypsies remained an impoverished and marginalized group.111  By the 
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interwar period, Gypsies had begun to enjoy some improvement in their social position with a 
growing number escaping large boyar estates by moving to the city to become workers and a few 
fortunate ones joined the small middle class.  There was also a large group of nomadic Gypsies 
who sustained a free, if hardscrabble, life on the margins of Romanian society living in caravans.   
Gypsies were denied entry into the officer corps and when drafted were often selected to 
be orderlies.  They performed menial labor and other tasks for the officers, just as Gypsy house 
slaves had on boyar estates for centuries before emancipation and continued to under the new 
guise of domestic servants.  Not all orderlies were Gypsies, however, because officers were as 
comfortable using Romanians, who had been serfs (in many ways very much like slaves) until 
1864.  Gypsies may also have been preferred because of their traditional role as musicians and 
officers often selected those with such abilities to entertain them in their free time.  Regardless of 
the reason, Gypsies were overrepresentation in the ranks of orderlies.112  This lent legitimacy to 
the widespread belief among Romanian soldiers that Gypsies were cowards. 
 Racist songs, poems, and jokes mocking Gypsies as cowardly, lazy, stupid, and dishonest 
filled the military press for the amusement of soldiers.  This image was a kind of a mirror image 
to the one of Jews being cowardly, lazy, smart, and dishonest.  It illustrates that while Romanians 
did not fear Gypsies as a dangerous threat, like “Jewish-Communists,” Gypsies were still widely 
despised, even hated, by much of Romanian society.  Nevertheless, some Romanians not only 
tolerated Gypsies but lived comfortably with them, as attested by the racist wailings of the few 
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Romanian eugenicists who bemoaned the high rates of intermarriage between Romanians and 
Gypsies, especially in Transylvania.113  Despite this racial discrimination, Gypsies patriotically 
answered the call to serve during the period of growing crisis after 1938.  The Romanian Army 
could not easily mobilize men from the nomadic Gypsy population since they were often not 
officially listed in state records and lacked any fixed address, so were not registered with local 
recruitment offices.  Therefore, when the Antonescu regime later decided to identify and deport 
nomadic Gypsies to Transnistria to labor camps, the General Staff made no protest.   
 When the army crossed the Prut in 1941, tens of thousands of Gypsy soldiers fought on 
the front lines.  Even though they suffered discrimination, Gypsies still supported Romania as 
they believed in defending Orthodoxy, held anti-Semitic beliefs, and feared communism.  But 
Romanians had trouble understanding this, as Major Scârneci noted on 5 December 1941.  
[Private Tobu, Gypsy orderly for another officer,] is also fighting here in Crimea 
before fortress Sevastopol.  But for what?  For his poverty?  I take a postcard and 
following his words – as he is illiterate – I write to his family at home and I regret 
to the bottom of my soul that I cannot do more for him…The Country does not 
think of him, nay there’s talk…of colonizing them in Transnistria.114 
 
He could not see Gypsies as Romanians sharing the same intrinsic motivation.  Gypsies fought 
bravely on the front, many as NCOs, and won decorations they wore proudly on their chests like 
any other Romanian – at least until June 1942 when deportations of Gypsies began.115 
 News of the deportation of 11,474 nomadic Gypsies between 1 June and 2 October and 
13,245 “criminal” Gypsies between 2 and 16 September 1942 shocked Gypsies in the army.116  
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Antonescu ordered the deportations after a rushed census in May meant to target only nomadic 
and “criminal” Gypsies, but combination of racial prejudice, incompetence, and the zeal of the 
Gypsy-hating General Constantin “Piki” Vasiliu, commander of the Gendarmerie, meant that 
Gypsy soldiers who had been demobilized or on leave were also swept up by gendarmes in the 
first wave of deportations.  The General Staff had no objection to the deportation of nomadic or 
“criminal” Gypsies, but soon reports began arriving that drafted or draftable sedentary Gypsies 
or their families had been deported.  On 4 August 1942, the 3rd Security Division in Transnistria 
reported that “all [Gypsies] were evacuated casually, without being sorted, but sent in a big batch 
[la grămadă].  [The Gypsy soldiers among them] are claiming the rights won through law and 
military service.”117  In the end, after the intervention of the General Staff, more than half of the 
sedentary Gypsies that were initially slated to be deported were exempted from the second wave 
of deportations.118  Vasiliu, however, pushed to exceed these official limits.  When news reached 
Gypsy soldiers on the front that their families had been deported, they protested.  The Mountain 
Corps reported in October that Gypsy soldiers whose families had been swept up by gendarmes 
were very angry, “especially those that had behaved well on the front.”119   
Antonescu halted the deportations on 16 September 1942, but not before 25,000 Gypsies 
were abused, robbed, and sent to labor “colonies.”  On 3 October 1942, the General Staff issued 
Order Nr. 101290 that explained the recent events, clarified that any nomadic Gypsies still on the 
mobilization rolls should be erased and deported to Transnistria, claimed no family members of 
Gypsy soldiers had been mistakenly deported, and sedentary Gypsies should remain with units.  
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Contradicting itself, the General Staff argued if any Gypsy soldiers’ family members had been 
deported it was because they asked to be deported to accompany other family members.  Officers 
were to make lists of soldiers who said family had been mistakenly deported.120  A week later, 
the Ministry of Defense reported to the General Staff that it had intervened with the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, headed by General Dumitru Popescu, to end its plans for further deportations, 
citing the late season and previous mistakes during selection.  It instructed the General Staff “to 
correct these mistakes” by issuing travel papers to Gypsy soldiers to track down their families. 
The Transnistria Gendarme Inspectorate had been instructed to assist Gypsy soldiers to settle in 
Transnistria or repatriate their family to Romania.121  General Vasiliu opposed these efforts.    
Gypsy soldiers petitioned to save their families.  Some did not find out that their families 
had been deported for months or even a year later.  Private Gheorghe Zăilă had been mobilized 
since 2 July 1941, but finally got leave to visit his home in a village in Wallachia two years later, 
only to find that his wife, three children, mother, and sister had been deported to Balta County.  
Since his unit had been pulled off the front after Stalingrad to refit in Transnistria he managed to 
find them, but only his sister and a single child were still alive.  The major commanding Zăilă’s 
pioneer battalion petitioned the Balta gendarmes to let them return with the unit, as it was being 
transferred to Romania, since his family had been deported illegally.122  The Ministry of Internal 
Affairs had responsibly over all the deported Gypsies and it showed little sympathy when Gypsy 
soldiers petitioned for their families’ release, such as in the case of Corporal Gheorghe Bălteanu.  
Since he was on the front, his family in Craiova had been spared deportation, but his wife Giga 
                                                 
120 RG-25.003M, Reel 148, dosar 2659, c. 9.   
121 Ibid., dosar 148, f. 10.   
122 USHMM, RG-31.004M, Selected Records from the Odesa State Oblast Archive, 1941-1944, Reel 13, Ed. hr. No. 
5, Fond 2264, Opis 1, c. 245.  
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had “asked on her own” to be deported because her parents and siblings had been rounded up by 
the gendarmes.  The gendarmes denied wrongdoing because she had “chosen” to go.123  On 12 
March 1943, the General Staff sided with the Gendarmerie, admitting that while there were some 
Gypsy soldiers’ wives in camps in Transnistria, it was because they had hidden their identity to 
accompany family being deported or (allegedly) in hopes of being granted land.  It claimed that 
Gypsy family members could not be repatriated until May 1943 due to the threat of typhus.  The 
General Staff also ordered that all Gypsy soldiers who appeared in Transnistria should be told 
that their families would be repatriated as soon as possible and warned that they must report back 
to duty or they would be erased from mobilization rolls and join their families in Transnistria.124  
The Gendarmerie continued to give Gypsy soldiers the runaround and delayed repatriation until 
the Red Army approached.  When the General Staff was informed in January 1944 that some 
officers were letting Gypsy soldiers travel to Transnistria to fetch their families before the Red 
Army arrived, it ordered this to stop.  It reiterated that Gypsy soldiers had to go through official 
channels with the General Inspectorate of Gendarmes.125 
 The military justice system was biased against Gypsies and many of the soldiers sent for 
rehabilitation to the Sărata Training Center were Gypsies.  Courts martial convicted Gypsies in 
higher rates because they profiled all Gypsies as petty criminals, so when military and civilian 
jails were emptied of men to be rehabilitation there were many Gypsies among them.  General 
Poenaru reported in June 1942 that a few soldiers at Sărata had deserted or committed crimes, 
“The majority of these are Gypsies or have a revolting physical appearance [conformaţie] that 
                                                 
123 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 992, f. 20.  
124 The General Staff dismissed these wives, claiming that most were really just long-term girlfriends living in sin 
[concubine] with the soldiers, implying they were not worth repatriation, see, Fond CMC, dosar 810, f. 243. 
125 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 1481, f. 317.  
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initially inspires pity…[these] pickpockets and career deserters are the worst soldiers.”126  Just as 
released inmates arrived at Sărata Training Camp, the deportation of nomadic Gypsies reached 
its peak and word about them soon reached the camp.  The Sărata commandant read Order Nr. 
101290 to them on 8 October and added that nomadic Gypsies at Sărata with prison sentences 
still to be rehabilitated would remain at the center to be sent to the front.  The same was true for 
any Gypsies whose family had been deported as “dangerous to public order.”127   
Gypsies whose families had been deported were “agitated” by the fact that they would 
not be released and sent to join them in Transnistria.  They argued that they could not understand 
why they had to fight the Red Army to protect their families from communism if their families 
had been deported, discussed deserting once they were sent to the front, and some immediately 
deserted.  Colonel Iancu Ghenescu, te second in command at Sărata Training Center, confronted 
a group of Gypsies and asked if they wanted to go back to prison.  They responded, “we’d rather 
die.”  Ghenescu quipped in his report, “the yearning of the Gypsy for liberty is well known.”128  
Gypsies whose families had been deported likely made up a significant number of the 7 percent 
of rehabilitation soldiers who deserted from the Sărata battalions on the way to the front during 
fall 1942.129  Morale among these Gypsy rehabilitation soldiers must have been very low.    
Gypsy soldiers continued to fight on the front until the end of the war.  They had been 
told that as sedentary Gypsies their families would not be deported and the end of deportations in 
September 1942 let all Gypsy soldiers breathe a sigh of relief.  The General Staff needed Gypsy 
                                                 
126 Fond CI Nr. 5 Sărata, dosar 72, f. 32. 
127 Ibid., dosar 110, f. 362.  
128 Ibid., dosar 72, f. 170, 176.  
129 97% of those released from prison reported to the Sarata Training Center, 87% remained after two months of 
training, and 80% arrived on the front, see, Ibid., dosar 40, f. 247-248.  
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manpower and made sure no further deportations occurred.  Racial discrimination continued, but 
Gypsy soldiers trusted that their military service would protect their families.  Nonetheless, they 
must have remained nervous well into 1943 that the Antonescu regime might begin deporting 
sedentary Gypsies.  Those whose families were deported as nomadic or “criminal” received no 
relief and the fate of Gypsy soldiers betrayed by the Romanian Army is particularly tragic.   
Conclusion 
  Approximately 5,200 female volunteers served with the Red Cross on the front, 40,000 
ethnic Germans and comparable number of Gypsies served in regular units, and 75,000 minority 
soldiers served in labor battalions in Romania and Transnistria.  The experiences of women and 
minorities provides valuable additional perspectives that contribute to illustrating a fuller picture 
of the remarkable commitment of Romanian society during its “holy war.”  The volunteerism of 
boyar and middle-class women shows that the Romanian boyar and middle-class elite supported 
the Antonescu regime and the war against “Judeo-Bolshevism.”  The General Staff required high 
standards from nurses sent to the front and was able to find enough to meet its needs.  For all the 
exaggerated fears of the General Staff, most minority soldiers reported for duty and fulfilled the 
service demanded of them.  Those allowed to serve on the front typically fought bravely despite 
abuse, tensions, and discrimination facing minorities in the ranks.  The Romanian Army could 
not have fought on the front as well as it did without the efforts of women and minorities.  
 The situation faced by approximately 25,000 Jews from west of the Prut required to serve 
in segregated labor battalions was not very different from the rest of the labor battalions formed 
from a mixture of Romanian and minority draftees.  The conditions while working in Romania in 
segregated labor battalions were not good, but they certainly could have been much worse.  The 
soldiers of the Romanian Army and gendarmes of the Government of Transnistria treated Jews in 
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the ghettos and camps of Transnistria much worse, but the continuation of the war and the need 
for Jewish labor improve conditions during 1942-1943.  The General Staff benefited from skilled 
Jewish professionals and craftsmen working in workshops at various garrisons across Romania, 
but it also wasted professionally trained Jews assigned to manual labor in the countrside.  Anti-
Semitism hindered military efficiency because it wasted manpower.  Few officers opposed the 
policy, however, and most remained wary of having to employ Jews to support the Romanian 
Army in any way during the war.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 480 
 
CHAPTER X  
1942-1944: STALINGRAD, RETREAT, AND “SECOND STALINGRAD” 
 
The Red Army had broken through at the front, so Lieutenant Geratimusz Morar and his 
mountain troops were racing to try to reach safety in April 1944.  They had fought in the Kuban 
bridgehead for most of 1943, evacuated to Crimea in the fall, and now had to escape the Soviet 
net once more.  As they crossed the Yaila Mountains to reach Sevastopol one of his trucks ran 
out of fuel in a village, so he ordered the mayor have the villagers provide carts with horses or 
oxen to replace it.  When they prevaricated, claiming harnesses were worn out, Morar ordered 
his men to set up a light machinegun, and threatened the mayor that if all he had asked for was 
not ready in a half hour then “nothing will remain, y’all be shot.”  Animals, carts, and harnesses 
quickly appeared and Morar’s unit reached the coast to escape by sea to Constanţa.1  Romanian 
soldiers were still capable of violence against civilians during the long retreat from the east but 
began to think twice before committing crimes as the tide of war had turned against the Axis.   
This chapter examines the period between November 1942 and August 1944 to show that 
despite defeats, periods of demoralization, and overwhelming Soviet strength Romanian soldiers 
continued to fight, if no longer to destroy “Judeo-Bolshevism,” then certainly to defend Romania 
from Soviet invasion.  Soldiers also fought out of loyalty to comrades in their primary group and 
simply because they saw no other choice.  The rumors of terrible conditions for Romanian POWs 
in camps in the USSR strengthened resolve to avoid capture.  Fear became a powerful motivator, 
and not just fear of Soviet captivity but fear of Romanian officers who remained committed to 
                                                 
1 When he told this story, it was meant as a humorous anecdote of the front, see, Geratimusz Morar, Sibiu, 2012. 
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the cause and were given greater leeway to punish soldiers in times of crisis.  During 1943-1944, 
the General Staff focused on shoring up morale by propaganda and remuneration, especially that 
of troops in the Mountain and Cavalry corps on the front for more than two years.  Rehabilitation 
soldiers became more common as manpower dwindled.  Despite growing demoralization in the 
ranks and at home as it became clear Nazi Germany was losing the war, there was no widespread 
refusal to continue fighting by soldiers on the front or mass draft avoidance in Romania.   
 Fear of the Red Army undermined atrocity motivation.  Romanian officers and soldiers 
murdered few Jews after Stalingrad.  Although the “Final Solution” left few Jews in German-
occupied territory, nonetheless, Jews survived in Transnistria and Romania.  The heady days of 
1941, when they believed the Soviet Union was about to be vanquished, were gone and sobering 
news on the front stayed the hand of not only the Conducător but officers and soldiers too.  The 
anti-Semitism of officers and soldiers remained, but they no longer felt safe to violently manifest 
it because they feared Soviet justice and assumed Jewish lives had high value to the Soviets and 
Anglo-Americans – both allegedly controlled by a global Jewish conspiracy.  Romanian soldiers, 
who generally treated Slavic minorities less brutally than German troops, murdered fewer Soviet 
civilians.  Those believed to be partisans, however, were still shot out of hand.   
 The fate of Third and Fourth armies outside Stalingrad is well known, but the continued 
contribution of the Romanian Army afterwards in the battles for the Kuban, Crimea, and eastern 
Romania are largely ignored.  Beginning during the battle and continuing for decades after, the 
Germans used the Romanians as a scapegoat for the defeat because they had allowed the Soviets 
to encircle German Sixth Army in Stalingrad.  Until relatively recently most historians accepted 
German accusations that they had been let down by unmotivated Romanian soldiers who simply 
surrendered or fled.  Since the publication of Mark Axworthy’s book, most historians have begun 
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to revise their description of Stalingrad to show Third and Fourth armies stood and fought as best 
they could but were quickly overwhelmed.  Most attention, however, focuses on the drama inside 
Stalingrad and the Romanian contribution to the German relief attempt remains forgotten.2  The 
Romanian Army fought for another year and a half after the fall of Stalingrad.   
Romanian troops fought tenaciously in the defense during the long retreat from the Volga 
to the Dniester.  In November 1942-February 1943 many Romanian units fought almost literally 
to the last bullet at Stalingrad with Army Group B, during November 1942-September 1943 the 
Cavalry Corps fought tooth and nail in the Caucasus alongside those German units left behind by 
Army Group A, and in March 1944 the few Romanian forces available helped halt the Red Army 
in eastern Romania.  After defending Crimea since October 1943, only in April 1944 did soldiers 
rush to abandon the peninsula without much of a fight, no differently than German troops.  When 
Romanian soldiers had a chance to dig in to neutralize Soviet advantages they were stalwart, but 
if caught in the open they suffered grievously and if encircled lacked the means to escape.  When 
the General Staff mobilized the last of its manpower in spring 1944, Romanian youths reported 
to defend their homes without much incident.  When the Romanian Army finally collapsed on 20 
August 1944 it was due to Soviet superiority in men, firepower, material, and mobility.   
Soviet Winter Counteroffensive: November 1942 to January 1943 
 Stavka carefully prepared its strategic counteroffensive in late 1942.  Operation Uranus 
envisioned a double envelopment of German Sixth Army at Stalingrad by attacking its exposed 
flanks on the Don bend and Kalmuk steppe held by weakened Romanian forces.  Stavka massed 
                                                 
2 In the most authoritative accounts, at best they are mentioned in passing as part of the failed counterattack, see, 
Beevor, Stalingrad, 292; or they are simply not included, see, Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 300. 
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three Soviet armies on both flanks with the main blow to hit Third Army on the Don.  Red Army 
tankers were well aware of their superiority.  A captured Soviet officer reported that during their 
training Red Army soldiers were shown how captured Romanian anti-tank guns could not pierce 
the armor of Soviet tanks and told, “see what [kind of weak] resistance is in front of you?  You 
can go forward with all vigor and without fear.”3  In addition, the Red Army had concentrated a 
massive number of artillery pieces and aircraft.  Stavka tried to keep its offensive secret, using 
various methods to mask the Red Army buildup, but it was hardly a surprise as every German or 
Romanian officer saw the danger.  Yet there was nothing they could do to stop it.4 
 The German High Command had no strategic reserve and was dangerously overextended. 
German Sixth Army was weak from street fighting and immobile due to vehicle, fuel, and horse 
shortages.  Third Army had to commit most its infantry reserve in previous weeks leaving its line 
thin and brittle, moreover, its small mobile reserve was not under its control if the Soviets broke 
through.  Army Group B placed XXXXVIII Panzer Corps behind Third Army.  It consisted of 
the 1st Armored Division, which now had some German tanks to replace lost French ones, and the 
22nd Panzer Division, which was understrength, undergunned, and overall in shabby shape.  On the 
Kalmuk steppe, the situation was far worse for VI and VII corps.  Fourth Panzer Army, which 
retained control of both Romanian corps, had just the Korne Detachment as a tiny mobile reserve 
– the panzer army no longer had panzers.  Soviet local attacks had disorganized units and caused 
heavy losses, but Third Army and VI and VII corps still had plenty of fight left, even though the 
cold, supply crisis, and exposed positions had begun to sap soldiers’ morale.   
                                                 
3 From the 15th Infantry Division official history of the battle, see, Fond Armata 3-a, 1152, f. 11.   
4 For a more detailed examination of the Axis predicament see, Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 293.   
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 On 19 November, 3,500 guns, rocket artillery, and heavy mortars on the Don opened fire 
at 5:30.  Third Army was outnumbered two to one in infantry and many times that in firepower 
and tanks.  The barrage lasted an hour, pulverizing positions, cutting telephones, and disorienting 
troops, then shifted farther back to interdict supply and allow Soviet infantry and tanks to attack.  
Soviet Fifth Tank Army launched the main assault from the Serafimovich bridgehead against II 
Corps near Bolshoi, the center of Third Army, while Soviet Twenty-First Army began a smaller 
attack from the Kletskaya bridgehead against IV Corps that aimed for Gromky, farther on the 
right.  A thick fog limiting visibility aided the Soviets.  Romanian infantry managed to fight off 
the first wave of attacks in many places, but wherever the Soviets had massed armor more tanks 
arrived that barreled over concussed troops and pieced the front.5   
Soviet tanks ran roughshod over defenders lacking anti-tank guns and quickly penetrated 
into the rear.  A lieutenant commanding an artillery battery near Gromky later reported he began 
prearranged harassing fire, but to little effect, and by 9:30 am Soviet tanks appeared, most turned 
towards Gromky.  A few, with infantry leaping off, stayed to clear the Romanian guns.  A nearby 
anti-aircraft battery knocked out several tanks as his battery continued to fire in support of troops 
on the front, but he ran out of shells when his ammunition dump was hit by Soviet artillery fire 
and tanks shot up supply wagons.  The artillerymen fought off several attacks before retreating at 
noon with tanks close on their heels.6  After overrunning the front, Soviet tanks spread fear and 
chaos in the rear attacking poorly armed support troops.  Soviet infantry took many Romanians 
prisoner.7  By the end of the day II Corps had been decimated with a 19 km wide gash torn in the 
                                                 
5 Beevor, Stalingrad, 240-241; Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 92. 
6 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 1094, f. 43, 60.   
7 Duţu, Armata română în război, 194-195. 
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center of Third Army.  IV Corps was cut in two, ripping open a gap between 13th Infantry and 1st 
Cavalry divisions, into which 15th Infantry Division, the only reserve unit, counterattacked, but it 
failed to stop up the hole.  Between the two Soviet breakthroughs, V Corps and the remains of IV 
Corps were pinned down by strong Soviet frontal assaults as Red Army soldiers flooded into the 
holes carved on either flank.  The Soviets threatened to encircle the center of Third Army. 
 The only hope to stem the tide was the pitiful collection of armor that was the 22nd Panzer 
and 1st Armored divisions.  XXXXVIII Panzer Corps reacted to confused reports from the front 
in the long Prussian tradition and took the initiative to order a counterattack by 10:35 am, against 
the Soviet breakthrough at Gromky, but Army Group B, better informed, countermanded this and 
redirected the panzers to Bolshoi against the main breakthrough.  The 1st Armored Division was 
separated from 22nd Panzer Division in the confusion, so it trailed the panzers – both low on fuel.  
By nightfall they were directly in the path of the onrushing Soviet Fifth Tank Army, but still too 
far apart to support each other and were in danger of being encircled and destroyed individually.  
They had to adopt a “hedgehog” defense to survive.  The German liaison unit with 1st Armored 
Division was overrun during the night, its radio destroyed, and communication with XXXXVIII 
Panzer Corps interrupted.  The two divisions fought separately until 26 November.8  German or 
Romanian tankers, too busy saving themselves, could not ride to the rescue of Third Army.  
As a new day dawned, the Soviets began another offensive on the Kalmuk steppe against 
VI and VII corps at 10 am on 20 November with a 45-minute barrage.  Soviet IV Mechanized 
Corps overwhelmed the thin Romanian line, advancing to Plodovitoe, before it turned northwest 
towards Kalach on the Don bend.  Soviet IV Cavalry Corps then followed and turned southwest 
                                                 
8 Beevor, Stalingrad, 244-245; DiNardo, Germany and the Axis Powers, 151-152. 
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to strengthen the encirclement.9  Crişan Muşeţeanu, a medical officer, arrived in Kotelnikovo at 
Fourth Army headquarters and watched staff officers with pallid faces rush around after news of 
Soviet cavalry advancing on the town arrived.10  Germans in Stalingrad watched the 20th Infantry 
Division to their right be overrun by Soviet tanks and infantry.  A German counterattack rescued 
the Romanians, but most of the 20th Infantry Division was caught in the Stalingrad pocket.11  The 
fact Stavka could organize not just one, but two, major attacks stunned German High Command 
and General Headquarters, however, the fact VI and VII corps collapsed was not surprising.   
The Soviets reported that many Romanians threw down their weapons and surrendered, 
but this was more due to ammunition shortages and an incredibly tiny number of anti-tank guns, 
not lack of motivation.12  Granted, when troops saw shot after shot from their few anti-tank guns 
ricochet off Soviet tanks it was demoralizing, but survivors attest that crews did not abandon the 
guns and fired until out of shells or literally crushed under tank tracks.  Soviet infantry was more 
mobile, often riding tanks, and able to rapidly encircle overrun Romanian units.  Fourth Army’s 
ammunition stocks were quickly depleted, and General Constantinescu-Claps was angry to find 
out that the Germans did not have more, despite his repeated requests in previous days.  Third 
Army had previously ordered artillerymen to turn over their reserve rifle ammunition for use by 
the infantry, so when the Soviets broke into the rear many had only five rounds.13  Therefore, in 
many places Romanian soldiers fought until they were overrun or ran out of ammunition.   
                                                 
9 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 101; Duţu, Armata română în război, 214. 
10 Crişan V Muşeţeanu, Strigătul: Ediţie definitive (Bucharest: Editura “Jurnalul literar,” 2003), 20-21.   
11 Beevor, Stalingrad, 248-249; Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 103. 
12 Beevor, Stalingrad, 249-250. 
13 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 1273, f. 1; Dumitru Burciu, Iasi, 2010.  
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 The same morning, having penetrated deep into Third Army’s rear and brushing aside all 
counterattacks the day before, Soviet units advanced south or east to clear the Don bend and link 
up with the second attack from the east.  Through the hole where II Corps had been, Soviet Fifth 
Tank Army began a mad rush from Bolshoi to Kalach and Soviet Twenty-First Army turned east 
to roll up the German line after breaking through IV Corps to seize Gromky, sweeping up the 1st 
Cavalry Division as Axis troops fled in panic to Stalingrad.  In between V Corp and the remnants 
of IV Corps doggedly held on.  The only Third Army formation relatively unscathed was I Corps 
to the west.  Romanian support units in the rear had little combat value and stampeded to escape.  
Sergeant Lungu’s gendarmes in his military police unit joined the rout, “As far as the eye could 
see, the plain was dotted with soldiers, lost [ones], stray [ones], and officers among them, [all] of 
course without weapons.  [I ran] like a rabbit through the snow, not knowing in what direction, 
but I saw behind me, on a hill, a Russian tank following me.”14  Soviet VIII Cavalry Corps soon 
reached the Chir River, encountering few Romanian or German combat troops in the thinly held 
rear, and captured supply depots, hospitals, and other Axis rear installations.15   
 The ad-hoc force that coalesced around V Corps was named the Lascăr Group and placed 
under XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, which promised that panzers were on their way and ordered the 
Romanians to stand and fight.  The Lascăr Group was comprised of the 5th, 6th, and 15th Infantry 
Divisions, respectively led by generals Mazarini, Lascăr, and Sion, plus the remnants of 13th and 
14th Infantry divisions, which formed a horseshoe shape facing north that was threatened on both 
flanks.  These forces stood fast not only because they had been ordered to, but because they were 
                                                 
14 Lungu, Dela Stalingrad la Gherla, 24.   
15 Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 296.   
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too busy fighting off Soviet attacks and lacked mobility to break out.  The three generals held a 
war council that lasted into the wee morning hours of 20/21 November.  A letter arrived from the 
Soviets at 5th Infantry Division’s headquarters telling them that they had been abandoned by the 
Germans and requesting surrender, which Mazarini considered, but Lascăr and Sion argued that 
so long as there was ammunition they had to keep fighting.16  Despite promises, by the end of the 
day 22nd Panzer Division had been forced south, and 1st Armored Division, which was defending 
5th Infantry Division’s flank, soon followed.  The Soviets began encircling the Lascăr Group.17   
While the Lascăr Group held out on the Don, Fourth Army had the unenviable mission of 
trying to reform the broken VI Corps and the understrength VII Corps on the Kalmuk steppe.  Its 
job was made harder because Fourth Army did not have operational control.  General Şteflea, in 
Rostov, ordered General Constantinescu-Claps to counterattack, promised supplies, and told him 
Army Group B had ordered key towns to be fortified.  Fourth Panzer Army’s liaison with Fourth 
Army told Constantinescu-Claps that VI and VII corps could not retreat and to fight to the last.  
Constantinescu-Claps asked Ştelfea on 21 November who had final say – him or the Germans.  
He complained the stand fast orders were unrealistic and argued that the survivors of VI Corps, 
plus VII Corps, should be pulled back to shield Kotelnikovo where his headquarters and supplies 
were located.18  General Headquarters, however, backed Army Group B’s stand fast orders.   
The fate of the Lascăr Group was sealed on 22 November as Soviet forces approached a 
weakly defended Kalach on the Don bend from both west and east.  The day began with promise 
when a Romanian aircraft landed in the pocket at Golovski where wagons with wounded, anti-
                                                 
16 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 1152, f. 12-13.   
17 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 95.   
18 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 1273, f. 22-23, 71, 87. 
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aircraft units, and stragglers had gathered at 6th Infantry Division’s headquarters.  Later, German 
aircraft dropped food, ammunition, and leaflets promising panzers were coming.  After that five 
Romanian transports landed with supplies and evacuated 60 wounded officers.19  The 5th Infantry 
Division’s situation on the western flank of the pocket, however, steadily worsened all day and at 
4 pm the generals met again.  General Ioan Sion argued with General Mazarini who was ready to 
accept a second Soviet surrender request.  Mazarini had been Third Army’s chief of staff in 1940 
to General Iacobici.  He was made Deputy Chief of the General Staff under General Ioaniţiu, but 
after his death he worked again under Iacobici when he took over as Chief of the General Staff.  
Mazarini and Iacobici were close and held similar concerns about mobilizing Echelon II units in 
January 1942, so when Iacobici resigned Mazarini was demoted.  He shared the same motivation 
as his soldiers.  In 1941, he argued it was “a national imperative” that Jews in labor battalions in 
Romania be isolated from civilians and he did not protest reprisals against Jews in Odessa.  Now, 
however, the warnings in the General Staff reports he had helped pen earlier that year that argued 
Echelon II units were unfit for combat against the Red Army were coming true.  Mazarini saw no 
hope and quickly became demoralized.20  General Lascăr broke the deadlock, recognizing that 5th 
Infantry Division’s situation was desperate, but arguing that honor would not allow ignominious 
surrender, so they would plan a breakout for that night and hope XXXXVIII Panzer Corps would 
approve.21  Soviet attacks disrupted these plans.  Captain Păsat, commanding the survivors in his 
company of rehabilitation soldiers that were still fighting with 5th Infantry Division, remembered 
the terrible massacre in the ever-shrinking pocket, “Flamethrowers, handled by tankers, like on a 
                                                 
19 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 97.  
20 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 781, f. 177; dosar 870, f. 645-647; Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 74-75.  
21 Codeword “Lăscar” for remaining to fight and “Mihai” for a breakout, see, Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 894, f. 15-16. 
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maneuver, never missed.  When the flame finally reached a fleeing soldier, you saw how he fell 
down and struggled with the flames, until the tank crushed him with its heavy tracks…looking 
like a frog, a dog, or a cat that had been run over by a heavy car.”22  The Soviets took Golovski 
at 9 pm, capturing most of 6th Infantry Division’s headquarters, including Lascăr and Mazarini 
who were sheltering from deadly Soviet fire in a basement.  The Soviets ordered Lascăr to use a 
megaphone to try to convince the rest of his troops to surrender.  General Traian Stănescu, chief 
of staff of 6th Infantry Division, led those who avoided capture northward and took command of 
the Lascăr Group’s remaining forces that were short on ammunition and food.23   
Now on his own, General Sion ordered 15th Infantry Division, which had repulsed weaker 
Soviet attacks against the southeast perimeter of the Lascăr Group, to break out a few hours later.  
His forces broke contact and struck southwest, led by an advance guard of anti-tank and artillery 
guns that soon stretched out over 12 km, and followed by a disorganized mob of stragglers from 
Golovski that lengthened the column further.  After a harrowing night march on 22/23 November 
in freezing weather, with dangerous crossings across rivers as ice broke under heavy equipment, 
and a Soviet bombardment under illumination that drove most of the stragglers to the south, Sion 
and the advance guard successfully linked up with 22nd Panzer Division at Bolshaia Donshchinka 
with about 3,600 soldiers, 1,045 horses, 18 vehicles, four mortars, and two guns.24  His men were 
reinforced with a battery of German anti-tank guns and ordered to defend the village.  Any plans 
the 22nd Panzer Division may still have had earlier on 22 November to relieve the Lascăr Group 
                                                 
22 Păsat, Memoriile Căpitanului Dumitru Păsat, 142.   
23 Duţu, Armata română în război, 202-203; Păsat, Memoriile Căpitanului Dumitru Păsat, 147-149.   
24 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 894, f. 17-18; dosar 1152, f. 17.   
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were frustrated by continued Red Army attacks.  The 1st Armored Division was also driven back 
and forced to retreat westwards towards the relative safety of the Chir during that day.25 
On 23 November, Soviet XXVI Tank Corps took Kalach, crossed the Don bend and then 
linked up with Soviet IV Mechanized Corps, arriving from the east, at the Karpovka River.  To 
the north Romanian and German troops competed to escape to Stalingrad across the few bridges 
across the Don still in Axis hands.  Sergeant Lungu, who had reformed his unit and now escorted 
half an infantry company, engaged in a shootout with Germans guarding a bridge, while in other 
places cavalrymen tried to ford the river, many drowning in the attempt.26  General Dumitrescu 
issued an order that day, marked secret, that authorized his corps commanders to take “the most 
severe measures to suppress the rout and panic behind the front,” such as summary execution and 
setting up “dams” to intercept and reorganize panicked soldiers, and he threatened to punish his 
corps commanders for further disorder in the rear.27  On the Kalmuk steppe, Fourth Panzer Army 
ordered the Korne Detachment, which now included the bulk of 8th Cavalry Division, to abandon 
VII Corps and rush north to plug the hole in VI Corps’ line, but it was too little too late.   
The last organized resistance by Third Army forces east of the Chir in the Don bend was 
eliminated during 24-25 November.  General Sion’s group was attacked in the early morning of 
24 November, after the Germans had pulled out their anti-tank guns without telling him.  He and 
his staff tried to stiffen the defense by their personal presence on the line, but his troops had little 
ammunition left and began panicking.  At 11 am, Sion finally ordered a retreat towards the 22nd 
Panzer Division, but he was killed by shrapnel and most of his men became casualties.28  Only 
                                                 
25 Duţu, Armata română în război, 204; Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 98-99. 
26 Lungu, Dela Stalingrad la Gherla, 24-25.  
27 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 992, f. 431-432.  
28 Ibid., dosar 1152, f. 17-18. 
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an estimated 800 soldiers managed to reach the 22nd Panzer Division and escape with it when it 
broke out to the west on 24/25 November.  The 1st Armored Division retreated west of the Chir 
that night as well.  Third Army rushed its tanks north and finally they linked back up with the 
panzers to defend a bridgehead at Chernishevskaia.29  The last of the Lascăr Group, mostly the 
6th Infantry Division still in its original positions on the Don, fought on through 24 November, 
but lack of ammunition compelled General Stănescu to order a surrender by the end of the day.  
Romanian aircraft reported they could see bloody stains on the snow and the bodies of men and 
horses gathered on the hills around Golovski where they had huddled during a final stand.  By 26 
November all resistance ended, and an estimated 27,000 Romanian soldiers went into captivity.30 
Although the resistance of the Lascăr Group was in vain, it shows Romanian soldiers did 
not lack the will to fight, but rather necessary modern equipment.  General Headquarters, which 
in the past had often dealt harshly with generals after retreats, now reassured Third Army that it 
recognized the calamity was not a result of command incompetence or poor discipline.  On 24 
November, General Şteflea wrote General Dumitrescu that the extent of the defeat should not be 
exaggerated, blamed Soviet material superiority for the catastrophe, and argued it was not a time 
to look for scapegoats.  This after the Red Army had shattered Third and Fourth armies in a week 
and bagged close to 300,000 Axis soldiers in Stalingrad.  He emphasized the need to root out any 
defeatism.  “It must not be forgotten that German power is so great that it cannot be defeated.  So 
forward with unshaken faith in final victory.”  Dumitrescu noted, “Very wise and correct words.  
This is also my Christian faith.  Will be communicated to the troops.”31  Antonescu soon issued 
                                                 
29 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 99-100.  
30 Duţu, Armata română în război, 205; Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 97-98. 
31 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 838, f. 96-97.   
 493 
 
his own declaration, “Every [man] ought not forget that he carries in his person the responsibility 
of the future of the Romanian Nation and that the Country can disappear forever if the Army 
does not fight.”32  Romanian officers trusted in the motivation of soldiers to keep fighting and in 
a German military miracle to restore the situation – with good reason due to prior experience.   
Indeed, the Romanians supported the German relief offensive, Operation Winter Storm.  
German High Command rushed Marshal von Manstein to command surviving Axis forces, now 
called Army Group Don, hoping his presence would reenergize Axis forces and he could repeat a 
triumph like in Crimea earlier that year, but by this point his operational genius was no match for 
Soviet material.  General Constinescu-Claps marshaled Fourth Army’s 39,000 survivors, only a 
third were combat soldiers, and finally set up a line defending Kotelnikovo.  Now von Manstein 
cobbled together the Pannwtiz Detachment, a battalion of panzers and vehicles with Romanian 
artillery support, to cover the arrival of reinforcements.  LVII Panzer Corps, consisting of 6th and 
23rd Panzer divisions, brought from refitting in France and fighting in the Caucasus respectively, 
began assembling around Kotelnikovo.  Third Army helped hold a line from the Don along the 
Kriushka and the Chir with its remaining 83,000 soldiers, only 36,000 combat troops, forming 
broken units into ad-hoc battle groups.33  On 12 December, von Manstein launched his attack to 
relieve Stalingrad.  The 6th Panzer Division spearheaded the offensive with assistance from the 
remains of 18th Infantry Division, the 23rd Panzer Division with just 30 panzers guarded its right, 
and VI Corps, now only the size of a brigade, guarded its left flank – as per his normal practice 
von Manstein placed the Don bend on VI Corps’ left to shield its flank.  They broke through and 
                                                 
32 Ibid., dosar 1364, f. 16.  
33 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 101, 109. 
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reached the Aksai in a day.  The Popescu Cavalry Group, the Pannwitz Detachment fused with 
the 8th Cavalry Division, joined in the attack, protecting the 23rd Panzer Division on its right.  As 
Romanian cavalrymen passed the infantry they shouted encouragement, “Break the front!”  The 
breakthrough was an illusion, however, some Romanian infantry only had 120 rifle rounds and 
ten grenades, there were too few panzers, Soviet resistance stiffened, and the advance slowed to 
a crawl.34  After the arrival of the 17th Panzer Division, von Manstein restarted the attack on 18 
December, but a Soviet offensive on the Don had already ended any hope of success.    
Operation Little Saturn began on December 16 and slammed into the Italian Eighth Army 
on the Don just northwest of Third Army.  Italian Eighth Army swiftly collapsed because it was 
materially outclassed, demoralized by earlier local attacks, and many Italian soldiers panicked or 
quickly surrendered.35  The Italian retreat exposed Third Army, so I Corps, consisting of 7th, 11th 
and 9th Infantry Divisions, ignored German orders to stand fast and retreated southwards.  A new 
attack by Soviet Third Guards Army across the Kirushka, encircled most of I Corps and German 
62nd Infantry Division on 19 December and destroyed them over a few days.  Part of 7th Infantry 
Division escaped with Italian help marching 200 km in 14 days.  The remnants of II Corps, plus 
the depleted 22nd Panzer and 1st Armored divisions, held the Chir for a few days, but abandoned 
their positions by 22 December.36  This forced von Manstein to transfer the 6th Panzer Division 
the next day to meet the threat and call off his offensive 56 km from the Stalingrad pocket.   
                                                 
34 Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, 301; Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 109-110; Museteanu, Strigatul, 51.  
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As the last survivors of Third Army broke out, the Soviets attacked the bulge created by 
Operation Winter Storm.  Sergeant Ezechil, whose cavalry platoon spent Christmas in minus 45-
degree Celsius weather in the burnt ruins of a village retaken from the Soviets, remembered the 
counterattack on 26 December.  Soviet tanks broke through the line, crushing guns and soldiers 
who instinctually grouped together for protection, “leaving behind a red mass of blood and flesh 
steaming on the snow.”  Ezechil escaped, but many others were captured.  Red Army troops shot 
many on the spot and stripped others naked, leaving them to freeze to death.37  Soviet troops had 
been shooting surrendering Romanian soldiers in large numbers since the beginning of Operation 
Uranus rather than burden themselves with prisoners, especially as they were pressured to 
advance quickly, short on rations, and full of vengeance.  General Constantinescu-Claps’ chief of 
staff Lt. Colonel Dragomir secretly ordered units to fall back at night after reporting they had 
come under heavy attack.  The subterfuge leaked, so German orders to stand fast remained.  
Retreat or stand fast, it made little difference as moonlight allowed the Soviets to keep attacking.  
The 1st Infantry Division’s headquarters was overrun and Kotelnikovo fell on 29 December.38  
Third and Fourth armies were pulled off the front on 27 December 1942 and 3 January 1943 
respectively. 
Inside the Stalingrad pocket, an estimated 12,600 Romanian soldiers continued to resist.  
The remains of 20th Infantry Division helped defend the southern perimeter, halting attacks on 3 
and 10 December 1942, and scattered survivors of the 1st Cavalry Division plugged holes on the 
western perimeter.  Sergeant Lungu remembers soldiers crammed into bunkers who burned tires 
                                                 
37 Ezekial, La Portile Infernului, 52-59.   
38 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 1273, f. 270-271, 282-287; Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 110-111.  
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for heat and, as food supplies dwindled, they fought with German soldiers for slaughtered horse 
meat.  The Luftwaffe tried to supply the Stalingrad, but the situation deteriorated quickly since it 
could not transport near enough supplies.  German officers issued less food to Romanians troops.  
They began starving and rationed horse meat to avoid hungry troops going over to the Soviets.39 
General Tătăranu, commander of 20th Infantry Division, surprised the General Staff when 
he flew out of the pocket on 13 January 1943.  He claimed General von Paulus had sent him to 
report on the situation inside Stalingrad and to pass along a request for Romanian aircraft to help 
supply the trapped forces.  Tătăranu met with Antonescu, Pantazi, and Şteflea in Bucharest on 17 
January and he reported positively on German-Romanian relations inside the pocket.  Antonescu 
accused him of abandoning his men and besmirching the honor of the army and declared that he 
knew full well there were no aircraft available for von Paulus.40  In 1941, Tătăranu had been the 
other Deputy Chief of the General Staff under General Ioaniţiu, during which time he negotiated 
the Tighina Agreement, authorized executing “franc-tireurs” east of the Dniester, and pushed for 
the ghettoization of Jews in Transnistria along the lines as previously in Moldavia.41  He acted as 
the chief of staff for General Iacobici when he took command of Fourth Army at Odessa and did 
not protest the murder of Jews after it fell.  He too was demoted in February 1942 after Iacobici 
resigned.  In 1943, Antonescu ordered Tătăranu to return to Stalingrad for rehabilitation or face 
court martial.  On the flight back, however, already ill, he became sicker still, and returned to be 
hospitalized – Hitler claimed in April 1943 he had ordered von Paulus to send Tătăranu out of 
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Stalingrad.42  The 20th Infantry Division collapsed on 26 January.  On 2 February, German Sixth 
Army finally surrendered, so 91,000 Germans and 3,000 Romanians marched into captivity.   
Stalingrad was a catastrophe for the Romanian Army.  Beginning in October, Third and 
Fourth armies lost an estimated 140,000 soldiers, most (110,000 men) after 19 November, and 
together only mustered 73,000 soldiers on 7 January 1943.43  The material losses were equally 
disastrous, since most heavy weapons and equipment were lost and could not be replaced.  For 
weeks thousands of survivors dodged Soviet patrols to reach friendly lines.  General Dumitrescu 
had stragglers suspected of panicked flight flogged and sent back to their units while any officers 
suspected of cowardice were court martialed.  Deserters caught far from the front were punished 
more severely.44  The German High Command wanted to keep the survivors near Rostov, but the 
General Staff argued that most were rear support soldiers, demoralized, and lacked equipment to 
provide even just rear security.  Therefore, the bulk of the survivors marched in terrible weather 
to Transnistria to refit, but all combat troops were left behind to guard the Azov Sea coast.45 
Soviet Winter Counteroffensive in the Caucasus: December 1942 to February 1943 
The defeat at Stalingrad left Army Group A dangerously exposed in the Caucasus.  Hitler 
had agreed to transfer panzer divisions and now to evacuate Army Group A but decided to hold a 
“springboard” for a future counteroffensive.46  German Seventeen Army was given a handful of 
German divisions plus six Romanian divisions to hold onto the Taman Peninsula.  It pulled back 
forces from Grozny to Krasnodar, including the 2nd Mountain Division, while the 6th, 9th Cavalry, 
                                                 
42 Possibly Parkinson’s, see, Pantazi, Cu mareşalul până la moarte, 233; Duţu, Armata română în război, 231. 
43 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 114.  
44 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 843, f. 152.  
45 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 1482, f. 46, 4-14. 
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and 19th Infantry divisions of the Cavalry Corps defended the Black Sea coast.  When the Wetzel 
Group, with the 10th Infantry, 3rd Mountain, and two German divisions, arrived it absorbed the 
Cavalry Corps.  German Seventeenth Army mixed German battalions into Romanian divisions as 
“corset stays” to strengthen them – the tactic was first used in the First World War to prop up the 
Austro-Hungarian Army.  This mixed German-Romanian force held off Red Army attacks from 
Novorossiysk on the Black Sea coast east along the mountains to south of Krasnodar.47   
The General Staff grew concerned about Romanian soldiers’ motivation in the Caucasus.  
The 19th Infantry Division reported news of Stalingrad had shaken its troops: rumors swirled that 
King Carol II was in the USSR, Germans abused Romanians, and Antonescu had been removed.  
In New Year’s messages, King Mihai I praised soldiers for “righteous battle for the liberation of 
invaded provinces” and Antonescu said after a year of “unimaginable sacrifice” troops were still 
unified in “the destiny of our righteousness.”48  General Racoviţa was replaced on 2 January by 
General Gheorghe Cealîk, the former commander of 4th Infantry Division had been relieved on 1 
August 1942 and had a new chance to prove himself.  On 10-11 January, armed a with a pile of 
charts and graphs showing Romania’s contribution to the war effort, Antonescu met with Hitler.  
He used the crisis to obtained concessions to keep his men fighting.  He demanded Hungary be 
required to send more soldiers to the front, obtained promises for deliveries of German arms, and 
secured payments to stabilize Romania’s economy.49  Antonescu had promised a military welfare 
state would care for soldiers’ families, but inflation undercut these efforts; German payments of 
gold or Swiss francs for oil and foodstuffs let him to increase financial aid to soldiers’ families.  
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At the same time, General Pantazi ordered each company, battery, or squadron to make a “corner 
of shame” with a list of deserters who had been executed in the unit, a mirror to the usual “corner 
of honor” with a list of those killed in battle, to try to motivate by the threat of eternal shame.50   
The situation farther north deteriorated when the Hungarian Second Army on the Don fell 
apart under a Soviet offensive on 13 January and then German Second Army was smashed on the 
Donets on 29 January.51  The Soviet thrust to the Dnieper became overextended.  On 21 February 
Marshal von Manstein launched a counterblow, retook Kharkov, and stopped the Soviets.  By the 
end of March, the line stabilized almost where it had been before Case Blue, except that German 
Seventeenth Army held an arc east of the Taman peninsula dubbed the Kuban bridgehead.  The 
10th Infantry Division helped defeat a major Soviet landing at Novorossiysk on 4 February trying 
to outflank the line, but Soviet artillery drove back Romanian troops threatening a tiny surviving 
beachhead – later German-Romanian attacks never could liquidate it.  The Germans blamed poor 
Romanian morale, not Soviet firepower, pointing also to an isolated case of a battalion in the 19th 
Infantry Division temporarily refusing to return to the line on 23 February, to justify breaking up 
the 3rd Mountain, 6th Cavalry, and 19th Infantry divisions to plug their best units into the German 
line.  The intact 2nd Mountain Division took the northern end of the line on the Azov Sea and the 
Cavalry Corps, 9th Cavalry Division reinforced with parts from other divisions, guarded the rear.   
Third Army Operations: February 1943 to February 1944 
 The Romanian Army, not counting troops occupying Transnistria or defending oil fields 
around Ploieşti, on the front was reduced to 110,000 soldiers.  Around two-thirds defended the 
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Kuban bridgehead until October 1943 while the rest occupied Crimea.  On 10 March 1943, after 
shepherding survivors of Stalingrad to Transnistria, Third Army again had administrative control 
of all units east of the Dniester, but German armies had operational control.52  Stalingrad seemed 
to prove their worst fears about the Romanians, and German commanders sent alarming reports 
on Romanian troops’ morale to German High Command.  The General Staff was concerned too, 
employing both carrot and stick to reinforce soldiers’ intrinsic motivation to keep fighting.  
Stalingrad unquestionably had a sobering effect on morale, but even demoralized soldiers 
will fight to avoid capture, due to blind obedience, out of hatred of the enemy, and from fear of 
punishment by officers.  All on top of intrinsic motivation.  After two years Romanian troops had 
begun to understand the German racial worldview and their own place in it, the SSI reported that 
a few soldiers worried that German victory would mean “we will be the Germans’ slaves [for] all 
time.”53  Yet better a slave to the Nazis than a victim of the Soviets.  Fear of “Judeo-Bolshevism” 
was reinforced by knowledge of crimes in the USSR that convinced soldiers Soviet victory must 
be avoided at all costs.  The public in Romania agreed.  Wilhelm Filderman, a Jewish leader in 
Bucharest, recorded after Stalingrad that acquaintances “tell me they are afraid that one day the 
Jews will seek revenge.”54  General Pantazi inspected the Kuban bridgehead in February 1943.  
He reported that morale was not as bad as the Germans said, but gave each division commander 
authority to punish, rehabilitate, or execute soldiers because they were isolated from Third Army 
courts martial.55  The General Staff ordered lists of soldiers who had been awarded medals that 
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were supposed to receive land in eastern Romania after the war to be updated by units, expecting 
the news to motivate peasant soldiers hungry for land to keep fighting bravely.56   
Inter-Axis relations took a sharp downward turn during Stalingrad.  General von Weichs 
blamed Third Army for the disaster.  He claimed demoralized Romanian soldiers did not fight, 
castigated all generals except Dumitrescu and Lascăr for not following his orders, and argued all 
officers were pro-British.  Following criticism, von Weichs rounded up and disarmed Romanian 
troops and ordered a court martial of the leadership of 14th Infantry Division for an unauthorized 
withdrawal.57  Firing back, Antonescu demanded Ferdinand Heim and Karl-Adolf Hollidt, the 
commanders of XXXXVIII Panzer and German XVII corps respectively, be fired for abandoning 
Third Army, pointed out German soldiers had fled too, and complained of German abuse.  Hitler 
appeased Antonescu by making von Weichs apologize and firing Heim.  Marshal von Manstein 
halted further punishments but promised he would respect the Romanian Army’s honor.58  He 
demanded Lt. Colonel Dragomir be fired for secretly ordering Fourth Army to retreat.  General 
Constantinescu-Claps took responsibility, so Antonescu relieved him in February 1943.  German 
soldiers’ contempt for Romanian soldiers was not so easily papered over.  As they competed for 
scarce resources that winter, tensions broke out into conflict: Germans kicked Romanian troops 
off trains, out of shelters, and threatened them with pistols.  They screamed that Romanians were 
cowards and to blame for the defeat at Stalingrad.59  The scale of these incidents should not be 
exaggerated and tapered off as weather and supply situation improved, but tensions permanently 
increased.  The Romanians needed the Germans, so they swallowed their pride and kept fighting.   
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Spring Reorganization  
 Third Army spent the spring rounding up stragglers and deserters.  The General Staff set 
up a “dam” of gendarmes on the western bank of the Bug and ordered Fourth Army to establish 
another on the eastern bank to intercept soldiers.  The General Staff ordered all officers, NCOs, 
and soldiers caught “without justification” in the rear would not be allowed to return to Romania.  
Instead, they would “be intensively retrained with iron discipline” in at Training Center No. 3 in 
Tiraspol in Transnistria.60  Romanian units in the Caucasus and Crimea were undermanned, and 
the General Staff relied on rehabilitation soldiers for replacements and counted on their intrinsic 
motivation to fight.  During March, gendarmes gathered 2,172 deserters who survived the winter 
living in villages around Rostov and sent them for a stint at the Tiraspol Training Center.  Those 
guilty of more serious crimes, such as impersonating military police or becoming bandits, were 
imprisoned or executed.  Antonescu reaffirmed in April that deserters should be sent to the front 
for rehabilitation after two months of retraining at the Sărata or Tiraspol training centers – four 
months for those guilty of a second desertion.  Henceforth, all “recidivists” would have “D” for 
“detained” tattooed on the back of both hands and were supposed to be executed if they deserted 
again, but this was not enforced.61  Training Center No. 3 reported later that men were deserting 
from Tiraspol anyway because they decided that the front was worse than being caught deserting 
again and knew they would not be executed.  An officer complained that while the Germans just 
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shot deserters the Romanian Army used “weak retaliatory measures.”62  Most deserters accepted 
the offer for redemption, so rehabilitation soldiers became increasingly common on the front.    
As Third Army combed Ukraine for wandering troops, the Mountain Corps reported that 
the morale of soldiers rotating off the front from the Kuban bridgehead was low.  A group of 200 
troops from the 6th and 9th Cavalry divisions passing through Feodosia in Crimea in early March 
1943 looked totally neglected, averted their eyes to avoid saluting officers, acted disorderly, and 
were photographed by German troops who mockingly exclaimed “and these fight for our Greater 
Reich.”63  In April, an anxious General Avramescu reported that men coming from the Caucasus 
did not look or act like soldiers: officers lacked braid, proper caps, and belts; soldiers dress was 
poor, wore pieces of Soviet uniforms, and saluting fell by the wayside.  Some Romanian soldiers 
sold their food or equipment to civilians, many were often drunk, and looted wherever they went.  
Probably unfairly, he blamed reserve officers for not taking enough interest in their men.  When 
asked to explain their actions soldiers simply responded, “I come from the front,” as a catch-all 
excuse.64  Some of his concerns are legitimate, but senior officers often obsessed over uniforms 
impossible to keep pristine on the front and riotous behavior is expected of troops fresh from the 
front.  In the Kuban bridgehead soldiers complained about not receiving leave, mail not being 
delivered, incompetent or abusive officers, worn out equipment, insufficient food, and incidents 
with Germans.  Letters from home informing troops of abuses by village civil servants, shortages 
of all kinds, and insufficient financial aid did not help soldiers’ morale.65    
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Officers and chaplains did their best to keep up morale on the front.  Priest Ion Popescu 
held conferences with 20th Mountain Battalion in Feodosia for the start of Lent.  He promised the 
troops if they “will not swear, steal, desert, or self-mutilate…will avoid sin and will pray to God, 
[they] will keep a more genuine and more beautiful fast than that of food.”  Priest N.T. Cernea 
weekly visited troops of 10th Motorized Roşiori Regiment in the trenches outside Novorossiysk.  
He passed out little crosses, gathered soldiers to talk about “the purpose of our battle,” and held 
special meetings with newly arrived soldiers to encourage them to fight “against the enemy of 
faith and our Romanian Nation.66  The General Staff issued an instructional pamphlet to officers 
on how to educate those traveling home on leave: they should tell families about great victories, 
sacrifice, bravery, and Soviet losses.  Soldiers should be reminded of the crimes of Bolshevism.  
It concluded, “Either we vanquish [the enemy] in the East, or we disappear as [a] State from the 
map of the world!”67  Priest Grigorie Enăchescu with the 1st Mountain Battalion in Crimea took 
these instructions to heart.  He held conference on 23 March and spoke for an hour, concluding, 
“Communism is Jewish [jidovesc] and facilitates the coming of the kike dream.”68 
 The General Staff, preparing to rebuild Echelon II units, needed to transfer the survivors 
of Stalingrad from Transnistria from Romania, but worried what effect these demoralized troops 
might have on civilian morale.  Therefore, the Antonescu regime had county prefects organize 
“national-patriotic demonstrations” in every village, town, and city to reinforce commitment for 
the war.69  The survivors were amalgamated with rear echelon garrison troops and new draftees 
to rebuild Echelon II units.  In June, concerned after reports of poor morale in units rebuilding in 
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Romania, General Pantazi complained that despite previous orders some officers were not giving 
proper attention to “patriotic education.”  He also blamed the “Jewish element” in Moldavia for 
spreading defeatist rumors and ordered that soldiers should not interact with Jews.70   
The Kuban Bridgehead and Kursk 
 The Kuban bridgehead steadily shrunk under Soviet pressure in March as combat turned 
into trench warfare that favored the Axis troops.  The Germans had sufficient time to construct a 
series of defenses 75 km west of the old Krasnodar line, dubbed the Blue Line, consisting of six 
successive positions separated by 10-15 km with a perimeter of only 80 km.  The German tactic 
of dispersing Romanian infantry, mountain, or cavalry (increasingly footbound due to horse and 
vehicle losses) regiments among German divisions in the middle of the line, while 2nd Mountain 
Division and the Cavalry Corps held the flanks on the coast, was a success.  Whatever crisis in 
morale among Romanian troops in winter appears to have passed with the coming of spring.  The 
German trenches provided the Romanian soldiers the cover they needed and reduced the effect of 
Soviet firepower.  The Blue Line was occupied on 6 April 1943 and repelled Soviet offensives in 
April, May/June, and July/August; before retreat in September and final evacuation on the night 
of 8/9 October.  Axis losses in the Kuban bridgehead were relatively low, only 51,795 Germans 
and 9,668 Romanians, inflicting roughly an equal number of losses on the enemy.71 
 Stavka concluded that the Kuban bridgehead was an operational dead end and treated it 
as such, sending just enough troops and material to keep up the pressure, but funneling most of 
its resources to Ukraine.  Hitler refused to evacuate the Kuban bridgehead and asked Antonescu 
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for help.  The General Staff sent 1st and 4th Mountain divisions, well-rested after nearly a year of 
light duties in Crimea, to trade places with 2nd and 3rd Mountain divisions, worn down after Case 
Blue, the winter retreat, and trench warfare.  The divisions slowly traded places between March 
and July, so Romanian troops temporarily made up almost 40 percent of the forces in the Kuban 
bridgehead.  Major Scârnceci’s 3rd Mountain Battalion landed in Taman port on 16 June, and six 
days later, on the second anniversary of the invasion of the USSR, he wrote with frustration,   
[Antonescu] we long ago fulfilled your command [to cross the Prut], we’ve even 
gone the extra mile.  We crossed many waters, slower [ones], faster [ones], and 
deeper [ones]: the Dniester, the Bug, the Dnieper, the greater and lesser Inhul.  
We even crossed over seas…[to the] Kuban, where we will shed blood and where 
again we will bury our dead, the budding hope of the nation.  Don’t you believe 
that we have long ago fulfilled the command?  Don’t you consider it is enough?  
Don’t wait for us to have our say, because then it will be too late.  It seems that 
the Germans, our associates, no longer have too good a hand of cards.72   
 
Yet like most Romanians he saw no other option than to keep fighting.  The German defeat in 
the battle of Kursk proved Scârneci was correct that the German Army had few cards left to play. 
Operation Citadel, a long-delayed offensive launched on 5 July against a Soviet bulge in the line 
left by Marshal von Manstein’s earlier success at Kharkov, aimed to encircle and destroy Soviet 
troops to reassure allies like Romania that the Wehrmacht was still capable of winning a victory.  
Instead it was “a complete and utter misfire.” 73  The northern attack was halted in its tracks, the 
southern attack made some progress but had no chance of success, moreover, the Allied landing 
in Sicily on 10 July convinced Hitler to call off the floundering offensive just three days later.  
Operation Citadel did not achieve any of its objectives, operational or political, and a Red Army 
counteroffensive soon drove the Germans out of Russia and into eastern Ukraine. 
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 As the battle of Kursk played out, the General Staff reinforced the Kuban bridgehead.  In 
June, I Air Corps deployed to Mariupol, its Romanian pilots flying German-made aircraft across 
the Azov Sea to provide air support to the “rabbits,” as infantry were nicknamed, in the trenches.  
Corporal Cârlan, in the rear with his radio in the Kuban bridgehead, watched waves of German 
and Romanian Stukas pass overhead to pound Soviet troops.74  The Germans delivered broken-
down Czech-made tanks to the Mountain Corps in Crimea, and in July a battalion of refurbished 
tanks were sent to the Kuban bridgehead.  Among replacements were 600 men from the Sărata 
Training Center.  The 994th Independent Infantry Battalion with the 19th Infantry Division had 
lost almost half its men since arriving on the front in December 1942, but it received praise and 
Iron Crosses from the Germans for its solid performance.75  Some commanders did not want to 
accept rehabilitation soldiers, blaming them for demoralizing other soldiers and dishonoring their 
sacrifice.76  General Dumitrescu brow beat subordinates who questioned the policy because the 
manpower crisis was so dire he needed them.  Some troops sent for rehabilitation were now over 
45.  Security in the rear was so lax that deserters from the Blue Line could cross back to Crimea.  
Gendarmes did not question wandering soldiers they stopped who said they were trying to get to 
the Kuban bridgehead and just hustled them back across the straits to their units.77  While a few 
soldiers chose to connive a way out of the Kuban bridgehead to hide out in Crimean cities, and a 
tiny number chose to head for the hills to join the partisans, the overwhelming majority remained 
committed to the war.  Life in the trenches took on a routine.  Chaplains ministered to wounded, 
blessed troops, weapons, or shelters, and continued to baptize and marry civilians.  After arriving 
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with 1st Mountain Division, Priest Nicolae Petrache helped build shelters for wounded, designed 
a cemetery, and oversaw the renovation of a church that officers and soldiers wanted restored.78  
There was time for fun, such as saving up alcohol to get drunk or attending a German-Romanian 
soccer match.  The situation was so good that when Hitler finally approved the evacuation of the 
Kuban bridgehead Romanian gendarmes reported that soldiers did “not understand the decision 
to retreat from the Kuban, where they had impenetrable positions.”79 
 The Soviets pieced the front in eastern Ukraine, Kharkov fell on 22 August, forcing the 
German Army to retreat and abandon the Kuban bridgehead.  The worn out Romanian pilots of I 
Air Corps were transferred west.  General Erwin Jaenecke prepared a phased withdrawal of the 
15 divisions with German Seventeenth Army that fell back on Taman port to evacuate to Crimea.  
The retreat began on 16 September.  Stavka tried to disrupt these plans.  A Red Army offensive 
started on 10 September, capturing Novorossiysk six days later, and landed a force in the rear on 
22 September attempting to cut off the Axis retreat and capture the whole force, but 19th Infantry 
Division helped fight off the landing.  Romanian soldiers fought well as Axis troops leapfrogged 
from line to line.  The evacuation went like clockwork, aided by the extreme narrowness of the 
Kerch Strait and aircraft from the newly arrived German I Air Corps, and approximately 177,000 
Germans, 50,000 Romanians, and 25,000 Russian HiWis – with most of their heavy equipment –
slipped away for only 5,000 German and 600 Romanian casualties by 9 October 1943.   
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“Encircled” Crimea 
 After the defeat at Kursk, the Germans hoped to hold a line along the Dnieper river bend 
and then south from Zaporozhye to Melitopol to the Azov Sea to protect Crimea from being cut 
off and “encircled.”80  The only reserves in the area were the ad-hoc 24th Infantry Division built 
from the surviving combat troops of the 7th and 11th Infantry divisions left behind by Third Army 
in March 1943 – including the 993rd and 995th Independent Infantry battalions, the former having 
fought bravely on the Don and the latter fresh from Sărata – tasked with coastal defense.  The 4th 
Mountain Division, recently evacuated from the Kuban bridgehead, was hurried north and both 
undermanned divisions contributed to the German defense of Melitopol.81  An estimated 75,000 
Romanian troops remained in Crimea or about a third of the defenders.  Neither the Germans nor 
the Romanians expected to remain in Crimea very long and its defenses were in shambles.  
By all reports the Cavalry Corps and other divisions recently arrived in Crimea were in 
bad shape, but some were worse off than others.  The 10th, 19th Infantry, 3rd Mountain, and 6th 
Cavalry divisions were still capable of being used on the frontline in a defensive role, but 1st, 2nd 
Mountain, and 9th Cavalry divisions were fit only for anti-partisan warfare or coastal defense.82  
Lt. Colonel Victor Isăceanu arrived from Romania in September to find 13th Călăraşi Regiment, 
newly arrived with 9th Cavalry Division, “in [a] state of moral ruin,” so he set to work getting his 
new soldiers “back in hand.”  He soon restored discipline, however, he could do nothing to fix 
material shortages.  His men “were marching without shoes, almost barefoot, in summer blouses, 
full of lice!  The officers, who had lost their baggage in the battles in Kuban, were in the same 
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state.”83  This unit was one of the worst off, so it was assigned to guard the coast against a Soviet 
landing.  The Axis commanders temporarily lost control of their men during the evacuation and 
resulted in a spike of Romanian stragglers and deserters who wandered the rear, either in search 
of their unit or trying to escape the threat of a “second Stalingrad,” especially since it was far 
from certain that the German Seventeenth Army would defend the peninsula.   
General Jaenecke spent most of October planning to abandon, not defend, Crimea.84  He 
was not an inspiring leader and did not bring order to the confused mishmash of competing Axis 
commands in the region, so the isthmus at Perekop was left open assuming German Seventeenth 
Army would soon evacuate.  On 6 October, in this confused situation, the General Staff replaced 
General Avramescu with General Hugo Schwab, a Saxon from Transylvania, as commander of 
the Mountain Corps, the two trading places as commander of III Corps in Transnistria.  This was 
done primarily to stick a disliked minority with the unenviable task of fighting a doomed battle.  
Avramescu was respected by his soldier and the change was unpopular with much of the rank 
and file, especially mountain soldiers from Transylvania, many of whom were prejudiced against 
Saxons.  Major Scârneci despaired that the Mountain Corps, the pride of the Romanian Army, 
was now commanded by an “arrogant, lazy, and, above all, stupid Saxon.”85  Schwab had led the 
9th Infantry Division during the liberation of eastern Romania, then it occupied Transnistria for a 
year before the Echelon II unit was sent to the Don where it was destroyed.  In March 1943, he 
took over III Corps and set to work rebuilding broken units.  He began to do the same in Crimea, 
sorting out and reorganizing the mixed-up survivors evacuated from the Kuban bridgehead. 
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The Soiets advanced along the Azov Sea to threaten Crimea, so Romanian soldiers who 
had just escaped from one trap, now found themselves about to be caught in another, and morale 
suffered.  Corporal Cârlan noted, “When we left from the Kuban front no one asked themselves: 
where are we going?  Everyone was thinking about escape, but now everyone asked themselves: 
where?”86  The SSI had anxiously pointed out examples of demoralization in Crimea earlier that 
spring: a group of soldiers had refused to embark for the Caucasus until rations were improved, 
many complained of being called Gypsies by the Germans, and one was heard saying, “instead 
of allies the Germans have become our masters, as if we were occupied by them, like are other 
countries.”87  Officers kept them in line and after their bellyaching soldiers resignedly followed 
the rest of their comrades who prepared for another battle.  General Pantazi trusted in soldiers’ 
motivation enough to order on 12 October that corps commanders should excuse anyone caught 
as stragglers or deserters for the first time and set up an infantry regiment to “reeducate” them 
for two months and then send them back to their units – this was a new spin on the rehabilitation 
policy as it did not officially stigmatize them or reassign them to a different unit.88  Only soldiers 
guilty of “serious” desertion or crimes should be sent to court martial.   
In the confusion of the evacuation of the Kuban bridgehead many soldiers went AWOL, 
wandered looting goods, or carried on black market activities on the side in Crimea, but only a 
small number of soldiers chose the option of “serious” desertion.  On 25 October, 40 mountain 
troops boarded a train, pretending to be heading home on leave, and were not checked by guards. 
At Tighina they got off the trains, split up, and continued by foot to avoid gendarme posts on the 
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frontier, but at least one group was caught.  Third Army ordered increased gendarme patrols in 
Kherson, a city on the direct route from Crimea to Romania, to halt disorder in the streets caused 
by drunken soldiers or deserters.89  Romanians, like the Germans, listened to news and music on 
Soviet radio and, between programs, it screeched at them to give up.  “Romanian soldiers!  Your 
fate in Crimea is sealed, do not believe the Germans.  They lie to you…Desert while you have 
the chance.  Surrender!”  Major Scârneci, like most Romanian soldiers, scoffed at the message, 
“I wonder to whom?  The Tatars in Crimea?”90  Atrocity propaganda, reports of poor conditions 
in POW camps, and brutal treatment of captured Romanians by Soviet troops all made surrender 
unappealing.  A handful turned traitor and joined the Soviet partisans in the Yaila Mountains.   
When General Jaenecke finally threw together a belated defense, General Schwab was on 
hand to provide reorganized units that could be plugged into gaps at key locations.  After a week 
of fighting, the Soviets broke through the German line at Melitopol, on 28 October.  Both the 4th 
Mountain and 24th Infantry divisions were mauled, two-thirds of their soldiers became casualties, 
although many went missing during the retreat they chose to escape rather than be captured and 
1,530 were soon gathered up.  The survivors were amalgamated into the 4/24th Infantry Division 
on 5 December and trusted only with rear security until May 1944 when it was renamed the 4th 
Mountain Division and put back on the front.91  On 29 October, advance Soviet units approached 
a nearly undefended Perekop, the Germans raced to set up a defense and eventually remembered 
to have Schwab send troops.92  While a mixed bag of German and Slovak units blocked Perekop, 
the ad-hoc Balan Group, three mountain battalions, an artillery battalion, a company of anti-tank 
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guns, and a company of tanks, was sent to the Sivash Sea coast.  The same day, Schwab ordered 
discipline be maintained by swift corporal punishment and authorized company commanders to 
use “capital measures” for “grave disorders that could endanger combat potential…[but]…after 
being carefully thought through and only in the exact moment of the infraction.”93  These orders 
are no different than a dozen others that had been issued by various Romanian commanders since 
June 1941.  Anytime a commander felt he had to make sure subordinates took things seriously he 
threated summary execution, but it is doubtful officers shot their men when manpower shortages 
were so severe.  Schwab’s order should be read more as a signal of the start of a crisis.    
 The Soviets launched a combined land and sea attack on November 1 to seize Crimea off 
the march, but the German slapdash defense had plugged up Perekop.  The Soviets turned to the 
exposed coast of the Sivash Sea and began crossing in force, but the Balan Group was on hand to 
stymie the Red Army until German reinforcements arrived.  At the same time, the Soviets landed 
2,500 troops across the Kerch strait near Eltigen.  On 3 November, the Red Army made a larger 
disorganized landing near Kerch port farther north, so the 6th Cavalry Division took over bottling 
up the Eltigen bridgehead to let German soldiers face the new threat.  Axis forces had contained 
the Soviets to a 13 km deep bridgehead on the Sivash Sea by 6 November, and four days later the 
Germans just managed to contain the Soviet attack at Kerch.  The immediate crisis had passed.94  
Seven undermanned Romanian divisions, three weak German divisions, and a myriad of German 
support units, over 200,000 men, settled into a stalemate.  The 6th Cavalry, 3rd Mountain, and a 
German division guarded the most vulnerable coastline along the Kerch peninsula, two German 
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divisions blocked Perekop, the 19th Infantry Division manned the Sivash Sea and Arabat spit, the 
9th Cavalry Division guarded the western coast, the 1st and 2nd Mountain divisions patrolled the 
southern mountains and seaside, and the 10th Infantry Division was kept in reserve.  This fails to 
convey the true complexity of the defensive arrangements as Romanian divisions had German 
“corset stays” and German divisions plugged Romanian units into their overstretched fronts. 
General Schwab reported on 24 November that in 20 days of combat his forces had lost at 
least a quarter of their already reduced combat strength.  The fall of Melitopol and occupation of 
all the territory to the Dnieper by the Soviets exacerbated his personnel shortage because soldiers 
on leave and replacements could not arrive by land, so he asked they be flown in.  He also wrote 
that morale was low and a few more soldiers had deserted to the partisans, so several days later 
he asked that financial aid to the families of soldiers fighting in the Crimea be increased, to even 
double that of soldiers elsewhere, to improve morale.95  On 28 November, Hitler sent a letter to 
Antonescu informing him that Crimea would be defended “by all means.”  He promised that the 
German Seventeenth Army would be supplied by sea, reinforcements would be sent, and a land 
corridor would soon be restored.96  In fact, German Seventeenth Army was well-supplied by sea 
in the following months as German-Romanian troops continued to hold off the Red Army.   
With the larger bridgehead near Kerch port contained, General Jaenecke decided to use 
Romanian troops supported by German assault guns, artillery, and Stukas to destroy the smaller 
bridgehead at Eltigen.  Early on 4 December, the 6th Cavalry Division attacked from the north, 
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but met strong resistance aided by Soviet guns from across the strait.  The 3rd Mountain Division 
began attacking from the south.  The northern line started to cave in the following day and the 6th 
Cavalry committed all its forces on 6 December.  During the night 1,500 Soviets broke out to the 
north.  The Romanian forces overran the bridgehead in the morning, taking 2,300 POWs, and the 
Soviets that had broken out were quickly found huddled on the coast beneath Mount Mithridates.  
The 3rd Mountain Division surrounded the group, German artillery and aircraft bombarded them, 
and on 11 December they surrendered.97  This was the last Axis success before the two sides dug 
in for the rest of the winter.  Between 1 October and 31 December, the battles at Melitopol and in 
Crimea cost the Romanian forces 6,500 casualties, leaving over 63,000 in the peninsula.98 
 While generals Jaenecke and Schwab worried about Romanian morale, the 19th Infantry 
division, reinforced by the 10th Infantry Division and German “corset stays,” held the Sivash Sea 
through the winter against repeated local attacks.  When Lt. Colonel Iscăceanu’s dismounted 13th 
Călăraşi Regiment was transferred to the 10th Infantry Division’s sector his cavalrymen showed 
less stomach for the fight.  In the first Soviet attack against his unit one squadron panicked under 
heavy artillery bombardment and fled without firing a shot, so it was withdrawn and transferred 
to the German sector at Perekop.  Jaenecke sandwiched Romanian units between German units 
because manpower was so dear that he could not simply pull the few poor performing Romanian 
units off the front.  The Soviets set up megaphones in front of the 13th Călăraşi Regiment, which 
broadcast Romanian songs intermixed with appeals encouraging them to desert.  Iscăceanu heard 
the voice of Major Nicolae Cambrea, the two had been acquainted before his capture on the Don, 
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claiming that the Soviets treated Romanian POWs well.99  These efforts were a failure as none of 
Iscăceanu’s soldiers deserted to the enemy.  The 13th Călăraşi Regiment was an exceptional case 
because it was a severely demoralized unit that had lost most its heavy weapons and horses in the 
Caucasus, but it illustrates how the Axis dealt with such demoralized Romanian units. 
 German Seventeenth Army knew its position in Crimea would crumple under the weight 
of a major Soviet offensive and wanted to evacuate, but Hitler would not countenance it and sent 
two more weak divisions.  This was not irrational.  German High Command estimated the weak 
German-Romanian force was tying down three Soviet armies, plus air and naval assets, and kept 
the peninsula from becoming a base for Soviet air attacks against the Romanian oil industry.100   
Moreover, Crimea was relatively easy to supply by sea.  Although the General Staff had begun 
planning for the defense of eastern Romania in September 1943, as the Kuban bridgehead was 
being evacuated, it was convinced by these arguments.101  This decision, however, left 75,000 
experience Romanian soldiers, not to mention heavy weapons and equipment that were in short 
supply at home, stuck in Crimea and reduced to 63,000 men by January.  General Şteflea needed 
to rebuild Echelon II units, but he had to send men to replace casualties, which included many 
rehabilitation soldiers, eventually raising the force to 65,000 soldiers by April.102  This left even 
fewer men for the defense of Romania if the Soviets broke through across the Dnieper.   
General Schwab busied himself with schemes to improve the morale of his mix of proud 
Mountain and Cavalry corps veterans and rehabilitation replacements.  On 9 December, he asked 
Third Army to begin granting leave to his troops again and suggested that those who had been on 
                                                 
99 Fond Manuscrise, MSS 676, f. 25.   
100 Duţu, Armata română în război, 254; Forczyk, Where the Iron Crosses Grow, 261, 265. 
101 Ardeleanu, Istoria statului major general, 335-337. 
102 Scafeş, Armata română, 63-64. 
 517 
 
the front for 24 months or more should be sent home once a replacement arrived.103  This was a 
well-intentioned idea, but it backfired and may have hurt morale. There were few replacements, 
and veterans with 24 months were soon frustrated they were not sent home immediately, some 
even threatened their officers.104  The General Staff blamed poor morale in the ranks on officers 
neglecting propaganda and ordered that each unit’s second-in-command to focus on such efforts.  
The General Staff sent several teams of three “propaganda missionaries” and three musicians led 
by an officer to raise spirits in Crimea from January to March 1944.105  Desertions continued at a 
minimal level and morale was generally poor, but most soldiers kept fighting. 
Anti-Partisan Operations in Crimea and Ukraine 
 In addition to defending Perekop, the Sivash Sea, and Kerch the Axis had to deal with the 
partisan movement in Crimea.  The SSI reported that civilians were anticipating the arrival of the 
Soviets and emancipation from “German slavery.”  During the winter, partisans began attacking 
lone trucks and even whole convoys in mountainous forested areas, first by groups of 10-20 but 
later as large as 500-600.  Between 1 November and 10 December 1943 there were 105 attacks 
near Simferopol alone.  The SSI recorded a predictable response.  “The reprisals carried out by 
the German authorities[,] and in part by the Romanian [authorities, only] accentuated even more 
the appetite for revenge of the locals, who are only waiting for the right moment.”106   
General Jaenecke ordered General Schwab to clear the Yaila mountains of at least 7,000-
8,000 partisans.107  He carried out a successful corps-sized sweep in the forested massif south of 
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Suja during 29 December 1943-9 January 1944 resulting in 1,934 dead, 121 wounded, and 2,763 
partisans taken prisoner at a cost of 44 dead and 197 wounded Romanians.  The paltry number of 
weapons taken and the large number of women and children among the prisoners suggests that 
while the sweep destroyed their logistical base most armed partisan men escaped.108  Schwab 
followed this big operation by smaller sweeps since more of his units were sent to the front on 
the Sivash Sea.  1st Mountain Division only carried out one operation on 16-18 January, resulting 
in 13 partisans killed and 429 prisoners captured, and 14 camps destroyed for three killed and 13 
wounded; 2nd Mountain Division carried out three sweeps on 16-19, 18-24, and 29-30 January, 
resulting in 159 partisans killed and 96 prisoners captured, and hundreds of burned huts for 23 
killed and 76 wounded.  The limited results of these subsequent operations were because targeted 
zones were too large, terrain was very difficult, and Romanian units were easily observed.109 
 Third Army too was tasked with fighting partisans.  By December, General Dumitrescu’s 
forces included III Corps – 4th/24th, 15th, and 8th Infantry Divisions – and a number of German or 
Slovak security units, to secure the rear between the Bug and Dnieper.110  Reports indicated that 
the partisan movement was growing in Transnistria too, before August 1943 it only consisted of 
a few diehard communists and NKVD agents, now groups of 30, 50, and even 100 were forming 
in the north and south of the province, and began carrying out isolated attacks.111  Dumitrescu 
issued special orders in January 1944 on combating partisans in Transnistria: flyers were posted 
to warn the population of “grave sanctions” if they supported partisans; possible threats, such as 
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former Red Army officers or NCOs released earlier from POW camps, were detained and sent to 
Budeşti in Romania; hostages were taken; and strict order maintained by raids, expedited judicial 
processes, and public executions.  The partisan movement previously had almost been inexistent 
in Transnistria, so any increase in activity was worrying and dealt with harshly.  
Jews and the Army 
 While Stalingrad definitively ended any plans to deport Jews in Romania west of the Prut 
to death camps in Poland, the Antonescu regime’s treatment of Romanian and Soviet Jews in 
Transnistria continued to be harsh.  The Government of Transnistria used Jews living in ghettos 
as labor in factories.  Jews in camps in the countryside were forced to work on farms guarded by 
gendarmes, Ukrainian police, or ethnic Germans who frequently shot Jews out of hand for minor 
infractions.  In response to German requests for labor, Governor Alexianu sent thousands of Jews 
across the Bug to work in Reichskommissariat Ukraine, most never to return.  There were some 
signs of changing attitudes, however, such as in January 1943 when the Central Jewish Office in 
Bucharest permitted an Aid Committee with the goal of improving conditions for Jews to inspect 
all the ghettos and camps in Transnistria.112  Romanian and Soviet Jews continued to be beaten 
and abused by Romanian gendarmes or local police, but fewer and fewer were murdered as their 
labor was valuable for the war effort and officers no longer tolerated such criminality.  
Despite an estimated 100,000 Romanian and Soviet Jews surviving in ghettos and camps 
in Transnistria, none of General Dumitrescu’s anti-partisan orders in December 1943 mentioned 
the threat of “Jewish-Communists.”  As the Soviets approached in early 1944, Romanian soldiers 
in Transnistria began to treat Jews much better.  In the final weeks of Romanian occupation, a 
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Jewish survivor recalled, “No one was abusive, not the officers, not the soldiers, not the military 
prosecutors, not the pharmacists, not the agricultural engineers.  The ‘Jidani’ [kikes] had now 
become ‘the Jewish gentlemen.’”113  Pressured by a few members of his government, particularly 
diplomats, and the monarchy, Antonescu relaxed some anti-Semitic policies and began to blame 
the Germans for the previous violence in eastern Romania.  After a year of petitioning by Jewish 
leaders, the Conducător agreed to repatriate 34,600 of the 54,000 surviving Romanian Jews from 
Transnistria, but between 20 December 1943 and 11 January 1944 only 18,500 Jews – most were 
originally from near Dorohoi in southern Bukovina that had not been occupied by the Soviets in 
1940 – were repatriated before he halted transports on 27 January.  Antonescu believed that the 
repatriation of Soviet Moldovans in Transnistria took priority over deported Jews.114  
Antonescu also worried what effect the sudden return of tens of thousands of Jews would 
have on popular opinion.  After they had been deported, Romanians had seized their property or 
otherwise benefited, so few were happy to see Jews return.  On 20 June 1942, a group of 29 Jews 
from Vatra Dornei, a town in southern Bukovina, were released from the Moghilev ghetto due to 
their skills in forestry and returned to the town to cut timber for the war effort.  They asked that 
their homes be restituted.  Vatra Dornei was thrown into an uproar and locals petitioned that the 
Jews be sent back; eventually they had to be put under guard to protect them from a mob.115  The 
Antonescu regime, which was already reluctant to repatriate Jews it still saw as communists or 
traitors, feared Jews returning might trigger popular protests against the government.  
 
                                                 
113 Translated quote found in Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania, 223.  
114 Ibid., 249-250, 254-256. 
115 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 1243, f. 217-218.   
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Trench Warfare in Crimea 
 Throughout the winter of 1943-1944, the Soviets kept up the pressure on Crimea and the 
Dnieper as Stavka prepared another series of offensives for the spring.  The Red Army began a 
local attack on 10 January 1944 to eliminate the German bridgehead east of Dnieper at Nikopol.  
Its destruction on 8 February prompted German Seventeenth Army and the General Staff to beg 
Hitler to allow Crimea to be evacuated before it was too late, but German High Command stood 
firm and ignored their pleas.116  Axis forces had no choice other than to dig in deeper, however, 
the sodden clay soil and shortage of materials made constructing defenses on the Sivash Sea near 
impossible.  The 10th and 19th Infantry divisions entrenched best they could and repelled repeated 
local Soviet attacks as winter turned to spring.  On the Kerch peninsula, the 3rd Mountain and 6th 
Cavalry divisions helped keep the Red Army bottled up and guarded the coast.  Romanian troops 
made the most of the sudden glut of supplies that the Germans dumped into Crimea on Hitler’s 
orders by engaging in black market activities to make money that they sent home to their family 
or squandered satisfying various vices.  Some Romanian troops got quite good at manufacturing 
fake papers to avoid inquisitive gendarmes and obtain rations from German canteens.117 
 As Axis troop dug in, they did so with one eye on retreat in expectation of an inevitable 
Soviet breakthrough.  German Seventeenth Army had operational control of all Axis forces in 
Crimea, but Romanian units were divided between the Mountain Corps under General Schwab, 
occupied with anti-partisan operations in the mountains, and the Cavalry Corps under General 
Cealîk, holding back the Soviet bridgehead on the Sivash Sea; they shared coastal defense duties.  
                                                 
116 The chorus included von Kleist, Jaenecke, Şteflea, and Antonescu, see, Duţu, Armata română în război, 254.  
117 Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 1407, f. 3.   
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In early February, Cealîk reported that while soldiers’ morale was poor, officers were committed 
and overall the Cavalry Corps’ units were sound, except for the 3rd Roşiori – most its men were 
rehabilitation soldiers – and 13th Călăraşi regiments.118  Lt. Colonel Iscăceanu’s 13th Călăraşi 
Regiment was so demoralized that even squeezing it between German units did not help, so they 
were set to work digging trenches and shelters for a fall back line at Perekop.119  Schwab carried 
out another series of anti-partisan sweeps in late-February, but they failed to kill or capture very 
many.  He asked General Jaenecke if some of his mountain units on the Sivash Sea or at Kerch 
could be transferred so he could organize larger sweeps to make sure mountain roads were kept 
clear in case the Axis forces needed to retreat.  None could be spared, however, due to continued 
Soviet attacks, and all Jaenecke could offer were a few aircraft in support.120   
 Third Army continued to carry out security operations between the Bug and Dnieper.  
General Dumitrescu, always a stern disciplinarian, complained of some of the same problematic 
outer signs of indiscipline reported earlier in Crimea – poor appearance, lackadaisical saluting, 
drunkenness, fights, folk songs with new “subversive” lyrics – but there were few desertions.121  
When soldiers from the front entered Transnistria, they encountered a large population of Jews 
now unknown east of the Bug, and old habits resurfaced.  On 26 February, two drunk soldiers 
entered the Balta ghetto and began shooting wildly, wounding a Jew and killing a Ukrainian.  
Both were arrested immediately.122  Such disorder was no longer tolerated because Third Army 
                                                 
118 Fond Corpul de Cavalerie, dosar 1256, f. 59-66, 80. 
119 The soldiers emerging caked in the sticky clay soil, see, Fond Manuscrise, MSS 676, f. 39-40.  
120 Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 1833, f. 1-4, 7, 15; only a few Luftwaffe aircraft remained after December 1943 
and by the spring the Soviets had near overwhelming superiority, see Forczyk, Where the Iron Crosses Grow, 267.     
121 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 2780, f. 214-215, allegedly the soldiers did not realize the nature of the lyrics, see, f. 237.   
122 Ibid., dosar 3032, f. 71.  
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worried about indiscipline and surviving Jews were needed to work.  Romanian soldiers’ anti-
Semitism simmered under the surface but was now kept in check for pragmatic reasons.   
Defending the Iaşi Front: March to August 1944 
 When the Antonescu regime mobilized its last manpower reserves for a last-ditch defense 
of Romania, most youths reported out of a mixture of patriotism, social pressure, and coercion by 
the Rural Gendarmerie.  On 8 February, the General Staff instructed that across Romania men in 
the 1946 contingent, 19-year-olds, were to report for frontline service, furthermore, in Moldavia, 
Bukovina, and Bessarabia all youths in the 1947-1950 contingents, 18- to 15-year-olds, would be 
called up too “in order to know the number of young men eligible for military service.”123  They 
knew that the fate of their nation hung in the balance and feared Soviet occupation, so when draft 
notices went out a week later the General Staff did not face protests or mass draft avoidance.  By 
August 1944, the Romania Army would mobilize 1,077,000 soldiers.  It took the General Staff a 
year, but it had rebuilt many Echelon II units, although they were short on firepower, especially 
anti-tank weapons, and their mobility was practically nil.124  The new draftees were formed into 
training battalions and rushed piecemeal into battle once they had a modicum of training.      
 Soviet attacks had battered the Germans all winter and now a new spring offensive broke 
through on the Dnieper in Ukraine on 8 March.  That same day Hitler ordered that “strongholds” 
in cities or towns be created with the mission to be encircled to slow down the Soviets, but these 
were mere speed bumps in the path of the Red Army.125  Fourth Army, commanded by General 
                                                 
123 58% for infantry, 9% for cavalry, 9% for artillery, 7% for engineers, 7% grăniceri, 7% for sailors, 7% for airmen, 
1.5% for gendarmes, and .5% for firefighters, see, Fond Corpul de Cavalerie, dosar 1211, f. 255-256.  
124 674,000 were in the rear, only nine in operational divisions and the rest in 21 training divisions, Scafeş, Armata 
română, 73; for details on efforts to reequip the army, see, Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 145-154. 
125 For details on the winter battles and spring breakthrough, see, Robert M. Citino, The Wehrmacht’s Last Stand: 
The German Campaigns of 1944-1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017), 27-36, 54-56. 
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Racoviţa after 23 January 1944 and consisting of the Cantemir Mixed Tank Group and IV Corps, 
was reactivated on 15 March to defend Romania’s northeastern frontier, but the Soviets overran 
northern Bessarabia, northern Transnistria, and all Bukovina before Fourth Army’s meager force 
could set up a defense.  The Soviets crossed the Dniester at Moghilev on 18 March.  Antonescu 
and General Şteflea sent letters to Hitler the next day begging for help.  Antonescu complained 
he had not been kept up to date on the front, warning of serious material losses if Bessarabia fell, 
and Şteflea admitted Fourth Army lacked the weapons to halt the Soviets.126  The Soviets retook 
Bălţi, crossed the Prut on 26 March, and soon occupied Botoşani and Rădăuţi.  Farther north, the 
Red Army crossed the Dniester on 28 March and Cernăuţi fell on a day later without a fight. 
German Sixth Army, reconstituted after Stalingrad, held onto southern Bessarabia and 
Transnistria with its line bulging east to the Bug protecting Odessa, the primary port supplying 
German Seventeenth Army.127  Third Army’s mish-mash of security forces preceded the front 
and inevitably left stragglers behind, but most avoided capture and were thrown back on the line 
without punishment.  General Dumitrescu made sure on 21 March to clarify it was “only an act 
of generosity and of parental understanding and in no way a sign of tolerance [for desertion].”128  
He needed anyone willing to fight as Third Army began organizing a defense on the Dniester.  In 
Crimea, General Schwab, anticipating that the Red Army would soon attack there too, risked an 
enemy landing by stripping units from coastal defense and ordered 1st Mountain Division to clear 
mountain roads with the help of Tatar police.  The three sweeps during 9-13 March failed to net 
many partisans but kept the roads clear and would pay off during the evacuation of Crimea.129   
                                                 
126 Arimia, Antonescu-Hitler Vol. II, 139-143.  
127 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 2246, f. 78; Duţu, Armata română în război, 254, 269. 
128 He no longer had patience for the official rehabilitation process, see, Ibid., dosar 2968, f. 247.  
129 275 partisans, plus destroyed camps, for 17 Axis losses, see, Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 1833, f. 200-209.   
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 The Soviet breakthrough precipitated a flood of refugees into Romania.  German High 
Command evacuated all men of military age in Crimea or east of the Bug to deny manpower to 
the Red Army.  Soviet civilians who had collaborated or otherwise feared the return of Soviet 
power bribed Romanian gendarmes to cross the Bug.  Sonderkommando R resettled the ethnic 
Germans from Transnistria to the Reich.  Antonescu, under pressure from the diplomatic corps, 
the monarchy, and Jewish leaders in Romania reversed his earlier decision against repatriating 
Romanian Jews from Transnistria on 14 March.  Another 10,700 were evacuated.130  On 1 April, 
German Sixth Army took control of unoccupied Transnistria as Governor Alexianu evacuated his 
personnel and stripped the province of resources.  The SSI reported that German soldiers treated 
locals brutally, healthy people were again hiding in the catacombs under Odessa, and Romanian 
troops from Bessarabia were overheard discussing deserting.131  Soviet occupation of northern 
Bessarabia again presented basarabeni with the dilemma of choosing home or nation.   
 At the beginning of April, a barrage of attacks threatened Romania from all sides.  After 
barreling forward to the Dniester, the Red Army seemed to still have plenty of steam, and Stavka 
planned to knock Romania out of the war.132  On 4 and 5 April, the U.S. Army Air Force began a 
sustained bombing campaign against Romania with raids on Bucharest and Ploieşti that shocked 
the home front. 133  On 7 April, the Soviets began an offensive against the Axis forces in Crimea.  
The Romanian Army was a hollow shell after irreplaceable losses of men and equipment outside 
                                                 
130 It’s likely that a few more Jews found ways to escape on their own, see, Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania, 257.  
131 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 3032, f. 277.   
132 Soviet historians claimed for decades that Stavka was not planning to knock out Romania that spring, but it again 
pushed the Red Army too hard and it became overstretched, see, David M. Glantz, Red Storm over the Balkans: The 
Failed Soviet Invasion of Romania, Spring 1944 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2007), xii-xiii. 
133 The bombers caught Bucharest unready and hit the North Train Station filled with refugees killing nearly 3,000 
and wounding over 2,000.  For a personal experience, see, Giurescu, Romania in the Second World War, 161-163. 
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Stalingrad and most its remaining experienced units were in Crimea, but without its support the 
Wehrmacht could not hope to hold its southern flank.  If the Romanian Army had surrendered it 
would have be a disaster to the Nazi war effort, losing valuable fighting troops, the vital oil fields 
around Ploieşti, and access to the rest of the Balkans.  The Antonescu regime refused to give up, 
Romanian officers at all levels supported the decision by using lash or decorations to motivate, 
and soldiers fought on to defend their homes out of patriotism, fear, and fatalism.   
Despite these odds the German-Romanian soldiers managed to halt the Red Army due to 
Soviet overreach, geography, and pure determination by desperate Axis soldiers.  The Red Army 
had a habit of becoming overextended after multiple offensives until its logistics broke down and 
its soldiers were exhausted.  Axis forces, on the other hand were falling back on a virtually intact 
logistical network in Romania, which was run by militarized railroads called the “Second Army” 
in state propaganda, allowing rapid reinforcement and resupply.  For the first time in nearly three 
years the Axis had a secure rear because no partisan or resistance movement existed in Romania.  
The terrain of eastern Romania, hills in Moldavia and Bessarabia with the Carpathian Mountains 
to the west, favored the defense and funneled the Soviets toward the Focşani gap to the south.134  
Lastly, Romanian soldiers were willing to sacrifice their lives to defend Romania. 
 As the Red Army overran northeastern Romania, Army Group A, renamed Army Group 
South Ukraine on 5 April, shifted German units to Fourth Army to act as “corset stays” and then 
plugged arriving Romanian units into holes in the German line.  These was the same tactics used 
in the Kuban bridgehead and Crimea.  German “corset stays” only worked, however, because the 
                                                 
134 Glantzi, Red Storm over the Balkans, 10-11; for a discussion of “the Soviet Way of War,” see, Citino, Death of 
the Wehrmacht, 289-290; Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 156-157.   
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Romanian soldiers’ motivation to keep fighting – if Fourth Army had decided to not fight or flee 
a few German units in its ranks could not have stopped it.  German High Command had little to 
fear because rather than trying to abandon the war the General Staff willingly put the defense of 
Romania into the hands of the German Army.  As Romania embraced Nazi Germany, Hungary 
was wavering, so Hitler ordered its occupation on 19 March, much to Antonescu’s delight, who 
used his 23-24 March meeting with the Führer to rail against Hungarians and try to convince him 
to return northern Transylvania.135  The Conducător returned only with promises of support.  
 It was up to German-Romanian forces in eastern Romania to stop the Red Army until any 
reinforcements or equipment arrived from Berlin.  The Soviets advanced across the Prut and then 
the Siret into northern Moldavia as Fourth Army fell back in disorder.  The roads were crowded 
with refugees, some units reported that soldiers were throwing down their weapons, and General 
Racoviţa claimed that 80 percent of basarabeni were deserting.  Memories of 1940 made officers 
paranoid about basarabeni, and a significant portion chose home over nation, particularly if they 
were from Soviet-occupied Bessarabia and worried about their families, however, most remained 
loyal.  Investigations proved initial reports were overblown, and troops were not unmotivated, as 
indicated by the fact that weapon losses were only slightly above normal and at most 10 percent 
of basarbeni deserted.136  Moreover, most of deserters turned out to be stragglers, so Racoviţa set 
up new gendarme units to round up troops and reassigned them to the nearest unit.  On 13 April, 
Antonescu took a harsher stance when he issued Order No. 10.523 that authorized commanders 
                                                 
135 For details on Hitler’s decision, see, Cornelius, Hungary in World War II, 269-276; Arimia, Antonescu-Hitler 
Vol. II, 143-146. 
136 By 7 April 1944, Fourth Army had suffered 2,807 casualties and counted 2,938 lost weapons.  Additionally, in 
the whole of April, only 487 basarabeni had become stragglers or deserted out of a total of 4,672 under General 
Racoviţa’s command, see, Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 1533, f. 17-18, 26-27; dosar 1596, f. 185, 187, 196-197.  
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to summarily execute officers, NCOs, and soldiers for desertion, cowardice (including panicked 
flight, provoking others to panic, remaining behind, throwing away one’s weapon), looting, self-
mutilation, insubordination, or striking a superior.137  Understanding this was a classic example 
of a kneejerk reaction to a crisis common to Romanian generals few commanders shot anyone. 
Terrain, logistics, and sacrifice by poorly armed and trained Romanians, not executions, 
finally arrested Fourth Army’s retreat.  The Red Army continued south between the Carpathians 
and Prut, soon threatening Iaşi.  To the southeast, the Soviets pushed German Sixth Army back 
across the Bug, Odessa fell on 10 April, Tiraspol soon after, and they established a bridgehead 
across the Dniester at Tighina on 12 April.  These were, however, final efforts by the exhausted 
Soviets, and in less than a week a German-Romanian line had solidified.  It ran south along the 
Carpathian foothills in northern Moldavia, then jutted out east across central Moldavia north of 
Iaşi, continued across the Prut into central Bessarabia north of Chişinău to the Dniester, then 
turned south along the river, and ended at the Black Sea.  Romania was safe, for now.   
Fall of Crimea 
As the front in eastern Romania stabilized, the Axis collapse in Crimea was total.  On 7 
April, the Soviets opened their attack with a bombardment to pin down the Germans at Perekop, 
because the main attack was directed against the Romanians defending the Sivash Sea that began 
the next day against the well dug in 10th Infantry Division.  The 10th Infantry Division withstood 
the attacks, but the 19th Infantry Division on its right was cracking, so the Red Army shifted its 
attack and broke through the next day.138  Corporal Cârlan endured an intense bombardment and 
                                                 
137 Ibid., dosar 1533, f. 31-32. 
138 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 133; Forcyzk, Where the Iron Crosses Grow, 272-275.   
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his unit was soon overrun.  He records that Soviet soldiers shouted in Romanian, “Where are you 
running to, huh, motherfuckers, ‘cause we will put our hands on you before Sevastopol.”  When 
a comrade urged Cârlan to flee he refused because if he left his radio “[the officers] will shoot 
me.”139  Axis forces began a pell-mell race to Sevastopol.  The units at Kerch began pulling back 
on 10 April, German troops and part of 3rd Mountain Division crowded onto ships at Feodosia on 
13 April to evacuate to Sevastopol.  The 9th Cavalry Division abandoned its defenses on the west 
coast and fell back without serious loss.  On 12-14 April, the Mountain Corps set up a line on the 
old Soviet positions north of Severnaya Bay and fought off Soviet tank attacks.  The perimeter 
extended south over the next few days as troops arrived from Kerch by sea or by roads through 
the mountains or along the coast.140  The partisans in the Yaila Mountains did not impede the 
Axis retreat, in part due to the previous Romanian sweeps, but also because they were afraid to 
attack heavily armed Axis units.  By 16 April, Axis defenses had coalesced around Sevastopol, 
and 81,700 German and 46,700 Romanian soldiers eventually reached its perimeter.141 
Hitler ordered German Seventeenth Army to hold out at all costs.  General Jaenecke 
argued for wholesale evacuation but was only allowed evacuate rear support troops from Crimea 
during 12-27 April.  He immediately began to surreptitiously save combat troops too.  Romanian 
soldiers formed into groups of twenty in the Chersonese peninsula, those few evacuated by air 
could take just 10-15 kg of possessions, while those evacuated by sea could take more.  Corporal 
Cârlan had managed to reach the Sevastopol perimeter with his radio and while his group looked 
for an embarkation point they were ready to shoot any Germans that tried to stop them.  As they 
                                                 
139 Cârlan, Păstraţi-mi amitirile!, 155, 161. 
140 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 134. 
141 Duţu, Armata română în război, 256.   
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waited for their ship, they sheltered from Soviet aircraft in the same catacombs that Soviet troops 
had hidden in two years before.142  The seaside soldiers endured a quick but dangerous voyage as 
Soviet aircraft and submarines actively patrolled.  By the end of April, 28,000 Germans, 21,000 
Romanians, and 23,000 Slovaks, HiWis, POWs, and civilians had been evacuated.143  Soldiers 
joyfully celebrated the Romanian coast come into view, but on 30 April, as Corporal Cârlan left 
Constanţa with train of soldiers, along the tracks crowds had gathered “like at a military parade.”  
Peasants came from nearby villages at the news of a train with soldiers from Crimea was passing 
through, so families could ask for news about their husbands, fathers, or sons.144   
Hitler discovered General Jaenecke’s subterfuge and fired him on 1 May, replacing him 
with General Karl Allmendinger, but the change in command did not change the situation.  That 
day the 2nd Mountain Division came under attack on the northern perimeter outside Sevastopol.  
On 5 May the Soviets launched a larger diversionary attack, again on the northern perimeter, the 
1st and 2nd Mountain divisions helped hold them off, but the main Soviet assault targeted German 
V Corps on the southern perimeter and began two days later.  It soon had to retreat, which forced 
German-Romanian forces north of Severnaya Bay to retreat in the night to avoid being cut off.145  
Hitler finally approved full evacuation on 8 May and during the next five days ships and aircraft 
rescued another 29,000 Germans, 15,000 Romanians, and 4,000 HiWis.  The Soviets managed to 
sink several transports during the crossing, drowning 7,000 German and 4,000 Romanian troops, 
or about 10 percent of those evacuated.  Roughly 3,000 Romanian soldiers escaped by air for a 
                                                 
142 Cârlan, Păstraţi-mi amitirile!, 184. 
143 Fond Corpul de Cavalerie, dosar 1234, f. 151; Duţu, Armata română în război, 261. 
144 Cârlan, Păstraţi-mi amitirile!, 186-190. 
145 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 135.  
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total of 39,000 rescued, but 53,500 German and 22,000 Romanian soldiers were captured.146  
The Red Army, for once, suffered far fewer casualties during the battle, roughly a third of Axis 
losses.  The exhausted Romanian troops arrived without heavy equipment, while the Germans 
saved 1,092 tons of material the Romanians only got room for 291 tons, and the Cavalry Corps’ 
horses were all left behind.  These soldiers were desperately needed to defend Romania.   
Defending the Iaşi Front 
With the Soviets halted, General Ferdinand Schörner, commander of Army Group South 
Ukraine, organized his forces on what Romanians dubbed the Iaşi front.  He organized two sub-
army groups, ostensibly under the control of the titular general as a sop to Romanian pride, Sub-
Army Group Wöhler consisted of German Eighth Army and Fourth Army, and Sub-Army Group 
Dumitrescu had German Sixth Army and Third Army.  Third Army fielded three corps, one was 
German, and Fourth Army had five corps, one was German.  German Eighth Army just had three 
corps, one was Romanian, but German Sixth Army had five corps, all German.  All four armies 
were actually more intertwined at lower levels from the confused fighting that spring, plus the 
need to buttress Romanian units that had few anti-tank guns or tanks, limited artillery, and raw 
recruits more poorly trained than those in 1941.147  Romanian reinforcements would arrive in the 
following months, but not before one more major Soviet offensive in May.  
Fear became the overriding motivation of soldiers, fear of Soviet occupation and fear, to 
a lesser extent, of draconian discipline enforced by officers.  Fourth Army reported on 21 April 
that Red Army soldiers were terrorizing Romanians in Soviet-occupied territory, including mass 
                                                 
146 Duţu, Armata română în război, 262, 257; his numbers are slightly off as he double counts the 3,000 soldiers 
evacuated by air, see, Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 136; Citino, The Wehrmacht’s Last Stand, 305-307. 
147 Strangely, after dismissing the manpower crisis, Axworthy makes the dumbfounding claim that the Romanian 
Army was better equipped in 1944 than it had been in 1941, see, Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 145-154. 
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rape of girls and women in front of parents or husbands.  General Racoviţa encouraged civilians 
from an area 6 km behind the front to evacuate west.148  Such rumors, and stories of Soviet tanks 
crushing crosses in Romanian cemeteries in the USSR were believed – in many cases were true – 
and motivated men to lay down their lives in defense of hearth and home.  Third Army stragglers 
had caught up, by 1 April only 270 of its 3,800 rehabilitation soldiers were still listed as missing, 
and General Dumitrescu’s 63,700 soldiers stopped Soviet attacks on the Dniester.  On 25 April, 
veterans of 10th Vânători Regiment, dug in deep, waited out a three-hour bombardment, emerged 
quickly, and stopped an attack dead in its tracks.149   During a visit to the front, Antonescu saw 
some soldiers stealing from civilians, so Fourth Army reminded its commanders on 21 April that 
Order No. 10.523 required “the smallest transgressions” be punished by firing squad.  This time 
a spat of executions followed, including two company commanders, because officers needed to 
impress on soldiers that Romanian territory could not be treated like occupied Soviet territory.  
Nevertheless, contrary to the Conducător’s express orders most were not executed, 6th Infantry 
Division with Fourth Army rehabilitated all soldiers who participated in a counterattack in April 
that had been labeled deserters after the retreat in March, and even Antonescu merely confiscated 
the colors of the 18th and 90th Mountain groups for a panicked retreat north of Iaşi at the end of 
the month, which he would return only if they redeemed themselves through combat.150  During 
April desperate Romanian counterattacks and German panzers held the Soviets on the Iaşi front. 
On 2 May, Stavka launched the first Iaşi-Chişinău offensive, hoping to pierce the front at 
Târgu Frumos and then advance south through the Focşani gap into the Wallachian plain.  Soviet 
                                                 
148 They were to take particular care to evacuate any girls 10 or older, see, Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 1596, f. 211.  
149 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 2968, f. 6-7; dosar 2877, f. 17. 
150 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 1533, f. 69, 105, 111; Fond Armata 3-a; dosar 2898, f. 38. 
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forces attacked V and I corps, breaking through badly equipped Romanian units, but LVII Panzer 
Corps came to Fourth Army’s rescue and filled the holes.  The General Staff threw in the 101st, 
102nd, 103rd, 104th Mountain “commands” and the 110th Infantry Brigade as well.  Each of these 
was made up of three battalions of raw recruits or support troops taken from the garrisons of the 
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Mountain, and 10th Infantry divisions.  These improvised combat units were later 
reinforced with survivors from their parent divisions that were being evacuated from Crimea.151  
The Soviet offensive ground to a halt after six days, stopping short of Târgu Frumos just outside 
of the village of Ruginoasa, soldiers quickly nicknamed it “the battle of Ruşinoasă [shameful]” 
because they had not been able to withstand Soviet pressure and needed panzers to save them.152  
On 8 May, German Sixth Army attacked the Soviet bridgehead at Taşlîc, a narrow strip jutting 
30 km from the Dniester towards Chişinău, and destroyed it in a week.153  For the rest of May, 
fighting on the Iaşi front devolved into a series of local attacks by both sides.   
In the meantime, the Allies began coordinating an air campaign against Romania.  While 
Anglo-American bomber fleets still targeted oil production at Ploieşti, supported by the Red Air 
Force, they prioritize destroying railyards in major cities to disrupt Axis operations.  From April 
to August, 157 locomotives, 619 passenger cars, 3,010 freight cars, 1,525 tanker cars, and 10 
vehicles were destroyed.  This hampered the movement of troops and supplies to the front and 
oil deliveries to Germany were reduced to a trickle, however, Allied bombing caused collateral 
                                                 
151 Glantz, Red Storm over the Balkans, 268-274; 19th Infantry Division’s battalions stayed near its garrison on the 
Yugoslav border to fight any of Tito’s partisans who sought sanctuary from German anti-partisan sweeps across the 
frontier in Romania, see, Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 159; Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 3015, f. 9-10.   
152 Ionescu-Qunitus, Ploieşti, 2012. 
153 Temporarily removing the threat of double encirclement, see, Glantz, Red Storm over the Balkans, 291-304, 375.   
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civilian casualties of 7,600 dead, 7,600 injured, and 46,523 wrecked homes.154  On 19 May, the 
General Staff announced that officers, NCOs, or soldiers, whether on the front or in the rear, who 
had family affected by the bombing would receive 15-20 days of leave.155  Romanian reaction to 
the bombing was mixed, it demoralized some and angered others.   
While situation on the Iaşi front improved during May, battles inflicted heavy casualties 
on the Romanian Army.  After panzers helped them stop the Soviets, Fourth Army soldiers dug 
in and repelled attacks.  Desperate for men but unwilling as yet to throw teenage draftees with a 
few weeks training into the fray, the General Staff emptied the Chişinău prison of all stragglers 
and deserters on 10 May and sent them to the front.  General Dumitrescu liberally employed the 
lash to maintain discipline in May, having 491 flogged, 265 for being AWOL or deserting and 84 
for “incorrectness,” compared to just 75 in April.156  German Sixth Army destroyed several other 
small Soviet bridgeheads across the Dniester in the middle of the month.  This convinced Stavka 
to postpone any more major attacks until later that summer to allow the Soviet forces on the Iaşi 
front time to rest, receive replacements, and be resupplied. 157  At the end of May, with Fourth 
Army’s sector near Târgu Frumos stabilized, General Schörner felt confident enough to order 
German Eighth Army to counterattack in the Târgu Frumos-Iaşi sector as well.     
General Wöhler only had the means for a limited offensive.  Its goals were to secure the 
exposed highway between Iaşi and Târgu Frumos, seize key heights north of Iaşi, and disrupt a 
                                                 
154 Luke Truxal, "Bombing the Romanian Rail Network," Air Power History 65, no. 1 (Spring 2018), 15-22; Duţu, 
Armata română în război, 290; the USAAF carried out 42 daylight raids and the RAF at least 23 nighttime raids 
between 4 April and 19 August 1944, see, Bernád, Rumanian Aces of World War 2, 53. 
155 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 2898, f. 47. 
156 Ibid., dosar 2968, f. 289; dosar 3031, f. 61, 73; Third Army had 1,165 soldiers AWOL or deserters: 1054 
Romanians, 11 basarabeni, 32 bukovineni, 25 Hungarians, 16 Ukrainians, 5 Germans, and 22 others, see, f. 62.   
157 Glantz, Red Storm over the Balkans, 317-318.   
 535 
 
Soviet attack Army Group South Ukraine believed was brewing – it had actually been called off.  
At 4 am on 30 May 360 guns opened fire.  The 24th and 23rd Panzer divisions led the attack, with 
German (and Romanian) air support, and in two days fighting took a bite out of the Soviet line to 
the Jijia River.  The German 79th Infantry and 14th Panzer divisions took over, so the 24th Panzer 
Division could shift west for the next part of the offensive.  The second attack by the 24th Panzer 
and Grossdeutschland Panzer Grenadier divisions, supported by the 18th Mountain (formerly 18th 
Infantry) and 3rd Infantry divisions on either flank, on 2 June against now alert Soviet troops met 
with heavy resistance and halted after four days.  Soviet counterattacks carried on for days more, 
aided when American aircraft bombed Iaşi on 7 June disrupting Axis communications.  The two 
attacks succeeded in creating a small bulge in the Soviet defenses, captured 1,500 POWs, and 
destroyed numerous tanks, guns, and aircraft.  They failed, however, to take the hills north of Iaşi 
used to direct Soviet artillery fire.158  The front now settled into a period of relative calm. 
With the front stable, Army Group South Ukraine focused on securing the rear.  Refugees 
in southern Moldavia and Bessarabia included Romanians, Jews, minorities from Bessarabia and 
Transnistria, and HiWis.  The General Staff evacuated an area 5 km behind the frontline and all 
men who were swept up were assigned to labor battalions.  On May 16, it issued special orders in 
regard to Jews from Moldavia who had evacuated south and west after March, all Jews who had 
evacuated from Soviet-occupied territory had to register with local authorities in a city, never in 
the countryside, and could not leave, but Jews from territory not occupied by the Soviets had to 
return.159  In early June, Army Group South Ukraine complained there were still refugees in the 5 
                                                 
158 Glantz, Red Storm over the Balkans, 339-365; Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 1666, f. 89, 96-99, 258-259, 100. 
159 Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 1814, f. 141.   
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km zone in its rear, and that locals were returning home to southern Bessarabia since the front 
had stabilized.  General Wöhler argued refugees were a threat, claiming some betrayed Third 
Army movements to the Red Army, and requested basarabeni be stopped from returning.160  The 
Rural Gendarmerie had precipitously evacuated southern Bessarabia in March, making it hard to 
stop basarabeni from returning home and giving them the option to ignore mobilization orders 
that spring, but most youths answered the call to defend their homes.161 
The General Staff knew that it was only a matter of time before the Red Army attacked 
again and prepared for a final battle.  The Romanian Army faced almost every kind of shortage: 
weapons, ammunition, and equipment, officers and NCOs, training and experience, but it fielded 
a large number of soldiers determined to defend their country to the last.  Reinforcements finally 
arrived during the summer, swelling Fourth and Third armies’ ranks to 432,000, although most 
were new recruits with three months training.  Morale in the ranks was shaky.  In some respects, 
soldiers’ situation had improved because so close to home soldiers were not short of food, mail 
arrived on time, and leave was regular, but the Red Army’s obvious superiority meant that they 
knew their fate was sealed.  In consequence, the General Staff organized a propaganda blitz to 
bolster morale.  Officers held meetings, especially for new recruits, where materials the General 
Staff provided were read to the ranks to remind them of what they were fighting for: a defensive 
war after Soviet occupation in 1940, the restoration of România Mare, Christian civilization, and 
protecting families from Soviet tyranny.  Propaganda missionaries and chaplains preached faith 
in final victory.162  How much these efforts convinced Romanian soldiers that the Axis could still 
                                                 
160 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 3026, f. 8-11, 13, 18, 19.  
161 Ibid., dosar 2968, f. 138.   
162 But there were shortages in all printed materials, see, Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 1814, f. 496, 509, 313-314. 
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win the war is debatable, but they reinforce soldiers’ motivation to keep fighting.  Colonel Mitica 
Panaite, an instructor at an artillery school in Focşani, noted on 6 July, “We are few remaining, 
few indeed who still believe in a good ending!  My optimism has not waned, but you probably 
need to be a German to still be able to believe [in final victory].”163  If few believed in a good 
ending, most were not ready to surrender their country into the hands of the Soviets. 
The Iaşi front was remained quiet from June to August.  In certain places a live and let 
live attitude developed in the trenches, 2nd Lieutenant Gheorghe Netejoru recalled that neither 
side fired at men getting water in his sector, but the Soviets keep up the pressure with patrols, 
artillery or air bombardments, and local attacks, which caused on average 3,600 casualties each 
month.164  During this same time the number of stragglers, soldiers gone AWOL, and deserters 
remained manageable.  Since 1941 divisions had averaged a hundred soldiers missing for various 
reasons per month, after battles the number often increased.  In the fourteen weeks between 22 
March and 5 July, the 14th Infantry Division reported 744.165  Generals Dumitrescu and Racoviţa 
still worried basarabeni in the ranks might again desert in large numbers as they had in 1940, so 
officers kept a close watch on them and tried to split them up and mix them in among men from 
the Old Kingdom who they considered to be more reliable.  There is evidence that basarabeni, 
especially those from territory already occupied by the Soviets, were less motivated to fight since 
they wanted to return home to be with their families.166  General Pantazi inspected Fourth Army 
                                                 
163 Fond Manuscrise, MSS 625, f. 3.  
164 Netejoru, Şi eu am luptat în est, 71; 3,849 in June, 4,344 in July, and 2,591 in August, see, Axworthy, Third Axis, 
Fourth Ally, 159.  
165 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 2968, f. 535-536, 548, 553, 573, 575.   
166 Third Army reported that the 18th Security Battalion, comprised of 564 basarabeni and 2 from the Old Kingdom, 
only had 8 deserters, 5 “returned from desertion,” and 67 absent without leave during March and April 1944, plus 
134 lost in Crimea, see, Ibid., dosar 2968, f. 162; German XXIX Corps reported that during 1-10 June 1944 that 
there were no deserters from the 9th Infantry Division, three (two basarabeni) from the 21st Infantry Division, and 14 
basarabeni from 4th Mountain Division, in response to Soviet promises that they would be allowed to go home, see, 
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four times, and Third Army once, during the summer.  After the war he was adamant that, “The 
troops were in excellent physical and moral condition; [however] it is true that the moral 
condition was due in large part to the presence of German armored divisions.”167  
The news from other fronts was not encouraging.  Romanian officers and soldiers closely 
followed Operation Overlord in Normandy after 6 June and Operation Bagration against Army 
Group Center in Byelorussia after 22 June; they knew if Nazi Germany collapsed that Romania 
was doomed.  The announcement Hitler had survived the 20 July 1944 bomb plot was greeted 
with relief by Romanian troops because they assumed that it meant that the German Army would 
not abandon them to the Red Army.  V Corps reported that as France and Poland were liberated 
by the Allies its soldiers “are worried about the way in which the war will end and they do not 
hesitate to show, their desire to conclude a peace as quickly as possible.  Their morale, can be 
considered good still.”  Since soldiers did not want peace at any price.  “Our battle is regarded 
confidently, figuring that, without the barrier of the Army, the Country would be the prey of 
bolshevism.168  The decision by German High Command in mid-July to strip Army Group South 
Ukraine of its panzers had a disquieting effect on the Romanian Army.  In June there had been 
nine panzer or panzer grenadier divisions in Romania, but by August there were only two panzer 
(one in desperate need of refitting), one panzer grenadier, and the 1st Armored divisions.169  The 
departure of the panzers did not go unnoticed by Romanian soldiers or civilians.  General Korne, 
promoted to lead the rebuilt 1st Armored Division, noted on 2 August that the trains loaded with 
                                                 
dosar 3028, f. 175; on 10 August 1944, the 4th Mountain Division reported it had 118 deserters, 32 from Soviet 
occupied Bessarabia, 3 from Romanian occupied Bessarabia, 12 from occupied Bukovina, 10 from Soviet occupied 
Moldavia, and 61 from the rest of the country, see, dosar 2968, f. 548.  
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168 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 1635, f. 35.  
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panzers passing through Transylvania were watched mournfully by peasants late into the night.  
He ordered his soldiers to be told that the transfer of panzers was in Romania’s interest – so the 
German Army could win battles elsewhere to help the Romanian Army.170   
The Antonescu regime was still willing to make great sacrifices in lives and even territory 
to hold back the Red Army.  On 5 August, during their last meeting, Antonescu tried to convince 
Hitler to transfer panzers back to the Iaşi front or to abandon southern Bessarabia and almost all 
of Moldavia to a line along the Carpathians, the FNB fortifications, and the Danube.  He argued 
that this shorter line on strong natural defenses could be held by Romanian infantry and free up 
more German units to be transferred to Poland, but Hitler believed this was only a ruse to allow 
Antonescu to abandon the Axis once the German forces left Romania.171  While the meeting was 
acrimonious at times, it ended with Antonescu promising to fight to the end, the Iaşi front would 
be held.  The German High Command did not believe Stavka had any forces left after Operation 
Bagration for another offensive against Army Group South Ukraine, but it was mistaken.   
 On 19 August, after amassing overwhelming forces, two Soviet army groups began local 
attacks all along the front and then the next day launched two concentric attacks, later called the 
second Iaşi-Chişinău offensive.  The Second Ukrainian Front would strike the main blow in the 
Târgu Frumos-Iaşi sector held by Fourth Army bracketed on each side by German Eighth Army, 
German XVII Corps on its left flank along the Carpathian foothills and Mieth Group on its right 
flank north of Iaşi, driving south with the goal of breaking through the weak Romanian-German 
line, overrunning the rest of Moldavia, and pouring through the Focşani gap into the Wallachian 
                                                 
170 Fond Armata 4-a, dosar 1635, f. 114.   
171 Although he finally agreed to use the FNB line as a fallback, see, Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 161.   
 540 
 
plain.  This would also cut off German Sixth Army’s retreat from southern Bessarabia.  German 
Sixth Army, commanded by General Maximilian Fretter-Pico, held the Chişinău sector between 
the Prut and Dniester and most of the Dniester river bank, but it too was only “a horde of nearly 
immobile infantry.”172  Third Army held the lower Dniester and guarded the coast from a Soviet 
landing.  The Third Ukrainian Front targeted the seam between the two armies from a bridgehead 
it held across the Dniester at Tiraspol and planned to drive west to the Prut as quickly as possible 
to cut off and encircle German Sixth Army, Third Army’s fate was an afterthought.173 
Two massive barrages, both about an hour and a half in duration, pulverized the German-
Romanian defenses in the Târgu Frumos-Iaşi sector and on the Dniester.  The Soviets had 1,200 
tanks in Moldavia, plus 600 tanks squeezed into the Dniester bridgehead, which they committed 
almost immediately forcing the Axis defenses to crumple.  Romanian units that stood and fought 
were crushed, some panicked and fled on foot or by cart since few trucks were left, and the rest 
retreated opening holes in the front.  The same was true of German units, some of which broke 
under Soviet pressure, and the Red Army split open the line on the Dniester the first day.  That 
evening Antonescu visited Fourth Army headquarters where General Avramescu, temporarily in 
charge as General Racoviţa was away on leave, and Lt. Colonel Dragomir favored an immediate 
retreat south to the FNB line to block the Focşani gap.  Antonescu, General Şteflea, and General 
Wöhler decided to try to reform a line on the Bahlui River just behind Fourth Army, which was 
more realistic because foot-bound and poorly-trained Romanian soldiers would never be able to 
carry out the fighting retreat envisioned by Avramescu.  German-Romanian counterattacks in the 
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Târgu Frumos-Iaşi sector on 21 August failed to contain Soviet breakthroughs.  The following 
day Antonescu ordered Şteflea to organize a phased withdrawal of Fourth Army to the FNB line.  
The Conducător met with General Johannes Friessner, recently transferred to head Army Group 
South Ukraine, and convinced him off the wisdom of his unilateral action.  Soviet troops crossed 
the lower Dniester in force early on 22 August and Cetatea Albă fell by the evening.  General 
Dumitrescu responded by ordering Third Army to begin a headlong retreat west to the nearest 
crossing over the Danube at Ismail to try to set up a new defensive line on the river.174   
Conclusion 
 The collapse of the Iaşi front, after the withdrawal of most panzer forces, was inevitable 
because the disaster outside Stalingrad had eviscerated the Romanian Army, and its contribution 
to the defense of the Kuban bridgehead and Crimea further hollowed it out.  While morale in the 
ranks understandably began to suffer during the retreats and evacuations of 1943, the underlying 
motivation of Romanian soldiers remained sound.  They understood Romania was imperiled by 
the advance of the Red Army and despite reverses on the front most proved resilient in combat.  
Furthermore, after each major retreat most stragglers returned, and the policy of rehabilitation 
continued to function reasonably well until the war ended.  Officers used atrocity propaganda, 
flogging, awards, and the threat of execution to reinforce soldiers’ motivation.     
When the Red Army reached Romania, the Antonescu regime managed to throw enough 
soldiers into the fight to help stop it as it mobilized more men for a final battle.  While few still 
believed in final victory, Romania’s “holy war” to destroy communism had morphed into a war 
of national defense and soldiers feared an awful retribution for crimes in the USSR.  The General 
                                                 
174 For a very detailed, day by day, blow by blow account, see, Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 167-174.  
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Staff mobilized 1,077,000 soldiers by August 1944 – an incredible number, near its 1940 peak, 
before România Mare was carved up – because Romanian society still supported the war.  On 22 
August, the eve of a royal coup against Antonescu, there was every indication that the Romanian 
Army would continue to fight to the bitter end.  The collapse of the Iaşi front would trigger the 
fall of the Conducător, not through a popular revolt, but a palace coup organized by Mihai I and 
a coterie of a few disaffected Carlist officers that decapitated the militarist faction of the officer 
corps.  Subsequent events would demonstrate that the officer corps made one last attempt to save 
Romania from prolonged Soviet occupation through feat of arms.  This required soldiers to keep 
fighting for another nine months on the Eastern Front. 
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CHAPTER XI  
EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION 
 
Leaving General Şteflea to direct Fourth Army’s retreat to the FNB line, Antonescu flew 
back to Bucharest late on 22 August and planned to leave the next day to a headquarters being 
set up in the “Transylvanian plateau” as a national redoubt.  He met with National Peasant leader 
Ion Mihalache and then Liberal leader Gheorghe Brătianu, both from the conservative wings of 
their outlawed parties and on good terms with Antonescu, who both pressured him to meet with 
King Mihai I and discuss a possible armistice.  He seemed amenable, but in the morning Vice 
President Mihai Antonescu and the Conducător’s wife had to cajole him to meet with youthful 
monarch.  Finally, they convinced him to set up a meeting for 3 pm that day.  They had no idea 
that they were playing into the hands of a small group of plotters who would have been frustrated 
if Antonescu had kept his plans to go to Transylvania where he would have been unreachable.   
Mihai Antonescu arrived punctually, met by Mihai I and General Sănătescu, Chief of the 
Military Household, but the Conducător showed up late.  He did not want to brief the king on the 
situation at the front because the news was bad and weakened his position with Mihai I who was 
still technically head of state and had been flirting with politicians who favored a negotiated end 
to the war.  He reported that the Soviets had broken through both in Moldavia and in Bessarabia 
and was soon blaming everyone but himself for the collapse.  Mihai I interrupted, asking if it was 
not time to consider an armistice, but Antonescu rejected this outright.  He would only accept an 
armistice if the Germans agreed, received a guarantee from the Anglo-Americans that Romania 
would not be occupied by the Soviets, and the fate of eastern Romania should be decided after 
the war.  Mihai Antonescu mediated and suggested waiting a few days for a response from 
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Anglo-American agents in Ankara in neutral Turkey to see if they accepted these terms.  Mihai I 
and Sănătescu pushed the Conducător to step aside, he refused, arguing the Axis had to try to 
hold the FNB line, even if it meant throwing battalions of teenage draftees without little training 
or heavy equipment into the path of the Soviet juggernaut, and if Wallachia was overrun then the 
Romanian Army would “withdraw to the mountains and will try to hold them there.”  “If that’s 
how things are, then there’s nothing more for us to do,” the king replied and then stood up.  This 
declaration contained a prearranged phrase that was the signal for a captain and three NCOs from 
the Military Household who were waiting in the next room to enter.  They arrested both Marshal 
Antonescu and Mihai Antonescu, escorting them to be locked in a room nearby, but not before 
Antonescu shouted “tomorrow you will all be executed” and spit in the captains’ face.1 
 The conspirators quickly moved to decapitate the Antonescu regime.  They summoned 
generals Pantazi, Vasiliu, and Tobescu, respectively Minister of Defense, Minister of Internal 
Affairs, the Chief of the Gendarmerie, in the name of Antonescu and arrested them.  The Prefect 
of Bucharest followed.  Eugen Cristescu, chief of the SSI, suspicious of the summons, refused to 
come, and alerted the Germans.  General Iosif Teodorescu, head of the Military Command of the 
Capital, was convinced by his chief of staff, who was one of the main conspirators, to lock down 
Bucharest.  The German Military Mission had its communications cut.  At 10:30 pm a speech by 
the king was broadcast over the radio that told the nation that “only way to save the country from 
total catastrophe” was to abandon the Axis, declared a new “government of national unity,” and 
announced an armistice – repeatedly emphasizing Great Britain and the United States along with 
                                                 
1 For an account of the coup based on King Mihai I’s recollections, see, Porter, King Michael of Romania, 98-110.  
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the Soviet Union to soften the shock of making peace with “Judeo-Bolshevism.”2  Moscow was 
surprised by the coup, an armistice had not been negotiated, and the Red Army continued to treat 
the Romanian Army as a foe.  The officer corps was taken unware too.  Already collapsing, the 
Romanian Army now disintegrated as commanders decided whether to keep fighting, surrender, 
or try to escape.3  Nonetheless, senior officers accepted the authority of the king who was still 
the official head of the Romanian Army.  General Dumitrescu told General Friessner, after he 
asked if Third Army would abandon the Germans after three years of comradeship, “I cannot 
take another attitude than that which H.M. the King and the new government took.”4   
The German-Romanian military divorce was remarkably cordial at first.  While General 
Friessner initially wanted to order all Romanian troops disarmed, he was dissuaded by his chief 
of staff, and for good reason.  Contrary to later German accusations, Romanian soldiers did not 
attack the Germans or let the Soviets through.5   If Army Group South Ukraine had attempted to 
disarm them, however, the amicable bubble would have popped.   At Focşani, Colonel Panaite 
watched columns of German and Romanian soldiers stream by for days after 23 August, German 
officers separated and organized German troops into ad-hoc companies.  Panaite was content to 
let heavily armed and anxious Germans, “who are afraid of their own shadow,” pass unmolested, 
even after news arrived that the Luftwaffe had bombed Bucharest.6  On 25 August, the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs ordered prefects to maintain order, refugees to be fed, and Romanian soldiers 
                                                 
2 Ibid., 112, 115.    
3 General Racoviţa claimed he was involved in the planning of the coup to explain his absence from Fourth Army, 
but it appears he had just taken the traditional August leave, see, Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 177, 180. 
4 For his full report on 23 August 1944 to the Ministry of Defense, see, Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 3065, f. 284-287.  
5 Heniz Guderian, Panzer Leader (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 1996), 367.   
6 Between 24-26 August destroyed or damaged 100 buildings, killed seven, and wounded 22.  The new government 
tried to whip up public anger against these “terror attacks.”  Today, Romanians like to say that two days of German 
bombing did more damage than five months of the Anglo-American bombing.  The Allies damaged or destroyed 
9,500 buildings, killed 5,224, and wounded 5,482 in the capital, see, Armă, Bucureşti sub bombardamente, 202, 179. 
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to disarm and intern German soldiers.  Panaite began disarming Germans, but let them continue 
without their weapons, at least until the first Soviet patrols arrived on 29 August.7  Third Army 
tried to escape across the Danube, fighting as late as 25 August, but the Soviets landed marines 
by sea to force it to surrender.  A large part of Fourth Army was cut off and went into captivity.  
On 24 August, General Schwab, technically commander of VII Corps but now just one of many 
confused men, tried to escape by car.  He and his driver were halted by a group of Soviet soldiers 
and he shot himself rather than be captured.8  An estimated 154,000 soldiers had been captured 
by 12 September when a Soviet-Romanian armistice was finally signed.  The Germans lost over 
200,000 men in subsequent weeks.  The conspirators organized a defense of Bucharest, secured 
the oil fields around Ploieşti, and cleared other key points.  Resistance from scattered Luftwaffe 
or other German rear echelon units was limited and Romanian rear echelon troops captured tens 
of thousands.9  The first Soviet units, including the Tudor Vladimirescu Division recruited from 
Romanian POWs in camps in the USSR, paraded through Bucharest on 30 August.   
Historians have assigned the royal coup an importance that obscures Romanian soldiers’ 
intrinsic motivation in the previous three years.  In the traditional narrative, 23 August 1944 and 
the following nine months of combat by the Romanian Army until 9 May 1945 are pointed to as 
proof that Romania was only ever a reluctant ally of the Axis, the officer corps was always pro-
Allied, and troops were excited to fight Hungary but apathetic about fighting east of the Dniester 
against the USSR.  Therefore, the alliance with Nazi Germany and Romanian participation in the 
                                                 
7 Fond Manuscrise, MSS 625, f. 24-31; Fond Corpul de Munte, dosar 1814, f. 418.   
8 Romanian military historians have tried to turn this into an act of honorable suicide, however, it seems likely that 
Schwab feared what is fate would be under the Soviets as an ethnic German, German soldiers were separated from 
Romanian soldiers and treated more poorly, or for war crimes in Crimea, see, Duţu, Armata română în război, 347. 
9 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 174-175, 185-186, 188-193; Citino, The Wehrmacht’s Last Stand, 311-312. 
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Holocaust was Antonescu’s war and not Romania’s “holy war.”  That narrative glosses over the 
fact that most of Romanian society had supported Operation Barbarossa in 1941, still supported 
the defense of Romania from the Soviets, and that the coup was orchestrated by a clique around 
the king with connections to the small liberal opposition.  Indeed, there is every sign that officers 
and soldiers would have kept fighting the Red Army if the coup had not taken place. 
The path towards an armistice with the USSR is overemphasized by historians who argue 
that Romanians did not support Hitler’s war of annihilation against “Judeo-Bolshevism.”  In fact, 
directed by the Conducător’s right-hand man Mihai Antonescu, Romanian diplomats in neutral 
capitals across Europe spread this narrative of Romanian reluctance after Stalingrad to justify 
Romania’s continued contribution to the Nazi war effort – many of these diplomats continued to 
propagate this story after the war.  They shaped the historiography up to today.  The Antonescu 
regime never seriously considered a separate peace with the Soviets until defeat was staring it in 
the face in spring 1944, even then it shied away.  Antonescu preferred to retreat to Transylvania, 
in a repeat of Romania’s stand in Moldavia during the First World War, rather than accept Soviet 
terms.  The choice not to negotiate an armistice before the second Iaşi-Chişinău offensive shows 
the continued strength of nationalism, religion, and anti-communism.  Only anti-Semitism was 
less prominent, but it too remained inculcated in the officer corps and the ranks.   
The Antonescu regime, and most Romanians, entertained fantasies of an anti-communist 
alliance between the Axis and the Anglo-Americans to save Romania from Soviet occupation.10  
In a meeting in January 1943, Antonescu mentioned the idea to Hitler of a compromise peace 
with the Anglo-Americans so Nazi Germany to destroy the USSR.  The Führer rejected the idea. 
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The Anglo-American doctrine of “unconditional surrender” declared a few days afterward at the 
Casablanca Conference shattered Romanian hopes they might form an anti-communist alliance.11  
There were no additional efforts until after the Anglo-American landing in Sicily and the fall of 
Mussolini’s government.  Antonescu met with Raoul Bossy, a diplomat leaving for neutral Bern 
to influence international opinion, on 1 September 1943.  The Conducător laid out arguments to 
explain why Romania did not abandon the Axis.  He had “had to enter the war against Russia” 
because Romania could not “receive Bessarabia as a gift from the Germans” and so lose northern 
Transylvania permanently.  He was then “forced” to advance to the Don.  “I did not persecute the 
Jews,” he lied.  He could not withdraw troops from the Kuban bridgehead because the Germans 
would supposedly shoot Romanian generals “as they shot the Italians generals who retreated in 
Sicily.”  He prevented the Germans from occupying the country, blocked the exiled Legionaries 
from coming back to power, and avoided the loss of southern Transylvania to Hungary.12  These 
were all self-serving lies or half-truths designed to obscure Romanian commitment to the Axis 
and how deeply officers and soldiers had implicated themselves in Hitler’s war of annihilation.  
Nevertheless, they are still cited by historians.  Antonescu used the same arguments at the trial of 
leaders of the Antonescu regime in May 1946 in Bucharest.  The People’s Tribunal highlighted 
the Conducător’s role in persecuting Jews, Gypsies, and religious sects to discredit him, but it 
backfired.  Antonescu’s defense was seen as honorable and patriotic, plus most Romanians had 
agreed with his harsh polices against these groups during the war, and most favored leniency for 
the former Conducător and six others condemned to death.  Nonetheless, he was shot, along with 
                                                 
11 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 119-120.   
12 A faction inside the Antonescu regime, mostly in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, began to see their role as saving 
Romania from Soviet occupation by sacrificing the Conducător and gladly repeated his arguments that emphasized 
German coercion to neutral or Anglo-American agents, see, Bossy, Recollections of a Romanian diplomat, 455-456.   
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Mihai Antonescu, General Vasiliu, and Governor Alexianu, on 1 June 1946; the sentences of 
General Pantazi, Eugen Cristescu, and Radu Lecca were reduced to life in prison.13  Antonescu 
became an anti-communist martyr and the strength of his myth endures in Romania to this day. 
The announcement, on 8 September 1943, of an armistice between Italy and the Anglo-
Americans gave the Antonescu regime new hope that Romania might escape Soviet occupation.  
Mihai Antonescu, along with the liberal opposition, became obsessed with rumors of an Anglo-
American landing in the Balkans and tried to encourage Allied representatives to commit to such 
an endeavor to act as a shield from Sovietization.14  While Romanian diplomats with links to the 
liberal opposition later claimed Antonescu was naïve about foreign policy, the liberal opposition 
shared the same hopes to escape from Soviet occupation and used the same arguments in parallel 
discussions with Allied agents.  Both were rebuffed by Anglo-American representatives who told 
the Romanians they would have to deal with the Soviets.  The Antonescu regime finally reached 
out to the Soviets after the Red Army overran northeastern Romania in March 1944.  Beginning 
the next month, representatives began negotiating in Stockholm in neutral Sweden.  Moscow told 
Bucharest its minimum armistice requirements were: the Romanian Army had to turn against the 
German Army, return to 1940 borders, reparations, and release of Soviet POWs.  The Antonescu 
regime countered with: a window of time to let the Germans withdraw, a Romanian headquarters 
in the “Transylvanian plateau” the Red Army could not occupy, and a postponement on the fate 
of on northern Bukovina and Bessarabia until after the war.  The two sides argued back and forth 
                                                 
13 The group included 18 others, only some of whom were present, the rest were tried in absentia.  During the trail, 
Iuliu Maniu testified in a way that cast the Conducător in a good light.  Mihai I tried to find a way to commute all 
the sentences, but failed, see, Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 249-259; Porter, Michael of Romania, 158-159.   
14 Giurescu, Romania in the Second World War, 286-288, 300-301. 
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until the pointless talks petered out in early July 1944.15  Frustrated, Stavka planned to overrun 
Romania anyway, but fortunately for Moscow Mihai I’s royal coup presented the Soviets with a 
cooperative government to sign an armistice and legitimize Soviet occupation. 
 For the first half of the war the king had been a willing figurehead.  Mihai I’s portrait was 
placed alongside those of Antonescu and Hitler at all official celebrations, he visited the front at 
Ţiganca and Odessa, promoted Antonescu to the rank of marshal in August 1941, received the 
Order of Michael the Brave from Antonescu at the November 1941 victory parade in Bucharest, 
received German generals, and met with Hitler in December 1941.  Mihai I and Queen-Mother 
Helen, to their credit, privately protested the deportation of Jews from Bukovina and Bessarabia 
to Transnistria in September 1941, managing to save a few individuals, and the massacre of Jews 
at Odessa in October 1941.  They spoke against the deportation of the rest of Romania’s Jews in 
1942 and advocated for the repatriation of Jews from Transnistria in 1943.16  Between 1940 and 
1943, Antonescu kept the young monarch isolated and uninformed, especially when a coup led 
by Serb officers put the 17-year-old King Peter II on the throne of Yugoslavia in 1941, triggering 
German invasion.  The Conducător was anxious that Carlist officers should not use the monarch 
to depose him.  He need not have worried as most officers remained loyal to his militarist faction 
until 23 August 1944.  After Stalingrad the relationship between Mihai I and Antonescu began to 
change.  The king chaffed under restrictions and censorship – his 1943 New Year’s declaration 
was altered for allegedly indirectly criticizing Antonescu and the revised version still upset the 
German Military Mission for simply mentioning a hope for peace.  Mihai I then invited members 
                                                 
15 Giurescu, Romania in the Second World War, 326-328.  
16 Ibid., 308-309; in Berlin the queen-mother was referred to as “the Jew lover” and was blamed for halting the 
deportation of Jews to Auschwitz, see, Porter, Michael of Romania, 70-76.   
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of the liberal opposition to a royal hunting trip in February 1943.  This was his signal that he was 
ready to take a larger role in politics, but he continued to publicly support the war. 
 Antonescu decided to appoint General Sănătescu as the Chief of the Military Household 
in March 1943.  He was a cavalryman and longtime acquaintance that Antonescu trusted to keep 
Mihai I informed enough about military developments, as the king was now demanding, to keep 
him compliant, but politically isolated from the liberal opposition.  Ironically, Sănătescu quickly 
came to see Mihai I as a means to increase his own influence and eventually engineered the coup 
against Antonescu.  Sănătescu had been a prominent Carlist officer and one of the deputy chiefs 
of the General Staff in 1937.  In 1940, as VIII Corps commander, he investigated the Dorohoi 
pogrom.  After 1 February 1941 he commanded IV Corps, fought at Odessa and Stalingrad, and 
replaced General Constantinescu-Claps in command of Fourth Army between 11 February and 
24 January 1944.  At first Sănătescu tried to mediate between Antonescu and Mihai I, but soon 
began to help the king.  His dual position as Chief of the Military Household and commander of 
Fourth Army provided Mihai I with accurate reports from the General Staff and the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs.  He also put the king in contact with other former Carlist officers who had been 
demoted or retired in 1940 after Antonescu took power and resented the Conducător.17   
Mihai I used intermediaries to communicate with Liberal and National Peasant leaders 
and diplomats in the Antonescu regime who were sympathetic to finding a way out of the Axis 
alliance.  The SSI kept Antonescu well-informed on these developments.  He told his naysaying 
diplomats like Bossy, who believed Germany was near collapse in February 1943, that the small 
liberal elite were “misled by the aristocratic and cosmopolitan milieu in which [they] lived” and 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
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that foreign diplomats in Bucharest, “Seeing only ladies from our upper class and moving only in 
anglophile circles, they imagine that this country is pro-British, while in fact the people follow 
me one hundred percent.”18  While the Conducător was exaggerating, it was not by much.  He 
correctly gauged the commitment of Germans to Hitler’s regime and, as a non-boyar who had 
commanded Romanian peasant soldiers for most of his life, he had a much better understanding 
of their support for the “holy war.”  Antonescu mistakenly did not consider the king a threat.   
By the summer of 1944, Mihai I and a few conspirators had developed a small network of 
liberal politicians prepared to back a royal coup.  The king’s primary conspirators were: General 
Sănătescu; General Gheorghe Mihail, who was Chief of the Military Household, Sub-Secretary 
of the Ministry of Defense, and Chief of the General Staff under Carol II; General Aurel Aldea, a 
logistics officer on the General Staff and head of the Ministry of Army Endowment under Carol 
II; and Colonel Dumitru Dămăceanu, a staff officer of the Military Command of the Capital with 
the mission to convince General Teodorescu to back the coup when it came.19  On 20 June 1944, 
the Liberal, National Peasant, Social Democrat, and Communist parties agreed to establish the 
clandestine National Democratic Bloc, so it was in place to give the coup a democratic veneer of 
popular support.20  The influence of these political parties, reduced to little more than their core 
leadership and a few thousand committed members operating illegally since 1938, was limited to 
the liberal elite.  They did not represent a national consensus in favor of usurping the Antonescu 
regime.  Mihai I and his conspirators knew that the officer corps could not be trusted to abandon 
the German Army and had seen what happened in Italy when a coup was launched before Allied 
                                                 
18 Bossy, Recollections of a Romanian Diplomat, 447.   
19 Porter, Michael of Romania, 100, 114-116. 
20 Giruescu, Romania in the Second World War, 320. 
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forces arrived – the Wehrmacht occupied Italy and restored Mussolini triggering a bloody civil 
war.  Therefore, they chose the moment for the royal coup very carefully and very successfully. 
The armistice negotiations took place in Moscow during early September.  The Soviets 
dismissed Romanian efforts to leverage the royal coup or inclusion of the Romanian Communist 
Party in the National Democratic Bloc for better conditions.  The Soviet-Romanian armistice was 
appropriately harsh for a defeated enemy that had participated in the German invasion from the 
first day, carried out atrocities across the Soviet Union, and occupied Transnistria.  Its 20 articles 
required: free movement of Soviet forces, liberation of Soviet POWs, payment of the costs of 
Soviet occupation, reparations in goods or materials worth 300 million dollars, arrest and trial of 
war criminals, and dissolution of organizations “of a Fascist type.” 21  Two important conditions 
were Article 1 that demanded the Romanian Army field a minimum of 12 divisions for the Red 
Army and Article 18 that established an Allied Control Commission to occupy Romania.  There 
would be no inviolate “Transylvanian plateau” or de facto royal dictatorship under Mihai I.    
The demands of the Soviet-Romanian armistice of 12 September 1944, soldiers’ intrinsic 
motivation, and institutional extrinsic motivation explain the Romanian Army’s contribution to 
the Soviet war effort after 23 August.  The Romanian Army eventually contributed 19 divisions 
to Soviet campaigns in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, seven more than required by the armistice.  
After the royal coup, many of the 245,000 men who were not captured by the Soviets, believing 
the war was over, simply went home and it took weeks to remobilize these soldiers.  First Army, 
improvised from rear or training units in Wallachia, fended off German-Hungarian attacks along 
                                                 
21 For the full Soviet-Romanian armistice, see, R.Y. Malinovski, L Patrascanu, D. Damaceanu, B. Stirbey, and G. 
Popp, “The Armistice Agreement with Romania; September 12, 1944,” The Avalon Project, accessed 4 May 2018, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/rumania.asp.   
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the western frontier in September to cover the Soviet advance.  Fourth Army supported the Red 
Army operations in October to liberate northern Transylvania from Hungarian occupation, which 
went a long way to legitimizing Mihai I’s coup.  First and Fourth armies participated in the Red 
Army’s campaign in Hungary, helping seize Budapest, until December 1944.  Then they fought 
in Czechoslovakia.22  The king launched the coup to spare Romania the ravages of war and avoid 
the Sovietization of his country, it was partly successful in the former and failed in the latter.  
The Romanian Army faced conditions as difficult as any before 23 August 1944, perhaps 
worse, but Romanians soldiers continued to fight because of the same deep-rooted motivations as 
before – except anti-Semitism was discouraged and flogging was officially banned.  Nationalism 
motivated Romanian soldiers to fight to Stalingrad, and now to the gates of Prague.  If northern 
Bukovina and Bessarabia were lost, northern Transylvania was redeemable.  In Sentinla’s third 
to last issue, on 10 September, after reading the king’s proclamation Private Neaţa celebrates and 
then advances with Soviet-Romanian forces against a mustachioed Hungarian soldier as the sun 
dawns over the mountains, “Forward, comrades, for us the sun has risen!”23  The reality was far 
more prosaic and confused.  Sergeant Ezechil’s colonel confirmed the radio broadcast by visiting 
the Military Command of the Capital and then told his men that soon Red Army soldiers would 
arrive and some “will not forget about the conflict [we] had with them.  They will try to provoke 
us to make a scene.”  He warned they would try to demand their pistols.24  Corporal Cârlan, who 
had been demobilized after escaping Crimea in April, was at home and preparing to report to his 
regiment on 23 August after a gendarme delivered a messaged that veterans of Crimea were to be 
                                                 
22 A few Romanian armored units fought in Austria, see, Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 199-202, 209-214. 
23 Rădulescu, “Păţanile Soldatului Neaţa,” Sentinela, 10 Septembrie 1944, 3.   
24 Ezechil, La porţile infernului, 84.   
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mobilized for the front.  The next morning, he learned of the royal coup, but he still reported to 
his regiment in Brăila where he and his comrades were put to work replacing hay in mattresses to 
prevent them from discussing the troubling events.  A few days later they were ordered to set up 
patrols on the highways to round up German soldiers, “Many among our soldiers looked on with 
sadness at these prisoners with whom until yesterday we were comrades in arms and now we 
treat them as enemies.  Nevertheless, there were Romanian soldiers that during the night robbed 
them of wedding rings, watches, pens, etc.”25  Soldiers carried out their duty with heavy hearts as 
former allies were interned and former foes allowed to pass.   
After the German Army enlisted the Hungarian Army to attack Romania in September, 
Romanian soldiers were less sympathetic towards their erstwhile allies.  2nd Lieutenant Crisan, 
demobilized after fighting at Odessa to run a militarized factory in his native Arad because of a 
medical problem, had to flee east as German-Hungarian forces advanced.  He and a couple other 
Baptists evaded Axis patrols on foot and then took a train to the Carpathian foothills where they 
met the Red Army, “Soon they were coming in swarms from every direction, it seemed.  It was 
the most amazing thing I had ever seen.  An ocean of people marching!”26  The Tirol Training 
Center threw the 988th, 989th, 990th, 998th, and 999th Independent Infantry battalions into the fray 
to bulk up understrength units.27  By 19 September enough Soviet and Romanian reinforcements 
had arrived to allow a counteroffensive.  On 28 September, General Racoviţa, the new Minister 
of War, officially abrogated the 1941 orders regulating flogging, declaring “beating was always 
considered as a degrading punishment,” and on 13 October ordered, “I completely ban this brutal 
                                                 
25 Cârlan, Păstraţi-mi amintirile!, 196-201. 
26 Crisan, An Amazing Life, 138, 143-146 
27 Fond CI Nr. 5 Sărata, dosar 376, f. 2, 56-57; Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 195-198.  
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manner of punishment.”28  While flogging may have ended, unofficial beatings most likely did 
not, and Romanian commanders – under pressure from Soviet superiors – still used threats. 
The Soviets and the General Staff tried to harness Romanian nationalism to keep soldiers 
fighting.  Article 19 of the Soviet-Romanian armistice promised the return of “Transylvania or of 
the greater part of it,” leaving its final frontier unclear, but Article 4 explicitly restored the 1940 
border in eastern Romania.  Third Army reported on 9 September that two basarabeni asked to 
be demobilized or at least given leave to find their refugee families and decide on if they would 
stay or go home.29  Some nationalists believed that Romania might expand its western frontier at 
Hungary’s expense.  During Fourth Army’s advance into northern Transylvania, soldiers scrolled 
“To the Tisa!” on their equipment.  Northern Transylvania was kept hostage under direct Soviet 
military control after its liberation.30  Those fighting farther into Hungary were told they were 
fighting to ensure the return of northern Transylvania and possibly to annex territory to the Tisa, 
although by November some plaintively wrote “We crossed the Tisa” on their guns.31  Northern 
Transylvania was returned to civilian control on 9 March 1945, not due to a feat of arms on the 
front, but Mihai I’s installation of a suitable pro-communist government in Bucharest.  
Romania was the first Axis country occupied by the Soviets, but not the first to exit the 
war and Anglo-American occupation of southern Italy greatly influenced the Soviet occupation 
of Romania.  The first Allied Control Commission was established over Italy on 10 November 
1943 by the Anglo-American forces who used their military clout on the ground to set policy, 
                                                 
28 He actually quoted an order from Carol I written in 1902 in which the monarch said, “I wish that striking would 
disappear, finally, from My army” to support his ban, see, Fond Corpul de Cavalerie, dosar 266, f. 105, 121.   
29 Fond Armata 3-a, dosar 3047, f. 5.   
30 Csaba Békés, László Borhi, Peter Ruggenthaler, and Ottmar Traşca, ed., Soviet Occupation of Romania, Hungary, 
and Austria, 1944/45-1948/49 (Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2015), 15-17. 
31 Scafeş, Armata română, 127.   
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even over Soviet objections, and Stalin was determined to use the Red Army to do the same in 
Romania.32  Marshal Rodion I. Malinovsky, commander of Second Ukrainian Front, was named 
head of the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission and began meddling in politics.  He encouraged 
the Romanian Communist Party to organize an armed “Patriotic Guard” and create the National 
Democratic Front, which excluded the Liberal and National Peasant parties.  Some in the king’s 
clique complained that the Anglo-Americans had betrayed them.33  General Sănătescu, Prime 
Minister from 23 August to 5 December 1944, adopted the Italian policy of “co-belligerency” to 
try to win Anglo-American favor against the Soviets. 34  When the Romanian Communist Party 
demanded his resignation he switched places with General Nicolae Rădescu.  The 70-year-old 
Carlist had been interned at Târgu Jiu during 1941-1942 for outspoken anti-German comments, 
so he could not be accused of being a fascist, and after 15 October 1944 had taken over as Chief 
of the General Staff.  Rădescu remained in office from 7 December 1944 to 1 March 1945 with 
Sănătescu as Chief of the General Staff until 20 June 1945 and the two continued to try to bring 
the Anglo-Americans over to their side by maximum commitment to the Allies.   
The Soviets wanted Romanian troops as cannon fodder for the front, but on 28 September 
1944 the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission demanded that all units in Romania be dissolved 
or demobilized.35  This was due to both military and political reasons.  The Romanian Army had 
                                                 
32 Békés, Soviet Occupation of Romania, Hungary, and Austria, 18.   
33 Porter, Michael of Romania, 126-127, 129.  
34 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 202; known as the Italian Co-Belligerent Army, Army of the South, or Italian 
Liberation Corps, it began with a motorized brigade in December 1943, eventually the British equipped four Italian 
divisions that fought at various times, but the policy was not effective and did not save Italy’s empire in Africa, see, 
Richard Lamb, War in Italy, 1943-1945: A Brutal Story (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 185-186, 197-201 
35 Those to be dissolved: Third Army; I, II, III, Cavalry, and Moto-Mechanized corps; 10 infantry/mountain, three 
cavalry, and a moto-mechanized division.  Those to be demobilized “as peace units” were: V and Mountain corps; 
and three infantry/mountain divisions.  It probably no coincidence that these units included most of the Red Army’s 
primary Romanian adversaries (Third Army, Cavalry Corps, and Mountain Corps) during the previous three years of 
combat on the Eastern Front, see, Békés, Soviet Occupation of Romania, Hungary, and Austria, 39-43.  
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to equip and supply its units and lacked the means to outfit both units for the front and the rear.  
Stavka still had great difficulties supplying the Red Army, so it was not about to waste resources 
on a distrusted former enemy.  It did outfit the Tudor Vladimirescu and later the Horia, Cloșca 
and Crișan divisions, in 1943 and 1945 respectively, recruited from prisoners in Soviet camps 
who had gone through Soviet political indoctrination the Soviets considered reliable.  Indeed, 
General Sănătescu planned to use units in Romania to try to keep the Soviet occupation in check, 
which the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission frustrated by requiring their demobilization.   
Fighting alongside “godless communism” was hard to justify.  In September 1943, due to 
pressure from the Allies, Stalin initiated a rapprochement with the Russian Orthodox Church and 
Soviet propaganda used the news to try to undermine Romania’s “holy war” rhetoric, with little 
success.  Russian Orthodox priests blessed the Tudor Vladirmirescu Division’s colors when its 
soldiers swore an oath to Soviet-Romanian friendship and to “liberate” Romania from fascism.36  
After the royal coup, open anti-Semitism was no longer tolerated, but most soldiers and officers 
still believed in the insidious nature of Jews.  On 30 August 1944, the General Staff feared that 
ending the policy of segregated labor battalions of Jews and assigning most Hungarian or Slavic 
soldiers to labor battalions in the rear was going to lead to a flood of minorities into the officer 
corps, especially Jewish reserve officers or NCOs.  It argued that the policy had been unpopular 
and misguided because it spared minorities from the front and forced Romanians to bare all the 
losses.  The General Staff, then under General Mihail, suggested capping the number of minority 
                                                 
36 Romanian Army propaganda combated these claims by pointing out continued Soviet persecution of religion, see, 
“Comuniştii şi religie,” Soldatul, 21 Septembrie 1943, 1; for text of the oath taken by Romanian POWs, blessed by 
Russian Orthodox priests, see, Şperlea, De la armata regală la armata populară, 48, 257n106.  
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cadets in reserve officer or NCO schools to 25 percent of each class; the rest would be sent to the 
front as privates.37  The officer corps still did not want minorities, especially Jews, in its ranks. 
 Anti-communism remained an important motivation, although it was no longer overt, as 
the sooner the Germans were defeated, Romanian officers and soldiers calculated, the sooner the 
war was over and the sooner the Red Army occupying Romania would be required to leave.  For 
all the talk of a return to democracy, generals Sănătescu and Rădescu acted on behalf of a new 
royal dictatorship trying to prevent a communist coup in Romania.  In comparison to Romania’s 
voluntary alliance with Nazi Germany, the coerced alliance with the Soviet Union was much less 
popular.  In Focşani, Colonel Panaite endured meals with a Soviet general, another officer told 
him he was sure that “the Russians will be destroyed by the British,” and he spent 14 September 
1944 reading the armistice’s 20 articles “[each] one heavier than the other.”  Two days later, now 
in Bucharest, along with 60 officers, 40 NCOs, and 1,000 men, Panaite swore a new oath to the 
king; it was his sixth – to Carol I in 1913, to Ferdinand I in 1915, to the Regency and Mihai I in 
1927, to Carol II in 1931, to Mihai I and the Conducător in 1941, and to Mihai I alone in 1944.  
Following the ceremony, “The idiot from [the General Staff] struggled to explain the oath and 
the allying with the U.S.S.R.”38  The crimes carried out by Soviet soldiers in Romania added to 
anger about the armistice in the ranks.  While German soldiers in Romania had caused trouble 
from time to time, and in March 1944 retreating German soldiers temporarily treated Romania 
like the USSR, Soviet troops in Romania initiated a sustained period of criminality.  Red Army 
crimes were not as horrific as later in Hungary or Germany, most were associated with theft of 
                                                 
37 Traşcă, “Chestiunea evreiască” în documente miltiare române, 880-882.  
38 Fond Manuscrise, MSS 625, f. 40, 49-50.  
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property or looting, but rape and murder were common.39  2nd Lieutenant Teodorescu wrote in 
early October that after Soviet and Romanian troops occupied Târgu Mureş drunken Red Army 
soldiers looted the city, vandalizing the mostly intact city, and that three broke into where he and 
other Romanian officers were lodging.  The Soviets threaten Teodorescu and his comrades with 
pistols as they went through their things looking for watches, cash, or other things to steal.40  The 
knowledge of Soviet crimes in the rear had a terrible effect on morale and motivation.     
A few Romanian officers and soldiers chose to continue to fight the Soviets.  The Nazis 
set up a puppet government set up in Vienna under Horia Sima on 10 December 1944.  It acted 
as a magnet for disaffected officers who were captured or deserted across enemy lines as fears 
grew that they may be prosecuted for criminal actions the USSR.  Eventually, an estimated 6,000 
Romanian soldiers served in Sima’s “National Army.”  A few were arrested in Germany, where 
they had been training on 23 August 1944, but most were captured in battles in Hungary.  Some 
faced harsh conditions in POW camps in the Reich where they were despised as traitors and used 
a labor.  The SS decide to recruit a Romanian SS division from these men and plenty of officers 
jumped at the chance to fight the Soviets again.  The Waffen Grenadier Regiment of the SS (1st 
Romanian) was formed in November 1944, a second and third regiment followed, but only the 
first saw combat and were not trusted to fight against their countrymen.  The Waffen Grenadier 
Regiment of the SS (1st Romanian) was destroyed in March 1945 defending Pomeria.41 
When First and Fourth armies were sent to Czechoslovakia in December 1944 morale 
and motivation markedly weakened.  2nd Lieutenant Teodorescu’s 7th Mountain Battalion had 
                                                 
39 Békés, Soviet Occupation of Romania, Hungary, and Austria, 31-38.  
40 Teodorescu, Mândreia vânătorului de munte, 185 
41 Heinen, Legiunea “Archanghelul Mihail,” 432-434; Scafeş, Armata română, 208-210.   
 561 
 
been sent home to Deva in late October but was now remobilized to reinforce the 2nd and 3rd 
Mountain divisions on the front.  He recalled that “I cannot make a comparison with [my] other 
departures for the front.”  The first in June 1941 was quiet to keep the coming invasion a secret, 
soldiers stern-looking, and in passenger cars; the second in July 1942 was a great celebration, 
soldiers smiling, but only officers and NCOs in passenger cars; the third in August 1944 was 
confused, soldiers worried-looking, and in passenger cars; and now the fourth under new Soviet 
“masters,” resigned soldiers, and even the officers in freight cars.  He angrily blamed “godless 
communists” for making them leave two days before Christmas, “our great Christian holiday.”42  
Romanian troops had to attack uphill against German positions in the mountains of Slovakia and 
whenever they finally crested a ridge they were usually stopped by German positions on a river 
in the valley below that they had to force their way across.  Sergeant Ezechil recalled that on the 
Hungarian plain they used frontal attacks after short artillery bombardments, but they were not 
always synchronized with the attack and hit the infantry.43  Such tactics were even less effective 
in mountains and First and Fourth armies were stuck in bloody battles until early April 1945. 
After helping to liberate northern Transylvania, the Romanian Army deployed 210,000 
men with the First and Fourth armies in Hungary between 6 October 1944 and 15 January 1945 
and peaked at 248,000 in Czechoslovakia before the end of the war.  During each campaign the 
army suffered 42,700 and 66,500 casualties respectively44  The Romanian Army’s poor training, 
lack of equipment, supply shortages, and lack of mobility resulted in heavy losses with few left 
to replace them.  Corporal Cârlan, acting as a telephone operator because all radios were broken, 
                                                 
42 He dismissively called them “bull cars,” see, Teodorescu, Mândria vânătorului de munte, 197-198.   
43 Ezekial, La Porţile Infernului, 93-94; Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 210-211. 
44 Many of the casualties were from frostbite, see, Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 209-210, 214. 
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was required to fight with other telephone operators as infantry because manpower was so short.  
A colonel gave Cârlan his watch as a reward for leading a defense against an attack in April.  He 
noted that in his regiment was a 17- or 18-year-old “volunteer Turk,” armed with a Russian rifle 
almost as tall as he was, who disappeared on his own to come back with prisoners.45  Worse than 
the deprivation and casualties on the front was the news from home: families starving because of 
Soviet reparations, the Romanian Communist Party growing in power, and crimes by Red Army 
troops.  Recent accusations the Red Army was purposefully grinding down the Romanian Army 
in the mountain battles exaggerate Soviet malevolence because the Romanian mountain troops 
were trained to fight in such terrain, the other underequipped infantry not good for much else, 
and Romanians were simply not trusted to fight in key battles by their Soviet masters. 
The Soviets distrusted Romanian officers, for good reason, but needed their assistance for 
campaigns in Hungary and Czechoslovakia – at least until the NKVD uncovered evidence of war 
crimes or alleged betrayal.  During September 1944, the Soviets had almost all army, corps, and 
division commanders in Third and Fourth armies dismissed.  A few like generals Dumitrescu and 
Ştelfea were arrested, the Red Army used other senior officers who had fought against it before 
23 August 1944.  General Macici led First Army until 12 February 1945 when he was arrested to 
be tried in Bucharest for his role in escalating the massacre of Jews in Odessa in 1941.  Generals 
Avramescu and Dăscălescu were shuffled back and forth to command Fourth Army over the next 
seven months.46  On 2 March 1945, the second time the Soviets relieved him, Avramescu and his 
                                                 
45 Cârlan, Păstraţi-mi amintirile!, 243, 247-248, 251. 
46 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 208.   
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chief of staff (now-General) Dragomir, who had issued the unauthorized retreat orders to Fourth 
Army after the failure of Operation Winter Storm in 1942, were arrested and disappeared.   
Their arrest quickly became a cause célèbre at home.  Avramescu’s son-in-law was Ilie 
Vlad Sturdza, son of Prince Mihail Sturdza, who was in Vienna acting as the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs for Sima’s puppet government.  Ilie Sturdza had been an officer with Fourth Army and 
had surrendered to a German unit in November 1944.  He was not the first Romanian officer to 
collaborate with Nazi Germany after 23 August 1944.  General Platon Chirnoagă, a former staff 
officer for General Dumitrescu, had been captured with most of 4th Infantry Division in October 
1944 on the Tisa after a German counterattack.  He embraced his former allies and soon became 
Minister of Defense under Sima.  He later escaped into exile, after a brief stint in a POW camp 
run by the Anglo-Americans, and in 1965 wrote his anti-communist, pro-Legionary account of 
the war.  A few other officers from Fourth Army headquarters had also disappeared during the 
winter of 1944-1945 and the Soviets assumed they deserted to the Germans.  After Fourth Army 
had difficulty carrying out an attack as ordered, the Soviets appear to have become convinced 
that Avramescu was sabotaging his own attacks and was planning to lead a large part of Fourth 
Army in a mass defection to the Germans, so he was arrested.  They also arrested his wife and 
daughter, who had followed him to the front, on 3 March 1945.  After repeated inquiries about 
his whereabouts, the Soviets claimed months later that Avramescu had been killed in a German 
air attack, but it’s possible he was executed by the Soviets.47  While it is not likely Avramescu 
                                                 
47 Only one bullet hole was found in Avramescu’s staff car, whereas if he had truly been the victim of a German air 
attack the vehicle would have been riddled with bullets.  Although nationalist historians favor NKVD murder, thus 
making him an anti-communist martyr, it is possible that he shot himself, especially after the recent arrest of Macici 
for war crimes and his own guilty conscience for ordering the deaths of Jews and Soviet civilians in Crimea.  His 
daughter, wife of Ilie Sturdza, committed suicide, but his wife survived to return from Siberia in 1956.  Avramescu’s 
body was buried in Budapest, where it remained until 23 October 2000 when it was returned to Romania and re-
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was planning to defect, the fact that officers were deserting their posts shows how unpopular the 
alliance with the Soviets was, especially as there are no comparable examples during 1941-1944.  
Furthermore, most Romanian officers captured by the Germans almost immediately collaborated, 
whereas it took months to convince only a few in camps in the USSR to collaborate.  
Whatever officers’ anti-communist hopes, the Romanian Army’s contribution in the last 
nine months of the war against Nazi Germany did not save Romania from continued occupation 
and Sovietization.  From 80,000 in May 1945, the number of Soviet troops in Romania grew to 
616,000 in March 1946 as the Red Army demobilized, but 240,000 stayed until the November 
1946 elections.48  On 19 March 1945, the new pro-communist Petru Groza government passed a 
law allowing officers or NCOs to be retired “if they surpass army staff needs” and purged 1,878 
officers and 4,081 NCOs.  Further purges were carried out after the end of the war as the Allied 
(Soviet) Control Commission made sure the army was demobilized to 136,345 by August 1947, 
as small as in 1932, the worst year of the Depression.49  Its transformation from the royal army to 
popular army was well underway before the official communist seizure of power in 1948.   
As the war ended, the Soviets directed left-wing and communist members of the Groza 
government to begin prosecuting officers.   Immediately after the armistice, the NKVD tracked 
down SSI agents in Romania to interrogate them about spies they had recruited in the USSR, and 
in the process uncovered evidence of crimes committed by the Romanian Army.50  During 1945-
                                                 
buried in a military cemetery in Cluj in Transylvania, see, Victor Nitu, “General Gheorghe Avramescu,” 
WorldWar2.ro, accessed 29 March 2016, http://worldwar2.ro/generali/?language=en&article=97; Manuel Stănescu, 
“Generalul Avramescu, trădător sau victim a NKVD?,” Historia.ro, accessed 14 May 2018, 
https://www.historia.ro/sectiune/general/articol/generalul-avramescu-tradator-sau-victima-a-nkvd 
48 Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 215.   
49 The Soviets targeted the core of royal officers, see, Giurescu, Romania in the Second World War, 394-398.   
50 Békés, Soviet Occupation of Romania, Hungary, and Austria, 44-46, 50-52. 
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1947 the People’s Tribunal tried senior officers for war crimes, especially the Odessa massacre.  
The first group were judged alongside Antonescu, such as generals Pantazi, Şteflea, Macici, and 
Trestioreanu, and sentenced to death.  All had their sentences commuted to life in prison.  A few, 
such as generals Dumitrescu and Dăscălescu, were released due to insufficient evidence.  A new 
wave of prosecutions began after the Romanian Communist Party took power in 1948.  During 
1948-1956 these trials included generals such as Racoviţa, Ciupercă, Constantinescu-Claps, and 
Korne.  Most were guilty of ordering atrocities on the Eastern Front, but they were imprisoned 
primarily for political reasons.  Constantinescu-Claps managed to have his prison sentence of 15 
years hard labor for ordering a group of 4-6 partisans hanged reduced with testimony from Jews 
from Bacău who said he took pity on them during the war.51  He was one of few to receive such a 
defense and was released in 1955 after four years in jail.  Since 1989, nationalist historians have 
depicted all Romanian generals as victims of communist persecution.52  While politics did play a 
larger role after Mihai I was forced into exile on 30 December 1947, the arrests and prosecutions 
were legitimate.  In fact, more officers and soldiers should have been tried for war crimes.   
Conclusion 
Romania’s “holy war” was a disaster of its own making.  It was a conservative society 
with deeply held anti-Semitism that also despised communism.  The creation of România Mare 
strengthened nationalist expectations for a powerful state that benefited ethnic Romanians and a 
homegrown fascist movement helped radicalize Romanian politics in the 1930s.  The Depression 
                                                 
51 They credited him for preventing a pogrom – like the one in Iaşi – from breaking out in Bacău in July 1941, said 
his treatment of Jewish hostages in 1941 was not harsh, reported he stopped a few Jews from being deported to 
Transnistria in 1942, and believed he convinced Racoviţa from setting up ghettos in Fourth Army’s rear in Moldavia 
after March 1944, see, Fond Personal, dosar 8434, vol. 1, f. 114, 148-150; Fond Informativ, dosar 138870, f. 8.   
52 Alesandru Duţu, Drama generalilor români: 1944-1964 (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 1997).   
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only exacerbated pre-existing ideological cleavages between the populist majority and the small 
liberal establishment.  As the international situation deteriorated after 1936, Carlist politicians 
chose neutrality and edged into the orbit of Nazi Germany.  The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, fall 
of France, and Soviet occupation of eastern Romania decisively altered Romanian foreign policy.  
King Carol II would have allied with Nazi Germany if Antonescu had not seized power first due 
to popular protests.  After 1941, Romanian soldiers participated enthusiastically in Hitler’s war 
of annihilation against “Judeo-Bolshevism” because of nationalism, religion, anti-Semitism, and 
anti-communism.  As the war dragged on soldiers fought on for many reasons: comrades in their 
primary group, fear of punishment by officers, promise of reward, fear of the Soviets, reasons of 
honor, and blind obedience.  Officers and soldiers were ready to fight to the end, but the clique 
around Mihai I executed a well-planned and perfectly timed coup on 23 August 1944.  
According to Romanian records, the butcher’s bill was very high indeed.  The Romanian 
Army suffered 624,740 casualties fighting alongside the Wehrmacht between 22 June 1941 and 
23 August 1944 which included 71,585 killed, 243,622 wounded or sick, and 309,533 missing.53  
Most of those listed as missing were killed or captured.  Soldiers who became prisoners suffered 
terribly in POW camps in the USSR, especially those captured during Stalingrad.  An estimated 
70,000 Romanian soldiers went missing during the battle, the Soviets reported that they captured 
38,000, but due to Soviet supply shortages – and apathy – by the end of May 1943 only 20,317 
Romanian POWs were still living.  The promise of adequate rations was the main reason 9,800 
Romanians, out of 25,000 POWs, joined the Tudor Vladimirescu Division in October 1943.  Yet 
                                                 
53 Duţu, Armata română în război, 9; these numbers are slightly different from Axworthy’s who calculates: 72,291 
dead, 242,425 wounded, and 283,332 missing, see Axworthy, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, 216.   
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despite harsh conditions in the POW camps, and while 90 percent of soldiers or NCOs selected 
accepted, only 15 percent of officers approached by communist recruiters did.  The largest group 
of prisoners was taken after 20 August 1944, over 120,000 soldiers according to Soviet records, 
increased the number to 156,000 Romanian POWs, but again high mortality during the winter 
reduced the prisoner population to 106,000 by March 1945.  The Soviets recorded a total of an 
estimated 187,000 Romanian POWs taken by September 1944, of which 132,000 soldiers were 
eventually repatriated by April 1956, for a mortality rate of 29.1 percent.54  Romanian soldiers 
fought on after despite such losses primarily because of intrinsic motivation, although extrinsic 
motivation played an increasingly important role as the war continued.     
After the royal coup on 23 August 1944, the Romanian Army fought a much less popular 
campaign alongside the Red Army.  In the last nine months of war, it suffered on average 2,400 
more casualties each month than in the previous 38 months, which eventually totaled 169,822 
casualties and included 21,035 killed, 90,344 wounded, and 58,443 missing.55  For a campaign 
against a weak German Army, without any large encirclements, the number of missing soldiers is 
unusually high, and many were probably deserters.  Soldiers considered the campaigns to defend 
western Romania, to liberate northern Transylvania, and even to invade Hungary as worthwhile, 
on the other hand they believed the campaign in Czechoslovakia was futile.  Particularly because 
soldiers’ sacrifices seemed in vain once northern Transylvania was returned and while the Soviet 
occupation hurt Romania, but military discipline and obedience to the state kept most fighting.          
                                                 
54 Vittalie Văratie, coord., Prizonieri de război români în Uniunea Sovietică: Documente, 1941-1956 (Bucharest: 
Eitura Monitorului Oficial, 2013), xx-xi.   
55 Duţu, Armata română în război, 12.   
 568 
 
The Romanian Army perpetrated murder on a mass scale on the Eastern Front because of 
soldiers’ intrinsic motivation.  The Antonescu regime was responsible in one way or another for 
the murder of an estimated 300,000 Romanian and Soviet Jews in territories that it administered 
between 22 June 1941 and 23 August 1944, most died during the first year of the war.  At least 
50,000 Jews were murdered in eastern Romania or during the deportations from Bukovina and 
Bessarabia.  An estimated 50,000 Jews were killed in Iaşi and Odessa.  Approximately 100,000 
Jews were executed by soldiers, gendarmes, SS militias, and Ukrainian police during the winter 
of 1941-1942.  Another 100,000 Jews died in ghettos or camps in Transnistria from starvation, 
exposure, or sickness from 1941 to 1944, but most during the first winter.  An estimated 50,000 
of the 125,000-145,000 Romanian Jews deported in the fall of 1941 survived to be repatriated or 
liberated.  How many Soviet Jews survived is unclear as the Romanian authorities never cared 
enough to keep an accurate count, but it was probably roughly equal.  Only 6,000 of the 25,000 
Gypsies deported to Transnistria returned to Romania in May 1944.  It is likely that more than 
just this small numbered survived, left behind or not counted, but many historians estimate that 
roughly half of those deported to Transnistria eventually died there.  The estimated 300,000 Jews 
west of the Prut were fortuitously spared deportation to Auschwitz.56    
The Romanian Army collaborated closely with the SS east of the Bug.  Romanian troops 
provided support or directly murdered thousands of Soviet Jews, both under the direction of the 
SS and on their own initiative, but the exact number is impossible to parse from German crimes.  
Without a doubt, Einsatzgruppe D’s thinly stretched force enlisted the help of Romanian soldiers 
to carry out the “Final Solution” in Crimea.  A sizable number of the approximately 40,000 Jews 
                                                 
56 Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania, 224, 236, 242.   
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murdered in the peninsula were either turned over to the SS, knowing that they would be killed, 
or shot by Romanian soldiers themselves.  Additionally, Romanian soldiers carried out crimes 
against Soviet civilians and partisans.  Romanian commanders ordered the taking hostages and 
execution of civilians in reprisal for attacks west of the Dniester, so officers quickly adapted to 
German anti-partisan tactics east of the Dniester.  Thousands of Soviet civilians, partisans, and 
POWs were shot in cold blood by Romanian troops during the campaign in the USSR.     
Romania soldiers were not simple peasants who lacked motivation on the Eastern Front, 
nor was the Romanian contribution to the Nazi war effort solely Antonescu’s war, rather it was 
Romania’s “holy war.”  Nationalism, religion, anti-Semitism, and anti-communism were strong 
ideologies compatible with Hitler’s war of annihilation.  The Romanian Army used extrinsic 
motivation in the form of propaganda, coercion, and remuneration to reinforce soldiers’ combat 
motivation.  Propaganda played a role in atrocity motivation.  Without the Romanian Army, the 
Wehrmacht’s Army Group South would have experienced greater difficulties during Operation 
Barbarossa.  Fourth Army bottled up Odessa and Third Army provided desperately needed men 
for the conquest of Crimea.  Case Blue would have been impossible without the contribution of 
Axis allies, especially Romania.  German High Command could not have held onto the Kuban 
bridgehead for most of 1943 and onto Crimea into 1944 without the Romanian Army.  Similarly, 
SS efforts to implement the “Final Solution” would have been less effective if Romanian troops 
had not so willingly participated.  The royal coup of 23 August 1944 was carried out by a small 
group of conspirators who decided to seek an armistice with the USSR that the Romanian people 
did not ask for and neither the Antonescu regime nor the officer corps were unwilling to make. 
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